Judgment : BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. (1). THIS appeal under Section 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is at the instance of an employer and is directed against the order dated 27th July, 1999 passed by the Commissioner, workmens Compensation, Durgapur, in Claim Case No. 861 of 1986 thereby directing the appellant to pay compensation of Rs. 73,668/-to the respondent. (2). BEING dissatisfied, the employer has come up with the present appeal. (3). THE respondent before us filed an application in terms of Section 3 of the act on the following allegations: one Ganesh Bahadur Chettri, a watch guard employed by the appellant, received personal injury by an accident on 19th April, 1985 arising out of and in course of his employment resulting in his death. His dead body was found at about 430 a. m. on 20th April 1985. In spite of demand, the employer refused to pay the compensation. Hence, the proceedings for compensation. (4). THE claim application was opposed by the employer by filing written statement thereby denying the material allegations made in the application and the defence taken by the appellant may be summed up thus: (a) The deceased was on duty as watchman from 10 p. m. on 19th April, 1985 till 6 a. m. on 20 April, 1985 and at about 8 a. m. on 20th April, 1985 he was found lying dead on the rooftop of the weighbridge of the colliery and a medical officer declared him dead and thereafter, was referred to the barakar outpost and police came and ordered for post-mortem examination of the dead body. (b) The medical officer of Sub-Divisional Hospital at Asansol conducted the postmortem investigation of the dead body on 20th April, 1985 and made the following report: "opinion as to the cause of death is kept reserved pending chemical examination of viscera. " (c) No mark of trauma appeared from the said report and, therefore, the presumption was that it was a case of natural death and, consequently, the applicant was not entitled to get any compensation. At the time of hearing, the claimant and two other co-employees of the victim gave evidence in support of the application, while the Deputy Manager, personnel of the Colliery deposed in opposing the application. (5). At the time of hearing, the claimant and two other co-employees of the victim gave evidence in support of the application, while the Deputy Manager, personnel of the Colliery deposed in opposing the application. (5). AS pointed out earlier, the learned Commissioner by the order impugned herein arrived at the conclusion that the post-mortem did not disclose the cause of the death as the autopsy surgeon deferred the opinion pending the receipt of the viscera report and thereafter, the final opinion of the surgeon had not been brought on record. The Tribunal further held that the deceased was on duty over the weighbridge and the death certificate also did not disclose the cause of the death and in such circumstances, it should be presumed that the death was not a natural one. The learned Commissioner, consequently, directed the employer to pay a sum of Rs. 73,668 /- as compensation, after taking into consideration the salary enjoyed by the employee. (6). BEING dissatisfied, the employer has come up with the present appeal. (7). MR. Gupta, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, at the first instance, contended that the victim being undisputedly a watchman could not be said to be a "workman" within the meaning of the Act, as defined in Section 2 (1) (n) thereof. (8). MR. Gupta points out that the category of watchman has been included in the Schedule II of the Act in the year 1995 whereas the death occurred long back in the year 1985. According to Mr Gupta, the inclusion of watchman in the schedule II itself indicates that prior to 1995, the watchmen were not workmen within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, the respondent was not entitled to get compensation in terms of Section 3 of the Act. (9). MR. Gupta next contends that in this case, no apparent physical injury was found on the body of the deceased and in such circumstances, the learned commissioner was not justified in concluding the case as one of unnatural death arising out of and in course of the employment of the deceased. Mr Gupta further contends that the dead body was found beyond the duty hours at 8 a. m. and it appeared from the deposition of DW-1 that he was not even in his uniform. Mr Gupta further contends that the dead body was found beyond the duty hours at 8 a. m. and it appeared from the deposition of DW-1 that he was not even in his uniform. By relying upon the said piece of evidence, Mr Gupta contends that the learned commissioner perversely concluded that the respondent was entitled to get compensation. (10). MR. Pal, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, has opposed the aforesaid contentions advanced by Mr Gupta and has contended that Clause (ii) of the Schedule II brings the victim, a watchman working in the premises where manufacturing process is going on, within the category of workman and, therefore, even prior to inclusion of Clause xxxiii in the Schedule II, his clients husband was a workman. (11). MR. Pal, therefore, contends that the learned Commissioner on the basis of evidence on record having arrived at a conclusion that it was a case of unnatural death of a workman in course of and arising out of employment, this Court in this appeal should not interfere with such finding of fact on re-appreciation of evidence within the narrow scope of Section 30 of the Act. He, therefore, prays of dismissal of the