JUDGMENT: Sri Rama Swamy & Sri Prasanna Visweswaraswami Temple, Potegunta, Rapur Taluk, Nellore District, is the appellant. The respondents' suit, being O.S.No.42 of 1980, on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Gudur, for declaration, possession and future mesne profits was decreed on 31.12.1982. Therefore, the present appeal is filed by the defendant temple. 2. The suit schedule properties are agricultural dry lands admeasuring Acs.16.91 cents comprised in Survey Nos.391, 392, 135, 164, 168 and 109 situated at Potegunta Village of Rapur Taluk in Nellore District. Plaintiffs alleged that they belong to Barber community, rendering bhajantri service (tom-tom) in the defendant temple. Their ancestors were granted the inam in respect of suit schedule properties. After their demise, plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the property till 1969. The Inam Register and Village Revenue Records also show their names as occupants. The inam was granted by the Zamindar of Venkatagiri on condition of the plaintiffs rendering bhajantri service. Defendant, which has no title to the properties, auctioned leasehold rights on 30.06.1968. Puttamreddi Bakkireddi became successful bidder. He and the defendant filed O.S.No.51 of 1969 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Gudur, which was renumbered as O.S.No.20 of 1970 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Venkatagiri, for injunction. After obtaining temporary injunction, defendant and Bakkireddi dispossessed the plaintiffs. 3. Plaintiffs further alleged that during the enquiry under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 (Inams Abolition Act, for brevity), (A.P.Act No.XXXVII of 1956), they were not issued a notice as contemplated under the Inams Abolition Act. The proceedings obtained by the defendant, therefore, are void and did not confer any title. The inam enquiry was conducted in connivance with Village Munsif, who was also trustee of the temple. Therefore, plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration that plaint schedule properties are personal inam of the plaintiffs, subject to performance of tom-tom service at temple, to direct the defendant to deliver possession of the property, and to direct defendant to pay future mesne profits at such rate as may be determined by the Court. 4. The defendant opposed the suit. The pleadings in the written statement in brief are as follows. The suit schedule properties from times immemorial are endowed and in occupation of the defendant temple. 4. The defendant opposed the suit. The pleadings in the written statement in brief are as follows. The suit schedule properties from times immemorial are endowed and in occupation of the defendant temple. The temple has leased out the same to various individuals on yearly basis. The plaintiffs' allegation that suit schedule properties are personal inam for rendering service of tom-tom in the temple is not correct. Plaintiffs were never doing any such service. During the special functions like Sri Rama Navami, Dasara, Siva Rathri, Pratistapana day, Kartika Mondays etc., bhajantries are engaged on contract rate and they are duly paid by the trustee. The temple was registered as a religious institution under Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (Endowments Act 1966) on 13.06.1968. The leasehold rights of the temple were auctioned on 30.06.1968. 5. The lands were also subject matter of enquiry before the Inams Abolition Tahasildar. After issuing notices as prescribed under the Inams Abolition Act and Rules made thereunder, the Special Deputy Tahasildar conducted enquiry in Inams Case No.43 of 1958 at Gudur. During the enquiry, the plaintiffs or their predecessors gave statements. The authority then recorded that suit schedule lands are owned by the defendant Institution. A regular patta was issued under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act to the defendant. These proceedings have become final and are binding. The plaintiffs have no right to seek a declaration and validity of the proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act cannot be gone into by the Civil Court. If the plaintiffs are aggrieved by the same, they have to prefer an appeal to the concerned authority. Under Section 14 of the Inams Abolition Act civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Though plaintiffs are aware of the proceedings, they did not object. They are, therefore, estopped from taking contrary pleas. They are not in possession and temple alone is in possession of the property. 6. Defendant further alleged that the Commissioner of Endowments Department by proceedings dated 18.08.1979 granted permission to the trustee to sell the lands on outright basis by conducting public auction. Accordingly, lands were sold in public auction in the presence of Assistant Commissioner of Endowments. Successful bidders deposited 1/3rd of bid amount. Most of them also paid entire amount, and the Commissioner of Endowments Department confirmed the sale on 06.02.1980. Accordingly, lands were sold in public auction in the presence of Assistant Commissioner of Endowments. Successful bidders deposited 1/3rd of bid amount. Most of them also paid entire amount, and the Commissioner of Endowments Department confirmed the sale on 06.02.1980. The purchasers are in possession of the respective lands purchased by them. Bakkireddi filed O.S.No.20 of 1970 when plaintiffs attempted to trespass into the land. The same was decreed. Therefore, the suit is barred by principle of res judicata. 7. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues. 1. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from contesting the grant of Ryotwari patta to the suit lands in favour of the defendant under the Estates Abolition Act? 2. Whether the defendant has perfected its title to the suit lands by adverse possession? 3. Whether the auction purchasers of the lands sold in the auction held on 28.12.79 and confirmed by the orders of the Commissioner, Endowments department dt.6.2.80 are proper and necessary parties, if so, whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of them in the suit? 4. Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration, possession and mesne profits in respect of the suit properties as prayed for by them? 5. To what relief? 8. Plaintiff Nos.1 and 7 examined themselves as P.Ws.1 and 2 respectively. Besides examining P.Ws.3 to 5, plaintiffs marked Exs.A.1 and A.2. Ex.A.1 is certified copy of 10(1) Account Book of Potegunta Village for 1369 Fasli (1959). Ex.A.2 is the certified copy of Village Inam Fair Register. The defendant temple examined the Inams Deputy Tahasildar (IDT), Nellore, as D.W.1. The trustee of the temple was examined as D.W.2. D.Ws.3 to 6 were also examined and marked Exs.B.1 to B.7, which are the notices, statements and other related documents, which came into existence during the enquiry by D.W.1. Ex.B.8 is the extract from the Register of Hindu Religious and Charitable Institutions under Section 38 of the Endowments Act 1966. Ex.B.25 is the certified copy of the judgment in O.S.No.20 of 1970, and Exs.B.27 to B.33 are the money receipts evidencing payments to musicians, who performed bhajantri service at defendant temple. Exs.B.34 to B.36 are the proceedings in relation to the auction conducted by the temple to sell away the suit schedule properties. 9. Ex.B.25 is the certified copy of the judgment in O.S.No.20 of 1970, and Exs.B.27 to B.33 are the money receipts evidencing payments to musicians, who performed bhajantri service at defendant temple. Exs.B.34 to B.36 are the proceedings in relation to the auction conducted by the temple to sell away the suit schedule properties. 9. On considering the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court held that the civil Court's jurisdiction is not barred because there was no decision of the Tahasildar under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act in the eye of the law. He also came to the conclusion that defendant obtained patta in collusion with plaintiff No.4, who signed Ex.B.27 and B.30 receipts. The trial Court did not give much importance to Exs.B.1 to B.6 also. The defendant's plea of res judicata and the plea of estoppel were also not accepted by the trial Court holding that in a suit for injunction the question of title is not a substantial issue. 10. From these submissions of learned Counsel, to which a reference is made while considering the specific question, the following five points would fall for examination. 1. Whether entire appeal is abated on the death of respondent No.7 in the appeal? 2. Whether the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred in view of Section 14 of the Inams Abolition Act read with Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)? 3. Whether the plaintiffs participated in Inams enquiry, and if such participation is true, are they estopped from seeking declaration that suit properties are personal inam? 4. Whether Ex.B.25 - the judgment in O.S.No.20 of 1970, operates as res judicata and bars the suit? and 5. Whether the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary parties? In Re Point No.1: Question of abatement: 11. The suit was filed by seven plaintiffs seeking a declaration that the suit schedule properties are personal service inam of the plaintiffs. They succeeded in the suit. During the pendency of the defendant's appeal, respondents 4, 6 and 7 died. The legal heirs of respondents 4 and 6 are brought on record by virtue of the orders of this Court, dated 04.04.2008, in C.M.P.Nos.15093 and 15096 of 1995. However the appellant did not take any steps to bring the legal heirs of respondent No.7 (plaintiff No.7). During the pendency of the defendant's appeal, respondents 4, 6 and 7 died. The legal heirs of respondents 4 and 6 are brought on record by virtue of the orders of this Court, dated 04.04.2008, in C.M.P.Nos.15093 and 15096 of 1995. However the appellant did not take any steps to bring the legal heirs of respondent No.7 (plaintiff No.7). On this admitted position, the learned Counsel for respondents submits that as the relief claimed is joint and indivisible, when the appeal is abated against respondent No.7, the entire appeal has to be dismissed. He points that when the appeal is abated against respondent No.7, if the appeal is entertained and is allowed as against respondent Nos.1 to 6, it would be inconsistent with the decree passed by the lower Court at least insofar as respondent No.7 is concerned. