ORDER: C.V. RAMULU,J In all these Writ Petitions, common questions of law and fact arise for consideration; therefore, they are being disposed of by this common Order. 2. The Writ Petitions are directed against Orders dated 13-12-2006 made in O.A.No.5655 of 2006, dated 14-7-2006 in O.A.No.4312 of 2006 and dated 18-1-2007 in O.A.No.5742 of 2006 on the file of Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad, whereunder the applications filed by the respondents herein complaining as to non-extension of the benefits under G.O.Ms.No.145, General Administration (Services-D) Department, dated 15-6-2004, were allowed and the respondents therein were directed to include the name of the applicants for the panel year subsequent to the year 2003-04 for effecting promotion to the post of Deputy Civil Surgeon. 3. The respondents, when they were promoted to the post of Deputy Civil Surgeon in the Health Department of Government of Andhra Pradesh, have either declined promotion or did not join within 15 days from the date of promotion as required under unamended Rule 11(b) of the Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules,1996 (for short 'the Rules'), which reads as under: "Time to join a post on appointment otherwise than by direct recruitment: A person appointed to a post, otherwise than by direct recruitment, shall be allowed a joining time of 15 (fifteen) days from the date of receipt of the order of appointment sent to the candidate by registered post with acknowledgment due or by any other means. If a person fails to join the post, within the period of 15 (fifteen) days or evades to join the post by proceeding on leave, the offer of appointment shall be treated as automatically cancelled and the name of the candidate shall be deemed to have been omitted from the list of the approved candidates and he/she shall forfeit his/her right of appointment both for the present and in future for the post." 4. The grievance of the respondents before the Tribunal was that in view of amendment of Rule 11(b) of the Rules under G.O.Ms.No.145, dated 15-6-2004, they are entitled for consideration for promotion to the post of Deputy Civil Surgeon, though they failed to join duty in the post for which they were promoted earlier and the forfeiture of the promotion cannot be treated to be a permanent feature. 5. 5. The case of the writ petitioners before the Tribunal was that though the applicants (respondents herein) were promoted to the post of Deputy Civil Surgeon during the panel year 2003-04, they did not join in the promotion post and Rule 11(b) issued through G.O.Ms.No.145, dated 15-6-2004 is prospective and does not have retrospective effect; as such, the respondents herein are not entitled for promotion to the post of Deputy Civil Surgeon for the panel year 2005-06. The Tribunal, after considering the rival contentions and placing reliance on the Judgment of the Apex Court in NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL COOPERTIVE MARKETING FEDERATION OF INDIA LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA1 whereunder it was held that any amendment by way of substitution in the Rules will come into effect from the date of introduction of the original Rule, allowed the O.As and directed the petitioners herein to promote the respondents herein to the post of Deputy Civil Surgeon in the panel year subsequent to the date of amendment of the rules. Aggrieved thereby, the present Writ Petitions are filed. 6. Sri J. Sudheer, learned Special Government Pleader, representing the learned Advocate General appearing for the petitioners, strenuously contended that the issue that arises for consideration in these Writ Petitions has been covered by a Judgment of a Division Bench of this Court dated 21-9-2005 in Writ Petition No.17676 of 2005, wherein it was held that amended rule has no retrospective effect and as such, an employee/officer, who was allowed a time of 15 days to join the post from the date of receipt of the order of appointment, does not join the post within the stipulated time or evades to join the post by proceeding on leave, shall lose his right for promotion once for all, as he is not entitled for consideration for promotion in any future recruitment years, as per the unamended rules. Thus, the orders passed by the Tribunal holding that the Rule has retrospective operation are liable to be set aside. Though the said judgment was cited in the impugned Orders, but was not taken into consideration by the Tribunal. Further, the learned Special Govt.Pleader relied upon a judgment reported in GOVERNMENT OF INDIA v. INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIATION2 and has drawn attention of the Court to paragraph-25, which reads as under: "25. Though the said judgment was cited in the impugned Orders, but was not taken into consideration by the Tribunal. Further, the learned Special Govt.Pleader relied upon a judgment reported in GOVERNMENT OF INDIA v. INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIATION2 and has drawn attention of the Court to paragraph-25, which reads as under: "25. Substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier provision and its replacement by the new provision (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation, ibid, p. 565). If any authority is needed in support of the proposition, it is to be found in West U.P. Sugar Mills Assn. v. State of U.P.; State of Rajasthan v. Mangilal Pindwal; Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga and Co. and A.L.V.R.S.T. Veerappa Chettiar v. S. Michael. In West U.P. Sugar Mills Association case a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that the State Government by substituting the new rule in place of the old one never intended to keep alive the old rule. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances centring around the issue the Court held that the substitution had the effect of just deleting the old rule and making the new rule operative. In Mangilal Pindwal case this Court upheld the legislative practice of an amendment by substitution being incorporated in the text of a statute which had ceased to exist and held that the substitution would have the effect of amending the operation of law during the period in which it was in force. In Koteswar case a three-Judge Bench of this Court emphasized the distinction between 'suppression' of a rule and 'substitution' of a rule and held that the process of substitution consists of two steps : first, the old rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place." and submitted that the amended rule has no retrospective operation nor there is any express provision or by necessary implication it can be treated as operative with retrospective effect. Therefore, the decision relied upon by the Tribunal has no relevance to the facts of the case and thus it acted in an arbitrary and illegal manner in allowing the O.As. The language used in the G.O. is very clear. Therefore, the decision relied upon by the Tribunal has no relevance to the facts of the case and thus it acted in an arbitrary and illegal manner in allowing the O.As. The language used in the G.O. is very clear. Further, Government has issued clarification in Memo No.10266/B1/05-3, dated 30-8-2005, whereunder the intention of the Government was made very clear to say that G.O.Ms.No.145, dated 15-6-2004 is made prospective only, but has no retrospective effect. Therefore, the amendment in G.O.Ms.No.145, dated 15-6- 2004 is not applicable to the persons to whom the promotion was offered or effected, but declined to join within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order. Therefore, the intention of the amendment was very clear. Learned Special Government Pleader has also relied upon the Judgments reported in SREE BANK LTD. V. S.D. ROY & CO.3 and has drawn attention to paragraph 9, which reads as under: "9. Why then was sub-s. (3) enacted ? It must have been to give sub-s. (1) full retrospective operation, to make it affect vested rights. If it were not so, sub-s. (3) would have been a mere surplus age or enacted ex abundanti cautela. A statute is not to be so read unless that reading is compelled by the words used. There are no such words and I do not think that that reading is justified by the rule of presumption that a statute is not intended to have a retrospective operation. In this case particularly because of the clear intention of the Act to protect a sizeable section of the public consisting of the depositors. I feel that a reading of sub-s. (3) as a surplusage or ex abundanti cautela would be unwarranted. Furthermore, if that sub-section was enacted merely ex abundanti cautela, then why did it not also say that the provisions of S. 45-O would apply to a case where the winding up order had been made before the Act? Why was it not thought that caution was necessary to provide for such a case also? I am not saying that sub-s. (3) does not make the section apply to a case where the winding up order had been made before the amending Act. Why was it not thought that caution was necessary to provide for such a case also? I am not saying that sub-s. (3) does not make the section apply to a case where the winding up order had been made before the amending Act. All that I am saying is that the omission of a reference to the case of a winding up under such an order shows that sub-s. (3) was not ex abundanti cautela. It must have been intended to give full retrospective effect to S 45-O including sub-s. (1) of that section." Learned Special Government Pleader also drawn attention of the Court to the judgment in RAMJI PURSHOTTAM v. LAXMANBHAI D.KURLAWALA4 wherein it was held as under: "12. Whether Act No. LI of 1975 insofar as it amends Section 12 of Act No. 57 of 1947 can be said to be retrospective in operation is the first question. A perusal of Section 12 shows that sub-section (1) speaks of the landlord's entitlement to the recovery of possession of premises from the tenant. Sub- section (2) speaks of the institution of suit. The fulfilment of conditions prescribed by sub-section (2) is a condition precedent to enable a landlord to institute a suit for recovery of possession. On the date of passing of the decree for recovery of possession the Court shall have to record findings by reference to Section 3(a) of the Act that the tenant has been in arrears for a period of six months prior to the institution of the suit, that a period of one month has expired from the date of the service of notice in writing demanding the rent in arrears from the tenant and that the tenant neglected to make payment of such arrears for the abovesaid period of one month. It has always open for the tenant to show that though he was alleged to be in arrears but that was not so. On the date of the institution of the suit the tenant did not have a right to claim adjustment of the amount of water charges paid by him against the amount of rent in arrears. However, he could have paid such water charges to protect himself against discontinuance of water supply, an essential service. On the date of the institution of the suit the tenant did not have a right to claim adjustment of the amount of water charges paid by him against the amount of rent in arrears. However, he could have paid such water charges to protect himself against discontinuance