JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—The petitioner is a Senior Advocate practicing in Supreme Court of India. By this writ petition he is enforcing his legal and constitutional rights under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, to quash the acquisition of large area of land (373.218 hectrs.) by the Government of Uttar Pradesh for Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (GNIDA), including a farm house purchased by him in Khasra Plot No. 160 (area 0.7830 hectrs. equivalent to 3 bigha 1 biswa and 80 biswansis) in Village Tushiana, Pargana & Tehsil Dadri, Distt. Gautam Budh Nagar. He is recorded as tenure holder of the land in Khatauni (records of title) of the year 1409-1414F. (2002-2007 A.D.). The challenge to the powers of ‘eminent domain’ by the State is on the grounds that there was no public purpose and in fact no need at all for acquisition of the land. The invocation of urgency clause in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A and under Section 17 (4) of the Act, in the proposal to acquire the land under Section 4 of the Act was mechanical exercise of executive power without application of mind, to the need to dispense with the right of hearing given to the affected persons under Section 5-A of the Act. 2. The petitioner has raised constructions in small portion of the land surrounded by 8 high boundary wall. He has constructed a pump house and store, and has planted ornamental flowers and fruit bearing trees. He is living in House No. 355, Sector 15-A, NOIDA and is using the property for pleasure. He was informed by the Town Planner of GNIDA in the letter dated 10.10.2001 allowing his application dated 15.9.2001 for construction of boundary wall; temporary construction of pump house and store that if the land is acquired, he will not be entitled to any compensation for these constructions. 3. The notification under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act (in short the Act) was published by the State Government on 10.4.2006 proposing acquisition of large number of plots in Village Tushiana, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, Distt. Gautam Budh Nagar with total area of 379.001 hectrs. including the petitioner’s plot No. 160 (area 0.7830 hects.) for “planned industrial development”. Gautam Budh Nagar with total area of 379.001 hectrs. including the petitioner’s plot No. 160 (area 0.7830 hects.) for “planned industrial development”. In para 2 of the notification dated 10.4.2006 the Governor of Uttar Pradesh, expressed its opinion : “The Governor, being of the opinion that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act, are applicable to said land inasmuch as the said land is urgently required, for the planned industrial development in district Gautam Budh Nagar through Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority and it is as well necessary to eliminate the delay likely to be caused by an inquiry under Section 5A of the said Act, the Governor is further pleased to direct under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the said Act that the provision of Section 5A of the said Act shall not apply.” 4. The notification under Section 6 read with Section 17 (1) of the Act acquiring the land, following the notification under Section 4 of the Act proposing to acquire the land in public purpose, was made on 30th November, 2006 acquiring 373.218 hectrs. of land out of 379.001 hectrs. proposed to be acquired. By this notification the Governor of U.P. declared : “NOTIFICATION No. 6330/77-4-06-133N/05 Lucknow : Dated 30th November, 2006 In continuation of Government notification No. 6486/77-4-2005-133N/05, Dated 10th April, 2006 issued under subsection (1) of section 4 and sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894) and lastly published by giving public notice on 26.4.2006 the Governor is pleased to declare under Section 6 of the said Act that he is satisfied that the land mentioned in the Schedule below is needed for a public purpose, namely for the planned industrial development in District Gautam Budh Nagar through Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority and under Section 7 of the said Act to direct the Collector of Gautam Budh Nagar to take order for the acquisition of the said land. 2. 2. The Governor, being satisfied that the case is one of urgency is further pleased under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act to direct that the Collector of Gautam Budhnagar, though no award under Section-11 has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the date of publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section-9, take possession of the land mentioned in the Schedule, for the said public purpose.” District Pargana Tehsil Village Plot No. Area to be Acquired (in Hects.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Gautam Dadri Dadri Tusiyana — 373.218 Budh (As per Hects. Nagar schedule enclosed 5. The writ petition was filed on December 18, 2006 with an apprehension that the State Government is likely to take possession of the acquired land. It was released by five Benches of the Court. It came to be nominated to us by Hon’ble Senior Judge. On the statement of Shri S.P. Kesarwani that the notice under Section 9 of the Act has not been issued to the petitioner so far, we did not pass any interim order and allowed time to both to the State Government and GNIDA to file their replies. The pleadings were exchanged within a month. The Advocate General, however, appeared to be very busy to argue the matter and took several adjournments on which we were constrained to make an interim order on 2.2.2007, which was extended from time to time and that with great difficulty the Addl. Advocate General appointed by the new Government in the State agreed to argue the matter. It was heard on 25.10.2007, 30.10.2007, 1.11.2007, 20.11.2007 and finally on 13.12.2007. 