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2008 DIGILAW 4656 (MAD)

P. Chengaiah & Others v. D. Chandra

2008-12-15

M.JEYAPAUL

body2008
Judgment : Common Order: 1. Application No.517 of 2004 is filed by the applicants/plaintiff invoking Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure for attaching the suit property described in the suit schedule and also order detention of the respondent/defendant in civil prison for disobeying the order of injunction granted by this court in O.A.No.636 and 637 of 1995 dated 22. 1996. 2. Application No.3738 of 2008 is filed praying to consider and dispose of Application No.517 of 2004 in C.S.No.1843 of 1994 before ever the learned Master proceeds with the Trial of C.S.No.1843 of 1994. 3. Application No.3741 of 2004 is filed seeking a direction that the respondent/defendant shall not be heard in the main suit in C.S.No.1843 of 1994 until the offending, pendente lite sale executed by her in violation of the order of injunction passed by this court on 22. 1996 is cancelled in accordance with law. 4. In the suit in C.S.No.1843 of 1994 instituted by the applicants seeking specific performance of an agreement of sale between the applicants and the respondent, this court was pleased to pass an order in O.A.No.636 of 1995 and 637 of 1995 on 22. 1996 as follows:- "That the defendant/respondent in both the applications be and is hereby directed not to alienate the property more fully set out in the schedule hereto during the pendency of the suit, and ensure any construction that may be put up by the defendant is in accordance with law, so as to avoid exposing the plaintiff in the event of his success in the suit from having to face the demands for demolition of the superstructure which has not been put up in accordance with law." The respondent chose not to prefer any appeal against such order. Thus, the said order has reached finality. 5. It is contended by the applicants that they applied for encumbrance certificate for the suit property immediately after some strangers, who came to the suit property in the last week of December 2003, claimed to have purchased the same and found to their shock and surprise that the respondent had sold the suit property to one T.A.Dhakshayini under a sale deed dated 7. 2003 registered as document No.1567 of 2003 in the office of the Sub Registrar, T.Nagar. 2003 registered as document No.1567 of 2003 in the office of the Sub Registrar, T.Nagar. Contending that the respondent has wilfully flouted the order of injunction passed by this court, the applicants sought for punishment of the respondent for disobedience and remand the respondent to civil prison as provided under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The property of the respondent is also liable to be attached, it is contended in Application No.517 of 2004. .6. Honourable Mr.Justice V.Ramasubramanian took up Application No.517 of 2004 and by order dated 21. 2008, expressed his view that the said Application could be taken up after the evidence was recorded on both sides and directed the office to list the suit before the Master for recording evidence and post the suit after recording evidence along with the said Application seeking to punish the respondent for contempt. Honourable Mr.Justice S.Tamilvanan took up the very same Application No.517 of 2004 on 17. 2008 and expressed his view that the learned Additional Master should proceed with the exercise of recording evidence as directed by Honourable Mr.Justice V.Ramasubramanian in the aforesaid order dated 21. 2008. 7. In the aforesaid circumstances, the applicants chose to file Application No.3738 of 2008 praying to consider and dispose of Application No.517 of 2004 seeking to punish the respondent for contempt before ever the learned Master proceeds with the trial of the case in C.S.No.1843 of 1994. The applicants also filed a separate application in Application No.3741 of 2008 seeking a direction that the respondent shall not be heard in the main suit until the offending pendente lite sale executed by her disobeying the orders of injunction passed by this court is cancelled in accordance with law. 8. In none of the applications, the respondent chose to file counter. .9. 8. In none of the applications, the respondent chose to file counter. .9. Learned counsel appearing for the applicants would vehemently submit that the respondent, who was the defendant in the suit laid by one Banu Priya in C.S.No.1142 of 1992 seeking specific performance of agreement of sale having set up a defence that the alleged agreement of sale entered into by the respondent was only a sham and nominal document, chose to file a joint memorandum of compromise before the court without disclosing the order of injunction granted in O.A.No.636 and 637 of 1995 in C.S.No.1843 of 1994 and played fraud upon the court, obtained a compromise decree and sold away the suit property to a nominee of the said Banu Priya despite the fact that an order of injunction granted by this court with respect to the suit property in the suit laid by the applicants was in vogue. The respondent has, in fact, invented a device obviously to cripple the rights of the applicants who have got an order of injunction with respect to the suit property in the suit laid by them for specific performance of agreement of sale. Though the applicants have filed a separate suit in C.S.No.128 of 2006 as against the respondent, the said Banu Priya and the third party purchaser, seeking to declare the sale deed executed by the respondent on 7. 