of water supply, an essential service. Section 21 of Act No. LI of 1975 introduced Explanation III in Section 12 of Act No. 57 of 1957 which is declaratory in nature and creates a fiction for holding the tenant deemed to have paid the rent to the extent of payment of water charges and creating a statutory right in the tenant to make adjustment of the amount of water charges paid to the Municipal Corporation from out of the amount of rent due by him to the landlord. So long as the amount of water charges paid by the tenant has not been actually returned or reimbursed by the landlord to the tenant, the tenant would be justified in treating the amount of water charges paid by him to the Municipal Corporation as the amount of rent paid by him to the landlord. In other words, to the extent of water charges paid by tenant he cannot be deemed to be in arrears outstanding against him. 13. Strictly speaking, in the present case, the application of the amendment brought in by the statute to the pending proceedings does not have the effect of retrospectivity. The rent is alleged to have fallen in arrears for the period 1- 6-1969 to 31-101970. Some payment of water charges is said to have been made referrable to the same period. Thus, both the events are referrable to a period anterior to the coming into force of Act No. LI of 1975. The law coming into force during the pendency of the proceedings is being applied on the date of judgment to the pre-existing facts for the purpose of giving benefit to the tenant in the pending proceedings. This is not retroactivity. 14. Justice G. P. Singh states in Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Ninth Edition, 2004, at page 462) - "the fact that a prospective benefit under a statutory provision is in certain cases to be measured by or depends on antecedent facts does not necessarily make the provision retrospective. This is not retroactivity. 14. Justice G. P. Singh states in Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Ninth Edition, 2004, at page 462) - "the fact that a prospective benefit under a statutory provision is in certain cases to be measured by or depends on antecedent facts does not necessarily make the provision retrospective. The rule against retrospective construction is not always applicable to a statute merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing." 7. Whereas, Sri M. Panduranga Rao, learned counsel appearing for the respondent in W.P.No.5213 of 2007, stated that the Rule by necessary implication has retrospective effect and the Tribunal has rightly considered so. The Orders passed by the Tribunal do not require any interference by this Court. Further, he has also relied upon a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.26654 of 2005, dated 9-8-2006, whereunder, it was held that Rule 28 does not disentitle a member of a service from being considered for promotion in a future vacancy merely because he/she had relinquished his/her right under the Rule for promotion earlier. Further, placing reliance on the judgment reported in AJIT SINGH (II) v. STATE OF PUNJAB5 and DELHI JAL BOARD v. MAHINDER SINGH6 it is contended that if an employee is otherwise eligible, it is his fundamental right under Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India for consideration of his case for promotion and Rule 28 of the Rules does not prohibit consideration of promotion forever, it is further contended that no inconvenience is caused either to the employer or any injustice is caused to the other employees, in view of consideration of the cases of the respondents for promotion. Promotion is a fundamental right under Article 16(1) of the Constitution and such a right cannot be taken away permanently. 8. Sri Naveen Rao, learned counsel appearing for respondents in Writ Petition Nos.26698 of 2006 and 659 of 2007 strenuously contended that the context of the language used in the amended rule/section has to be taken into consideration to decide whether the same has retrospective operation or not. Further, this is a beneficial legislation and the contextual relevance has to be necessarily taken into consideration. The preamble of G.O.Ms.No.145, dated 15-6-2004 is very clear in this regard. Further, this is a beneficial legislation and the contextual relevance has to be necessarily taken into consideration. The preamble of G.O.Ms.No.145, dated 15-6-2004 is very clear in this regard. By taking the aid of the preamble to the amended rule, one has to necessarily infer that it is amended only to meet the mitigating circumstances and to confer benefit on the persons, who have lost their promotion in view of the fact that they have not availed the promotion effected or offered to them within 15 days as required under the old Rule. The new rule confers the benefit and by conferring such benefit, nobody is affected. It is only to mitigate the hardship of the employees, the old Rule was amended as a beneficial legislation and as such, it has to be necessarily construed that the amended Rule operates retrospectively. Learned counsel also drawn attention of the Court to preamble of G.O.Ms.No.145, dated 15-6-2004 and pointed out that it was issued only to mitigate the hardship caused to the Government employees and the Government decided that the cases of such of those employees who could not join in the promotion posts to be considered, in the next panel year. Accordingly, the Government has decided to amend the Rule. 9. At this stage, during the course of arguments, a new angle of the matter has come to light. G.O.Ms.No.145, dated 15-6-2004 is an amendment by way of substitution. The amendment says "In the said rules, in rule 11 for sub-rule (b), the following shall be substituted". Therefore, Sri Naveen Rao, learned counsel has stated that an amendment by way of substitution would come into operation with retrospective effect and it has to be treated as if the law was made as on the date of commencement of original statute/rule. In this regard, the learned counsel relied upon a judgment reported in INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIATION case (2 supra) and drawn attention to paragraphs 10,14,15,16,17,22,23 and 28, which read as under: "10. An exemption notification, it is trite, must be construed having regard to the object and purport which the same seeks to achieve. 