JUDGMENT 1. - By way of this writ petition the petitioner has prayed that the impugned award dated 28.01.1995 and order dated 15.04.2002 passed by the learned Labour Court, Jaipur may kindly be quashed and set aside and the claim of the respondent No. 1 Bhagwan Sahai may kindly be dismissed with costs. 2. The brief facts of the present case are that the State of Rajasthan referred the following dispute under Section 10(1) (c) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 to the learned Labour Court, Jaipur vide notification No. F.1(1)(159) labour/92 dated 10.10.1992 : " D;k Jfed Hkxoku lgk; iq= lwjtey tkV ( ftldk izfrfuf/kRo Jh lw;Zizdk'k flag] 881] rhljk pkSjkgk] ckck gjh'kpUnz ekxZ] t;iqj }kjk fd;k x;k gS ) dks mi ou laj{kd lkfgch ifj;kstuk ou foHkkx] jktLFkku ljdkj] 'kkgiqjk] ftyk t;iqj }kjk fnukad 1-5-86 ls lsokeqDr fd;k tkuk mfpr ,oa oS/k gS\ ;fn ugha izkFkhZ fdl jkgr ,oa jkf'k dks izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ " 3. According to the claim filed by the respondent No. 1 Shri Bhagwan Sahai, he worked from 1.8.1984 as a Cattle Guard under the present petitioner. He worked upto 1.1.1986, on which date when he went for his work, he was not taken on duty. Thereafter he approached the Conciliation Officer, who submitted a failure report, upon which the Government framed an industrial dispute as above and referred it to the learned Labour Court, Jaipur. The respondent No. 1 Shri Bhagwan Sahai prayed for reinstatement with full wages and all consequential relief, as he was unemployed after the alleged termination of his service. He also alleged that no seniority list of the Cattle Guard had been prepared by the Department. 4. The learned Labour Court despite non-service of the court notice, the exparte proceedings were ordered on 6.9.1994 and thereafter an ex pane award was passed on 28.1.1995, declaring that the termination of the respondent No. 1 Bhagwan Sahai's services w.e.f. 1.1.1986 was unlawful and hence he was reinstated with benefit of continuity of service and consequential benefits and full wages. 5. Against this order, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 6. On the other hand learned counsel for respondents Mr. P.S. Sharma has appeared and prayed to this court that the award passed by the labour court is correct in the eyes of law. 7. 5. Against this order, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 6. On the other hand learned counsel for respondents Mr. P.S. Sharma has appeared and prayed to this court that the award passed by the labour court is correct in the eyes of law. 7. The Division Bench of this Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 423/1997 Management M/s. Bharatpur Nutritional Products Ltd. v. Ishwar Chand and in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 422/1997 The Management M/s. Bharatpur Nutritional Products Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan has considered the case decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. "Having carefully scanned the impugned order, I notice that all the contentions raised before me were analyzed and considered in great details by the Labour Court. The scope of supervisory jurisdiction was explained by the Supreme Court in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Company Limited, 2003(3) S.C. 524 which runs in (para-7): "The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an appellate court of the tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision." 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The wide jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 has to be exercised with great circumspection. The High Court cannot constitute itself into an appellate court over Tribunals. Article 226/227 is a device to secure and advance justice and not otherwise. In a case of this nature, it is true, the High Court exercising the power of judicial review would not interfere with the discretion of a Tribunal unless the same is found to be illegal or irrational. In an application for a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing an award of an Industrial Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court is very limited. In an application for a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing an award of an Industrial Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court is very limited. It can quash the award, inter alia, when the Tribunal has committed an error of law apparent on the face of record or when the finding of facts of the Tribunal is wholly perverse. It is also a settled law that in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court acts only in a supervisory capacity and not as an appellate tribunal. It does not review the evidence upon which the inferior tribunal proposed to base its conclusion, it simply demolished the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or manifestly erroneous, but does not, as a rule, substitute its own view for those of the inferior tribunal. 9. In the present matter, I do not find any jurisdictional error, perversity and illegality in the award passed by the labour court. The finding of the labour court is based on the basis of material placed before him. There is no error apparent in the face on record. I, therefore, do not find any justification to interfere with the award. In my view the writ petition does not call for any interference. The same is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******