JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This revision is directed against the order, dated 3.5.2008, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cachar, Silchar, in CR Case No. 2598/1996, allowing the complainant's prayer for examining, as a witness, one Smt. Jonali Deka, by invoking the provisions of Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The material facts, leading to the present revision, may, in brief, be set out as follows: (i) The opposite party No. 2 herein namely, Smt. Swarna Das, lodged a complaint, which came to be registered as CR. Case No. 2598/1996. By her complaint, the complainant (i.e., the opposite party No. 2 herein) alleged, inter alia, thus: The present Petitioner is her husband, their marriage have been solemnised on 20.9.1995 and, after their marriage, they lived together as husband and wife at Odharbund, but her husband (i.e., the present Petitioner), while serving at Guwahati, solemnised a second marriage, on 26.9.1996, with Smt. Jonali Deka aforementioned and, having received the information as regards her husband's second marriage, the complainant came to Guwahati and lodged the said complaint. (ii) The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Guwahati, having recorded the initial depostion of the complainant under Section 200, Code of Criminal Procedure, issued processes against the present Petitioner and the said Smt. Jonali Deka, as accused, for offence allegedly committed by them under Section 494 read with Section 109, IPC, whereupon the present Petitioner as well as the said Smt. Jonali Deka filed a revision, in this High Court, seeking to get the entire, complaint quashed. This revision came to be registered as Criminal Revision No. 214/1997. By order, dated 2.4.2001, passed, in the said Criminal Revision, the High Court quashed the complaint proceeding as against the said Smt. Jonali Deka. However, the complaint, in question, as against the present Petitioner, was sustained and the proceedings were directed to be continued against the present Petitioner as accused. (iii) Having, then, recorded the evidence before charge, the learned trial court framed a charge, under Section 494, IPC, against the present Petitioner as accused. To the charge, so framed, the accused-Petitioner pleaded not guilty. After framing of the charge, the complainant and her witnesses were further cross-examined by the present Petitioner. (iii) Having, then, recorded the evidence before charge, the learned trial court framed a charge, under Section 494, IPC, against the present Petitioner as accused. To the charge, so framed, the accused-Petitioner pleaded not guilty. After framing of the charge, the complainant and her witnesses were further cross-examined by the present Petitioner. In course of time, the accused-Petitioner was examined under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure (iv) Thereafter, when the complaint case was pending for arguments, a petition was filed, on 14.3.2008, by the complainant seeking a direction to call the said Smt. Jonali Deka, as a court witness, by invoking the provisions of Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure. This petition was resisted by the accused-Petitioner. By order, dated 3.5.2008, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Guwahati, allowed the complainant's prayer and directed issuance of summons to Smt. Jonali Deka, as Court witness, fixing, 25.6.2008, as the date for recording of her evidence. In these circumstances, the accused-Petitioner has filed this revision putting to challenge the validity of the order, dated 3.5.2Q08, aforementioned. 3. I have heard Mr. J.M. Choudhury, learned senior Counsel, appearing on behalf or the accused-Petitioner, and Mr. K. Munir, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. 4. Appearing on behalf of the accused-Petitioner, Mr. J.M. Choudhury, learned senior Counsel, has submitted that Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be resorted, to, as a matter of course, in every case and in every circumstance and that the exercise of power, under Section 311, cannot be such as would cause prejudice to the accused or give unfair advantage to the prosecution. Exercise of powers, under Section 311, can also not be permitted, submits Mr. Choudhury, to fill up the lacunae in the case of the prosecution. In the case at hand, Smt. Jonali Deka, points out Mr. Choudhury, was, originally, an accused in the complaint case aforementioned and, hence, having chosen to make her an accused, the complaint cannot, now, be allowed to call her, as a witness, by taking resort to the provisions of Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure. This apart, points out Mr. In the case at hand, Smt. Jonali Deka, points out Mr. Choudhury, was, originally, an accused in the complaint case aforementioned and, hence, having chosen to make her an accused, the complaint cannot, now, be allowed to call her, as a witness, by taking resort to the provisions of Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure. This apart, points out Mr. Choudhury, the complainant's case having already been closed, and the accused-Petitioner having already been examined under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, permitting, now, calling of Smt. Jonali Deka, as a witness, would be used by the complainant to fill up the lacunae in her case and thereby, cause not only prejudice to the accused, but also cause miscarriage of justice. In support of his submissions, Mr. Choudhury places reliance on Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India and Anr., (1991) Supp (1) SCC 271, and Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, (1999) 6 SCC 110 . 5. Resisting the submissions made on behalf of the accused-Petitioner, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, Smt. Jonali Deka was an important witness inasmuch as her evidence would be of great relevance and will help the court in determining the truth as to whether the accused-Petitioner has solemnised another-marriage and, if so, whether the marriage, so solemnised by him, would be invalid for the fact that the accused-Petitioner was already married, when he solemnised his marriage with Smt. Jonali Deka, and whether the accused Petitioner has committed thereby an offence of bigamy, which is punishable under Section 494, IPC. 6. While considering this revision, what needs to be pointed out is that Section 494 IPC, which penalizes an act of bigamy, reads as under: 494. Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife.- Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Exception.- This section does not extend to any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction, nor to any person who contracts a marriage during the life of a former husband or wife, if such husband or wife, at the time of the subsequent marriage, shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years, and shall not have bean heard of by such person as being alive within that time provided the person contracting such subsequent marriage shall, before such marriage takes place, inform the person with whom such marriage is contracted of the real estate of facts so far as the same are within his or her knowledge.... 7. A careful reading of Section 494, IPC, makes it clear that in order to make a person guilty of an offence under Section 494, IPC, what has to be proved is that the second, marriage would have been valid, but for the fact that the person, undergoing the marriage, in question, (i.e., the second marriage) was already married. It logically follows that if the second marriage has to be void, the first marriage must be legally valid. If the first marriage is not legally valid, the question of the second marriage being void does not arise at all. Hence, the second marriage too must have all the ingredients of a valid marriage, for, when the second marriage is not valid or is not according to law, it would, otherwise, also, be void. Consequently, no offence, in such a case, can be said to have been made out under Section 494, IPC. 8. Thus, the word 'marries', occurring in Section 494, IPC, means whoever 'marries' by some form of marriage known or recognized by the law. Merely showing that some form of ceremony of marriage was gone through is, therefore, not sufficient to sustain an accusation of bigamy under Section 494, IPC. In fact, in Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1979 SC 713 , the Apex Court has made it clear in that in order to attract the provisions of Section 494, IPC, both the marriages of the accused must be valid in the sense that the necessary ceremonies, required by the personal law governing the parties, had been duly performed in both the marriages. 9. 9. Unless, therefore, the requirements of a valid marriage are established in both the marriages of the person, who is sought to be prosecuted, the offence, under Section 494, IPC, cannot be said to have been completed. 10. Bearing in mind the ingredients of the offence under Section 494, IPC, let me, now, turn to the scope of Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure, its aims and objectives. For the purpose of a clear understanding of what Section 311 aims at conveying, appropriate it is that the provisions, embodied in Section 311, are carefully, taken note of Section 311 is, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow- 311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present: Any court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. 11. A patient reading of the Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure, clearly shows that this Section is divided into two parts. While the word, used in the first part, is, "may", the word used, in the second part, is, "shall", It would, therefore, logically follow that the first part of Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure is permissive in nature and gives a discretion to a criminal court to act, at any stage, of enquiry, trial or other proceeding, in one of the three ways, namely, (1) to summon any person as a witness, or (2) to examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or (3) to recall and re-examine any person already examined. 12. The second part of Section 311 is, however, mandatory in nature and casts an obligation on the court (i) to summon and examine or (ii) to recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. 13. The language, employed in Section 311, clearly shows that this Section is couched in widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the court in any manner. However, the wider the power, more cautious shall be the exercise thereof. 13. The language, employed in Section 311, clearly shows that this Section is couched in widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the court in any manner. However, the wider the power, more cautious shall be the exercise thereof. No exercise of power, in a judicial proceeding, can be arbitrary and, more so, the power to call or recall a witness. Whereas the first part of Section311, as already indicated above, gives a discretion to the court to call, recall and re-examine any person as a witness, the second part of this section does not really give any discretion to the court; rather, it clarifies that if a court forms the view, in the facts of a given case, that the evidence of the person, who is sought to be called, recalled or re-examined, is essential to the just decision of the case, it would be mandatory for the court to call, re-call or re-examine a person as a witness. This mandatory exercise of power can also be to obtain fresh evidence provided that the court forms a view, as indicated hereinbefore, that bringing of such fresh evidence on record is essential to the just decision of the case. 14. Though the law requires the parties to produce, before the court, the best available evidence, the fact remains that even in a criminal trial, prosecution as well as defence has the right to choose their witness or witnesses and also as to what evidence they would adduce. Nonetheless, they are bound to adduce the best available evidence. The court has no power to compel either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular witness. This embargo placed on the powers of the court, i.e., the limitation of not directing either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular witness as their witness, is sought to