14. However, the question which arises for consideration in this case is as to what would be the effect of the subsequent notification. 15. The word "substitute" ordinarily would mean "to put (one) in place of another"; or "to replace". 14. However, the question which arises for consideration in this case is as to what would be the effect of the subsequent notification. 15. The word "substitute" ordinarily would mean "to put (one) in place of another"; or "to replace". In Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, at page 1281, the word "substitute" has been defined to mean "To put in the place of another person or thing" or "to exchange". In Collins English Dictionary, the word "substitute" has been defined to mean "to serve or cause to serve in place of another person or thing"; "to replace (an atom or group in a molecule) with (another atom or group)"; or "a person or thing that serves in place of another, such as a player in a game who takes the place of an injured colleague". 16. By reason of the aforementioned amendment no substantive right has been taken away nor any penal consequence has been imposed. Only an obvious mistake was sought to be removed thereby. 17. There cannot furthermore be any doubt whatsoever that when a person is held to be eligible to obtain the benefits of an exemption notification, the same should be liberally construed. 22. Had the intention of the Government of India been only to extend the said benefit only to the exporters from any other seaport, airport or inland container depot, recourse to the proviso appended to sub-clause (iv) of clause (2) of the notification dated 7-4-1997 could have been taken. But by reason of the notification dated 27-11-1997, one 'sea port' and 'six inland container depots' have been added. The last two words in the category of seaport, namely, "Tuticorin and Vishakhapatnam" had been substituted by the words "Tuticorin, Vishakhapatnam and Kakinada. Similarly the last two words, namely, Ludhiana and Hyderabad" in the category of inland container depot had been substituted by the words "Ludhiana, Hyderabad, Nagpur, Agra, Faridabad, Jaipur, Guntur and Varanasi. It, therefore, cannot be said to be a case where some other seaports or inland container depots have been added for the purpose of extension of the benefit but the newly added seaports or inland container depots had been made a part of the original notification. The Union of India while making a subordinate legislation had advisedly used the word "substitution" in place of the word "addition". The Union of India while making a subordinate legislation had advisedly used the word "substitution" in place of the word "addition". The object and purport of the subsequent notification issued by the Union of India was, thus, to grant the same benefit which had been granted to the exporters who were registered at the other seaports, airports or inland container depots as specified in the notification dated 7-4-1997 but also to those exporters, who had been exporting from such seaports or inland depots as specified in the amended notification dated 27-11-1997. 23. If the Central Government intended to extend the benefit to the members of the Respondent-Association only with prospective effect, it could have said so explicitly. Such a benefit could also have been extended by taking recourse to the proviso appended to sub-clause (iv) of clause (2) of the notification dated 7-4-1997. It may, therefore, be safely concluded that by reason of the amended notification, the Central Government only intended to rectify a mistake and, thus, the same will have retrospective effect and retroactive operation. 28. The doctrine of fairness also is now considered to be a relevant factor for construing a statute. In a case of this nature where the effect of a beneficent statute was sought to be extended keeping in view the fact that the benefit was already availed of by the agriculturalists of tobacco in Guntur, it would be highly unfair if the benefit granted to them is taken away, although the same was meant to be extended to them also. For such purposes the statute need not be given retrospective effect by express words but the intent and object of the Legislature in relation thereto can be culled out from the background facts." Learned counsel relied upon the decision reported in UNION OF INDIA v. C. RAMA SWAMY7 and has drawn attention of the Court to paragraphs 16 and 17 which read as under: "16. The effect of a rule being substituted by a new rule clearly is that the old rule, which stands substituted, can under no circumstances have any application at least from the date when it ceased to exist. The effect of a rule being substituted by a new rule clearly is that the old rule, which stands substituted, can under no circumstances have any application at least from the date when it ceased to exist. With effect from 7th July, 1987 a new Rule 16-A having been incorporated in the Rules, it was this rule alone which was applicable when the respondent represented for alteration in the date of birth by his first representation of 4th September, 1982. Reading Rule 16-A as a whole it is clear to us that it applies to all person belonging to the All India Services who were in service and the said rule does not exclude pre 4th December, 1971 direct recruits from its application, as has been held by the Tribunal. 