JUDGMENT 1. - By way of filing this petition, the petitioner has prayed to quash and set-aside the punishment order dated December 18, 1999. order of the appellate authority dated January 27, 2001, to treat the period of suspension as spent on duty and it should be counted for all purposes, quash and set aside the recovery order dated October 16, 2001 and also that if any recovery is being made by the respondents from salary and allowances of the petitioner, during pendency of the writ petition, the said recovery may be declared illegal and directions be issued to the respondents to refund the amount with interest. 2. Brief facts of the case according to the petitioner are that he was initially appointed on the post of Clerk in the respondent Bank. On February 27,1985, he was doing the main work, which was allotted to him. The Bank Manager, on February 27,1985 itself verbally directed the petitioner also to work in cash Section to accept share application money of Lumix Industries, as at that relevant point of time there was a great boom in share market. 3. The respondent Bank issued suspension order dated November 13, 1985 to the petitioner. In the suspension order it was mentioned that disciplinary enquiry was contemplated in the alleged involvement in the misappropriation of share application money deposited by the customers of the Bank. Certain other facts regarding payment of subsistence allowance to be paid to the petitioner, were also mentioned. On February 27, 1985, the respondent Bank also suspended one person namely Mr. Sohan Lal Meena, who at the relevant point of time was working in cash Section, on same allegations as levelled against the present petitioner. Subsequently the respondent Bank issued a charge-sheet to the petitioner, which the petitioner received on December 18, 1985 in which certain allegations regarding misappropriation of money were levelled. Petitioner immediately on receipt of the charge-sheet submitted a letter dated January 8, 1986 to the respondent Bank praying therein to furnish copies of the record so that he may file reply in the matter. The respondent Bank failed to supply any documents to the petitioner, the result of which was that the petitioner did not file reply to the charge-sheet. During pendency of the departmental enquiry, the respondent Bank referred the matter to the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short ‘the CBF). The respondent Bank failed to supply any documents to the petitioner, the result of which was that the petitioner did not file reply to the charge-sheet. During pendency of the departmental enquiry, the respondent Bank referred the matter to the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short ‘the CBF). The CBI after registering FIR, filed dial Ian against the petitioner on December 12, 1985 for the offence punishable under Section 409 IPC and Sections 5(2), 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In the meanwhile, the disciplinary authority revoked the suspension order of the petitioner vide order dated March 22, 1991 and in the revocation order it was ordered that the petitioner was to be paid salary and emoluments from the date, the petitioner reports for duty at the rate on which the petitioner would have drawn but for his suspension and ordered that fate of the suspension period shall be outcome of enquiry. After filing of the criminal case in CBI Court, the respondent Bank did not initiate the disciplinary proceedings and prefer to await the decision of the Special Judge, CBI. 4. The CBI, after investigation, submitted challan against the present petitioner for the afore-mentioned offences and after completion of trial, the Special Judge, CBI, vide judgment dated November 14,1994 exonerated/acquitted the present petitioner from the aforementioned charges. The operative portion of the judgment dated November 14, 1994 is reproduced here-in-below:(Vernacular matter omitted..) 5. Immediately after receipt of certified copy of judgment, he submitted it before the respondent Bank along with a representation. The respondent Bank, to the utter surprise of the petitioner, instead of honoring the judgment of the learned Court below, all of a sudden, after 11 months of the judgment and 10 years from the date of charge-sheet, intimated the petitioner vide letter dated November 1. 1995 expressing their decision to proceed further in the departmental enquiry for the same charges, which was already tried by the competent Court. The learned counsel further submitted that the said direction is in clear contravention of the principles of natural justice, the Shastri Award which was pending in Banking Industry on employee and employer. 6. In the Month of November 1995, the respondent Bank appointed Mr. Ravi Kumar as Enquiry Officer, to conclude the enquiry. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer started to conduct the enquiry without supplying the petitioners the relevant documents. 6. In the Month of November 1995, the respondent Bank appointed Mr. Ravi Kumar as Enquiry Officer, to conclude the enquiry. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer started to conduct the enquiry without supplying the petitioners the relevant documents. After acquittal of the petitioner, the respondent Bank filed a complaint before the Assistant Commissioner, Labour, Jaipur against the Disciplinary Authority and Enquiry Officer stated therein that the petitioner was already acquitted for the similar charge. Hence, the departmental enquiry could not have been proceeded against the petitioner. The respondent Bank contested the application by filing counter reply. The Assistant Labour Commissioner, did not finally decide the complaint. 7. Petitioner was thereafter in receipt of letter dated August 17, 1998, wherein the findings of Enquiry Officer were communicated to the petitioner. In the aforesaid letter it was mentioned that the petitioner is guilty and if he wants to make any representation/submission on the findings, he is free to do so in writing. The petitioner submitted the reply to the show cause notice through respondent Bank in which he raised nine points. Thereafter, the respondent Bank issued a letter dated February 5, 1999, by which punishment of ‘Censure’ was imposed upon the petitioner. The petitioner being aggrieved with the aforesaid order of punishment, placed written submissions before the Disciplinary Authority. The petitioner mentioned in the written submissions that he has already been acquitted by the competent Court, hence, the respondent Bank cannot make second trial for the same charges. Petitioner further mentioned in the written submissions that findings of the enquiry officer are perverse, therefore, he may be exonerated. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority passed the order dated February 18, 1999 imposing the punishment of ‘Censure’ upon the petitioner. In the punishment order it was observed that the period spent under 1 suspension was to be treated as ‘Not spent on duty’ and shall not be reckoned for any purposes whatsoever and the increment for the period of suspension shall not be released. 8. The petitioner feeling aggrieved with the aforesaid punishment order, preferred an appeal challenging the punishment order, before the General Manager, Personnel Wing (Appellate Authority), in which he raised specific pleas. On February 6, 2001, the petitioner received a letter dated February 6, 2001, in which it is mentioned that the appeal filed by him has been rejected by the appellate authority. 9. On February 6, 2001, the petitioner received a letter dated February 6, 2001, in which it is mentioned that the appeal filed by him has been rejected by the appellate authority. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that after more than 2 years from the passing of the punishment order, now the petitioner is in receipt of order of recover)' dated October 16, 2001. 10. In para I of the writ petition the petitioner has specifically mentioned that (here is violation of clause of equality enshrined in the Article 14 of the Constitution of India as there has been a great discrimination in awarding punishment to the petitioner. The similarly situated employee who was given charge-sheet alleging that he was in connivance with the petitioner in committing misconduct, has not been punished at all and charge-sheet was withdrawn without any disciplinary enquiry and suspension order was also revoked and all benefits were given to him. It is submitted that there cannot be no yardsticks even in the matter of awarding punishment or while dealing with the departmental enquiry, in which the charges against the employees are same. 11. The petitioner being aggrieved with the aforesaid order of punishment, has preferred this writ petition before this Court. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents filed a detailed reply to the writ petition. The Respondents almost admitted all the facts, which the petitioner has mentioned in the writ petition. The respondents in para I of the reply to the grounds specifically mentioned that although Mr. Sohan Lal Meena was also served with a charge-sheet, proceedings against him were waived for the lime being, and the right has been reserved by the Bank to proceed against him if it becomes necessary. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the case of the present petitioner is same as of Mr. Sohan Lal Meena as charge-sheet served upon Shri Meena has been waived, thus, the charge-sheet served upon the present petitioner is liable to be waived. 13. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and carefully gone through the entire material made available to me including the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 14. In Bharat Ram Meena v. State of Rajasthan and Others reported in 2002 (4) WLC (Raj.) 209 , the relevant portion of which is quoted as under: “27. 