be balanced by the Legislature with the help of the provisions contained in Section 311 inasmuch as the Legislature has, with the help of Section 311, empowered the criminal court to call, recall or reexamine any person as witness. The only rider, which Section 311attaches to the exercise of this power, is that a criminal court cannot call, recall or re-examine any person as witness, unless examination of such a person is, in the opinion of the court, essential for a just decision of the case. The only rider, which Section 311attaches to the exercise of this power, is that a criminal court cannot call, recall or re-examine any person as witness, unless examination of such a person is, in the opinion of the court, essential for a just decision of the case. If, however, the court is of the view that evidence of a particular witness is necessary for reaching a just decision of the case, the court, either on its own or on the application of any of the parties concerned, call, recall or re-examine any witness as long as it does not cause prejudice to any of the parties concerned or does not give an undue advantage to any of such parties. 15. This kind of power, which Section 311 vests in a court, is not peculiar to the criminal.law inasmuch as similar provisions have been made even in respect of civil courts in the form of Order X, Rule 2, Order X, Rule 14 and Order XVIII, Rule 17. Even Section 165 of the Evidence Act recognizes court's power to put any questions any witness, at any time, which appears to the Judge as necessary for just decision of the case or in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant facts. 16. I may pause here to point put that a trial Judge is net merely a recording machine of evidence given by the witnesses nor can he be a silent spectator to the evidence produced by the parties. Though a trial Judge must not drop the mantle of a Judge and assume the role of a prosecutor or a defence counsel, the fact remains, that his duty is to reach the truth and Section 165 of the Evidence Act gives the Judge adequate power and authority to put any question to any witness at any time - be it during the course of examination-in-chief or cross-examination or at the end of any such examination or re-examination which, to the Judge, appears to be necessary for a just decision of the case and in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant fact. Though a Judge must not usurp the function of a counsel, he needs to participate, in the trial, in such a manner as would ensure that the evidence, adduced by the parties, is legal and such evidence becomes clear, Complete and intelligible. Though a Judge must not usurp the function of a counsel, he needs to participate, in the trial, in such a manner as would ensure that the evidence, adduced by the parties, is legal and such evidence becomes clear, Complete and intelligible. A Judge, who merely sits at a trial and records evidence without caring to conduct examination of the witnesses in order to ensure that evidence on record becomes intelligible, must1 be held to have not performed his duty as warranted by law. A Judge is not merely an observer. It is his duty to explore, within permissible limits, the truth. If, therefore, a Judge finds that the examination of a witness is not being conducted in such a way as to unfora complete truth, it is not only right for the Judge, but his duty to intervene and put such questions as may be warranted and permissible within the ambit of Section 165. A Judge cannot behave like a passive agent, when a case is tried before him. He has the power and also the duty to question the witnesses in order to elicit relevant materials. A case cannot be allowed to suffer for failure of any of the parties to elicit relevant materials from a witness. It is to discover the truth and bring, on record, the relevant facts that a Judge has been vested with the power to put questions under Section 165. It is with this object in view that the Judge has been vested with the power to call any witness or recall any witness at any time suo motu, of at the instance of any of the parties if it becomes necessary for a just decision of the case. If the prosecution omits to bring out any relevant fact or the defence elicits from a witness, in the cross-examination, a statement which is obscure or incomplete, the defence does not acquire (the Judge must bear in mind) a vested right in such limited cross-examination. It is the duty of the Judge to remove such obscurity or incompleteness by putting appropriate question. In such a case. It is the duty of the Judge to remove such obscurity or incompleteness by putting appropriate question. In such a case. It is, rather, the duty of the Judge, conducting the trial, to elicit from the witness complete information so that the evidence given by him or her becomes clear and intelligible, though his putting of questions cannot be in a manner as if the witness is under cross-examination nor can such examination be aimed at destroying or diluting the effect of the cross-examination of the witness by the defence. It is for this reason that a court shall not put, in exercise of its powers under Section 165, leading question or put words into the mouth of the witness. 17. In fact, emphasizing what role a Judge should play in a trial, the Apex Court, in Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble reported in (2003) 7 SCC 749 , observed: 34. The courts exist for doing justice to the persons who are affected. The trial/first appellate courts cannot get swayed by abstract technicalities and close their eyes to factors which need to be positively probed and noticed.The court is not merely to act as a tape recorder recording evidence, overlooking the object of trial, i.e., to get at the truth, and oblivious to the active role to be played for which there is not only ample scope but sufficient powers conferred under the Code. It has a greater duty and responsibility, i.e., to render justice in a case where the role of the prosecuting agency itself is put in issue. (emphasis is supplied) 18. From the position of law laid down in Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan (supra), it becomes