17. Rule 16-A is a composite rule which was intended to and does apply to all persons of the All India Service to whom the principle Rules of 1958 are applicable." Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in WEST U.P. SUGAR MILLS ASSOCIATION v. STATE OF U.P.8 wherein it was held as under: "8. On the argument of learned counsel for the parties, the first question that arise for our consideration is that once the old rule has been deleted or repealed and substituted by a new rule, whether the old rule would revive when the substituted rule ceased to be operative. 14. The Government of U.P., in exercise of power under Section 28 read with Section 18 of the Act, amended Rule 49 by deleting it and substituting the same by a new Rule 49 which provided the society commission @ 2.69% of the minimum statutory cane price fixed by the Government of India. The notification dated 24-4-94 which has been extensively extracted above very clearly and in an unambiguous terms provided that old rule set out in column 1 below the rules shall be substituted by the rule set out in column 2. In fact, by doing so, the Government was very clear in its intention that it is substituting an old rule by a new one. Had the Government ever intended that after 30-9-92 the old rule would revive, it could have added a proviso to the old Rule 49 providing for society commission @ 2.69% with effect from 1-10-91 to 30-9-92. In fact, by doing so, the Government was very clear in its intention that it is substituting an old rule by a new one. Had the Government ever intended that after 30-9-92 the old rule would revive, it could have added a proviso to the old Rule 49 providing for society commission @ 2.69% with effect from 1-10-91 to 30-9-92. The deliberate omission to provide what has been contained in the new Rule 49 by way of a proviso to old Rule 49 shows that the State Government intended to repeal the old rule and substitute it by a new Rule 49. 15. It would have been a different case where a subsequent law which modified the earlier law held to be void. In such a case, the earlier law shall be deemed to have never been modified or repealed and, therefore, continued to be in force. Where it is found that the Legislature lacked competence to enact a law, still amends the existing law and subsequently it is found that the Legislature or the authority was denuded with the power to amend the existing law, in such a case the old law would revive and continue. But it is not the case here. It is not disputed that the State Government under Section 28 read with Section 18 of the Act, has power to frame rule prescribing the society commission. The State Government by substituting new Rule 49 never intended to keep alive the old Rule. The totality of the circumstances shows that the old Rule was deleted and came to be substituted by new Rule 49 and, therefore, we are of the view that after new Rule 49 ceased to be operative, the old Rule 49 did not revive." Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment reported in NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL COOP.MARKETING FEDERATION OF INDIA LTD. (1 supra) and has drawn attention of the Court to paragraphs 17,18,19,27 and 28, which read as under: "17. A validating clause coupled with a substantive statutory change is therefore only one of the methods to leave actions unsustainable under the unamended statute, undisturbed. Consequently, the absence of a validating clause would not by itself affect the retrospective operation of the statutory provision, if such retrospectivity is otherwise apparent. 18. A validating clause coupled with a substantive statutory change is therefore only one of the methods to leave actions unsustainable under the unamended statute, undisturbed. Consequently, the absence of a validating clause would not by itself affect the retrospective operation of the statutory provision, if such retrospectivity is otherwise apparent. 18. By the impugned amendment, the legislature has substituted the word 'of' which occurred in Section 80P (2)(a)(iii) and which had been construed by this Court in 1998 as 'belonging to', with the phrase 'grown by'. The clear effect of the submission, in keeping with general principles relating to amendments, would be that Section 80-P(2)(a)(iii) must be read as if the substituted phrase were included from the date that the section was introduced in the statute viz. 1-4-1968. 19. In making this change, the legislature does not 'statutorily overrule' this Court's decision in Kerala State Coop.Marketing Federation Ltd., as has been contended by the appellant. Overruling assumes that a contrary decision is given on the same facts or law. Where the law, as in this case, has been changed and is no longer the same, there is no question of the legislature overruling this Court. 27. The main thrust of the appellant's argument has been to the constitutionality of the amendment. The substitution in 1998 of the phrase 'grown by' in Section 8-P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act to operate from 1968, it is argued, amounts to a new levy and an unforeseen financial burden imposed on apex societies like the appellant with effect from the past 30 years. If this were so doubtless the Court may have considered the amendment to be excessively and unreasonably retrospective violating the appellant's fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(g) and 14 of the Constitution. But, in fact, the grievance is unfounded. 