JUDGMENT ( 1. ) THE question that arises for our consideration in the present appeal is, whether the interference by the Industrial Tribunal in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 33 (3) (b) of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947, in declining to grant approval to the order of dismissal dated 12. 12. 2007 passed against the workman pursuant to the domestic enquiry, is right and proper? ( 2. ) THE facts of the case in brief are as follows: the respondent-workman was working under the appellant as Stores assistant. A show-cause notice-cum-charge-sheet was issued against the respondent alleging that he left the factory premises unauthorisedly on the ruse of visiting Lakshmi Industries; helped an outsider, a photographer by name Mr. Srinivasa, to gain entry into the factory premises; made him take photographs of the Company's products unauthorisedly and thereby acted against the interests of the Company. In this regard a preliminary enquiry was conducted. In pursuance of the preliminary enquiry, charges were framed against the workman and a domestic enquiry was conducted. After taking into consideration the evidence of the management witnesses, the enquiry officer concluded the proceedings holding the workman guilty of misconduct alleged in the show-cause notice. 2. 1. The enquiry officer while conducting domestic enquiry followed the procedures that are contemplated under law and therefore there is no dispute with regard to the conduct of the domestic enquiry. Also, the tribunal while dismissing the application filed under Section 33 (3) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act regarding fairness of the enquiry rendered a finding by the order dated 16.4.2005 that the domestic enquiry held against the workman is fair and proper. The Tribunal was justified in reaching the said finding as regards the fairness of the enquiry. 2. 2. However the Tribunal, while considering the application of the management seeking its approval for dismissing the workman, has gone into the correctness of the findings recorded by the management in the domestic enquiry and arrived at a conclusion that the findings are perverse, guilty of victimization and also unfair labour practice and, therefore, declined to grant the approval sought by the management for dismissal of the workman. The Industrial Tribunal in its detailed order dated 12.12.2007, after re-appreciating the evidence on record, rendered a rinding that the enquiry officer's findings are based on the evidence collected during the preliminary enquiry and on the other hand, it ignored the evidence rendered by the workman which forms part and parcel of the enquiry itself. 2.3. As regards the first charge that the workman left the company premises unauthorisedly on 27.5.2002 at 9.30 a.m., the Tribunal relied on the evidence of one K. S. Nagarajan, MW4 to the effect that he (MW4) had sent the workman on 27.5.2002 at 9. 30 a. m. to Lakshimishree electroplaters for urgent material follow-up and that the workman reported back to him after visiting the Lakshmishree Electroplaters to hold that the finding of guilt recorded by the Enquiry Officer on the first charge in the face of such overwhelmingly contrary evidence is wholly perverse. 2. 4. The second charge that he helped an outsider to gain entry into the factory premises and took photographs of the company's products also has not been substantiated by any evidence on record. The management relied upon the hear-say evidence of MW3-Narendra Bahadur. He also did not say that the photographer had accompanied the workman or that at the workman's instance the photographer was admitted inside the factory premises. The photographer himself has not been examined nor any bill obtained from the photographer though Mr. S. G. N. Rao examined on behalf of the management states that he obtained the photographs from the photographer Srinivas of Ramana Photo Studio. It is under the said circumstance the Tribunal found that the affirmative finding of the enquiry officer with regard to the second charge was perverse and we have no reason to differ from the said finding. The order of the Tribunal was challenged before the learned Single judge calling upon this Court to review the order of the Tribunal under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Again the law is well-settled. ( 3. ) IN the case of B. C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and Others, (in c. A. No. 9830/1995 and connected cases disposed of on 1.11.1995) the apex Court has held as follows: "judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. ( 3. ) IN the case of B. C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and Others, (in c. A. No. 9830/1995 and connected cases disposed of on 1.11.1995) the apex Court has held as follows: "judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of Judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. " no doubt the powers of the Tribunal under Section 33 (3) (b) of the Industrial disputes Act are limited. As held by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions, where there is proper enquiry held by the Management, the Tribunal has to accept the finding arising out of it, but such power conferred on the tribunal under Section 33 (3) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act has to be interpreted by this Court while deciding the cases. In the case of Delhi cloth and General Mills Company Vs. Ganesh Dutt reported in 1950-67 (8-SCLJ) page 400, it is held as under: "the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by an Industrial tribunal in such circumstances is very limited and it has been laid down by several decisions of the Supreme Court. The legal position is that where a proper enquiry has been held by the management, the Tribunal has to accept the finding arrived at in the enquiry unless it is perverse or unreasonable and should give the permission asked for unless it has reason to believe that the management is guilty of victimisation or has been guilty of unfair labour practice or is acting mala fide. " ( 4. ) IN the case of Central Bank of India Limited, New Delhi Vs. " ( 4. ) IN the case of Central Bank of India Limited, New Delhi Vs. Prakash Chand Jain reported in 1969-II-LLJ-377, the Apex Court has held that the authority exercising power under Section 33 (3) (b) of the industrial Disputes Act can consider whether a prima facie case for according approval is made out by him or not and enquire whether the conditions prescribed by Section 33 (2) (b) and the proviso are satisfied or not and also consider whether the standing orders justify the order of dismissal, has an enquiry been held as required by the standing order and have the wages for the month been made as prescribed by the proviso? In the instant case, there are sufficient material to show that the tribunal even though has held that the enquiry against the workman was fair and proper, insofar as the procedural aspect is concerned the finding rendered by the enquiry officer does not stand the test of reasonableness and suffers from perversity and is guilty of victimization and unfair labour practice and smacks of mala fides. The enquiry officer failed to note the evidence adduced by the workman. On the other hand, the domestic enquiry was conducted based on the evidence collected behind the workman during the preliminary enquiry and on the evidence of the hear-say witness mw-3. The Tribunal has dealt with the matter in detail in its order and has arrived at correct findings. ( 5. ) WE are in agreement with conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal on the charges levelled against the workman and hence it may not be proper for this Court to travel further and set-aside the finding of the tribunal. ( 6. ) IN our considered opinion, the order of the learned Single Judge remitting the matter to the Industrial Tribunal for reconsideration is unwarranted and it would result in miscarriage of justice. We, accordingly, have no option except to set-aside the order of the learned Single Judge and confirm the order of the Tribunal. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge dated 29. 2. 2008 passed in W. P. No. 1442/2008 is set-aside.