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2008 DIGILAW 469 (GAU)

Md. Abdul Sattar v. State of Assam

2008-06-27

I.A.ANSARI

body2008
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This revision has raised a very interesting question of law and the question is this: Whether a wife can seek maintenance from her Husband, under Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, even if she had lived in adultery and, if so, under what circumstances? 2. The question, posed above, has arisen out of the judgment and order, dated 26.6.2007, passed, in Criminal Revision No. 28(0)4/2006, whereby the learned Sessions Judge, Darrang, has directed, the present Petitioner, as husband of the opposite party herein, to pay to her maintenance @ Rs. 500 per month by setting aside the order, dated 11.7.2006, passed in Misc. Case No. 72/2005, by the learned Judicial Magistrate. 3. I have heard Mr. H.R.A. Choudhury, learned senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, and Mr. M.H. Choudhury, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the opposite party. 4. While considering the revision, what needs to be noted is that it is not in dispute that both the parties to the maintenance proceeding are Muslim by faith and a valid marriage, (sic) of the Muslim personal law, was solemnized between them. It is also not in dispute that following their marriage, (sic) the parties to the maintenance proceeding cohabited as husband and wife. In fact, it is also not in dispute that the opposite party presently resides with her parents at her paternal house and the present Petitioner never paid any maintenance allowance to her since after the time the opposite party had left her matrimonial home. In order to justify his refusal to either maintain the opposite party or to pay for her maintenance, the Petitioner contended, and even, now, contends, in this revision, that the opposite party herein had eloped.with a relative of the present Petitioner, she swore an affidavit dissolving her marriage with the present Petitioner and left with her paramour as her husband. In order to justify his refusal to either maintain the opposite party or to pay for her maintenance, the Petitioner contended, and even, now, contends, in this revision, that the opposite party herein had eloped.with a relative of the present Petitioner, she swore an affidavit dissolving her marriage with the present Petitioner and left with her paramour as her husband. The opposite party disputes and denies the accusations, so made, against her and claims, on the other hand, that she had been abducted by a relative of her husband, (i.e., the present Petitioner), and upon her being so abducted, the present Petitioner had lodged, in this regard, a First Information Report and it was only after her recovery by police, from the house of her abductor, that her husband refused to take her back to her matrimonial home and, having been left with no option, she had to go back to, and take shelter at, her paternal house and, since then, she has been living with her parents, who are poor and cannot maintain her. This apart, according to the opposite party, she has no independent source of livelihood. 5. Even if, for a moment, it is assumed that what the present Petitioner contends is true that the opposite party had sworn an affidavit dissolving her marriage with the present Petitioner, the fact of the matter remains that a Muslim marriage cannot be dissolved by a wife by swearing an affidavit. This position of law is, in fact, not in dispute. Notwithstanding, therefore, the accusations made against the opposite party that she had been, once, living, with her paramour, the fact of the matter remains that the marriage-tie between the present Petitioner and the opposite party having not been snapped according to the law, applicable to the parties, their marriage-tie still, survives irrespective of fact as to whether the opposite party had voluntarily gone with her paramour and lived with her paramour or not. Thus, the crucial facts, which are relevant and necessary for determination of the case, were these: Whether the parties to the maintenance proceedings were husband and wife and whether the present Petitioner, as husband, refused to maintain the opposite party and whether such refusal is legally sustainable? 6. When the marriage-tie between the parties to the maintenance proceeding had survived and still survives, the present Petitioner cannot refuse to maintain the opposite party. 6. When the marriage-tie between the parties to the maintenance proceeding had survived and still survives, the present Petitioner cannot refuse to maintain the opposite party. His refusal to maintain is on the ground that the opposite party had lived in adultery with her paramour. For the purpose of a clear understanding of the circumstances, when a wife legally disentitles herself to receive maintenance under the scheme of Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, the provisions, contained in Section 125(4), need to be patiently scrutinized. With this end in view, Section 125(4), Code of Criminal Procedure is reproduced below: Section 125(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living an adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent. 7. A bare reading of the provisions of Section 125(4) makes it more that transparent that a husband has no obligation to maintain his wife if she is living in adultery. The expression "if she is living in adultery" conveys present continuous tense. That is to say, a wife disentitles herself from receiving maintenance from her husband only during the period, when she lives in adultery. When she does hot live in adultery, or when she ceases to live in adultery, even if she had lived in adultery in the past, the husband cannot refuse to maintain her on the ground that she had, in the past, lived in adultery. 8. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that Section 125 absolves a husband from the liability of maintaining his wife only when the wife lives in adultery or when, without sufficient reason, refuses to live with her husband or when she is living separately from her husband by mutual consent. Hence, when the wife ceases to live in adultery, the husband cannot, say that since she had lived in an adulterous relation with a man in the past, she is not entitled to receive maintenance from her husband, even though she has ceased to live in adultery. In the case at hand, even if the second party had lived in adultery, the fact remains that according to the evidence on record, she has been presently living admittedly, with her parents and has no surviving ties with her abductor or paramour, as the case may be. In the case at hand, even if the second party had lived in adultery, the fact remains that according to the evidence on record, she has been presently living admittedly, with her parents and has no surviving ties with her abductor or paramour, as the case may be. In such circumstances, the present Petitioner, as husband of the opposite party, was liable to maintain her, particularly, when the opposite party does not, admittedly, have any independent source of livelihood and she is dependent for her sustenance on her parents. It is no defence to the obligation of payment of maintenance to a wife by her husband if the wife has ceased to live in adultery even if she had maintained, in the past, adulterous relationship with another man. 9. Because of what have been discussed above, this Court finds no infirmity in the direction given by the learned Sessions Judge that the present Petitioner, as husband, shall pay maintenance @ Rs. 500 per month to the opposite party herein, as his wife. In short, thus, this Court finds no infirmity, legal or factual, in the order, which stands impugned in this revision. 10. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this revision fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. Petition dismissed