6. During the course of hearing we summoned and perused the records produced before us by the State Government as well as GNIDA. Shri Zafar Naiyer, Addl. Advocate General raised preliminary objections alleging that conduct of the petitioner and condition with which the permission was granted to him to raise boundary wall amounts to waiving his rights, challenging the acquisition of the land. He submitted that the condition in the letter of GNIDA dated 10.10.2001 accepted by him in his letter would operate as estoppel against him to challenge the acquisition. 7. He submitted that the condition in the letter of GNIDA dated 10.10.2001 accepted by him in his letter would operate as estoppel against him to challenge the acquisition. 7. Replying to the preliminary objections of Shri Zafar Naiyer and submitting that principles of estoppel are not attracted as there was no conscious and intentional waiver of the known facts and that there could be no waiver of public policy nor the petitioner could not be aware of any such proposal or final acquisition of the land by the State Government, almost six years before he applied for construction to the boundary wall, Shri Ravi Kant proceeded to argue, that there is no public purpose in acquisition of the land. There was no need to acquire the land for the stated purpose of planned industrial development. He would submit that there was no material to satisfy the State Government to invoke the urgency clause and that Section 17 (4) of the Act, was mechanically applied without application of mind. Section 5-A of the Act is the only provision by which opportunity is given to the citizen to object against proposed acquisition of his land and that the minimal rights of hearing given by the Act should not be defeated unless there is real and apparent urgency, to acquire the land for public purpose. The New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) and GNIDA have requested in the past, as in the present case, and the State Government has applied the urgency clause in acquisition of almost all the lands in their possession routinely, dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. With the help of the record produced by the State Government Shri Ravi Kant would submit that the averment in the counter affidavit of Shri Ayub Ali, Section Officer, Industrial Development, Section 4, U.P. Secretariat, Lucknow, with regard to public purpose and invoking the urgency clause and the material placed by GNIDA before the State Government would go to show that there was no proposal by any foreign industrial establishment for investing in the State of U.P. and further there was no material to show, that if the land according to their need is not made available, these units will establish their industries in other States. Further there was no material to show that if these industries go to establish their units in other States, proper industrial development of the area would not be possible. 8. Shri Ravi Kant submits that for invoking urgency clause for planned industrial development as public purpose, the GNIDA and the State Government were required to establish that any industry or industries, urgently need the land in the area. In fact there was not a single industry, or foreign company proposing foreign direct investment, in the area. The GNIDA did not have a single proposal to support the satisfaction recorded mechanically in the terms stated in the notes reproduced in the counter affidavit. Shri Ravi Kant has relied upon Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1977 SC 183 ; State of Punjab v. Gurdayal Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471 ; Om Prakash v. State of U.P., (1998) 6 SCC 1 ; Union of India and others v. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14 and Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja, (2004) 8 SCC 453 in submitting that compulsory acquisition of person’s property is a serious matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and pre emptive of arbitrariness and denial of the administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reason. Save in real urgency were public interest does not burke even a minimum time needed to give a hearing, the land acquisition authority, should not, having regard the Articles 14 and 19 initiate action under Section 17 of the Act. 9. Beginning from Narayan Govind Gavate (supra), the Supreme Court has consistently taken a view, which is summed up in para 16 of Krishan Lal Arneja’s case (supra) as follows : “Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5A of the Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. A public purpose, however laudable it may be by itself is not sufficient to take aid of Section 17 to use this extraordinary power as use of such power deprives a land owner of his right in relation to immovable property to file objections for the proposed acquisition and it also dispenses with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The Authority must have subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause under Section 17 keeping in mind the nature of the public purpose, real urgency that the situation demands and the time factor i.e. whether taking possession of the property can wait for a minimum period within which the objections could be received from the land owners and the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act could be completed. In other words, if power under Section 17 is not exercised, the very purpose for which the land is being acquired urgently would be frustrated or defeated. Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly, exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations such as due to earthquake, flood or some specific time bound project where the delay is likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. A citizen’s property can be acquired in accordance with law but in the absence of real and genuine urgency, it may not be appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and just opportunity of putting forth its objections for due consideration of the acquiring authority, while applying the urgency clause, the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State Administration.” 