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the plaintiffs claimed a declaration that the suit schedule properties are personal inam, but they never claimed a joint patta. Their case was that their ancestors were recognized as personal inam holders, and on coming into force of the Inams Abolition Act all the inams stood abolished and a person in occupation of the land would get a right for grant of ryotwari patta. According to the learned Counsel, such being the case, even if all the plaintiffs jointly filed a suit, they were only claiming patta individually. If ultimately a joint patta is granted in their favour as in the case of a joint family, the things would have been different. 12. This Court finds force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant. There cannot be any dispute that if the plaintiffs seek conversion of the inam into ryotwari lands, they have to necessarily approach the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act, and a suit is not a proper remedy. Secondly, no evidence is available on record to show that all the plaintiffs or their ancestors were jointly cultivating the lands. The array of plaintiffs would show that there are at least three families, namely, Dodlavaram, Potladutti and Gudluru - which were allegedly rendering bhajantri service in the temple, and therefore, if they approach IDT for any patta, the right would be considered independently depending on the evidence of possession by each person belonging to each family. The relief, therefore, cannot be treated as indivisible. The relief, therefore, cannot be treated as indivisible. If the appeal is abated against respondent No.7, the appeal would not abate as against respondents 1 to 6 for two reasons. Assuming that all the members of the bhajantri team approached the Inams Deputy Tahasilar, by which time any of the member is no more, certainly, his legal heirs would be entitled to patta. The declaration they sought is to the effect that in preference to the defendant temple, barbers alone are entitled for grant of patta. 13. Learned Counsel for the respondents relied on State of Punjab v Nathu Ram1. In the said judgment the State of Punjab filed an appeal before the High Court against Land Acquisition Award against two brothers. During the pendency of the appeal one of them died. Therefore, the High Court dismissed the appeal holding that the appeal is abated against other brother also, and also holding that both brothers were joint decree holders and in the absence of one of them, appeal is not properly constituted. When the matter came up before the Supreme Court, their Lordships held as under. It is not disputed that in view of O. 22, R. 4, Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter called the Code, the appeal abated against Labhu Ram deceased, when no application for bringing on record his legal representatives had been made within the time limited by law. The Code does not provide for the abatement of the appeal against the other respondents. Courts have held that in certain circumstances, the appeals against the co-respondents would also abate as a result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent. They have not been always agreed with respect to the result of the particular circumstances of a case and there has been, consequently, divergence of opinion in the application of the principle. It will serve no useful purpose to consider the cases. Suffice it to say that when O. 22, R. 4 does not provide for the abatement of the appeals against the co-respondents of the deceased respondent there can be no question of abatement of the appeals against them. To say that the appeals against them abated in certain circumstances, is not a correct statement. Of course, the appeals against them cannot proceed in certain circumstances and have therefore to be dismissed. To say that the appeals against them abated in certain circumstances, is not a correct statement. Of course, the appeals against them cannot proceed in certain circumstances and have therefore to be dismissed. Such a result depends on the nature of the relief sought in the appeal. The same conclusion is to be drawn from the provisions of O. 1, R. 9 of the Code which provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties and the Court may, in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. It follows, therefore, that if the Court can deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the appellant and the respondents other than the deceased respondent, it has to proceed with the appeal and decide it. It is only when it is not possible for the Court to deal with such matters, that it will have to refuse to proceed further with the appeal and therefore dismiss it. (emphasis supplied) 14. Thus, it all depends on the facts of each case as to whether appellate Court should proceed with the appeal when the appeal abates against one of the co-respondents. As a general rule, it cannot be held that whenever a co- respondent dies, entire appeal abates. Basing on the facts, the appellate Court can always proceed with the appeal against other respondents. 