2003 as null and void, this court has ample power to consider the vice committed by the respondent as against the court and the contumacious disobedience of the orders of this court and nullify the very sale deed executed by the respondent pendente lite when the orders of injunction not to alienate the suit property was in force. Had the order of injunction been brought to the notice of this court when it dealt with the joint memorandum of compromise filed in C.S.No.1142 of 1992, this court would not have blessed the parties therein with a compromise decree. Even if the purchaser of the property had no knowledge about the pendency of the suit laid by the applicants and the order of injunction restraining the respondent from alienating the suit property this court has every authority to avoid the sale deed executed pendente lite disobeying the orders of this court. Even if the purchaser of the property had no knowledge about the pendency of the suit laid by the applicants and the order of injunction restraining the respondent from alienating the suit property this court has every authority to avoid the sale deed executed pendente lite disobeying the orders of this court. The respondent has no right to defend the suit by letting in evidence unless she purged the contempt of court levelled against her. It is his further submission that the opinion expressed by Honourable Mr.Justice V.Ramasubramanian and Honourable Mr.Justice S.Tamilvanan does not cripple this court from passing appropriate orders in the light of the discussions generated in the present applications. .10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the respondent, who is aged and ailing without knowing the consequence, has executed the sale deed in favour of the nominee of the said Banu Priya armed with the compromise decree passed by this court in C.S.No.1142 of 1992. There was no deliberate disobedience of the orders of this court. He launched his attack on the other side who chose to approach this court time and again to consider and pass necessary orders in Application No.517 of 2004 despite the clear orders already passed not by one one Honourable Judge, but by two Honourable Judges that the said application would be coupled with the suit and considered jointly with the main suit in C.S.No.1843 of 1994 after the evidence was recorded by the learned Master as directed. This court cannot sit in judgment over the orders already passed by two Honourable Judges of this court in Application No.517 of 2004. It has been held by the Apex Court that the court cannot direct the contemnor not to defend the case until he has purged the contempt. The evidence has partly been recorded. Therefore, in all fairness and also in the interest of justice, the evidence part of the case will have to be completed before ever Application No.517 of 2004 is disposed of, he would further submit. Binding nature of the orders passed by the Honourable Judges of the court:- .11. The evidence has partly been recorded. Therefore, in all fairness and also in the interest of justice, the evidence part of the case will have to be completed before ever Application No.517 of 2004 is disposed of, he would further submit. Binding nature of the orders passed by the Honourable Judges of the court:- .11. Honourable Mr.Justice V.Ramasubramanian, having considered the stage of the suit in C.S.No.1843 of 1994, expressed his view that the evidence should be recorded by the learned Master in the main suit and the present Application No.517 of 2004 should be taken up along with the said suit. Having thus observed, the learned Judge directed the Registry to list the matter before the Master for recording evidence. Honourable Mr.Justice S.Tamilvanan agreed with the aforesaid view expressed by Honourable Mr.Justice V.Ramasubramanian and directed the registry to post the matter before the Additional Master to proceed with the exercise of recording evidence and complete the same. .12. Firstly, it is found that Application No.517 of 2004 was not disposed of finally by either of my learned Brothers on considering the merits of the Application. Secondly, considering the seriousness of the disobedience committed by a party litigant and the consequences that had flowed therefrom, the court which deals with the Contempt Application has every authority to decide whether the contemnor is entitled to defend the suit unless she has purged the contempt. Such an interesting point was not addressed by either of the counsel before my learned Brothers, who dealt with this Application earlier. Therefore, the said point was not decided by my learned Brothers when they passed some directions to the Registry, keeping the Application pending. Thirdly, there was no discussion generated before my learned Brothers as to the alleged fraud played upon by the respondent on the court. In the considered opinion of this court, if the aforesaid two aspects had been brought to the notice of my learned Brothers, they would not have directed the Registry to post the main suit for recording evidence, keeping the Application pending for disposal along with the suit. In such view of the matter, I find that the directions issued to the Registry with the aforesaid observations by my learned Brothers do not have a binding effect on me while dealing with Application No.517 of 2004 which was not finally disposed of. .PERPETRATION OF FRAUD UPON COURT:- 13. In such view of the matter, I find that the directions issued to the Registry with the aforesaid observations by my learned Brothers do not have a binding effect on me while dealing with Application No.517 of 2004 which was not finally disposed of. .PERPETRATION OF FRAUD UPON COURT:- 13. The applicants filed suit in C.S.No.1843 of 1994 praying for specific performance of an agreement of sale as against the respondent herein as on 7. 