10. Shri Zafar Naiyer, Addl. Advocate General submits that Village Tushiana is part of area for which GNIDA was constituted under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. It is also covered by Master Plan 2021 (First phase, year 2011, and Second phase, year 2021). Shri Zafar Naiyer, Addl. Advocate General submits that Village Tushiana is part of area for which GNIDA was constituted under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. It is also covered by Master Plan 2021 (First phase, year 2011, and Second phase, year 2021). The petitioner was told and cautioned by GNIDA on 16.5.2001, when he applied for permission to raise boundary wall by his request dated 4.5.2001, that the land is proposed to be acquired. The General Manager (Planning & Architecture) had submitted a report on 26.6.2001 that Plot No. 160 is also proposed for acquisition in Phase I. The petitioner voluntarily accepted the condition giving unconditional undertaking, not to insist and claim any compensation, if GNIDA ever acquires the land. The permission was granted on 10.10.2001 on the basis of undertaking of the petitioner. He has relied upon principle of estoppel under Section 115 of the Evidence Act supported by Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai v. M/s Virgo Steels Bombay, JT 2002 (3) SC 558 (para 14, 15 and 16) and R.N. Gosai v. Yash Pal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683 (para 10). 11. Shri Naiyer submits that urgency is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the State Government and that the State Government has recorded its subjective satisfaction, referred to in paragraphs 3 (c), (d), (e) and (f) of the counter affidavit filed by the State. The note made for the purposes of justification for invoking urgency clause was based upon the report of the Collector, that if the land in question is not made available, several entrepreneurs desiring to set up institutions may set up institutions in other States, which shall affect the economic development of the State. There were 67 applications, between 12.4.2005 to 14.6.2005 for about 120 hectrs.; 43 applications between 7.12.2005 to 31.3.2006 for 91 hectrs. and about 206 applications between 3.4.2006 to 22.2.2007 for establishing industries and institutions in the area. It was stated that the development of Knowledge Park, which includes Village Tushiana requires an area to be developed for speedy and integrated planned development. The possession of the area except that of the petitioner and one other person was taken on 2.2.2007. Out of 715 tenure holders affected by the acquisition only the petitioner and one M/s TPL have objected to the acquisition. The Knowledge Park is in a vast area including the present acquisition. The possession of the area except that of the petitioner and one other person was taken on 2.2.2007. Out of 715 tenure holders affected by the acquisition only the petitioner and one M/s TPL have objected to the acquisition. The Knowledge Park is in a vast area including the present acquisition. The area earlier acquired has been developed and allotted for setting up institutions and infrastructural facilities like roads (NH-24, link road and other roads). Any interference to the present acquisition will adversely affect the development of the Knowledge Park, the substantive part of which has already been completed and the land is allotted to entrepreneurs. 12. Shri Naiyer submits that Section 5-A of the Act confers a right upon the owner of the land to object to the acquisition of the land. The petitioner has already waived his rights to object to the acquisition at the time of seeking permission to raise temporary boundary wall etc. The petitioner has not disputed the urgency as well as public purposes with reference to the present acquisition. The urgency is matter of subjective satisfaction of the State Government. Besides, sufficient evidence was placed on record in the first supplementary counter affidavit by GNIDA, which establishes the material before the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar to record the reasons for urgency. Once these reasons recorded in the proposal by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, who sent the record to the State Government through the Director, Land Acquisition and which substantially established the urgency, were accepted, subjective satisfaction of the State Government for recording the urgency is not open for interference. He has relied upon the judgments in Jage Ram and others v. State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1033 (para 11); Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, AIR 1984 SC 1721 (para 8); Hari Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1984 SC 1020 ; State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi and others, AIR 1986 SC 2025 ; S.S. Darshan v. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 1996 SC 697 ; Union of India v. Praveen Gupta and others, AIR 1997 SC 170 ; Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1999 SC 436 ; First Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli and others, JT 2002 (2) SC 620 and Amar Singh v. State of U.P., 2003 (52) ALR 468. 