15. In Ram Sarup v Munshi2, it was held that when the decree was joint one, and part of the decree had become final by reason of abatement, entire appeal must be held to have been abated. It was an appeal arising out of the decree in favour of preemptors. The decree in respect of share of deceased appellant had become final, and therefore, it was pointed out that if the appeal is allowed it would result in conflicting decrees. Though the Supreme Court accepted the principle, ultimately, it did not grant any relief to the respondent, but allowed the appeal taking into consideration subsequent legislation. 16. In the case on hand, however, the plaintiffs sought only a declaration that they are entitled to grant of ryotwari patta by virtue of personal service inam, and therefore, even if the appeal abates against respondent No.7, entire appeal does not abate. 16. In the case on hand, however, the plaintiffs sought only a declaration that they are entitled to grant of ryotwari patta by virtue of personal service inam, and therefore, even if the appeal abates against respondent No.7, entire appeal does not abate. The point is answered accordingly. In Re Point Nos.2 and 3: 17. Admitted factual outline relevant for these two points in brief may be noticed. IDT, Gudur, initiated enquiry in Inams Case No.43 of 1958. It is not, however, clear from the record whether the enquiry was initiated suo motu or on an application made by the defendant. Whatever be the case, IDT issued Ex.B.1 - notice, purportedly under Rule 3(2) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Rules, 1957 (the Rules, for brevity), calling upon the persons as to why plaint schedule land should not be treated as inam to Institution3. He then conducted an enquiry and recorded statements - Exs.B.2 to B.6, of persons belonging to Barber community. He then issued Ex.B.7 patta in favour of the defendant. The contention, however, by the plaintiffs is that in the absence of any notice to the plaintiffs or in the absence of service of notice on the plaintiffs, Ex.B.5 - order of IDT and Ex.B.7 - ryotwari patta are nullity. When there is no decision as such under the Inams Abolition Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not ousted. Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that defendant obtained Ex.B.5 and B.7 in collusion with plaintiff No.4 (P.W.5), who signed Exs.B.27 and B.30 - receipts, and therefore, Section 14 of the Inams Abolition Act does not bar common law remedy. It is the further contention that as they had no notice in inams enquiry, the principle of estoppel has no application. 18. As the question of jurisdiction and estoppel are interrelated, it is necessary to notice the first principles regarding these legal aspects. When a person, by his declaration, act or omission, permits another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, the person who made declaration shall not be allowed in any suit or proceedings to deny the truth of that thing. This is relevant for the purpose of this case because of two reasons. First, plaintiff No.4 (P.W.5) gave statement Ex.B.2 before IDT. This is relevant for the purpose of this case because of two reasons. First, plaintiff No.4 (P.W.5) gave statement Ex.B.2 before IDT. Likewise, father of plaintiff No.2 gave statement Ex.B.6, and the father of plaintiff No.4 gave Ex.B.4. In addition to this, one Biliagunta Papaiah gave Ex.B.3 -statement. In Exs.B.2 and B.3, P.W.5 and Papaiah requested for grant of patta to them stating that they or their community people were enjoying the property. In Ex.B.4 father of P.W.5 who is aged 90 years, stated that during his lifetime, bhajantri service was not performed by the plaintiffs and that he had no knowledge about such service being performed by barber community. Father of plaintiff No.2 in Ex.B.6 stated that he has no objection to give patta to temple. The evidentiary value of Exs.B.2 to B.6 apart, these would prove that there was indeed notice to the plaintiffs or the persons interested in inam land. 19. The entire file relating to Inams Case No.43 of 1958 was brought to the trial Court. But, only Exs.B.1 to B.7 therein are marked. Ex.B.5 is the note orders of IDT, dated 12.03.1965. The same reads as under. 12-03-1965: Visited the Village and enquired the Village officers. None of parties turned up. Recorded the statement of the Village Officers. Issue pattas in favour of the Inamdars except in respect of S.No.335 which is an artisan Inam alienated in which case the issue of patta is deferred. On my way back to Nellore the Barbar (Mangalavallu) of the village meet me at Marlapudi and gave a statement requiring that they are the Inamdars of S.No.391 etc. covered by T.D.No.691 and requested that the pattas may be given in their favour. A perusal of the record reveals that the decision given by my predecessor was in favour of the institution and no appeal was prepared by the Barbers then. As such we are found to follow the decision. Further the Village Officers also stated that the land belongs to the Temple. So nothing could be done now on him request place issue patta in favour of the institution for these S.Nos. also. Submitted: Pattas have been put up for signature. (emphasis supplied) 20. The above note order in the file, marked as Ex.B.5 carries with it a presumption that being an