1994. The subject interim order in O.A.No.636 and 637 of 1995 in the aforesaid suit was passed on 22. 1996 directing the respondent herein not to alienate the suit property during the pendency of the suit. One Banu Priya filed a suit as against the respondent D.Chandra in C.S.No.1142 of 1992 seeking a relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale of the very same subject property as against the respondent. The respondent filed a written statement therein on 8. 1999 specifically contending as follows:- "It was at this juncture that the plaintiff persuaded the defendant to enter into an agreement with her so that she could request Chengaiah to settle the dispute with the defendant amicably. It was also agreed that the agreement will not be acted upon and it is intended only for the purpose of inducing Chengaiah to settle the dispute with the defendant. The plaintiff, who is a close friend of Chengaiah, informed the defendant that she would prevail one Chengaiah to settle the dispute amicably. Therefore, the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant approached her to sell the property is false." 14. The compromise decree passed in C.S.No.1142 of 1992 dated 30.1.2003 would go to establish that the respondent, having completely given a go-by to her serious contention raised in the written statement that the agreement of sale entered into with the said Banu Priya was only a sham and nominal document and also without informing the court about the order of injunction with respect the very same property restraining the respondent from alienating the property granted in C.S.No.1843 of 1994, filed a joint memorandum of compromise with Banu Priya and obtained a consent decree in C.S.No.1142 of 1992 directing the respondent herein to execute the sale deed for a higher consideration of Rs.35,00,000/= from Rs.25,00,000/= originally agreed to Banu Priya. Under the sale deed dated 7. Under the sale deed dated 7. 2003, the respondent sold the subject property to Mrs.T.A.Dhakshayini, a nominee of Banu Priya throwing to wind the prohibitory order passed as against her not to alienate the property in C.S.No.1843 of 1994. 15. Firstly, it is found that the respondent has set up a concrete contention in the suit laid by Banu Priya seeking specific performance of agreement of sale that the said agreement of sale was only a sham and nominal document. Secondly, though she was aware of the order of injunction granted in O.A.Nos.636 and 637 of 1995 in C.S.No.1843 of 1994 dated 22. 1996, she did not choose to inform the court while inviting a compromise decree for sale of the very same property in C.S.No.1142 of 1992. The respondent has fraudulently clinched a compromise deal with Banu Priya and carried out the fraud to the portals of the court while inviting a compromise decree as though the compromise clinched between the parties was a true and genuine one. Having persuaded the court to trust her, the respondent has obtained a compromise decree. Not stopping with that, she has chosen to execute the sale deed despite a prohibitory order against her. To hoodwink not only the applicant but also the court, the respondent has adopted such a dubious device. The court has no hesitation to come to the conclusion without any feeling of compunction that fraud has been perpetrated upon the court by the respondent in obtaining the consent decree without informing the court of the prohibitory order with respect to the suit property. Gravity of contumacious disobedience of the orders of the court:- 16. There is no dispute to the fact that the respondent suffered an order of interim injunction restraining her from alienating the subject property during the pendency of the suit as per the orders passed by this court in O.A.Nos.636 and 637 of 1995 in C.S.No.1843 of 1994 dated 22. 1996. There is no denial of the fact that the respondent is very well aware of such a prohibitory order crippling her from alienating the subject property during the pendency of the suit. The applicants were shocked to know from the encumbrance certificate obtained by them on 312. 2003 that there was the transfer of the suit property by the respondent to Dhakshayini. The sale deed dated 7. The applicants were shocked to know from the encumbrance certificate obtained by them on 312. 2003 that there was the transfer of the suit property by the respondent to Dhakshayini. The sale deed dated 7. 2003 was produced to establish such a sale transaction by the first respondent in favour of Dhakshayini, a nominee of Banu Priya, the plaintiff in C.S.No.1142 of 1992. 17. The applicants have waged a battle with the respondent to enforce the agreement of sale they have allegedly entered into with the respondent. The mischief committed by the respondent has driven the applicants to lay another suit in C.S.No.128 of 2006 as against the respondent, the said Banu Priya and Dhakshayini to declare that the sale deed dated 7. 