appeal. (12). THEREFORE, the first question that arises for determination in this appeal is whether the deceased, a watchman in the colliery, could be said to be a workman within the meaning of the Act as it stood on the date of his death. (13). IN order to appreciate the question, it will be profitable to refer to the definition of workmen as provided in Section 2 (1) (n) as also the Schedule II as it prevailed at that point of time. "2. (1) (n) "workman" means any person who is ? (13). IN order to appreciate the question, it will be profitable to refer to the definition of workmen as provided in Section 2 (1) (n) as also the Schedule II as it prevailed at that point of time. "2. (1) (n) "workman" means any person who is ? (i) a railway servant as defined in clause (34) of section 2 of the Railways act, 1989 (24 of 1989) not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, or (a) a master, seaman or other member of the crew of a ship, (b) a captain or other member of the crew of an aircraft, (c) a person recruited as driver, helper, mechanic, cleaner or in any other capacity in connection with a motor vehicle, (d) a person recruited for work abroad by a company, and who is employed outside India in any such capacity as is specified as Schedule II and the ship, aircraft or motor vehicle, or company, as the case may be, is registered in India, or; (ii) employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union; and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them. (2) The exercise and performance of the powers and duties of a local authority or of any department acting on behalf of the Government shall, for the purposes of this Act, unless a contrary intention appears, be deemed to be the trade or business of such authority or department. (2) The exercise and performance of the powers and duties of a local authority or of any department acting on behalf of the Government shall, for the purposes of this Act, unless a contrary intention appears, be deemed to be the trade or business of such authority or department. (3) The Central Government or the State Government, by notification in the official Gazette, after giving not less than three months notice of its intention so to do, may, by a like notification, add to Schedule II any class of persons employed in any occupation which it is satisfied is a hazardous occupation, and the provisions of this Act shall thereupon apply, in case of a notification by the Central Government, within the territories to which the act extends, or, in the case of a notification by the State Government, within the State, to such classes of persons: provided that in making addition, the Central Government or the State government, as the case may be, may direct that the provisions of this Act shall apply to such classes of persons in respect of specified injuries only. " (14). IT is true that from the year 1995, the category of watchman employed in the factory or other establishment has been included in the Schedule II. In our view, even prior to the inclusion of Clause XXXIII in the Schedule II in the year 1995, Clause (ii) of the Schedule II was wide enough to include the victim within the category of workmen. The said Clause (ii) is quoted below: " (ii) employed, otherwise than in a clerical capacity, in any premises wherein or within the precincts whereof a manufacturing process as defined in clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948, is being carried on, or in any kind of work whatsoever incidental to or connected with any such manufacturing process or with the article made whether or not employment in any such work is within such premises or precincts and steam, water or other mechanical power or electrical power is used. " (15). " (15). ALTHOUGH, Mr Gupta, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, tried to convince us that if the category of watchman was already within the Schedule II, the legislature would not have by way of amendment incorporated Clause XXXIII in the year 1995 for giving the benefit specifically to the watchmen and therefore, the employee in this case could not be a workman, we are not impressed by such submission. (16). AFTER going through the aforesaid provision, we find that in the year 1995, watchman appointed in a "factory or other establishment" has been no doubt included in the Schedule II, but prior to that, any employee other than clerk employed in any premises where a manufacturing process was going on was included within the definition of workman. In the case before us, the victim was working in the colliery as security guard where undisputedly manufacturing process was going on within the meaning of the Factories Act. The definition of manufacturing process as defined in the Factories Act is quoted below: "2. (k) "manufacturing process" means any process for ? (i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or (ii) pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance; or (iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power; or (iv) composing types for printing, printing by letter press, lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book binding; or (v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels; or (vi) preserving or storing any article in cold storage. " (17). AFTER going through the said definition, we find that the victim by virtue of his employment in the colliery definitely came within the meaning of the "workman" by taking aid of Clause (ii) of the Schedule II as manufacturing process is unquestionably carried on in the colliery. " (17). AFTER going through the said definition, we find that the