ORDER :- Aggrieved by reversing order of learned Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, in R.A. No.583 of 1993, dated 23.12.1996, Smt. VO. Padma Bai and her three children filed present revision petition under Section 22 of Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 ('the Act', for brevity). 2. The un-controverted fact of the matter is that R. Jagannadha Rao is owner of residential premises bearing No.7-1-178 situated at Moosakhan Bazar, Secunderabad. The same was let out to one C.S. Naidu on a monthly rent of Rs.200/-. First petitioner is daughter of C.S. Naidu. She statedly joined her father in tenanted premises after death of her husband Patiabhiram Naidu. After death of C.S. Naidu, petitioners filed R.C. No.155 of 1990 under Section 8(5) of the Act seeking permission to deposit rent in the Court. They alleged that landlord, Jagannadha Rao, refused to accept rent in spite of petitioners continued to be tenants. Petition was opposed inter alia denying relationship of landlord and tenant. Enquiry was conducted wherein petitioners 2 and 3 were examined as witnesses and Exs.Pl to P3 were marked. Jagannadha Rao examined himself as DW.1 and EX.B1 demand notice was marked. Learned Principal Rent Controller found justification for invoking Section 8(5) of the Act and by order dated 30.8.1993 directed tenants to pay all the arrears of rent from 1.3.1990 and also to deposit monthly rent in the Court. On appeal before learned Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, it was contended that a widowed daughter is not a tenant within meaning of Section 2(ix) of the Act. The appeal was allowed as a result of which tenants' petition was dismissed. 3. On appeal before learned Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, it was contended that a widowed daughter is not a tenant within meaning of Section 2(ix) of the Act. The appeal was allowed as a result of which tenants' petition was dismissed. 3. In the background of the case, only point which requires consideration is whether a daughter of tenant, who joined father after death of her husband, is tenant within the meaning of Section 2(ix) of the Act, which reads as under: 2.(ix) 'Tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son or daughter, of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of tenant's family upto the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building, by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter-house or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased out by a local authority. 4. The definition is in three parts. The main part defines tenant means, any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building. Second part is inclusionary part. In this category surviving spouse, son and/or daughter of a deceased tenant fall. Third part is exclusionary part according to which a person placed in occupation of a building by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter-house or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased out by a local authority. First petitioner is daughter of C.S. Naidu. There is no denial. As tenancy of Jagannadha Rao was with C.S. Naidu, fIrst petitioner does not fall in main part of definition. Similarly she does not fall in exclusionary part. Whether she falls under inclusionary part of definition ? There cannot be any doubt that within ordinary meaning of the term "son", it includes married son or a son who lost his wife. Similarly the term "daughter" also includes a minor daughter, major daughter, unmarried daughter, married daughter or an unfortunate widowed daughter. Whether she falls under inclusionary part of definition ? There cannot be any doubt that within ordinary meaning of the term "son", it includes married son or a son who lost his wife. Similarly the term "daughter" also includes a minor daughter, major daughter, unmarried daughter, married daughter or an unfortunate widowed daughter. Merely because terms like "married daughter" or "widowed daughter" do not find place in inclusionary part, the Court cannot introduce something more and expect· the Legislature to define a term taking into consideration all eventualities. The words used in a statute especially in dictionary clause should be given plain meaning. Giving such meaning, this Court has no manner of doubt in coming to conclusion that daughter also includes a married/ widowed daughter. In a given case married/widowed daughter is staying in tenanted premises, she shall have to be treated as a tenant. 5. Learned Counsel for petitioners has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in R. Ramanujam v. D. Venkat Rao, AIR 1982 AP 227 . The Division Bench having regard to Sections 2(ix), 14 and 24(2) of the Act, held that a legal heir of a tenant is entitled to claim tenancy. The question, which falls for consideration, in this case did not arise in the case. A reference however may be made to a decision of Supreme Court in Savita Samvedi v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 380 . 6. In Savitha Samvedi's case (supra), the facts were these. The father of Sa vita was a railway employee. He was allotted a quarter in railway colony in Delhi. Even while in service, he sought permission to allow his daughter to share the accommodation. As she was also a railway employee, permission was granted to Savita to share accommodation with effect from 16.3.1993. When he was about to retire at the end of the year, he exercised option in favour of Savita under the relevant circular and sought for regularization of accommodation of Savita. The same was rejected. Her challenge before the Central Administrative Tribunal was unsuccessful. The Supreme Court pressed into service the common saying, "A son is a son until he gets a wife. The same was rejected. Her challenge before the Central Administrative Tribunal was unsuccessful. The Supreme Court pressed into service the common saying, "A son is a son until he gets a wife. A daughter is a daughter throughout her life." The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of reading down and held that the Railway circular suffers from twin vices of gender discrimination inter se among women on account of marriage and recast the rule which gave the benefit of concession to a woman if she is a Railway employee and a retiring official has exercised his choice in her favour for regularization. The following observations of the Supreme Court are relevant: The retiring official's expectations in old age for care and attention and its measures from one of his children cannot be faulted, or his hopes dampened, by limiting his choice. That would be unfair and unreasonable. If he has only one married daughter, who is a Railway employee, and none of his other children are, then his choice is and has to be limited to that Railway employee married daughter. He should be in an unfettered position to nominate that daughter for regularization of Railway accommodation. It is only in the case of more than one children in Railway service that he may have to exercise a choice and we see no reason why the choice be not left with the retiring official's judgment on the point and be not respected by the Railway authorities irrespective of the gender of the child. There is no occasion for the Railways to be regulating or bludgeoning the choice in favour of the son when existing and able to maintain his parents. The Railway Ministry's Circular in that regard appears thus to us to be wholly unfair, gender-biased and unreasonable, liable to be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. The eligibility of a married daughter must be placed on a par with an unmarried daughter (for she must have been once in the state), so as to claim the benefit of the earlier part of the Circular... 7. If a married daughter or widowed daughter are excluded from the inclusionary part of definition of Section 2(ix) of the Act, it would result in discrimination among three categories of daughters, namely, unmarried daughter, married daughter and widowed daughter. 7. If a married daughter or widowed daughter are excluded from the inclusionary part of definition of Section 2(ix) of the Act, it would result in discrimination among three categories of daughters, namely, unmarried daughter, married daughter and widowed daughter. Any interpretation, it is axiomatic, must be in accordance with principles of equality, which is the foundation of Constitution of India. Therefore applying the principle in Savita Samvedi's case (supra), it must be held that first petitioner who is widowed daughter is also "daughter" within the meaning of Section 2(ix) of the Act. In that view of the matter, learned appellate authority has committed serious error in reversing the order of learned Rent Controller. S. Accordingly the impugned order is set aside. The order of learned Rent Controller is confirmed and civil revision petition is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.