ORDER Dipak Misra, J. 1. Regard being had to the similarity of question involved in this bunch of appeals, they were heard analogously and are disposed of by a singular order. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the facts in MAIT No. 156 of 2006 are adverted to herein. 2. At the outset, it is condign to mention that in this batch of appeals, the assail is to the order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, Jabalpur (for short 'the Tribunal'), in various appeals preferred by the assessee wherein the Tribunal dealt with the soundness and substantially of the order passed by CIT (Administration) whereby the said authority had declined to extend the benefit of registration of the assessee respondents, the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis under Sections 12A and 12AA of the IT Act, 1961 (for brevity, the Act') and the Tribunal on consideration of the various provisions of the Act and the law in the field overturned the order passed by the CIT (Administration) and directed him to grant registration to the assessee. 3. Questioning the justifiability of the order passed by the Tribunal, the Revenue has preferred the present set of appeals. It is worth noting that as the appeals were preferred at various points of time different questions of law were framed. In view of the aforesaid, a suggestion was given to the learned Counsel for the Revenue and learned Counsel for the assessee as to whether it should be apposite to frame a single substantial question of law by recasting the same. Learned Counsel for the parties fairly accepted the said suggestion and accordingly, the following substantial question of law is recast: Whether the Tribunal was justified in directing the CIT (Administration) to extend the benefit of registration under Sections 12A and 12AA of the Act to the assessees in spite of the fact, there has been amendment of Sections 10(20) and 10(29) of the Act solely on the foundation that they are entitled to registration as the activities of the institutions partake character of charitable purposes? 4. It is obligatory at this stage to state the similar dispute arose in a set of appeals before the Division Bench at Gwalior in CIT v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena and Ors. 4. It is obligatory at this stage to state the similar dispute arose in a set of appeals before the Division Bench at Gwalior in CIT v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena and Ors. (2008) 215 CTR (MP) 54, wherein the Division Bench scanning the various provisions of the IT Act and the provisions contain in Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 (for brevity the 1972 Act') expressed the opinion that the Krishi Upaj Samatis, the assessee respondents therein, are entitled to registration under Section 12A and under Section 12AA of the Act and hence, there was no warrant for interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 5. After the said decision was delivered the Division Bench at Indore in CIT v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Bhanpura IT Appeal No. 217 of 2007 and connected matters concurred with the view expressed by the Gwalior Bench and dismissed the appeals preferred by the Revenue. 6. Mr. Rohit Arya, learned senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Sanjay Lal, learned Counsel for the Revenue, submitted that decisions rendered in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena (supra) and Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Bhanpura (supra) require reconsideration by a larger Bench, as both the Division Benches have not addressed to the core issues and the crux of the matter. Learned senior Counsel to build the edifice in the aforesaid regard has raised the following proponements: (a) The decision rendered in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena (supra) has not analyzed the basic facet of Section 12AA of the Act which stipulates that a fact finding enquiry is necessary but has proceeded exclusively on the legal base which is facially incorrect on scanning of the anatomy of the provisions. (b) The CIT had analyzed the facts in entirety to come to the precise and specific conclusion that the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis are not meant for charitable purposes and hence, they are not entitled to be registered under the provisions of the Act, but, without dislodging or unsettling the said finding the Tribunal has expressed a contrary opinion which has been erroneously given the stamp of approval by the Division Bench. (c) The Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis by no stretch of imagination can be regarded as an institution as defined under Section 2(15) of the Act and, therefore, conceptually market committee cannot be put on a pedestal of a charitable trust. (c) The Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis by no stretch of imagination can be regarded as an institution as defined under Section 2(15) of the Act and, therefore, conceptually market committee cannot be put on a pedestal of a charitable trust. (d) Section 12AA, as per the decisions of two Division Benches, has been treated to be absolutely procedural or in the realm of adjective law though the enquiry sought to be conducted by the CIT pertains fundamentally to the substantive spectrum which has insegragable nexus with the entitlement of grant of registration. (e) The object and the purpose of the 1972 Act and the role assigned to the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis under the said enactment per se cannot be said to be charitable. In the absence of any factual data brought on record both the Division Benches have adverted to the statutory provisions without appreciating the factual matrix as a consequence of which error has crept in. (f) Assuming the objects and purpose of the enactments are to govern, yet in the Act, there is a provision