13. In Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli (supra) the Supreme Court summed up the law with regard to invoking urgency in para 5 as follows : “The question of urgency of an acquisition under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and ordinarily it is not open to the Court to make a scrutiny of the propriety of that satisfaction on an objective appraisal of facts. In this view of the matter when the Government takes a decision, taking all relevant considerations into account and is satisfied that there exists emergency for invoking powers under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act, and issues notification accordingly, the same should not be interfered with by the Court unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind to the relevant factors or that the decision has been taken by the appropriate authority mala fide. Whether in a given situation there existed urgency or not is left to the discretion and decision of the concerned authorities. If an order invoking power under Section 17(4) is assailed, the Courts may enquire whether the appropriate authority had all the relevant materials before it or whether the order has been passed by non-application of mind. Any post notification delay subsequent to the decision of the State Government dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5-A by invoking powers under Section 17 (1) of the Act would not invalidate the decision itself specially when no mala fides on the part of the Government or its officers are alleged. Opinion of the State Government can be challenged in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that action of the State Government is mala fide. Though the satisfaction under Section 17(4) is a subjective one and is not open to challenge before a Court of law, except for the grounds already indicated, but the said satisfaction must be of the Appropriate Government and that the satisfaction must be, as to the existence of an urgency. The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency even though cannot be conclusive but is entitled to great weight, as has been held by this Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1971 SC 1033 . The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency even though cannot be conclusive but is entitled to great weight, as has been held by this Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1971 SC 1033 . Even a mere allegation that power was exercised mala fide would not be enough and in support of such allegation specific materials should be placed before the Court. The burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, if the circumstances of the case in hand are examined it would appear that the premises in question was required for the students of National Medical College, Calcutta and the notification issued in December 1982 had been quashed by the Court and the subsequent notification issued on 25-2-1994 also had been quashed by the Court. It is only thereafter the notification was issued under Sections 4(1) and 17(4) of the Act on 29-11-1994 which came up for consideration before the High Court. Apart from the fact that there had already been considerable delay in acquiring the premises in question on account of the intervention by Courts, the premises was badly needed for the occupation of the students of National Medical College, Calcutta. Thus, existence of urgency was writ large on the facts of the case and therefore, said exercise of power in the case in hand, cannot be interfered with by a Court of law on a conclusion that there did not exist any emergency. The conclusion of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, therefore, is unsustainable.” 14. Shri Pradeep Kumar appearing for GNIDA submits that Village Tushiana comes under the planning of Greater Noida constituted under Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 6 of 1976. The notification was issued by the State Government on 28.1.1991 for planned industrial development of the area. The preliminary notification under the Act was published by the competent Government after invoking the urgency clause. The State Government found that the need for the land is urgent. The State Government is competent to apply its mind and issue the notification under Section 4 (17) after its subjective satisfaction. The preliminary notification under the Act was published by the competent Government after invoking the urgency clause. The State Government found that the need for the land is urgent. The State Government is competent to apply its mind and issue the notification under Section 4 (17) after its subjective satisfaction. The master plan has been prepared for planned industrial development and as per the master plan the land was proposed to be needed urgently for establishing various new industries, which submitted their proposal for installing their units in Greater Noida including the foreign industries. The urgency is genuine, and that the State Government has exercised its urgency powers in accordance with law. Shri Pradeep Kumar submits that the notification has been issued by the State Government strictly as per the provisions of the Act and that the State Government was subjectively satisfied to invoke the provisions of Section 17 (4) of the Act. The entire development of the Greater Noida area is going strictly as per Master Plan 2021. The area of Village Tushiana, where the disputed land is situated is proposed for development to establish the units of various good reputed Indian and foreign industries, which are negotiating with GNIDA to establish their latest modern prime units in Greater Noida area. Shri Pradeep Kumar submits that present acquisition has been challenged only by the petitioner and one M/s Technology Park Ltd. in Writ Petition No. 68439 of 2006. He submits that part of compensation has been deposited. The farmers, however, have not withdrawn the amount as they are negotiating for higher compensation. The land owned by the petitioner is a very small portion of the area acquired by the State Government and that larger public purpose may not be allowed to be defeated for small portion of the land owned by a Senior Advocate for his pleasure. 15. The State Government was required and produced the record, relating to the satisfaction for invoking the urgency clause under Section 17 (4) of the Act for dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. 