2003 executed by the respondent in respect of the subject property is null and void. The respondent, by her cunning act, has made the order of the court restraining her from alienating the subject property a mockery. The majesty of the court has been smartly challenged by the respondent by her deliberate act of alienation of the subject property to a third party. The gravity of such a wilful act of the respondent in disobeying the orders of this court cannot be simply condoned permitting her to defend the suit bringing disrepute to the majesty of the Court. 18. It is established by the applicants that the respondent has wantonly and wilfully disobeyed the orders of this court and incurred contempt of court. There is a subtle difference between a civil contempt as defined under section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the civil contempt adumbrated under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure. A mere disobedience of interim injunction granted or any order made under Rule 1 and Rule 2 of Order XXXIX would attract penal consequence. But, under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, every disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of court or breach of an undertaking given to a court would not fall under the definition of a civil contempt. There should be wilful or deliberate or intentional disobedience of the order of the court or breach of an undertaking. Only then, can the contemnor be hauled up for the contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. There should be wilful or deliberate or intentional disobedience of the order of the court or breach of an undertaking. Only then, can the contemnor be hauled up for the contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. But, here, in this case, there are sufficient materials to prove beyond doubt that the respondent has not only disobeyed the orders of this court, but also stealthily and deliberately disobeyed the orders of this court. Right to defend the suit:- 19. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent submits the authority in N.C.DAS v. M.A.MOHSIN AND ANOTHER ( 1997(7) SCC 438 ) wherein the Supreme Court has held that the contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked by a party litigant to wreak personal vengeance against the alleged contemnors. 20. The Supreme Court in R.N. DEY AND OTHERS v. BHAGYABATI PRAMANIK AND OTHERS ( (2000) 4 SCC 400 ) has observed that the contempt jurisdiction of the court cannot be misused as a weapon for the sole purpose of executing a decree or implementing an order for which law provides appropriate remedies. 21. In the instant case, it is not a case of personal vengeance sought to be wreaked through the process of the court invoking the contempt jurisdiction by the applicants. Alleging that the applicants entered into an agreement of sale with the respondent, they filed a suit for a direction to perform the part of the contract on the side of the respondent. Protective order with respect to the subject property was obtained by the applicants. But, the protection afforded to the applicants was completely pierced through by the respondent through the sale deed she executed. Under such circumstances, there is no question of giving vent to the personal animosity by the applicants through the process of contempt of court. No question of implementing the orders of the court by using the weapon of contempt by the applicants has arisen in this case. Therefore, the aforesaid authorities have no application to the facts and circumstances of this case. The right to defend without purge of contempt:- 22. The facts and circumstances of this case would amply demonstrate that the respondent has no respect to the law of the land. The seminal question as to whether such a contemnor can be permitted to defend her case without purging the contempt she has committed arises for determination. The right to defend without purge of contempt:- 22. The facts and circumstances of this case would amply demonstrate that the respondent has no respect to the law of the land. The seminal question as to whether such a contemnor can be permitted to defend her case without purging the contempt she has committed arises for determination. In all cases of contempt of court, the court cannot deny the defence of the contemnor. There may be cases where an error of judgment would persuade a contemnor to breach an undertaking or to disobey the orders of the court. There may be cases where no deliberate action would have been initiated to incur the wrath of the contempt of law. There may also be cases where the contempt committed by the contemnor does not have serious consequence or repercussion. The court will have to weigh the pros and cons of the gravity of the contempt committed by a contemnor and decide whether such a contemnor can be permitted to defend herself in the main lis. In the considered opinion of this court, the respondent has committed a contempt of far reaching consequences which virtually takes away the very right of the applicants to agitate usefully and purposefully before the court of law. 23. The Supreme Court in PRESTIGE LIGHTS LTD. v. STATE BANK OF INDIA (2007 (4) CTC 727) has observed as follows:- "An order passed by a competent Court-interim or final-has to be obeyed without any reservation. If such order is disobeyed or not complied with, the Court may refuse the party violating such order to hear him on merits. We are not unmindful of the situation that refusal to hear a party to the proceeding on merits is a drastic step and such a serious penalty should not be imposed on him except in grave and extraordinary situations, but some time such an action is needed in the larger interest of justice when a party obtaining interim relief intentionally and deliberately flouts such order by not abiding the terms and conditions on which a relief is granted by the Court in his favour." The Supreme Court has succinctly held that in grave and extraordinary circumstances, a drastic measure to show the doors to the contemnor can very well be resorted to. .24. .24. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent cited the authority viz., IN THE MATTER OF ANIL PANJWANI (PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 14 OF CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971) (2003-4-L.W. 16) wherein it has been observed as follows:- ."To our mind, the rule as to denying hearing or withholding right of participation in the proceedings to the contemnor may briefly be summed up and so stated. It lies within the discretion of the Court to tell the contemnor charged with having committed contempt of Court that he will not be heard and would not be allowed participation in the Court proceedings unless the contempt is purged. This is a flexible rule of practice and not a rigid rule of law. The discretion shall be guided and governed by the facts and circumstances of a given case. Where the Court may form an opinion that the contemnor is persisting in his behaviour and initiation of proceedings in contempt has had no deterrent or reformatory effect on him and/or if the disobedience by the contemnor is such that so long as it continues it impedes the course of justice and/or renders it impossible for the Court to enforce its orders in respect of him, the Court would be justified in withholding access to Court or participation in the proceedings from the contemnor. On the other hand, the Court may form an opinion that the contempt is not so gross as to invite an extreme step as above, or where the interests of justice would be better served by concluding the main proceedings instead of diverting to and giving priority to hearing in contempt proceeding the Court may proceed to hear both the matters simultaneously or independently of each other or in such order as it may deep proper." 25. In a case where the contempt was not so gross, the court might not invite an extreme step to show the doors of the defence to be put up by the contemnor. But, in a case where the contempt impedes the very course of justice, then the court will have to take an ultimate decision to dissuade the contemnor from participating in the proceedings of the court. .26. In view of the above facts and circumstances, I hold that the respondent loses her right to defend the suit laid by the applicants without purging the contempt of court levelled against her. .26. In view of the above facts and circumstances, I hold that the respondent loses her right to defend the suit laid by the applicants without purging the contempt of court levelled against her. .The authority of court to declare void an instrument of alienation:- .27. It is very useful to refer the observation made by the Bombay High Court in KESHRIMAL JIVJI SHAH AND ANOTHER v. BANK OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS (2004 (122) CC 831 = 2004 INDLAW MUM 122) ."It is time that we recognise the principle that transfer of immovable property in violation of an order of injunction or prohibition issued by Court of law confers no right, title or interest in the transferee, as it is no transfer at all. The transferee cannot be allowed to reap advantage or benefit from such transfer merely because he is not a party to the proceedings in which the order of injunction or other prohibitory direction or restraint came to be issued. It is enough that the transferor is a party and the order was in force. These two conditions being satisfied, the transfer must not be upheld. If this course is not adopted then the tendency to flout orders of Courts which is increasing day-by-day can never be curbed." 28. The question which arose for consideration before the Bench of the Bombay High Court was whether the transfer of an immovable property in contravention of a prohibitory or injunction order passed by the court was illegal or void. Coming down heavily upon the transfer of property made by a party litigant who was restrained from alienating the same, held that such a transfer pendente lite against the spirit of the restriction all along imposed by the court was illegal and could not at all be recognised. The transferee of the property took up a feeble stand that he had no knowledge about the order of prohibitory injunction as against the vendor. The court held that a transferee cannot be allowed to go scot-free setting up a defence that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The theory of bona fide purchaser without valid notice will not apply to alienations made pendente lite when an order of prohibitory injunction was in force. 