Judgment :- 1. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent. 2. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner Corporation challenging the award of the first respondent Labour Court, dated 12. 2002, made in I.D.No.136 of 1995. 3. It has been stated that the second respondent was employed as a Driver in the petitioner Corporation. While so, he had been punished for absenting himself from work on more than two occasions. Again the second respondent had absented himself from work for 21 days, from 211. 94 to 194. When he had turned up for work, on 112. 94, he was permitted to join duty, without prejudice to the disciplinary action initiated against him. Once again he was absent from work for four days in the month of February, 1995, and for twenty five days in the month of April, 1995, and for 30 days in the month of May, 1995. 4. For his absence from work, between 211. 94 to 112. 94, without prior intimation and without obtaining the prior permission of the management of the petitioner Corporation, charges had been framed against him and an explanation had been called for asking the second respondent to explain the reasons for his absence. Since the explanation submitted by the second respondent was not satisfactory, a domestic enquiry was held, based on the charges levelled against him. In the said domestic enquiry, which was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the second respondent was found guilty of the charges framed against him. Based on the report of the enquiry officer the management of the petitioner Corporation had issued a show cause notice asking the second respondent to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service. Since the explanation submitted by the second respondent was not satisfactory he was removed from service from 35. 95. 5. Aggrieved by the said order, the second respondent had raised an Industrial Dispute before the first respondent Labour Court. The second respondent had stated before the first respondent Labour Court that his absence was due to the fact that he was suffering from jaundice, cold and chest pain. Even during the domestic enquiry the second respondent had produced a prescription issued by Dr. Senguttuvan of Mannargudi and a medical certificate from Dr. K. Sekar, dated 194. The second respondent had stated before the first respondent Labour Court that his absence was due to the fact that he was suffering from jaundice, cold and chest pain. Even during the domestic enquiry the second respondent had produced a prescription issued by Dr. Senguttuvan of Mannargudi and a medical certificate from Dr. K. Sekar, dated 194. The Enquiry officer had found that if the treatment had been given by Dr. Senguttuvan, as seen from the prescription, the second respondent ought to have obtained the medical certificate, as well as the fitness certificate, from the same Doctor. On the said ground, the Enquiry Officer had found that the plea of the second respondent, that he was unwell during his absence from duty, was found to be false. 6. Contrary to the findings of the enquiry officer, the first respondent Labour Court had found that since the medical certificate, as well as the fitness certificate, had been issued by the same Doctor, the management of the petitioner Corporation ought to have condoned the absence of the second respondent. Accordingly, the first respondent Labour Court had held that the order of dismissal from service, issued against the second respondent, is contrary to law and devoid of merits. Hence, the first respondent Labour Court had ordered the reinstatement of the second respondent in service, with 50% of the backwages due to him. 7. The main contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the second respondent has been frequently absenting himself from work, unauthorisedly, and therefore, the punishment of dismissal from service, imposed on the second respondent, is just and reasonable. 8. Considering the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, as well as the second respondent and on a perusal of the records available, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner has not shown sufficient cause or reason for this Court to interfere with the award of the first respondent Labour Court, dated 12. 2002, made in I.D.No.136 of 1995. The first respondent Labour Court had exercised its discretionary power, under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to set aside the order of termination issued against the second respondent, having found that the said punishment was disproportionate in nature. 2002, made in I.D.No.136 of 1995. The first respondent Labour Court had exercised its discretionary power, under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to set aside the order of termination issued against the second respondent, having found that the said punishment was disproportionate in nature. Further, the Labour Court had found that the management of the petitioner Corporation ought to have considered the fact that the second respondent was suffering from certain illnesses due to which he was absent from work. Since sufficient evidence was available to show that the second respondent had undergone medical treatment, the management of the petitioner Corporation ought to have considered the same before imposing the extreme punishment of dismissal from service on the second respondent workman. Even though the second respondent had submitted his explanation stating the reasons for his absence from work, the same was not considered by the management of the petitioner Corporation before passing the order dismissing the second respondent from service. Thus, it is seen that the first respondent Labour Court had come to its conclusions after considering the evidence on record and by invoking its discretionary power, under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioner has not been in a position to show that the award of first respondent Labour Court, dated 12. 2002, made in I.D.No.136 of 1995, is either perverse or based on no evidence. In such circumstances, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Hence, it is dismissed. No costs.