DILIP GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE landlord has filed this petition for setting aside the order dated 30th August, 1997 passed by the prescribed authority by which the application filed by him under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the act) for eviction of the tenant from the shop in dispute as it was bona fide required by him for establishing his two sons in business was rejected. The landlord has also sought the quashing of the judgment dated 14th february, 2001 by which the appeal filed by him under section 22 of the Act, for setting aside the order passed by the prescribed authority, was dismissed. ( 2 ) THE application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act was filed by the landlord on 13th March, 1996 for eviction of the tenant from the shop in dispute and the same was registered as Rent Case No. 3 of 1996. It was inter alia stated that the landlord had let out the shop in dispute to Moti Ram on a monthly rent of Rs. 22/- which shop was required for the bona fide need of the landlord for establishing his sons Sanjay Kumar and Ajay Kuamr in business; the family of the landlord consisted of his wife and four sons Sanjay Kumar, Ajay Kumar, rajeev and Prabhas; Rajeev was employed in Kisan Gramin Bank while prabhas was also employed; Sanjay Kumar who was married and had two children was doing business in a rented shop in Mohalla Madhavganj which shop he had taken on rent of Rs. 150/- per month while his other son Ajay kumar was also doing business in a rented shop at Chawra Market which shop he had taken on rent at Rs. 250/- per month that the shops taken on rent by sanjay Kuamr and Ajay Kumar were insufficient for carrying out the business and the respective landlords were also pressurising them to vacate the shops and the children also wanted to augment their income as the family was increasing. 250/- per month that the shops taken on rent by sanjay Kuamr and Ajay Kumar were insufficient for carrying out the business and the respective landlords were also pressurising them to vacate the shops and the children also wanted to augment their income as the family was increasing. It was further stated that so far as the tenant was concerned he did not require the shop and in fact many shops of Nagar Palika in Kasba Ujhani were vacant which he could take on rent and that the landlord was likely to suffer greater hardship in the event the application filed by him was rejected. ( 3 ) A reply was filed by the tenant to the aforesaid application filed by the landlord. It was inter alia stated that he was doing business of repairing shoes from the shop in dispute and that even earlier the landlord had filed a suit for eviction against him which was dismissed but as the appeal filed by the landlord was allowed, he had filed a writ petition in this Court which was ultimately allowed and the matter was remanded to the Appellate Court for a fresh decision and the appeal was subsequently dismissed against which a writ petition is pending in this Court; that his family was very big consisting of 17 members; that he had no other shop available with him from where he could do this small business of repairing shoes; that in case he was asked to shift to some other rented shop, he would have to pay more than Rs. 1000/- per month as rent and also premium of about Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 1,00,000/- and that the sons of the landlord did not require the shop as they were already doing business from the rented shops. It was also stated that the tenant was likely to suffer greater hardship in the event the application was allowed. ( 4 ) THE prescribed authority rejected the application filed by the landlord holding that all the sons of the landlord were working in the respective shops and therefore, the need was not bona fide. It was also held that the tenant was likely to suffer greater hardship in the event the application was allowed. ( 4 ) THE prescribed authority rejected the application filed by the landlord holding that all the sons of the landlord were working in the respective shops and therefore, the need was not bona fide. It was also held that the tenant was likely to suffer greater hardship in the event the application was allowed. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 30th August, 1997 passed by the prescribed authority in P. A. Case No. 3 of 1996, the landlord filed an appeal under section 22 of the Act which was registered as Appeal No. 81 of 1997. ( 5 ) IT needs to be mentioned at this stage that the landlord had also filed another application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for eviction of tenant vishambher Nath from the adjoining shop and this application was registered as P. A. Case No. 6 of 1995. This application of the landlord was also rejected by the prescribed authority. An appeal was then filed by the landlord under section 22 of the Act against the aforesaid order passed by the prescribed authority in p. A. Case No. 6 of 1995 but during the pendency of the appeal, a compromise was entered into between the landlord and the tenant as a result of which possession of the shop was given to the landlord and according to the landlord sanjay Kumar is now doing business from the said shop. ( 6 ) IT also needs to be mentioned that on 5th October, 2006 this Court passed an order for enhancement of the rent to Rs. 750/- w. e. f. October, 2006. An application for modification of the order dated 5th October, 2006 was moved by the tenant. On 17th January, 2008 the learned Counsel for the parties agreed that instead of deciding the modification application, the petition itself may be finally heard and, therefore, the writ petition was directed to be heard on 28th January, 2008. ( 7 ) THE Appellate Court in Appeal No. 81 of 1997 took notice of the fact that the possession of the adjoining shop had been given to the landlord and sanjay Kumar had started his business from the said shop and so in such circumstances the need of the landlord was restricted to the need of Ajay Kumar. ( 7 ) THE Appellate Court in Appeal No. 81 of 1997 took notice of the fact that the possession of the adjoining shop had been given to the landlord and sanjay Kumar had started his business from the said shop and so in such circumstances the need of the landlord was restricted to the need of Ajay Kumar. The Appellate Court found that the rented shop from where Ajay Kuamr was doing his business was extremely small measuring 6 x 8 whereas the shop in possession of the tenant Mod Ram was 10 x 28. The Appellate Court also found that