action by public authority in the course of its official business it was correctly recorded. also. Submitted: Pattas have been put up for signature. (emphasis supplied) 20. The above note order in the file, marked as Ex.B.5 carries with it a presumption that being an action by public authority in the course of its official business it was correctly recorded. A reading of Ex.B.5 would show that when the IDT conducted enquiry in the Village, though none of the parties turned up for enquiry, and that on his way at Marlapudi, the Barbers appeared and gave statements claiming that they are inamdars in respect of Survey No.391 covered by TD No.691 and requested for grant of pattas. Ex.B.5 also belies any contention that there was no notice. If the contention is that at a stage of publishing notice under Rule 3(1) of the Rules, or at least at the stage of grant of patta under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act, plaintiff No.4 and father of plaintiff No.2 appeared and gave statements, the submission that there was no decision in the eye of law as required under the Inams Abolition Act cannot be accepted. For these reasons, it must be held that the plaintiffs are estopped from raising such contention. 21. Learned Counsel for the defendant submits that in view of Section 14 of the Inams Abolition Act, civil Court has no jurisdiction. She would also contend that the allegation of misrepresentation, fraud and collusion are without any merit. Nextly, she contends that when once a ryotwari patta is granted under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act, its validity cannot be questioned in a civil Court and the person aggrieved has remedies by way of an appeal under Section 7(2) of the Inams Abolition Act and revision under Section 14-A of the Inams Abolition Act. She placed strong reliance on the decision of this Court in Thumati Varamma v Thumati Rambhotlu4. Learned Counsel for plaintiffs submits that as there was collusion between P.W.5 and the defendant a suit is not barred. He placed reliance on G.Naganna v Staya Sri Sri Sri Pramoda Theertha Swamy Varu5. 22. There is no gainsaying that unless its jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred, a civil Court has jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature. Express bar is imposed by statute making it clear that a civil Court has no jurisdiction to try a suit or proceedings of civil nature. 22. There is no gainsaying that unless its jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred, a civil Court has jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature. Express bar is imposed by statute making it clear that a civil Court has no jurisdiction to try a suit or proceedings of civil nature. The principle of implied bar of civil Court's jurisdiction is inferred when the statute provides for a remedy before duly constituted authority and also provides appellate redressal mechanism. So to say, when the statute prescribes procedure for conferring a benefit and provides for appellate/original authority, without any doubt, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is impliedly barred even if there is no express mention of the same. 23. A claim for grant of ryotwari patta in respect of inam land is a right of civil nature. As per Sections 3 to 7 of the Inams Abolition Act and Rules 3 to 7 of the Rules, when an application is made by a person claiming ryotwari patta, the IDT is required to take steps as provided by the law. An application for grant of patta might in a given case consists adjudication of the claim to grant patta and/or a right to claim patta. A person may seek declaration that by reason of the original grant of inam, he is exclusively entitled to claim a right to patta. Both the claims can be adjudicated by the IDT subject to the decision of appellate authority in case such appeal is preferred. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil Court in the matter of deciding the nature of inam, the entitlement to inam and right to patta, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred. Here we may read section 14 of the Inams Abolition Act. 14. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts:- No suit or other proceeding shall be instituted in any Civil Court to set aside or modify any decision of the Tahsildar, the Revenue Court, or the Collector under this Act, except where such decision is obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or collusion of parties. 24. The first part expressly bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court. It lays down that no suit shall be instituted in civil Court to set aside or modify any decision of the Tahasildar, the revenue Court (Revenue Divisional Officer) or the Collector under the Inams Abolition Act. 24. The first part expressly bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court. It lays down that no suit shall be instituted in civil Court to set aside or modify any decision of the Tahasildar, the revenue Court (Revenue Divisional Officer) or the Collector under the Inams Abolition Act. The second part is an exception to first part. The exception is that if the decision of the Tahasildar or the Revenue Divisional Officer is obtained by misrepresentation or fraud or collusion the suit is not barred. If a party alleges that there is no notice or there is no proper notice or there is no adequate opportunity to represent the case before the Tahasildar while decision is rendered, it is not an exception to the express bar to civil Court's jurisdiction. Even if the plaintiffs allege that they had no proper notice, and therefore, there was no decision, a suit is barred. The remedy of the aggrieved in such an event is to prefer an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer. Hence on the ground of improper notice or lack of notice during the inams enquiry, a suit cannot be entertained. 