14. In Bharat Ram Meena v. State of Rajasthan and Others reported in 2002 (4) WLC (Raj.) 209 , the relevant portion of which is quoted as under: “27. The contention of uneven punishment (as compared to Dev Chand Meena’s case) has also engaged our attention considerably while taking the above view. On this aspect of the matter, we were reminded of a judgment rendered by Hidayatulla C.J, as he then was in 1970. We must commend Shri Prem Asopa, Sr. counsel, though appearing for respondents in this case made efforts, devoted time and very candidly produced before us the case of Rameshwar Dayai v. State of U.P., (1971) 3 SCC 924 i.e. Criminal Appeal No. 168/1969, decided on Feb. 2,1970 (quorum,: M. Hidayatullaii C.J., A.N. Ray and I.D. Dua, JJ). The contents of this order are reproduced as under: “Hidayatullah, C.J. - This appeal has been admitted only on the question of sentence by this Court in somewhat unusual circumstances. The members of the Police Armed Constabulary who had joined very recently and who were only trainee recruits, wished to go to their village and applied for leave on the ground that their wives were ill. This was their defence. The finding is that they did not apply but deserted their post and therefore committed an offence under Section 6(a) of the U.P. Pradeshik Armed Constabulary Act, 1948. The prosecution case had been accepted that they deserted service. Unfortunately, the two cases were tried before two different Sessions Judges. Although the offences were the same, the defences were also the same and the facts were absolutely the same, the sentences passed on their conviction were widely different. The present appellant received 7 years’ rigorous imprisonment and the other accused was sentenced to 4 years rigorous imprisonment. They both appealed and unfortunately again, the appeals came before different Judges in the High Court. One learned Judge reduced the sentence of 7 years to 4 years and the other learned Judge reduced the sentence of 4 years to three months, litis show's how the question of sentences awarded in a crime may be viewed differently by different Judges, a problem which has never been solved satisfactorily so far. One learned Judge reduced the sentence of 7 years to 4 years and the other learned Judge reduced the sentence of 4 years to three months, litis show's how the question of sentences awarded in a crime may be viewed differently by different Judges, a problem which has never been solved satisfactorily so far. However, the two cases being identical, it looks somewhat odd that one of the accused should be sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment while another who committed the identical offence and in the like circumstances should be sentenced to three months’ imprisonment. We must do something to make the punishment even in these two cases. We are told that the appellants in this case has undergone imprisonment for nearly ten months and we think it would be enough to say that the appropriate sentence in his case is the period of imprisonment already undergone by him. The appeal is allowed to this extent.” "'28. It is therefore, clear whether the matter is of a civil or criminal nature so far as the parity is concerned, Courts have always favoured even standards and have discarded the application of uneven stands in similar or identical cases. Uneven treatment is not at all palatable to the judicial conscience of the Court.” 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his case further placed reliance on a judgment reported in Babu Lal v. State of Raj. and Others, reported in 2000 (3) RLR 416 : 2000 Lab IC 3032 , the relevant para of the said judgment are reproduced here-in-below: "19. This takes us to consider the second limb of contention of the appellant-petitioner. We are satisfied that apart from procedure unfairness, the discrimination in inflicting punishment is also apparent. We have noticed that as per the findings of the enquiry report as accepted; by the disciplinary' authority, the Junior Engineer Mr. Leelani as well as the present petitioner, the store clerk were both at best were found guilty of supervisory negligence and not of theft directly. The very fact that; the disciplinary authority directed the recovery of the amount from Junior Engineer for his supervisory lapse, further indicates that the responsibility of the loss caused on account of supervisory; negligence of Junior Engineer was considered to be greater. The very fact that; the disciplinary authority directed the recovery of the amount from Junior Engineer for his supervisory lapse, further indicates that the responsibility of the loss caused on account of supervisory; negligence of Junior Engineer was considered to be greater. Yet for no ostensible reasons the petitioner who was merely a store clerk and was found guilty of the negligence in discharge of duties while; he was Store Munshi has been visited with an extreme penalty of dismissal from service. In regard to this, the only contention raised by the learned counsel for the State was that since the Junior Engineer was a, member of regular establishment and was found guilty of supervisory negligence, he has been given lesser punishment but the petitioner who was merely on the work charge establishment and not a confirmed, employee having been found negligent was thought fit not to be continued in the job. We see no rationale behind this reasoning in meeting out different punishments arising out of the same incident for which both the; employees have been subjected to similar charges and found guilty of supervisory negligence and not guilty of direct involvement in the commission of theft. In these circumstances, this distinction in the punishment by the very same authority in respect of the findings recorded in the very' same proceedings imposing two different punishments vitally varying as noticed by us, cannot be sustained. 