victim by virtue of his employment in the colliery definitely came within the meaning of the "workman" by taking aid of Clause (ii) of the Schedule II as manufacturing process is unquestionably carried on in the colliery. It is true that the colliery is not a factory by virtue of the exception mentioned in the definition given in the factories Act, and therefore, by incorporation of Clause XXXIII in the Schedule II, the legislature has merely extended the scope of the definition of workman by including all the watchmen whether employed in the factory or other establishment irrespective of the fact whether any manufacturing process is carried on in such establishment, whereas prior to such amendment, only the watchmen employed in any establishment where manufacturing process was going on could be treated as a workman but not others who were not employed in an establishment where no manufacturing process was carried on; but even prior to the amendment, the victim satisfied Clause (ii) of the Schedule II being employed in a place otherwise than in a capacity of a clerk where manufacturing process was being carried although colliery is not a factory according to the definition given in the Factories Act. (18). THEREFORE, we find no substance in the first contention of Mr Gupta that the victim could not be said to be the workman within the meaning of the Act at the time of his death. (19). THE next question is whether the respondent brought the case within the purview of Section 3 of the Act. (20). IN order to attract the provision of Section 3 of the Act, it is necessary that there should be an accident arising out of and in course of his employment. In this case, it has been well established that he entered into the employers premises for performing his duty in the night of 19th April, 1985 and he was found dead at 4 a. m. on 20th April, 1985. In this case, it has been well established that he entered into the employers premises for performing his duty in the night of 19th April, 1985 and he was found dead at 4 a. m. on 20th April, 1985. Although, DW-1 tried to make out a case that he was found dead at 8 a. m. on the next day, that is to say, beyond his duty hours and at that time he was not in uniform, no suggestion was given to the three witnesses of the respondent, who, all in one word, asserted that he was found dead at 4-4. 30 a. m. in the morning. His dead body found in the rooftop of the weighbridge and, therefore, the workman died while performing his duty arising out of and in course of his employment. (21). THERE is no dispute that the victim was aged about 40 years at the time of death and the medical officer of the appellant declared him dead. Nevertheless, he sent his body for post-mortem examination. The aforesaid fact indicates that the doctor even was not sure whether it was a case of natural death or arising out of any accident in course of his duty and at the same time, no evidence has been brought before the Court to show that he was suffering from any ailment prior to his death. Even no evidence has been adduced alleging that the victim had a heart attack. In such circumstances, in our view, the learned commissioner rightly concluded that the allegation of unnatural death could be reasonably inferred. We do not appreciate the submission of Mr Gupta that onus was entirely upon the applicant to show that it was a case of death arising out of accident and that the employer had no role to pay in disputing the allegation or had no duty to produce evidence in support of its defence of natural death. We do not appreciate the submission of Mr Gupta that onus was entirely upon the applicant to show that it was a case of death arising out of accident and that the employer had no role to pay in disputing the allegation or had no duty to produce evidence in support of its defence of natural death. The victim having died within the premises fully in control of the employer and apparently, a police case having been initiated at the instance of the employer itself, the initial burden to prove that the death was an unnatural one had been discharged by the applicant; but the employer could not prove that it was a case of natural death and in such circumstances, the Act being a beneficial piece of legislation, the Court should presume that it is a case of death arising out of an accident in course of and arising out of his employment when the employer is not coming forward with any evidence in support of the case of natural death in course of employment. (22). OVER and above, the scope of Section 30 of the Act is very limited. We can interfere with the findings recorded by the Commissioner only if the commissioner committed substantial error of law in arriving at the finding. We cannot reappreciate the evidence on record like a first Appellate Court within the meaning of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Simply because from the selfsame materials another view is possible, such fact even is not a ground for upsetting the findings of the learned Commissioner unless it is seen that the view taken by the learned Commissioner is a perverse one or his finding is based on no evidence or on total disregard of any important piece of evidence which, if taken note of, the conclusion would have been otherwise. In our view, the case before us, the findings recorded by the learned Commissioner was quite reasonable. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the learned Commissioner. (23). ALL the points taken by Mr Gupta having failed, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances, there will be, however, no order as to costs.