that the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis are bound to transfer the amount when directed by the State Government and in that event they lose the character of charitable institution inasmuch as there are no guidelines how the amount sought to be transmitted is to be spent. (g) When the applicability of Section 12AA is considered it is to be borne in mind that the amount collected has to be exclusively spent for charitable purposes and if there is any possibility of deviation the institution cannot be granted registration. (h) The diversion of funds by Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti to the State Government on the direction of the State cannot be regarded as an ancillary or subsidiary aspect but a major facet which creates a dent in the concept of charitable institution. (i) The decision in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena (supra) has erroneously laid emphasis on Section 11 of the Act though the said provision pertains to a different arena altogether. (i) The decision in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena (supra) has erroneously laid emphasis on Section 11 of the Act though the said provision pertains to a different arena altogether. (j) The decision rendered in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Bhanpura (supra) has held that Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis are entitled to exemption as they fulfil the requirements stipulated under Section 11 of the Act and hence, they are entitled to registration under Section 12A and under Section 12AA of the Act, though fundamentally by mere registration a charitable trust cannot claim exemption. 7. Mr. G.N. Purohit, learned senior Counsel, Mr. L.L. Sharma, Mr. A.P. Shrivastava, Mr. R.P. Singh, Mr. Hemant Pandey, Mr. Sumeet Nema and Mr. Kapil Jain, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of various assessees resisting the aforesaid submission of Mr. Arya, learned senior Counsel for the Revenue, raised the following contentions: (i) The decisions rendered in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena (supra) and Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Bhanpura (supra) have laid down the law correctly and, therefore, there is no justification for reconsideration of the lis by a larger Bench. (ii) Section 12A and Section 12AA have conferred power on the CIT (Administration) to deal with the matter of registration but while dealing with the matter of registration of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, which is created under 1972 Act the scheme of the 1972 Act has to be analyzed but the same has not been done by the CIT(A), but a correct opinion has been expressed by the Tribunal after analysing the 1972 Act, and hence, concurrence with the order passed by the Tribunal by the Division Bench is absolutely correct. (iii) The amendment that has been introduced amending the provision under Section 10(20) and omitting the Section 10(29) does not really affect that status of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis for getting registration in the absence of amendment of Section 2(15). (iv) The grant of registration is a condition precedent for claiming exemption under Section 11 of the Act and Division Bench though has opined that it is eligible for grant of exemption, the said opinion is to be construed that Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis are entitled to get exemption as per law, i.e., on fulfilling the conditions incorporated under Section 11 of the Act. (v) The provisions in the 1972 Act conferring power on the State Government for transmitting the amount to State Government do not frustrate the object and the purpose of the Act inasmuch as the Section 12AA of the Act is applicable to conceptual eventuality of statutory obligation if they are patent and manifest. (vi) Regard being had to the object of the 1972 Act under which the Samitis have been formed, use of a part of the fund cannot be central or seminal factor for grant or refusal of registration. (vii) The use of fund is ancillary and subsidiary to the very object of the purpose of the Act and that is not to be taken note of while dealing with the matter of grant of registration. If x-ray of the provisions fresco that the purpose is charitable there cannot be any justification for refusal of registration. (viii) The scope of enquiry as envisaged under Section 12AA of the Act is restricted or limited to the object and reasons of the institution and its genuineness and when the statutory body like Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti has statutory activities of perform the CIT (Administration) has fallen into error by not extending the benefit of registration and the same has been rightly overturned by the Tribunal. (ix) The issue pertaining to deviation of funds can be dealt with at the time of assessment and in any case that does not create an impediment or remora for obtaining the registration under the 1961 Act. 8. To appreciate the rival submission raised at the Bar we have carefully perused the decisions rendered in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena (supra) and Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Bhanpura (supra). It is noteworthy that prior to the amendment of Section 10(29), a local authority included the words "market committee" and thereby the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis per se were entitled to exemption. It was a blanket exemption under the said provision. The blanket exemption does not exist in praesenti. In view of the aforesaid Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis were required to obtain registration under Section 12AA of the Act to avail to benefit of the exemption under Section 11 of the Act. 9. In U.P. Forest Corporation and Anr. It was a blanket exemption under the said provision. The blanket exemption does not exist in praesenti. In