20. When the charge against two persons are substantially the same, a joint enquiry is held and both of them are found guilty but one was given lesser punishment and the other was dismissed. It must be held to be a case of patent discrimination, in the absence of any aggravating factor appearing from the record of proceedings against such employees visited with more harsh penalty. That was the view expressed by Allahabad High Court in (6) U.P. State Road Transport Corp. v. State of U.P. { 1978 1 LLN 589 ): 1978 LIC 355 . 21. Article 14, which ensures for a fair and just treatment at the hands of State or any instrumentality of State to all the citizens and is a guarantee against arbitrariness, unreasonableness and irrational discrimination, provides that bedrock for equality before law. It forbids any invidious discrimination between similarly situated persons. 21. Article 14, which ensures for a fair and just treatment at the hands of State or any instrumentality of State to all the citizens and is a guarantee against arbitrariness, unreasonableness and irrational discrimination, provides that bedrock for equality before law. It forbids any invidious discrimination between similarly situated persons. Two persons facing the same charge or charges of similar nature and found guilty of the same are persons similarly situated. In such cases it can be stated with conviction that when two or more employees are guilty of the same or similar misconduct, but in spite of that one employee is visited with more serious punishment and the other employee is given lesser punishment, and the discriminatory treatment cannot be explained on any rational ground then it must be held that employer is guilty of invidious discrimination. The fact that one is on work charge establishment and another on regular does not entitle the disciplinary authority to impose a higher punishment on employee on work-charge as compared to other employee on regular establishment. Classification of two delinquent officers on such basis in the matter of choosing punishment to be imposed cannot be justified. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, justifying the different punishments on the basis of nature of establishment on which the petitioner was employed, cannot be accepted. 23. Ordinarily, in these circumstances, we would have quashed the proceedings and remanded the case back for continuance of the disciplinary proceedings afresh against the petitioner. However, looking to age of the incident and ultimate nature of the findings recorded against the petitioner, learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that in totality of the circumstances when he has been found guilty of supervisory negligence, he shall be satisfied if relief to him is confined to the second contention and lesser punishment is imposed for supervisory negligence than termination of service and if reinstated in service, he would also be prepared to forego 50% of his back-wages to which he would be otherwise entitled to on quashing of the entire proceedings.” 16. In support of his case learned counsel also placed reliance of the judgment delivered in Capt. In support of his case learned counsel also placed reliance of the judgment delivered in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 1416 : (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999-I-LLJ-1094 the operative portion of which is reproduced here-in-below: “Suspension notwithstanding, nonpayment of subsistence allowance is an inhuman act which has an unpropitious effect on the life of an employee. When the employee is placed under suspension, he is demolished and the salary is also paid to him at a reduced rate under the nick name of ‘subsistence allowance’, so that the employee may sustain himself. The very object of paying the reduced salary to the employee during the period of suspension would be frustrated. If even subsistence allowance is not paid because ‘subsistence allowance’ mans of supporting life, especially a minimum livelihood. The act of non-payment of subsistence allowance can be likened to slow-poisoning as the employee, if not permitted to sustain himself on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance, would gradually starve himself to death.” 17. Thus, in my view it is a fit case to grant relief to the petitioner as claimed by him in the writ petition because the respondent Bank itself has mentioned in the writ petition that proceedings pending against Mr. Sohan Lal Meena, have been waived, and the case of the present petitioner also stands on the same footing. 18. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. The punishment order dated December 18,1999 and the order dated January 27, 2001 passed by the appellate authority are hereby quashed. The recovery order dated October 16, 2001 is also hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to count the entire suspension period, as spent on duty, for all purposes and shall also grant-all consequential benefits to the petitioner. This exercise shall be done by the respondents within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. No order as to costs.Petition ordered accordingly. *******