25. Whether there was any collusion between the defendant and P.W.5 (plaintiff No.4) as alleged by the plaintiffs? It is well settled that if a person seeks to treat a transaction voidable or seeks to resile from a transaction or a situation on the ground of collusion, fraud or misrepresentation, the burden lies on such a person to plead instances of collusion, fraud or misrepresentation and prove to get a desired declaration. There was not even an allegation in the plaint that plaintiffs obtained a decision or patta from IDT in collusion with plaintiff No.4. The learned trial Judge erroneously surmised collusion between plaintiff No.4 and Manager of the defendant temple. Even if Exs.27 to 30 are signed by plaintiff No.4 such collusion cannot be readily inferred. Indeed, plaintiff No.4 was examined on behalf of plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs allege that there was any collusion between plaintiff No.4 and defendant they ought to have sought permission to treat him as hostile and confront him with theory of collusion. There was not even a suggestion to him about the collusion. Besides this, in Ex.B.2, plaintiff No.4 (P.W.5) spoke in favour of the plaintiffs requesting for grant of patta. There was not even a suggestion to him about the collusion. Besides this, in Ex.B.2, plaintiff No.4 (P.W.5) spoke in favour of the plaintiffs requesting for grant of patta. If only there had been any collusion, he would have, like his father in Ex.B.4, expressed no objection for grant of patta in favour of defendant temple. Therefore, theory of collusion cannot be accepted. As the jurisdiction of civil Court is specifically barred, a suit is not maintainable. 26. In Thumati Varamma (supra) the question arose whether the civil Court has jurisdiction to decide about validity of the patta granted under the Inams Abolition Act. Answering the question in the negative, it was held as follows. That apart, the District Munsif cannot decide any such issue in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Vatticherukuru Village Panchayath v Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu and others, 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 228, wherein the learned Judges have observed that the Inams Act is a self contained Code. It expressly provided rights and liabilities, prescribed procedure, remedies of appeal and revisions, excluded the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Therefore, the civil Courts are ousted from the jurisdiction to consider whether a particular land situated in a particular village comes within the purview of Inam Abolition Act. As stated above, the Act itself is a self contained Code providing hierarchy of machinery to decide the matter. Accordingly, the issue involved in this particular case was already decided by the machinery provided under the Estate Abolition Act and Inam Abolition Act and the patta was granted by the Inams Deputy Tahsildar to PW2. When the matter was carried by the District Collector, the Estates Abolition Tribunal, constituted under the Estates Abolition Act, it was held that the said village does not come under the purview of Estates Abolition Act, but comes under the Inam Abolition Act and the above said judgment has become final and that too after the said Singaracharyulu contested the matter. Therefore, the learned District Judge, cannot be simply throw away the findings without considering the evidence adduced on behalf of both the parties, observing that the learned District Munsif did not consider the evidence and failed to give findings on certain aspects i.e., nature of the lands. 27. The suit was filed on 23.01.1980. Therefore, the learned District Judge, cannot be simply throw away the findings without considering the evidence adduced on behalf of both the parties, observing that the learned District Munsif did not consider the evidence and failed to give findings on certain aspects i.e., nature of the lands. 