view of the aforesaid Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis were required to obtain registration under Section 12AA of the Act to avail to benefit of the exemption under Section 11 of the Act. 9. In U.P. Forest Corporation and Anr. v. [2008] 297 ITR 1(SC) , the apex Court expressed the opinion that for claiming benefit under Section 11(1)(a) of the Act, registration under Section 12A is a condition precedent. Their Lordships have held that Section 11 provides for exemption of income which is applied for charitable purposes, and Section 12 is in the nature of an Explanation to Section 11, Section 12A provides that the provision of Sections 11 and 12 shall not be applied in relation to income of any trust or institution unless certain conditions precedent arc satisfied. Unless an assessee is granted registration under Section 12AA of the Act, claim for exemption from payment of tax under Section 11(1)(a) of the Act is not tenable. On a perusal of the decision rendered in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena (supra) it is evincible that the Division Bench in para 30 was posed with the question with regard to entitlement of exemption by the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis. The Division Bench has held, the exemption can be granted to the marketing committees provided that they spend the amount for charitable purposes as required by Sub-section (2) of Section 11. However, in para 35, the Division Bench has opined that the market committees fulfil all the requirements of Section 11 to get exemption and, therefore, are entitled to registration under Section 12A and Section 12AA of the Act. The Division Bench at Indore has reiterated the same view. 10. Mr. Rohit Arya, learned senior Counsel, has seriously criticized the aforesaid finding and submitted that the exemption cannot be granted per se. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee respondents do not dispute the said legal proposition. Mr. Arya, has submitted that the Bench at Gwalior in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena (supra) has referred to three requirements, namely : (I) income is derived from the property (II) property held under trust and (III) application of income wholly for charitable or religious purposes. It is contended by Mr. Mr. Arya, has submitted that the Bench at Gwalior in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena (supra) has referred to three requirements, namely : (I) income is derived from the property (II) property held under trust and (III) application of income wholly for charitable or religious purposes. It is contended by Mr. Arya that apart from above various other conditions as envisaged under Section 11 are required to be satisfied before exemption of tax is claimed before the AO. 11. We are inclined to think that the learned Counsel for the Revenue is right in his submission. But the question would be whether the matter requires a reference to a larger Bench. Submission of learned Counsel for the assessee is that the observations are prima facie in nature and in any case the Bench ultimately has held that the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis are entitled to get the benefit of registration. The reason that they fulfil the requirement of Section 11 has been ascribed or stated is only for the purpose of holding that the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis are entitled to get the benefit of registration. That apart, it is canvassed, the said reason is not the singular reason which has been ascribed for dismissal of the appeals. 12. On a perusal of the said decision, it is evident that the Bench has expressed the expressed the opinion that the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis are institutions which render services of general public utility. In our considered view, the judgment has to be read in that context. It is well- settled principle of law that a judgment of a Court is not to be read as a statute. In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. (2004) 8 SCC 579 it has been held as under: 10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. All ER 297 g-h Lord Reid said, 'Lord' Atkin's speech is to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances. In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. (2004) 8 SCC 579 it has been held as under: 10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. All ER 297 g-h Lord Reid said, 'Lord' Atkin's speech is to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances. Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) observed : 'One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board Lord Morris said All ER 761c: There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case'. 13. Keeping the aforesaid principle in view, when the judgment is read in that context, it would be quite clear that the enumeration by the Division Bench at Gwalior of Section 11 is only for the limited purpose of determination of charitable character of the samitis. Therefore, there is no need for reconsideration of the decisions by the larger Bench. 14. Presently, we shall advert to the aspect whether the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis are really entitled in law to get the benefit of registration under the scheme of the Act. We may refer to the dictionary clause in Section 2(15) of the 1961 Act. Section 2(15) defines charitable purpose which reads as under: 'Charitable purpose' includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief and the advancement of any other object of general public utility. 