28. The test of the length of time covered by the retrospective operation cannot by itself, necessarily be a decisive test. Account must be taken of the surrounding facts and circumstances relating to the taxation and the legislative background of the provision......In real terms, therefore, there was hardly any retrospectivity, but a continuation of the status quo ante. The degree and extent of the unforeseen and unforeseeable burden was, in the circumstances, minimal and cannot be said to be unreasonable or unconstitutional." 10. The degree and extent of the unforeseen and unforeseeable burden was, in the circumstances, minimal and cannot be said to be unreasonable or unconstitutional." 10. We have given our earnest consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned counsel on either side and perused the impugned Orders and other material made available on record. 11. At the outset, we may make it clear that we are in respectful agreement with the judgment rendered in Writ Petition No.17676 of 2005. We are also in respectful agreement with the judgment rendered in W.P.No.26654 of 2005, dated 9-8-2006. Since a new angle of the matter has been projected as to whether a substitution shall have retrospective operation from the date of original statute/rule and as it has not come up for consideration in the above two judgments, this exercise. 12. Now coming to the question proper, we are of the opinion that though the Tribunal has not furnished detailed reasons, in view of the various judgments cited by the learned counsel appearing for respondents, the language used in the preamble of G.O.Ms.No.145, dated 15-6-2004 and the context in which the Rule was amended, the amended Rule 11(b) vide G.O.Ms.No.145, dated 15-6-2004 operates retrospectively for the discussion made infra. 13. No doubt, it is the settled proposition of law that, generally speaking, a law made, unless it is expressly provided therein, it has no retrospective operation. Even this can be said to be a general rule, in case of an amendment, by way of substitution. But, there are certain exceptions, in case of amendment by way of substitution and it can take care of the situation affected by the rule, against which the amended rule is sought to be substituted, in the context in which it was made, has retrospective operation, by necessary implication inferred. In the instant cases, the substituted rule is not a newly added remedial measure, it is only to relax the rigidity of the existing rule and, therefore, it must receive a liberal construction. 14. In the instant cases, the substituted rule is not a newly added remedial measure, it is only to relax the rigidity of the existing rule and, therefore, it must receive a liberal construction. 14. Before going further, it may be relevant to notice the amended Rule 11(b), which reads as under: "11(b) Time to join a post on appointment/temporary appointment under Rule 10 including appointments by transfer or by promotion otherwise than by direct recruitment: A person on appointment/temporary appointment on ad hoc basis under Rule 10 including appointment by transfer or by promotion, otherwise than by direct recruitment, shall be allowed a joining time of fifteen (15) days to join the post from the date of receipt of the order of appointment sent to the candidates by registered post with acknowledgment due or by any other means. An employee, who does not join the post within the stipulated time or evades to join the post by proceeding on leave, shall lose his promotion right/offer for the current panel year and the name of the candidate shall be placed before the next Departmental Promotion Committee for consideration in the next year panel, subject to availability of vacancy. In case of non-selection posts, the name of the candidate, who does not join within the stipulated time in the promotion posts shall be considered for promotion again after a period of one year from the date of offer of appointment, subject to availability of vacancy." It is also relevant to notice Rule 28 of the Rules, which reads as under: "28. Relinquishment of rights by members: Any member of a service may, in writing, relinquish any right or privilege to which he may be entitled to under these rules or the special rules, if in the opinion of the appointing authority such relinquishment is not opposed to public interest. Such relinquishment once made will be final and irrevocable. Nothing contained in these rules or the special rules shall be deemed to require the recognition of any right or privilege to the extent to which it has been so relinquished. Provided that no conditional relinquishment or relinquishment of right for a temporary period shall be permitted." 15. Such relinquishment once made will be final and irrevocable. Nothing contained in these rules or the special rules shall be deemed to require the recognition of any right or privilege to the extent to which it has been so relinquished. Provided that no conditional relinquishment or relinquishment of right for a temporary period shall be permitted." 