the tenanted shop from where Ajay Kumar was doing his business was not sufficient as it was small and, therefore, the need of the landlord for establishing his son Ajay Kuamr in business from the shop in dispute was bona fide. However, the Appellate Court found that the tenant was likely to suffer greater hardship than the landlord in the event the application was allowed. In this connection the Appellate Court took into consideration the provisions of rule 16 (2) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the rules), since the shop was let out in the year 1945. The Appellate Court also took into consideration the weak financial position of the tenant and observed that it would not be possible for him to shift to an alternative accommodation on a reasonable rent. The appeal was, accordingly, dismissed. ( 8 ) I have heard Sri Manish Kumar Nigam, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Lalji Chaudhary, leanred Counsel appearing for the respondent-tenant and have perused the material available on record. ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Appellate Court fell in error in holding that the tenant was likely to suffer greater hardship in the event the release application was allowed as not only during the pendency of the application the tenant had made no efforts whatsoever to obtain an alternative accommodation but even otherwise the son of the landlord Ajay kumar cannot be compelled to carry on his business from a tenanted accommodation which was highly insufficient merely because the financial position of the tenant was weak. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-tenant, however, submitted that the petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands as he has not disclosed in the writ petition that the earlier writ petition filed by the landlord was dismissed and in any event the finding recorded by the appellate Court regarding comparative hardship does not suffer from any infirmity. ( 10 ) THE Appellate Court has recorded a categorical finding of fact that the landlord bona fide required the shop in dispute for the need of his son Ajay kumar as the existing tenanted shop from where Ajay Kumar was doing his business was extremely small and insufficient to meet his requirement. The appellate Court also found that the tenanted shop in possession of the tenant moti Ram was suitable for the purpose of business to be carried out by Ajay kumar. These are findings of fact based on appraisal of evidence and the learned Counsel for the respondent has not been able to produce any material before the Court which may persuade the Court to take a contrary view. ( 11 ) IN this connection reference may also be made to the decision of the supreme Court in Smt. G. Kaushalya Devi v. Ghanshyamdas, AIR 2000 SC 656 , wherein it was observed :- ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . We, therefore, cannot accept the contention of the appellant that since the respondent is already having his business in a leased premises of which he is in possession, he cannot seek eviction of the appellant. . . . . . . . . . . . . High Court upheld the finding of the Courts below that the respondent required the suit premises for his personal occupation for conducting the business and that these findings were neither perverse or based on any extraneous or irrelevant material. High Court was also of the view that the Act did not prohibit eviction of the tenant by the landlord if the members of the family of the landlord possessed other non-residential premises. Even though the respondent and his brothers were conducting business on partnership basis in M/s. Seetha Traders, yet it was no ground to contend that the requirements of respondent is not bona fide. We agree. Even though the respondent and his brothers were conducting business on partnership basis in M/s. Seetha Traders, yet it was no ground to contend that the requirements of respondent is not bona fide. We agree. " ( 12 ) THERE is a dispute between the parties regarding the comparative hardship. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the would suffer greater hardship in the event the release application filed by him was not allowed whereas the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the tenant is that the Appellate Court has given cogent reasons for recording a finding in favour of the tenant regarding comparative hardship. ( 13 ) AJAY Kumar is doing his business from a tenanted shop which is highly insufficient to meet his requirement as has been found by the Appellate Court. It has, therefore, to be seen whether in such a situation he would suffer greater hardship than the tenant in case the release application was rejected. The appellate Court has placed emphasis on Rule 16 (2) of the Rules which provides that while considering an application for release under section 21 (1) (a)of the Act in respect of a building let out for the purpose of any business, the appellate authority shall have regard to the facts including the fact that greater the period since when the tenant has been carrying on his business in the building, the less the justification for allowing the application. The Appellate court has observed that the shop was let out to the tenant in the year 1945 and this factor has been taken into consideration for recording a finding that the tenant would suffer greater hardship in the event the application is allowed. ( 14 ) THE Supreme Court in Sushila v. IInd Additional District judge, Banda and others, 2003 52 ALR (SC) 160, observed :- ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . So far as the petitioner is concerned, she has no other shop where she can establish her married son who is unemployed. In such circumstances, the only fact that the shop in question is in possession of the tenant since long will have no material bearing in deciding the question of comparative hardship. . . . . . . . So far as the petitioner is concerned, she has no other shop where she can establish her married son who is unemployed. In such circumstances, the only fact that the shop in question is in possession of the tenant since long will have no material bearing in deciding the question of comparative hardship. To say that son of the petitioner-landlady may remain unemployed but the shop in question must continue to remain in occupancy of the tenant to whom yet another shop is available in Chowk bazar would not withstand the guidelines and tests laid down in sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1972. In the case in hand we find that even though the period of tenancy of the respondent is no doubt long but availability of another shop to him where he can very well shift his business as found by the prescribed authority, neutralises the factor of length of tenancy in the accommodation in dispute. We further find that the landlady has no other shop where she can establish her son who is married and unemployed. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the business of father of Prem Parkash is so huge or that it is a very flourishing business so as to attract application of clause (c) of Rule 16 (2 ). As observed earlier it is clear that length of period of tenancy as provided under Clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the rules, 1972 is only one of the factors to be taken into account in context with other facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot be a sole criterion for deciding factor to order or not the eviction of the tenant. Considering the facts in the light of Rule 16 pressed into service on behalf of the respondent, we find that according to the guidelines provided therein balance tilts in favour of the unemployed son of the landlady whose need is certainly bonafide and has also been so accepted by the respondent before us. " ( 15 ) IN Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai and others, 2002 48 ALR (SC) 678, the Supreme Court also observed :- "so far as the challenge to proof of requirement is concerned is merits a summary dismissal. " ( 15 ) IN Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai and others, 2002 48 ALR (SC) 678, the Supreme Court also observed :- "so far as the challenge to proof of requirement is concerned is merits a summary dismissal. The rent controlling authority and the High Court, both, have on a meticulous evaluation of evidence found the requirement proved. None of the landlords is possessed of any other suitable alternative accommodation of his or her own to satisfy the requirement found proved. A landlord cannot be compelled to carry on business in rented premises and the proved requirement cannot be defeated by the tenant submitting that the landlord can start or comfortably continue to run his business in rented premises. . . . . . . . . . " ( 16 ) IT is, therefore, clear that the Supreme Court in Sushila (supra) examined the provisions of Rule 16 (2) (a) of the Rules and observed that the period of tenancy may no doubt be long but that cannot be the sole criteria for not ordering the eviction of the tenant where the need of the landlord is bona fide and he has no other shop to do business except, the rented premises. In the present case, as noticed above, the tenant could have found out an alternative shop for running his business. It is not his contention that no other shop was available since all that he contends is that he would not get a shop on a reasonable rent and would also have to pay premium. As observed by the Supreme Court in dhannalal (supra) the landlord cannot be compelled to carry on business in rented premises and the proved requirement cannot be defeated by the tenant by submitting that the landlord can comfortably continue to run his business in a rented premises. ( 17 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner also contended that no efforts whatsoever were made by the tenant during the pendency of the release application to find out an alternative accommodation and, therefore, the Appellate Court committed an illegality in holding that the tenant was likely to suffer greater hardship. There is no material on record which may indicate that the tenant made any sincere effort to find out any alternative accommodation. There is no material on record which may indicate that the tenant made any sincere effort to find out any alternative accommodation. ( 18 ) IN Faiyaz Khan v. Ilnd Additional District Judge, Jhansi and others, 2006 62 ALR 908, this Court observed: "concept of comparative hardship cannot be stretched to the extent of depriving the landlord of his property even if landlord is in real and imminent need. He has been brought on record that in adjoining town Dr. Amin was having a clinic even though he asserted that he attended that only off and on. In any case tenant did not show that he made any efforts to search alternative accommodation after filing of the release application. As held by the Supreme Court in B. C. Bhutada v. C. R. Mundada, 2006 63 ALR (SC) 438, this by itself was sufficient to tilt the balance of hardship against the tenant. " ( 19 ) IN view of the aforesaid, it has to be held that the landlord was likely to suffer greater hardship in the event the release application was rejected and the finding to the contrary recorded by the prescribed authority as well as by the Appellate Court are perverse and the release application filed by the landlord should have been allowed. ( 20 ) THE contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent is that the landlord has not come with clean hands as he has not disclosed in the present petition that the earlier writ petition filed by the landlord has been dismissed. The landlord had mentioned about the filing of the earlier writ petition in paragraph 5 of this writ petition and the said petition was decided after the filing of the writ petition. It" cannot, therefore, be said that any material fact has been concealed by the landlord in this writ petition. ( 21 ) THE writ petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The orders dated 30th August, 1997 and 14th February, 2001 passed by the prescribed authority and the appellate authority respectively are set aside. ( 22 ) HOWEVER, as the tenant has been in occupation of the premises for a quite some time, it would be appropriate to grant four months time to the tenant to vacate the premises provided he gives an undertaking within a period of three weeks from today before the prescribed authority to the following effect:-1. ( 22 ) HOWEVER, as the tenant has been in occupation of the premises for a quite some time, it would be appropriate to grant four months time to the tenant to vacate the premises provided he gives an undertaking within a period of three weeks from today before the prescribed authority to the following effect:-1. That the tenant shall pay damages at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month beginning from March, 2008 upto the date he handover the possession of the shop to the landlord. 3. That the tenant shall not induct any other person in the shop. 4. That the tenant shall handover peaceful possession of the shop to the landlord on or before the expiry of four months. Petition Allowed. .