15. The State Government was required and produced the record, relating to the satisfaction for invoking the urgency clause under Section 17 (4) of the Act for dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. The objections taken by the petitioner that the records must be produced before the Court to examine the sufficient compliance with the requirement of law in terms of Delhi Administration v. Gurdeep Singh Uban, (2000) 7 SCC 296 followed in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chanai, (2005) 7 SCC 627 (para 18) need not be considered as the State Government has placed before us the entire records including the recommendations made by the Collector on the request of GNIDA and the satisfaction recorded by the State Government on such material. 16. The petitioner had applied for permission for raising a boundary wall on Khasra Plot No. 160. The request made on 4.5.2001 was initially declined by Greater Noida on 16.5.2001. When the petitioner again took up the matter, the General Manager (Planning & Architecture) GNIDA submitted a report on 26.6.2001 that acquisition of Plot No. 160 is proposed in Phase-I and that a barbed wire fencing may be permitted. The letter was sent to the petitioner on 1.9.2001 to which he replied voluntarily accepting on 15.9.2001, the conditions and giving unconditional undertaking that he would not insist/claim for any compensation, if the GNIDA ever acquires the land. On this undertaking the permission was granted to the petitioner on 10.10.2001, with the condition that if the land is acquired, the petitioner will not be given any compensation for the constructions raised by him. This correspondence and the undertaking does not constitute waiver of the rights to challenge the acquisition, five years later by notification under Section 4 read with Section 17 (4) of the Act dated 10.4.2006 followed by notification dated 30.11.2006 under Section 6 read with Section 17 (1) of the Act. The waiver involves a conscious, voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such a waiver the party would have enjoined. The waiver involves a conscious, voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such a waiver the party would have enjoined. The agreement constituting the basis of such waiver depends upon the reciprocal promise, constituting the consideration for one and other and the reciprocity envisaged and engrafted should be such that one party, who fails to perform his own reciprocal promise cannot assert a claim for performance of the other party, and go to the extent of even claiming damages for non-performance by the other parties. In Sikkim Subba Associates v. State of Sikkim, (2001) 5 SCC 629 the Supreme Court held that he, who seeks equity must do equity, and when the contention or acceptance of belated performance was conditional upon the future good conduct and adherence to the promise of the defaulter, the so called waiver cannot be considered to be forever and complete in itself so as to deprive the State of its power to legitimately repudiate and refuse to perform its part on the admitted fact that the default of the appellants continued till even the passing of the award. 17. The undertaking given that if and when the land is acquired the petitioner would not claim compensation for the constructions, and the condition to raise boundary wall, pump house and store on such undertaking would not amount to waiver of petitioner’s rights to challenge the acquisition, on such grounds as may be open to him in law. The petitioner did not give up any of his rights, to challenge the acquisition of the land, if it was not made in accordance with law. He did not have any existing right in the year 2001 to be waived in return for permission to construct the boundary wall, pump house and store. The preliminary objection taken by Shri Zafar Naiyer, AAG have no locus to stand. 18. We may now consider the main question of invoking the urgency clause in acquisition of the land and dispensing with the public enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act giving right to a citizen to be heard in the matter of exercise of powers of ‘eminent domain’ to acquire the land. 18. We may now consider the main question of invoking the urgency clause in acquisition of the land and dispensing with the public enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act giving right to a citizen to be heard in the matter of exercise of powers of ‘eminent domain’ to acquire the land. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court held that Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable and important right in favour of person, whose lands are sought to be acquired, and having regard to the provisions contained in Art. 300-A of the Constitution, it has been held to be akin to a fundamental right. The State in exercise of its powers of ‘eminent domain’ may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring it, but the same must be for public purpose and reasonable compensation there for must be paid. The definition of public purpose is of wide amplitude and takes within its sweep acquisition of land for corporations owned or controlled by the State. But the same would not mean that the State is the sole judge thereof and no judicial review shall lie. It was further held that conclusiveness contained in Section 6 of the Act is indisputably attached to a need as also the purpose and in this regard ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited but when an opportunity of being heard is expressly conferred by statute, the same must scrupulously be complied with. Such an opportunity of being heard is necessary to be granted with a view to show that the purpose for which the acquisition proceeding is sought to be made is not public purpose as also the suitability of land therefor. The hearing must be effective and formation of opinion as regard public purpose, as also the suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind as regard consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The State in its decision making process must not commit any misdirection in law. 19. Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities, under which the State can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5-A of the Act, in exceptional case of urgency. The State in its decision making process must not commit any misdirection in law. 19. Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities, under which the State can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5-A of the Act, in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers cannot be, as held in Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja (supra), lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. A public purpose, however, laudable it may be, by itself is not sufficient to take aid of Section 17 of the Act to use this extraordinary power as use of such power deprives a land owner of his right in relation to immovable property, to file objections for the proposed acquisition and it also dispenses with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The authority must have subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act keeping in mind the nature of public purpose, real urgency that situation demands, and time factor that is whether taking possession of the property can wait for minimum period within which the objections could be received from the land owners and enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act could be completed. It was held in Krishan Lal Arneja that the urgency for invoking Section 17 of the Act should be one arising naturally out of circumstances, which existed, when the decision to acquire the land is taken, and not such, which is the result of serious lapse or gross delay on the part of acquiring authority. Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly, incidentally or extraordinarily, depending on situation such as due to earthquake, flood or some specific time bound project, which the delay is likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. In the absence of real and genuine urgency it is not appropriate to deprive the aggrieved party of a fair and just opportunity of putting forth its objection for due consideration of the acquiring authority. While applying the urgency clause the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility. In the absence of real and genuine urgency it is not appropriate to deprive the aggrieved party of a fair and just opportunity of putting forth its objection for due consideration of the acquiring authority. While applying the urgency clause the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part of State administration. 20. In Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli (supra) the Supreme Court cautioned that it is not open to the Court to make a scrutiny of the propriety of the subjective satisfaction on an objective appraisal of fact. When the Government takes a decision, taking all relevant consideration into account, and is satisfied that there exists emergency for invoking powers under Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act and issues a notification accordingly, the same should not be interfered with by the Court unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind to the relevant factors or that the decision has been taken by the appropriate authority malafidely. Whether in a given situation there exist urgency or not is left to the discretion and decision of the concerned authorities. If an order invoking powers under Section 17 (4) of the Act is assailed, the Court may enquire whether the appropriate authority had all the relevant materials before it or whether the order has been passed by non-application of mind. Though the satisfaction under Section 17 (4) of the Act is subjective one and is not open to challenge before a Court of law except on the ground that there was no material or that the decision is vitiated by malafides, the satisfaction must be of the appropriate Government, and the satisfaction must be, as to the existence of an urgency. The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency, even though it may not be conclusive, is entitled to great weight. 21. In Smt. Manju Lata Agrawal v. State of U.P. and others, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2251 of 2007 and other connected writ petitions a Division Bench of this Court reconsidered these questions and have held in their judgment dated 20.9.2007 : “The truth or correctness of the material will not be questioned by the Court nor will it go into the adequacy of the material. Writ Petition No. 2251 of 2007 and other connected writ petitions a Division Bench of this Court reconsidered these questions and have held in their judgment dated 20.9.2007 : “The truth or correctness of the material will not be questioned by the Court nor will it go into the adequacy of the material. Even if some of the materials on which the action is taken is found to be irrelevant, the Court would still not interfere so long as there is some relevant material sustaining the Order. (Vide Constitution Bench judgments in Rameshwar Prasad and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 2006 SC 980 ; and Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker Lok Sabha and others, (2007) 3 SCC 184 ).” “The aforesaid view has been diluted subsequently by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court; in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (P.J.), Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Haldia and others, (2005) 7 SCC 764 , wherein it observed as under : “But we are also aware that the principles of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be imprisoned in a straight jacket. They must yield to and change with exigencies of situation. They must be confined within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been