29. The court held that a transferee cannot be allowed to go scot-free setting up a defence that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The theory of bona fide purchaser without valid notice will not apply to alienations made pendente lite when an order of prohibitory injunction was in force. 29. In SURJIT SINGH v. HARBANS SINGH ( AIR 1996 SC 135 ), the Supreme Court has held as follows:- "In defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances, has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes." 30. The transferee, pendente lite, sought to implead himself in the civil proceedings. The court below allowed the plea of the transferee pendente lite and permitted him to participate in the pending civil proceedings. But, the Supreme Court has observed that the path treaded by the courts below was out of their bounds. A duty has been cast upon the court to treat the alienation as having not taken place at all. The ends of justice would be defeated if such a defiance of the restraint order is permitted to be casually disobeyed. 31. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the desire of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. A decree for partition obtained by non disclosure of the deed of lease executed by a party relinquishing his rights in the property amounts to a fraud played upon the court and therefore, such a decree is a nullity and non-est in the eye of law and is liable to be set aside. (vide S.P.CHENGALVARAYA NAIDU v. JAGANNATH ( 1994 (1) SCC 1 ). 32. The aforesaid ratio has been followed by the Supreme Court in a subsequent decision in GOWRISHANKAR v. JOSHI AMBA SHANKAR FAMILY TRUST ( 1996(3) SCC 310 ). (vide S.P.CHENGALVARAYA NAIDU v. JAGANNATH ( 1994 (1) SCC 1 ). 32. The aforesaid ratio has been followed by the Supreme Court in a subsequent decision in GOWRISHANKAR v. JOSHI AMBA SHANKAR FAMILY TRUST ( 1996(3) SCC 310 ). Fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of court. Therefore, the courts have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon that court. The court has also inherent power to set aside a sale brought about by fraud practised upon it or to set aside an order of compromise obtained by fraud. (vide INDIAN BANK v. SATYAM FIBRES (INDIA) PVT. LTD. ( 1996 (5) SCC 550 )). .33. Here is a case where the respondent has played fraud upon the court by inviting a consent decree in C.S.No.1142 of 1992 to upset the restraint order the applicants obtained as against her in C.S.No.1843 of 1994 and also to force the applicants to grope in the dark without there being any property at the fag end of the trial of the case. It will be a travesty of justice to direct the applicants to work out their remedy in C.S.No.128 of 2006 filed by them against the respondent praying to declare the sale deed dated 7. 2003 executed by the respondent in favour of Dhakshayini, permitting the respondent to participate in the main suit in C.S.No.1843 of 1994. The confidence reposed by the public in the majesty of law will be shaken if the alienation made by the respondent pendente lite against the spirit of the restraint order is allowed to continue even for a minute. This court will have to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to nullify the sale deed dated 7. 2003 taking into account the admitted position and also the fact that transferee has no right to defend himself on the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser for consideration without notice. Only then, can the respondent be permitted to defend the suit in C.S.No.1142 of 1992. .34. Taking into consideration the fraud played upon the court by the respondent in C.S.No.1142 of 1992 and the execution of the sale deed dated 7. Only then, can the respondent be permitted to defend the suit in C.S.No.1142 of 1992. .34. Taking into consideration the fraud played upon the court by the respondent in C.S.No.1142 of 1992 and the execution of the sale deed dated 7. 2003 very schemingly in favour of Dhakshayini, a nominee of Banu Priya, the plaintiff in C.S.No.1142 of 1992 and the gravity of the contempt committed by the respondent in C.S.No.1843 of 1994 bringing disrepute to the majesty of law, the sale deed dated 7. 2003 executed by the respondent in favour of Dhakshayini is declared as null and void. Reliefs granted to the applicants:- 35. The applicants have rightly approached this court to dispose of first Application No.517 of 2004 in C.S.No.1843 of 1994 before ever the learned Master proceeds with the trial of the said case. This court has held that the respondent cannot defend the suit in C.S.No.1843 of 1994 unless she has purged the contempt or the sale deed dated 7. 2003 is declared null and void. The respondent was brought in a wheel chair to the court at the time of hearing the Contempt Petition. Considering her age and her health profile and the decision already arrived at by this court to declare the sale deed dated 7. 2003 executed by the respondent as null and void, the court is not inclined to punish her for civil contempt. 36. In the result, the sale deed dated 7. 2003 executed by the respondent in favour of Dhakshayini, a nominee of Banu Priya is declared null and void exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this court under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though the respondent has committed civil contempt, she is not punished as the act of contempt committed by her has been wiped out by this court. All the three Applications are ordered accordingly. There is no order as to costs.