27. The suit was filed on 23.01.1980. IDT took a decision to grant patta in favour of defendant on 26.03.1965 (Certified copy produced before this Court shows that date as 12.03.1965, which is not correct). Ex.B.7 was granted on 26.03.1965 in favour of the defendant. If the plaintiffs are aggrieved by the decision and patta the remedy was to file appeal under Section 7(2) of the Inams Abolition Act. The Inams Abolition Act is a self-contained code and all the rights are to be decided only under the Inams Abolition Act as provided therein. The validity of Ex.B.7 cannot be gone into even collaterally in a suit filed by plaintiffs for declaration that properties are personal inams of the plaintiffs. For these reasons it must be held that Section 14 of the Inams Abolition Act bars suit for declaration that suit land is personal inam of plaintiffs. In Re Point No.4: The leasehold rights in respect of suit schedule properties were auctioned by the temple. One Bakkireddi was successful bidder. Alleging that there is a threat of trespass by the plaintiffs, defendant and Bakkireddi filed O.S.No.51 of 1969 for permanent injunction restraining plaintiffs from interfering with the suit schedule land. The plaintiffs remained ex parte. The trial Court passed decree - Ex.B.25, restraining plaintiffs from interfering with the possession of the defendant and the said Bakkireddi. Based on Ex.B.25 it is argued by the defendant that the finding therein is res judicata. Reliance is placed on explanation VIII to Section 11 of CPC. Per contra, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs relied on Sajjadanashin Sayed v Musa Dadabhai Ummer6 and Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v Ujagar Singh7 and submits that unless the issue in the present suit is shown to be substantial issue in the earlier suit, the same does not operate as res judicata. According to the learned Counsel, in a suit for permanent injunction substantial issue is possession of the plaintiff, and even if question of title is collaterally decided, the same cannot operate as res judicata. According to the learned Counsel, in a suit for permanent injunction substantial issue is possession of the plaintiff, and even if question of title is collaterally decided, the same cannot operate as res judicata. This Court after perusing Ex.B.25 is not able to countenance the submission of the learned Counsel for the defendant. In Sajjadanashin (supra), the Supreme Court considered the question "what is meant in Section 11 CPC by an issue being collaterally or incidentally in issue as distinct from being directly and substantially in issue?" The question was answered by their Lordships as follows. ...therefore instances where in spite of a specific issue and an adverse finding in an earlier suit, the finding was treated as not res judicata as it was purely incidental or auxiliary or collateral to the main issue in each of these cases, and not necessary for the earlier case nor its foundation... ..when a question arises before the courts as to whether an issue was earlier decided only incidentally or collaterally, the courts could deal with the question as a matter of legal principle rather than on vague grounds... 30. The above view was reiterated in Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha (supra) as under. We may also add one other important reason which frequently arises under Section 11 CPC. The earlier suit by the respondent against the Panchayat was only a suit for injunction and not one on title. No question of title was gone into or decided. The said decision cannot, therefore, be binding on the question of title. See in this connection Sajjadanashin Sayed v Musa Dadabhai Ummer (supra) where this Court, on a detailed consideration of law in India and elsewhere held, that even if, in an earlier suit for injunction, there is an incidental finding on title, the same will not be binding in a later suit or proceeding where title is directly in question, unless it is established that it was "necessary" in the earlier suit to decide the question of title for granting or refusing injunction and that the relief for injunction was founded or based on the finding on title. Even the mere framing of an issue on title may not be sufficient as pointed out in that case. (emphasis supplied) 31. Even the mere framing of an issue on title may not be sufficient as pointed out in that case. (emphasis supplied) 31. In view of the above two decisions, Ex.B.25 does not operate res judicata as it was not necessary for the Court to decide the question of title in a suit for permanent injunction. In Re Point No.5: The defendant took a plea that after obtaining necessary permission from the Commissioner of Endowments the trustee sold the suit schedule properties in public auction, that the purchasers paid entire sale consideration and that possession was delivered to them. Therefore, it was urged that they are proper and necessary parties, and in the absence of them, suit is not maintainable. 33. D.W.2 is the trustee of defendant temple. He admitted that auction purchasers did not pay the full amount and that he is not aware whether possession is delivered to them or not. Secondly, no evidence was let in by the defendant to show that auction was confirmed in favour of the auction purchasers. In this factual background the auction purchasers cannot be said to have acquired any right. They only had an inchoate right, and it was always open to the Commissioner to cancel the auction in accordance with the provisions of the Endowments Act. Therefore, this Court is not able to accept the submission of the defendant. Point is answered accordingly. 34. In the result, for the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower Court in O.S.No.42 of 1980 is reversed and the suit is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is not inclined to make any order as to costs.