stated, “to do a great right after all", it is permissible some times ‘to do a little wrong. [Per Mukherjee, C.J. in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 613 ]. While interpreting legal provisions, a Court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard realities of life. In our opinion, the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than “precedential.” (Emphasis added) Similarly, in P.D. Agrawal (supra) the Apex Court dealing with such a issue held that principles of natural justice have in recent time also undergone a sea change. As the principles of law is that some real prejudice must have been caused to the complainant, the Court has shifted from its earlier concept that even a small violation shall result in order being rendered a nullity. As the principles of law is that some real prejudice must have been caused to the complainant, the Court has shifted from its earlier concept that even a small violation shall result in order being rendered a nullity. While deciding the said case, the Apex Court placed reliance on and considered its earlier judgments, particularly, S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 ; Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd., (2005) 5 SCC 337 ; State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi, (2006) 1 SCC 667 ; and Mohd. Sartaj v. State of U.P., (2006) 2 SCC 315 . The Court held that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice. The Court further held as under : “If no prejudice is established to have resulted there from it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases.” In view of the above, it is evidence that person, who lodges the complaint, must establish that dispensation with the inquiry stipulated under Section 5-A has caused real prejudice to him.” 22. Coming to the present case we find that GNIDA is constituted under Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 6 of 1976. Village Tushiana is notified village under the Act vide Notification No. 7436 dated 28.1.1991 for industrial development. A proposal for acquisition of certain plots and land of Village Tushiana, Tehsil Dadri, Pargana Dadri, Distt. Gautam Budh Nagar was received by the State Government. The proposal contained information supported by document provided under the Government Order dated 30.9.2002 issued by the State Government, which included the preliminary enquiry report with regard to ownership of the land; the effect of the ceiling laws; the nature of constructions; religious places and the persons, who are going to be affected by such acquisition. The proposal also contained the reasoning for invoking the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. The proposal also contained the reasoning for invoking the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. These reasoning included report of Survey Amin/Lekhpal, Greater Noida; Naib Tehsildar, Greater Noida; Tehsildar, Greater Noida; and Special Officer, GNIDA stating that it is proposed to develop the industrial area, and to carry out the work of sewerage, electrification in the industrial plan of the area of the authority for which the allotments have been held up. The applicants require the allotment of the land, which is not possible as the land has not been acquired. There are reputed foreign industrial institutions in the applicants, which want to invest substantial capital in the area. It is absolutely necessary to make available the land according to their needs and if these units are not made available the lands according to their needs, they may establish their industrial units in some other States. Therefore, an attempt is being made to make the land available to these units so that these units may not go to other States and the industrial development of the region may not be properly made. The proposal, thereafter, provided that 10% of the cost of land for 379.001 hectrs. of the land has been deposited with the Addl. District Magistrate, Land Acquisition, Greater Noida. There is no religious place or monument on the proposed land. A total number of 715 families will be affected by acquisition in Gram Gawela and that 125 farmers have been stated to be landless. There are 42 tenure holders belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and 82 small farmers. There is no compensation or decretal amount and arrears as certified by the Addl. District Magistrate, Land Acquisition, and thus taking into account the land selected for acquisition a proposal for acquisition under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 was recommended. 23. The State Government considered the proposal and recorded its satisfaction agreeing with the reasons given in the proposal for the urgency and for public purpose of the planned industrial development. The satisfaction of the Government has been reproduced in para 3 (f) (iii) of the counter affidavit of Shri Ayub Ali, Section Officer, Industrial Development, Section 4, U.P. Secretariat, Lucknow. The State Government considered the proposal and recorded its satisfaction agreeing with the reasons given in the proposal for the urgency and for public purpose of the planned industrial development. The satisfaction of the Government has been reproduced in para 3 (f) (iii) of the counter affidavit of Shri Ayub Ali, Section Officer, Industrial Development, Section 4, U.P. Secretariat, Lucknow. It was also reported as stated in sub-para IV that prior to issuance of notification dated 30.11.2006 a noting was made that in the report/recommendation called for by the State Government it was mentioned that the user of 373.218 hectrs. land in Village Tushiana, Pargana & Tehsil Dadri, Distt. Gautam Budh Nagar in the Master Plan is institutional. The development has been restricted on account of availability of the land causing adverse effect on the development plan and that if the notification under Section 6/17 is