15. The aforesaid provision came to be interpreted by the Constitution Bench in Addl. CIT v. [1980]121ITR1(SC) , wherein the majority culled out the following principles: II. Where the main or primary objects are distributive, each and every one of the objects must be charitable in order that the trust or institution may be upheld as a valid charity. But, if the primary or dominant purpose of a trust or institution is charitable, another object which by itself may not be charitable but which is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose would not prevent the trust or institution from being a valid charity. III. But, if the primary or dominant purpose of a trust or institution is charitable, another object which by itself may not be charitable but which is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose would not prevent the trust or institution from being a valid charity. III. Though the objects specified in Clause (b) and (e) would benefit the members of the assessee, the benefit would be merely incidental in carrying out the main or primary purpose and if the primary purposes of the assessee were charitable, the subsidiary objects set out in those clauses would not militate against its charitable character and the purpose of the assessee would not be less charitable. IV. The true meaning of the last ten words in Section 2(15), viz., 'not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit', is that when the purpose of a trust or institution is the advancement of an object of general public utility, it is that object of general public utility and not its accomplishment or carrying out which must not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit. So long as the purpose does not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit, the requirement of the definition would be met and it is immaterial how the monies for achieving or implementing such purpose are found, whether by carrying on a activity for profit or not. V. If the language of a statutory provision is ambiguous and capable of two constructions, that construction must be adopted which will give meaning and effect to the other provisions of the enactment rather than that which will give none. VI. The inhibition of the exclusionary clause would be attracted if the purpose of the trust or institution in fact involves the carrying on of an activity for profit or in other words if any activity for profit is actually carried on as an integral part of the purpose or 'as a matter of advancement of the purpose'. There must be an activity for profit and it must be involved in carrying out the purpose of the trust or institution or, to put it differently, it must be carried on in order to advance the purpose or in the course of carrying out the purpose of the trust or institution. There must be an activity for profit and it must be involved in carrying out the purpose of the trust or institution or, to put it differently, it must be carried on in order to advance the purpose or in the course of carrying out the purpose of the trust or institution. There is, however, one qualification; if the constitution of a trust or institution expressly provides that the purpose shall be carried out by engaging in an activity which has a predominant profit motive, there would be no scope for controversy because the purpose would, on the face of it, involve the carrying on an activity for profit and it would be non-charitable even though no activity for profit is actually carried on. VII. The test which has now to the applied is whether the predominant object of the activity involved in carrying out the object of general public utility is to subserve the charitable purpose or to earn profit. Where profit-making is the predominant object of the activity, the purpose, though an object of general public utility would cease to be a charitable purpose. But, where the predominant object of the activity is to carry out the charitable purpose and not to earn profit, it would not lose its character of a charitable purpose merely because some profit arises from the activity. The exclusionary clause does not require that the activity must be carried on in such a manner that it does not result in any profit. 'If the profits must necessarily feed a charitable purpose under the terms of the trust, the mere fact that the activities of the trust yield profit will not alter the charitable character of the trust. The test now is, more clearly than in the past, the genuineness of the purpose tested by the obligation created to spend the money exclusively or essentially on charity.' The restrictive condition that the purpose should not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit would be satisfied if profit making is not the real object. VIII. It is not at all necessary that there must be a provision in the constitution of the trust or institution that the activity shall be carried on no profit no loss basis or that profit shall be prescribed. VIII. It is not at all necessary that there must be a provision in the constitution of the trust or institution that the activity shall be carried on no profit no loss basis or that profit shall be prescribed. Even if there is no such express provision, the nature of the charitable purpose, the manner in which the activity for advancing the charitable purpose is being carried on and the surrounding circumstances may clearly indicate that the activity is not propelled by a dominant profit motive. 