transparent that a court is not a tape recorder, which has to merely record evidence. Far from this, when the court's object is to do justice, it cannot overlook the necessity to reach the truth. Hence, while a court cannot assume the role of a party to a case, it nevertheless has the duty to remove vagueness or obscurity from a witness's evidence so that the evidence becomes intelligible to a court of law. 19. Far from this, when the court's object is to do justice, it cannot overlook the necessity to reach the truth. Hence, while a court cannot assume the role of a party to a case, it nevertheless has the duty to remove vagueness or obscurity from a witness's evidence so that the evidence becomes intelligible to a court of law. 19. No wonder, therefore, that the Apex Court, in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 178 , observed that these two sections, (i.e., Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 165 of the Evidence Act) confer jurisdiction on the judge to act in aid of justice. Dealing With the corresponding section in the old Code (Section 540) Hidayatuliah, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court, in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani (supra), observed as follows: It would appear that in our criminal jurisdiction, statutory law confers a power in absolute terms to be exercised at any stage of the trial to summon a witness or examine one present in court or to recall a witness already examined, and makes this the duty and obligation of the court provided the just decision of the case demands it. In other words, where the court exercises the power under the second part, the enquiry cannot be whether the accused has brought anything suddenly or unexpectedly but whether the court is right in thinking that the new Evidence is needed by it for a just decision of the case. 20. The observations, made by O. Chinappa Reddy, J. in Ram Chander v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 1036 are also to the same effect, as the observations in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani (supra). 21. However, as already pointed out earlier, the wider the power, more cautious has to be its exercise. The power, under Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot, therefore, be uncanalised, uncontrolled or arbitrary. Section 311 is neither limited by any particular stage of a criminal proceeding nor is it conditioned by any specific circumstance. The principle, underlying Section311, Code of Criminal Procedure, is that the evidence, to be obtained, shall appear to the court essential for a just decision of the case. Section 311 is neither limited by any particular stage of a criminal proceeding nor is it conditioned by any specific circumstance. The principle, underlying Section311, Code of Criminal Procedure, is that the evidence, to be obtained, shall appear to the court essential for a just decision of the case. It is for this reason that in Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, (1991) Supp (1) SCC 271, the Apex Court has held that the aid of Section 311 should be invoked only with the object of discovering relevant facts or obtaining proof of relevant facts in order to render a just decision in a given case. It is incumbent, on the part of the court, to take care to ensure that while exercising its powers under Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure, it does not allow a lacuna, left by the prosecution or by the defence, to be fulfilled nor shall the exercise of power put the accused to disadvantage or cause prejudice to him or give an unfair advantage to the prosecution. Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure can also not be utilized in such a way that it changes the nature of the case of either of the parties. 22. In the present case, the only ground, on which the entire challenge to the impugned order rests, is that allowing Smt. Jonali Deka to be called, as a witness, would help the complainant fill up the lacunae of her case. It is, at this stage, necessary to understand as to what a lacuna in a prosecution or a defence case means and conveys. 23. While considering the apprehensions, expressed by Mr. Choudhury, that calling of Smt. Jonali Deka would enable the complainant to fill up the lacunae of her case, it needs to be pointed out that the duty of the court is to discover the truth and obtain proof of the relevant facts. One of the relevant questions, in the present trial, is as to whether the accused-Petitioner had married Smt. Jonali Deka in accordance with the laws applicable to the parties. 24. In order to find a correct answer to the question, posed above, and discover the truth on this aspect of the case, examination of Smt. Jonali Deka, who is no longer an accused in the case, cannot but be regarded as essential for just decision of the case. 24. In order to find a correct answer to the question, posed above, and discover the truth on this aspect of the case, examination of Smt. Jonali Deka, who is no longer an accused in the case, cannot but be regarded as essential for just decision of the case. The fact that Smt. Jonali Deka had not been examined by the complainant earlier is not an inherent defect or deficiency of the complainant's' case. Failure of proper and effective management of the complainant's case by her counsel cannot be treated as a lacuna of the complainant's case. A lapse, in the management of a case, is not to be regarded as a lacuna of a party's case. An oversight, in the management of the prosecution's case, is not a lacuna. It is not the duty of the trial court to count errors committed by the parties in conducting their cases or to find out and declare as to who, among the parties concerned, performed better. A lacuna in a complainant's or prosecution's case would mean an inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the complainant's or prosecution's case. Explaining as to what can be regarded as a lacuna in a prosecution's case, the Apex Court, in Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, (1999) 6 SCC 110 , observed: 7. It is a common experience in criminal courts that defence counsel would raise objections whenever courts exercise powers under Section 311 of the Code or under Section 165 of the Evidence Act, 1872 by saying that the court could not "fill the lacuna in the prosecution case." A lacuna in the prosecution is not to be equated with the fallout of an oversight committed by a Public Prosecutor during trial, either in producing relevant materials or in eliciting relevant answers from witnesses. The adage "to err is human" is the recognition of the possibility of making mistakes to which humans are prone. A corollary of any such laches or mistakes during the conducting of a ease cannot be understood as a lacuna which a court cannot fill up. 8. Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution case. The advantage of it should normally go to the accused in the trial of the case, but an oversight in the management of the prosecution cannot be treated as irreparable lacuna. 8. Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution case. The advantage of it should normally go to the accused in the trial of the case, but an oversight in the management of the prosecution cannot be treated as irreparable lacuna. No party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors. If proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified. After all function of the criminal court is administration of criminal justice and not to count errors committed by the parties or to find out and declare who among the parties performed better. 25. Hence, when a defect arises, or crepts in, due to faulty management of the case by a party's Counsel or due to oversight or unmindfulness of a counsel, such a defect cannot, and shall not, be treated as a lacuna inherent in the case of the prosecution or the complainant. 26. Though it has not been raised in the present revision, I must point out that Indian criminal jurisprudence does not completely rule out even an accused becoming a witness against another accused. It is for this reason that an accused can, under Section 306, Code of Criminal Procedure, become an approver and, under Section 315, Code of Criminal Procedure, a competent witness. Had the criminal law completely barred an accused from ever becoming a witness, provisions, as regards approver, would not have been made in the form of Section 306, Code of Criminal Procedure, nor provisions, such as, the provisions contained in Section 315, Code of Criminal Procedure, would have existed. The provisions, contained in Section 306, Code of Criminal Procedure, read with Section 315thereof clearly indicate that it is possible, even for an accused, to be examined as a witness so long as he is not compelled to answer a question, which may incriminate him. Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India protects every person's right to refuse from becoming s witness or from being forced to incriminate himself/herself. No one, in the light of the guarantee, which Article 20(3) gives, be compelled to become a witness against himself or to make statement, which may incriminate him by her in any offence. 27. Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India protects every person's right to refuse from becoming s witness or from being forced to incriminate himself/herself. No one, in the light of the guarantee, which Article 20(3) gives, be compelled to become a witness against himself or to make statement, which may incriminate him by her in any offence. 27. It is, no doubt, true that Smt. Jonali Deka was, at one stage, an accused in the complaint proceeding. As she was found to have been summoned by the learned trial court without having any material on record against her to face the accusations under Section 494, IPC, the complaint proceeding, as against her was, as already mentioned above, quashed by the High Court. In such circumstances, Smt. Jonali Deka is no longer an accused. It is the case of the complainant that her husband (i.e., the present Petitioner) has married Smt. Jonali Deka. In such circumstances, when Smt. Jonali Deka is not an accused in the case, she can very well be examined as a witness. When the court considered her as a material witness, whose examination would enable the court to reach a just decision of the case, the order calling her to appear, in the case, as a witness cannot be said to be illegal. It may be pointed out here that the fact that examination of Smt. Jonali Deka would help the court to discover the truth obtain proof of relevant facts and help it in rendering a just decision of the case is really not in dispute. 28. In the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, therefore, it must be held that the evidence, which Smt. Jonali Deka may give, as a witness, at the trial, would help the court to reach a just decision of the case irrespective of the fact as to whether her evidence would go in favour of the complainant or in favour of the defence. What Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure, aims at, I must point out at the cost of repetition, is that these provisions shall be resorted to for the purpose of discovery or the relevant facts or proof of relevant facts essential for just decision of the case. What Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure, aims at, I must point out at the cost of repetition, is that these provisions shall be resorted to for the purpose of discovery or the relevant facts or proof of relevant facts essential for just decision of the case. Hence, even without the petition having been filed by the complainant in the present case, the learned trial court could have, on its own motion, summon, in exercise of the powers.under Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure, Smt. Jonali Deka as a witness. The fact that the learned trial that court has decided to do so on a petition filed by the complainant is immaterial. Hence, allowing Smt. Jonali Deka to be called as a witness cannot ipso facto cause prejudiced the defence of the accused, for, the accused would have the liberty to cross-examine her. 29. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, I do not find that the impugned order suffers from any infirmity, legal or factual. This revision, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. Petition dismissed