15. In the instant case, the preamble of the amended Rule in G.O.Ms.No.145, dated 15-6-2004 reads as under: "In Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules,1996 joining time is prescribed both for appointment by direct recruitment and for appointment by promotion/transfer. In case of appointment by promotion/transfer the existing time limit is 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the appointment order. Failure to join duty in the post for which the employee is appointed by promotion/transfer results in forfeiture of the present and future rights of promotion/appointment by transfer. As a result of the above condition, a government employee who does not join the promotion post within the stipulated time, loses his promotion rights to the next higher category permanently. It is noticed that for several reasons employees could not join in the promotion posts in the allowed time. To mitigate the hardship to the Government employees, the Government decided to consider, such of those Government employees who could not join duty in the promotion posts, in the next panel year. Accordingly, Government have decided to issue the following amendment to rule 11(b) of Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules,1996." 16. The preamble of a statute/rule is a part of the Act and is an admissible aid to construction. The preamble is expected to express the scope, object and purpose of the Act/Rule, more comprehensively. It may recite the ground and cause of making the Act/Rule, the evils sought to be remedied or the doubts intended to be settled. It is a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act/Rule and the mischiefs, which they intended to redress. Further, the preamble being a part of the statute can be read along with the provisions of the Act to find out the meaning of the words in the enacting provisions as also to decide whether they are clear or ambiguous. 17. Further, the preamble being a part of the statute can be read along with the provisions of the Act to find out the meaning of the words in the enacting provisions as also to decide whether they are clear or ambiguous. 17. The above preamble would reveal that the Government has noticed that an employee, who does not join in promotional post within stipulated time, loses his promotional rights, to the next higher category permanently and for several reasons, employees could not join in the promotion posts in the allowed time and their failure to join duty in the post of which the employee is appointed by promotion/ transfer results in forfeiture of the present and future rights of promotion/appointment by transfer. To mitigate this hardship, Government decided to consider such of those employees, who could not join duty in the promotion posts within the stipulated time, in the next panel year. Accordingly, the amendment was brought in. 18. The language imported, the context and the purpose in which the amendment was made would categorically indicate that it has retrospective effect. The words "an employee, who does not join the post within the stipulated time or evades to join the post by proceeding on leave, shall lose his promotion right/offer for the current panel year and the name of the candidate shall be placed before the next Departmental Promotion Committee for consideration in the next year panel, subject to availability of vacancy. In case of non-selection posts, the name of the candidate, who does not join within stipulated time in the promotion posts shall be considered for promotion, again after a period of one year from the date of offer of appointment, subject to availability of vacancy..." were incorporated to mitigate the hardship caused to the employees. Thus the rigidity and rigor of the rule has been relaxed/softened and the Rule enables consideration of such employees, who have lost their promotion in view of the fact that they have not joined within stipulated time or evades to join, in the next year panel, if vacancy is available. Further, we may have to examine the words 'employee, who does not join the post within stipulated time or evades to join the post". Further, we may have to examine the words 'employee, who does not join the post within stipulated time or evades to join the post". The language employed itself takes care of, grammatically speaking, the past, present and future situations of similar nature and enables an employee, who has already lost his promotion in view of rigidity of the old rule, to claim consideration of his case for promotion as per the amended rule in the next year panel; of course, subject to availability of vacancy. In this regard, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for respondents would amply demonstrate how and under what circumstances an amendment made by way of substitution can be construed as retrospective effect by way of necessary implication in the context and the language used therein. 19. Thus, a Rule, which is substituted newly for the old one shall not exclude persons, who are affected by such rule prior to its amendment for getting the benefit. 20. The ratio laid down in WEST OF U.P. SUGAR MILLS ASSOCIATION case (8 supra) shows that if a subsequent law, which modified the earlier law, was held to be void, the earlier law shall be deemed to have never been modified or repealed and, therefore, continued to be in force. In the case on hand, the old rule is sought to be amended by giving retrospective operation for the benefit of the employees, who were affected by the old Rule 11(b). The amended rule is sought to be extended to those persons, who did not join within stipulated time and hence, they are not entitled even for future consideration. 21. In NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL COOP. MARKETING FEDERATION OF INDIA LTD. case (1 supra) it was held that firstly the requirement is that the words used must be expressly provided or clearly employed to give retrospective operation to the amended law. Secondly, the retrospectivity must be reasonable and not excessive or harsh; otherwise, it runs risk of being struck down as unconstitutional. There is no fixed formula for expression of legislative intent to give retrospectivity to an enactment. Surrounding circumstances relating to the legislative background of the provision also have to be taken into account. 