16. In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in CIT v. [1965] 55 ITR 722(SC) , wherein it has been held as follows: (i) That advancement or promotion of trade, commerce and industry leading to economic prosperity enured for the benefit of the entire community. That prosperity would be shared also by those who are engaged in trade, commerce and industry, but on that account that purpose was not rendered any the less an object of general public utility. (ii) That the legislature had used language of great amplitude in defining 'charitable purpose' : the definition was inclusive and not exhaustive or exclusive. (iii) That the expression 'object of general public utility' was not restricted to objects beneficial to the whole of mankind. An object beneficial to a section of the public was an object to general public utility. To serve as a charitable purpose, it was not necessary that the object should be to benefit the whole of mankind or even all persons living in a particular country or province. It was sufficient if the intention was to benefit a section of the public as distinguished from specified individuals. The section of the community sought to be benefited must undoubtedly be sufficiently defined and identifiable by some common quality of a public or impersonal nature : where there was no common quality uniting the potential beneficiaries into a class, it might not be regarded as valid. (iv) That the primary objects of the chamber of commerce were not vague or indefinite. (v) That an object of general public utility, such as, promotion, protection, aiding and stimulation of trade, commerce and industries, need not, to be valid, specify the modus or the steps by which the object might be achieved or secured. (iv) That the primary objects of the chamber of commerce were not vague or indefinite. (v) That an object of general public utility, such as, promotion, protection, aiding and stimulation of trade, commerce and industries, need not, to be valid, specify the modus or the steps by which the object might be achieved or secured. (vi) That, if the primary purpose be advancement of objects of general public utility, it would remain charitable even if an incidental entry into. the political domain for achieving that purpose, e.g., promotion or opposition to legislation concerning that purpose, was contemplated. It was only for the purpose of securing its primary aims that it was mentioned in the memorandum of association that the Chamber might take steps to urge or oppose legislative or other measures affecting trade, commerce or manufactures. Such an object ought to be regarded as purely ancillary or subsidiary and not the primary object. (vii) That, therefore, the income of the Chamber of Commerce from its building was exempt from tax under Section 4(3)(i) of the IT Act as the building was held under a legal obligation wholly for charitable purpose. 17. In CIT v. [1983] 140 ITR 1 (SC), the apex Court has opined that expression object of general public utility is not restricted to object beneficial to whole mankind. Their Lordships have held that the said expression would prima facie include all objects which promote the welfare of the general public. It has been held therein that by advancement of general public utility it would remain charitable. 18. In CIT v. [1986] 159 ITR 1 (SC). it has been held that corporation is entitled to exemption as it had the object to carry charitable purposes and not profit inasmuch as it provides public amenities. 19. In CIT v. Gujarat Maritime Board (2008) 214 CTR (SC) 81 : (2007) 295 ITR 561, it has been ruled thus: 10. According to Section 2(15), the expression 'charitable purpose' has been defined by way of an inclusive definition so as to include relief to the poor, education, medical relief and advancement of any other object of general public utility. In this case, we are concerned with the interpretation of the expression 'advancement of any other object of general public utility'. 11. Under Section 11(1), income from property held for charitable purposes is not includible and does not form part of the total income. In this case, we are concerned with the interpretation of the expression 'advancement of any other object of general public utility'. 11. Under Section 11(1), income from property held for charitable purposes is not includible and does not form part of the total income. Section 11(1) has three Clause (a), (b) and (c). In all the three clauses the words are 'income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable purposes'. Under Section 11(4), the expression 'property held under trust' includes a business undertaking so held. In other words, income from business undertaking held for charitable purposes can fall under Section 11 subject to such income fulfilling the requisite conditions of that section. Their Lord ships proceeded to state as under: 13. At the outset, we may point out that Section 10(20) and Section 11 of the 1961 Act operate in totally different spheres. Even if the board has ceased to be a 'local authority', it is not precluded from claiming exemption under Section 11(1) of the 1961 Act. Therefore, we have to read Section 11(1) in the light of the definition of the words 'charitable purposes' as defined under Section 2(15) of the 1961 Act. 14. ... 15. ... 16. Applying the ratio of the said judgment in the case of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (supra), we find that, in the present case, the Gujarat Maritime board is established for the predominant purpose of development of minor ports within the State of Gujarat, the management and control of the board is essentially with the State Government and there is no profit motive, as indicated by the provisions of Sections 73, 74 and 75 of the 1981 Act. The income earned by the Board is deployed for the development of minor ports in the State of Gujarat. In the circumstances, in our view, the judgment of this Court in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (supra) squarely applies to the facts of the present case. 17. Before concluding, we may mention that under the scheme of Section 11(1) of the 1961 Act, the source of income must be held under trust or under other legal obligation. In the circumstances, in our view, the judgment of this Court in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (supra) squarely applies to the facts of the present case. 17. Before concluding, we may mention that under the scheme of Section 11(1) of the 1961 Act, the source of income must be held under trust or under other legal obligation. Applying the said test it is clear that the Gujarat Maritime Board is under legal obligation to apply the income which arises directly and substantially from the business held under trust for the development of minor ports in the State of Gujarat. Therefore, they are entitled to be registered as 'charitable trust' under Section 12A of the 1961 Act. 20. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is to be seen whether Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis fall in the category of charitable trust as contemplated under the IT Act. The 1972 Act has been enacted to provide for better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce and establishment and proper administration of markets of agricultural produce in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Section 11 deals with the constitution of market committee. Section 17 describes the power and duties of the market committee. Section 38 deals with Market Committee Fund. Section 39 provides the application of Market Committee Fund. Section 40A empowers the State Government to give direction to the Board Mandi Committees. Section 44 stipulates the purposes for which Madhya Pradesh State marketing development fund shall be utilised. Section 54 deals with inspection of markets and inquiry into affairs of market committee. In view of the aforesaid provisions there can be no shadow or trace of doubt that the Act has a charitable purposes and Krishi Upaj Mandi Schemes are formed for general public utility in a welfare State. They have a sacrosanct duty to subserve the cause of public welfare. When the scheme of the Act clearly reveals and evinces that the Samitis are established for marketing and protecting the interest of the agricultural producers there can be no scintilla of doubt that it is established for charitable purposes. At this stage we think it appropriate to refer to the Explanation to Section 13(7) of the 1961 Act. The said Explanation stipulates that for the purpose of Sections 11, 12 and 12A trust includes any other legal obligation. At this stage we think it appropriate to refer to the Explanation to Section 13(7) of the 1961 Act. The said Explanation stipulates that for the purpose of Sections 11, 12 and 12A trust includes any other legal obligation. Be it noted the CIT (Administration) has held that Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis are not institutions. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the assessee that even if a Samiti is not treated as an institution it will be covered within ambit and sweep of the Explanation to Section 13 inasmuch as the definition being inclusive includes any other legal obligation and hence, they are charitable trusts. The said view gets fructified by the pronouncement of law in the Gujarat Maritime Board (supra) to which we have referred to hereinabove. 21. A necessitous clarificatory note. Section 11 deals with exemption. We have already stated that the observations in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena (supra) are of prima facie in nature. The Bench at Indore has followed the said judgment. It is absolutely unambiguous that Section 11 is independent of Sections 12A and 12AA. In fact, it has been held by the apex Court in the case of Gujarat Maritime Board (supra) that Section 12A and Section 12AA are in the nature of Explanation to Section 11. The apex Court after expressing the said opinion has held that the respondent assessee was a charitable trust and held that it is entitled to registration. The lis in the present appeal was whether the Tribunal was justified in directing the CIT (Administration) to register the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis. Appeals are restricted to that. Thus, by grant of mere registration to the assessee, ipso facto, they cannot claim exemption. They have to satisfy the conditions precedent enumerated in the said provision. In this context we may usefully refer to the decision rendered by a Division Bench of High Court of Punjab & Haryana in CIT v. Market Committee, Dhariwal and Ors. (2008) 166 Taxman 392 (P & H), wherein the Bench has expressed the view as under: 51. The aforesaid submission had been advanced for a totally different purpose, namely, to highlight the fact that registration under Section 12AA of the IT Act did not ipso facto result in the grant of any income-tax exemption to a municipal committee. (2008) 166 Taxman 392 (P & H), wherein the Bench has expressed the view as under: 51. The aforesaid submission had been advanced for a totally different purpose, namely, to highlight the fact that registration under Section 12AA of the IT Act did not ipso facto result in the grant of any income-tax exemption to a municipal committee. The effort, on the part of learned Counsel, while advancing the instant contention, was to show, that registration under Section 12AA of the IT Act did not ipso facto bestow any benefit on the IT Act, did not ipso facto bestow any benefit on the market committee, lie clarified that, for the benefit of income-tax exemption, it would again be open to the petitioner to independently determine whether the market committee had utilised the income for which it seeks exemption, for a charitable purpose, in terms of the mandate of Section 11 of the IT Act, and only such income, which is so utilised, to the satisfaction of the IT authorities, would not be included, in the total income of the market committee, for the assessment year under reference for levy of tax. We find merit, in the aforesaid contention. We, therefore, hereby clarify that it will be open to the petitioner to examine the audit reports submitted by the market committee under reference, so as to determine the justification of the claim of the respondent market committee, for claiming tax exemption under Section of the IT Act. 22. We agree with the said view and clarify the position. In view of the foregoing analysis, the aforesaid appeals, being devoid of substance, stand dismissed without any order as to costs.