JUDGMENT 1. - By way of this writ petition the petitioner has prayed that the order/award dated 11 09.2001 (Annexure-1) passed by the Judge, Labour Court No.2 Jaipur be quashed and set aside and he further prayed for any other order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem just and proper. 2. The brief facts of the present case are that the respondent No.1 Kaluram was engaged on daily wages by the petitioner regarding his alleged termination with effect from 1.9.1992. He raised an industrial dispute, and the Government made a reference on 16.9.1995 to the Labour Court to adjudicate on the point; whether removal from service of Shri Kaluram w.e.f. 1.9.1992 was proper and legal and if not, to what relief he is entitled to. 3. The petitioner filed reply of statement of claim before the Labour Court and after that the learned court recorded the statements of both the side and passed an impugned order on 11.9.2001, holding that the removal from service of Shri Kaluram (respondent No.1) is not legal and proper. He is not entitled to be reinstated in his services, but shall be entitled to claim 50% back wages. Against this order, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 4. The respondent No.1 Kalu Ram has set up his case before the Labour Court is that he was appointed to look after the Plants in the Village Biro! w.e.f. 1.8.1989. He was removed from the services, w.e.f. 1.9.1992 without following the provision of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. In the reply the petitioner has stated before the Labour Court that the respondent No. 1 (Kalu Ram) was engaged on a scheme which remained in existence only upto a specified period and as soon as the budget provisions of the scheme was over and not available, he was discontinued from the services. There was not a regular post, nor was there any Budget provisions made for the post, it is not the case of the respondent No.1 that some other person was engaged after his removal. He, was, therefore, not entitled to be kept permanently on a regular basis. 6. According to the petitioner, the labour court has erroneously held that notice under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not complied with by the petitioner. He, was, therefore, not entitled to be kept permanently on a regular basis. 6. According to the petitioner, the labour court has erroneously held that notice under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not complied with by the petitioner. In support of the contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance in the case of Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi & Ors. reported in 1992(1) U.J. (S.C.) 676 and also cited a case of Vikas Adhikari, Panchayat Samiti, Bhadra & Ors. v. Surendra Kumar Sharma & Anr. reported in Western Law Cases (Raj.) Page 154 . 7. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents Mr. Manoj Pareek has appeared and argued that the workman has completed 240 days in one calendar year and the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He has also contended that basically in award only 50% back wages has been given while the labour court should award 100% back wages. 8. The Division Bench of this court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.423/1997 Management M/s. Bharatpur Nutritional Products Ltd. v. Ishwar Chand and in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.422/1997 The Management M/s. Bharatpur Nutritional Products Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan has considered the case decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.9. Having carefully scanned the impugned order, I notice that all the contentions raised before me were analysed and considered in great details by the Labour Court. The scope of supervisory jurisdiction was explained by the Supreme Court in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Company Limited, [2003(2) WLC (SC) Civil 255 : 2003(3) S.C.C. 524 ] which runs in (Para-7) : "The supervisory jurisdiction conferred ori the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or the tribunal. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or the tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision." 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The wide jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 has to be exercised with great circumspection. The High Court cannot constitute itself into an appellate court over Tribunals. Article 226/227 is a device to secure and advance justice and not otherwise. In a case of this nature, it is true, the High Court exercising the power of judicial review would not interfere with the discretion of a Tribunal unless the same is found to be illegal or irrational. In an application for a writ of Certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing an award of an Industrial Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court is very limited. It can quash the award, inter alia, when the Tribunal has committed an error of law apparent on the face of record or when the finding of facts of the Tribunal is wholly perverse. It is also a settled law that in the exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court acts only in a supervisory capacity and not as an appellate tribunal, it does not review the evidence upon which the inferior tribunal proposed (sic) to base its conclusion, it simply demolished the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or manifestly erroneous, but does not, as a rule, substitute its own view for those of the inferior tribunal.11. In the present matter, I do not find any jurisdictional error, perversity and illegality in the award passed by the labour court. The finding of the labour court is based on the basis of material placed before him. There is no error apparent in the face on record. I, therefore, do not find any justification to interfere with the award. In my view the writ petition (sic) does not call for any interference. The same is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******