delayed, there is possibility of encroachment over the land. The recommendation also proposed denotification of 5.783 hectrs. land and to acquire 373.218 hectrs. of land. 24. The averment in the counter affidavit and the record produced before us would go to show that land use of the land in Village Tushiana, in the master plan was reserved as, ‘institutional’. The land was part of notification of the industrial area under Section 3 of U.P. Act No. 6 of 1976. The development of the area was proposed for allotment to various industries and institutions and that it was stated that in case the development plan is not made available, the investors would establish their industries in some other States affecting the development of the industrial area. 25. On our request, a list of industries with their proposals was provided by the GNIDA alongwith their first supplementary counter affidavit. A perusal of the list of the industries would show that the GNIDA relied upon names of some of the industries, which have already set up their industrial units in other parts of Greater Noida and that there were no foreign companies or institutions, which had proposed to set up an industrial unit in the area. In fact GNIDA could not demonstrate or give the name of any foreign industry, which may have shown their interest for allotment of land in Greater Noida. 26. In fact GNIDA could not demonstrate or give the name of any foreign industry, which may have shown their interest for allotment of land in Greater Noida. 26. The sufficiency or insufficiency of the material, and the names of industries, which may have applied with concrete proposals for establishment of industrial units, is not material for the purposes of judicial review of the subjective satisfaction of the State Government. When there exists material before the State Government, in the shape of recommendations and that material is relevant for applying the mind for recording subjective satisfaction of invoking the urgency clause for acquisition of the land, the law does not permit the Court to consider the material as if it was weighing the evidence for the purposes of recording subjective satisfaction of invoking the urgency clause for acquisition of the land. If the material is relevant, on which competent authority, as reasonable person may invoke the urgency clause for acquisition of the land, the Court would not put such material on the scales, to weigh or measure such urgency. The Court is not competent to carry out judicial review of the sufficiency or insufficiency on the material placed before it. What the Court required to see is whether such material is relevant, and that the competent authority in the State Government could have formed an opinion without their being any motive or ill-will for invoking the urgency clause. In the present case the State has given in the counter affidavit, the material on which it had placed reliance and has produced the material before us, which we find to be relevant for the purpose of invoking urgency clause. Even if we may, after perusing the record arrive on different conclusion, we would restrain ourselves from interfering, as in such case we would be substituting our opinion in place of opinion of the competent authority in the State Government. If we do so, we would be sitting in appeal over the subjective satisfaction recorded by the State Government. The legal position obtained from the judicial precedents restrain us from doing so. 27. We also find that the acquisition affects large number of persons but that only M/s Technology Ltd. and the petitioner have challenged the acquisition. Annexure 2 to the supplementary affidavit of Shri Atul Shukla, Asstt. Law Officer, GNIDA is letter written by Addl. The legal position obtained from the judicial precedents restrain us from doing so. 27. We also find that the acquisition affects large number of persons but that only M/s Technology Ltd. and the petitioner have challenged the acquisition. Annexure 2 to the supplementary affidavit of Shri Atul Shukla, Asstt. Law Officer, GNIDA is letter written by Addl. District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), GNIDA to the Deputy Chief Executive Officer, GNIDA dated 16.11.2007 informing that it has acquired knowledge of four writ petitions other than writ petition filed by Shri Sudhir Chandra Agarwala, in the matter of acquisition of the land in Village Tushiana. These writ petitions are Writ Petition No. 16926 of 2007, Suvarn Gupta v. State of U.P.; Writ Petition No. 68436 of 2006, M/s Technology v. State of U.P.; Writ Petition No. 23677 of 2006, M/s Technology v. State of U.P., which was disposed of by the Court on 7.5.2006 and Writ Petition No. 65654 of 2006, M/s Technology v. State of U.P. It is also stated in the same letter that the affected farmers have not received the compensation in the hope of increase of compensation and that Rs. 1,82,86,91,986/-, required to be deposited as value of the land and rehabilitation has been deposited by the Development Authority. 28. For the reasons stated above, we do not find that the challenge to acquisition is barred by principle of estoppel. We, however, find that there was sufficient material placed by the GNIDA and the Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar before the State Government on which the State Government recorded its subjective satisfaction for invoking the urgency clause for acquiring the land and dispensing with the enquiry in hearing of objections under Section 5-A of the Act. We also find that apart from the petitioner and one more person, no one else has challenged the acquisition, and that the petitioner would not suffer any hardship, if the land purchased by him for a small farm measuring 0.783 hectrs. included in the acquisition of the area of 373.218 hectrs. is acquired for planned industrial development, a public purpose for which the land is needed. 29. The writ petition is dismissed. ————