22. Secondly, the retrospectivity must be reasonable and not excessive or harsh; otherwise, it runs risk of being struck down as unconstitutional. There is no fixed formula for expression of legislative intent to give retrospectivity to an enactment. Surrounding circumstances relating to the legislative background of the provision also have to be taken into account. 22. Coming to the case on hand, the preamble of G.O.Ms.No.145, dated 15-6- 2004, as noticed above, is very clear and reveals that the language used therein must be deemed that it has retrospective operation, apart from the fact that denial of consideration for promotion permanently is against the constitutional provisions i.e. Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India as is decided by a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.26654 of 1995, dated 9-8-2006. The language imported in the G.O. and the object sought to be achieved by way of amendment is crystal clear. The amendment was made taking into consideration various reasons for which some employees/officers may not join in the promotional post within the stipulated time or evades and, the rigid rule, that such persons are not entitled for consideration of their case for promotion even in the future panel years was sought to be relaxed/softened, to enable such persons to claim for consideration of their case for promotion, in the future panel years, subject to availability of vacancies. Further, we are in complete agreement with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondents that this is a beneficial legislation made to take out the rigidity of the rule denying the permanent consideration of promotion of an employee/officer when he does not join in the promotion post within stipulated time. So also, such persons would be very few in any Department, who did not join within stipulated time or evades to join in the promotional post for various reasons, but that itself does not mean that the employee/officer could be denied promotion permanently as per the old rules, even after the new rules have come into effect. Once the rigidity of the rule was noticed to have causing hardship, and to mitigate that hardship, if the rule is amended, it cannot be said that it has no retrospective operation. 23. Once the rigidity of the rule was noticed to have causing hardship, and to mitigate that hardship, if the rule is amended, it cannot be said that it has no retrospective operation. 23. We are of the considered opinion that such rule, when it is made to mitigate the hardship of the employees, it has to be extended for those, who lost their promotion during the subsistence of the old rule; otherwise, it must be deemed that a rule available on the statute is not made applicable to some of the employees, who suffered the same disadvantage under the old rules. A rule of this nature must not only be construed liberally, but it must be given a purposive meaning subserving the object sought to be achieved. A purposive construction is one which gives effect to legislative purpose. The context, the language and the object sought to be achieved by way of such an amendment and the peculiar circumstances under which the rigidity of the rule was sought to be relaxed show that it has retrospective operation and the respondent/applicants are also entitled for extension of the benefit of the amended rule for consideration of their cases for promotion immediately in the next year panel after the amendment of the rule or in the successive panel years after the amendment, subject to availability of vacancies. In view of this, we cannot accept the submissions made by the learned Special Government Pleader that the Memo issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh (Deputy Secretary) dated 30-8-2005 is nothing but a clarification issued as to the application of the amended rule; therefore, it must be deemed, that was the intention of the rule making authority and thus it has no retrospective operation. The Memo was issued by a Deputy Secretary, on administrative side. It cannot be taken as a clarification to the legislation made and such clarification is binding on the respondent- applicants. Here, we may mention that we have perused the file relating to the issuance of G.O.Ms.No.145, General Administration (Service.D) Department, dated 15-6-2004 placed before us by the learned Special Government Pleader. The sum and substance of the file would reveal that the amendment (substitution) of the rule was made for the purpose of giving benefit even to those, who were affected by old rule. The sum and substance of the file would reveal that the amendment (substitution) of the rule was made for the purpose of giving benefit even to those, who were affected by old rule. In view of the above, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners have no relevance to the facts of the present case. Therefore, they need not be dealt with in detail. 24. For all the above reasons, we are not inclined to interfere with the Orders dated 13-12-2006 made in O.A.No.5655 of 2006, dated 14-7-2006 made in O.A.No.4312 of 2006 and dated 18-1-2007 in O.A.No.5742 of 2006 by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal. The Writ Petitions are devoid of merits and are liable to be dismissed. 25. Accordingly, the Writ Petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.