JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shiv Charan, J.—The instant second appeal has been instituted against the judgment and decree dated 12-12-2007 passed by Addl. District Judge, Court No. 9, Ghaziabad in civil appeal No. 174 of 1994 (Dr. Jagdish Chand and others v. Roshan Lal Khandelwal). By the impugned judgment and decree the appellate Court allowed the appeal of the plaintiff/respondent and the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 15-7-1994 passed in O.S. No. 247 of 1987 (Dr. Jagdish Chand v. Roshan Lal Khandelwal) were set aside. And the suit was decreed for ejectment of the respondent from the property in dispute. And decree was also passed for recovery of arrears of rent and expenses for use and occupation. 2. The perusal of the judgment and decree of the Courts below shows that the respondent Dr. Jagdish Chand instituted O.S. No. 247 of 1987 for ejectment of the defendant/appellant from the property in dispute fully described at the foot of the plaint. It has been alleged in the plaint that the defendant/respondent is the landlord/owner of a plot situated at village Chikamberpur, district Ghaziabad and the defendant is the tenant of this property at the monthly rent of Rs. 1,400/- that as rent was not paid w.e.f. 1-8-1986 inspite of demand of several time and serving the notice. Hence his tenancy was terminated vide notice dated 29-12-1986 under Section 106 T.P. Act. But after service of notice neither the rent was paid nor the possession of the property was delivered. The arrears of rent and expenses for use and occupation were also claimed. The defendant/appellant contested the suit and filed written statement and denied the allegation of the plaint. It has further been alleged that the defendant had never been the tenant on behalf of the appellant of plot as alleged in the plaint. That the defendant was a tenant of building and the rent was paid upto 1986. But rent receipt were not issued from 1-8-1986 to 31-12-1986. That the building was let out on rent to the defendant in the year 1974. There were three rooms existing in the property in dispute besides bath room. That in the record of the Nagarpalika this property stand recorded as a building. That the provision of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are applicable to the property. That the building was let out on rent to the defendant in the year 1974. There were three rooms existing in the property in dispute besides bath room. That in the record of the Nagarpalika this property stand recorded as a building. That the provision of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are applicable to the property. That if it may be presumed that the defendant is the tenant of building then also three rooms are existing on the property in dispute from the very inception of the tenancy. And in view of Section 29-A the appellant is entitled for the benefit of Act No. 13 of 1972. That the suit is liable to be dismissed. That the learned trial Court framed as many as 8 issues on the basis of the pleadings. Both the parties produced oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their contention. And on the basis of the evidence produced by the parties the suit was dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 15-7-1994. On being aggrieved from the judgment of the trial Court the plaintiffs/respondents filed C.A. No. 174 of 1994 (Dr. Jagdish Chandra and others v. Roshan Lal Khandelwal) in the Court of District Judge, Ghaziabad and the appeal was allowed by the Add. District Judge, Court No. 9, Ghaziabad vide judgment and decree dated 12-12-2007. And against the judgment and decree of the appellate Court, the second appeal has been instituted. 3. I have heard Sri Jitendra Pal Singh Chauhan, learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri M.K. Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondents at length on the point of admission of second appeal. I have also perused the judgments of the Courts below and other evidence filed by the parties on record. It has been argued by learned Counsel for the appellant that the trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs/respondents on the basis of the evidence present before the trial Court. He also argued that before the appellate Court additional evidence was produced under Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C. The respondents filed the certified copy of the documents of Ghaziabad Development Authority (hereinafter called G.D.A) and statement of Dr. Jagdish Chandra (P.W. 1) was also recorded before the appellate Court regarding there documents. He also argued that before the appellate Court additional evidence was produced under Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C. The respondents filed the certified copy of the documents of Ghaziabad Development Authority (hereinafter called G.D.A) and statement of Dr. Jagdish Chandra (P.W. 1) was also recorded before the appellate Court regarding there documents. And on the basis of the evidence produced before the appellate Court the appeal was allowed and the suit of the plaintiffs/respondent was decreed for ejectment of the appellant/defendant from the property in dispute. It has been vehemently argued by learned Counsel for the appellant that the appellate Court erred in placing reliance on the alleged certified copy of the documents of G.D.A. That firstly, these documents cannot be called as public document as provided in Section 74 of the Evidence Act. He also argued that these documents cannot be treated as secondary evidence as provided under Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act. And he also cited certain judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in support of his contention. The learned Counsel further argued that appellate Court recorded the perverse finding to the effect that the property in dispute was a plot at the time of letting out to the appellant. That overwhelming evidence was present on the record to prove that at the time of letting out the property it was building according to definition of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. And the suit for eviction was not maintainable before the trial Court as a regular suit. And thet the appellant was entitled for the benefit of Section 20 of the Act. And alternative plea has also been raised that if the property in dispute is to be presumed a plot than as construction is existing in the property. Hence in view of Section 29-A of the Act, the appellant is entitled for the benefit of that Act. 4. The learned Counsel for the respondents disputed the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant. And it has also been argued that the property in dispute was let out in the shape of a plot. That this property was let out in the year 1974. That afterwards the defendant/appellant raised construction in the property in dispute in violation of law and hence G.D.A. served a notice to the appellant for raising illegal construction. And it has also been argued that the property in dispute was let out in the shape of a plot. That this property was let out in the year 1974. That afterwards the defendant/appellant raised construction in the property in dispute in violation of law and hence G.D.A. served a notice to the appellant for raising illegal construction. And thereafter the prosecution was also launched against the appellant in the Court of Prescribed Authority, Ghaziabad. That this was very important circumstance to establish that the property in dispute was a plot at the time of letting out. And that the construction was raised by the defendant/appellant illegally without consent of the respondents-landlord. And in these circumstances the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of Section 20 and also of Section 29-A of the Act. And the suit was perfectly maintainable. He also argued that the documents filed before the appellate Court were the certified copies of the record of G.D.A. And that the G.D.A. legally issued the certified copy. And these documents were the public documents in view of Section 74 of the Evidence Act. And in view of Sections 74, 63 and 65 of the Act these documents were admissible. And the appellate Court was perfectly justified in placing reliance on these documents. The learned Counsel cited the certain citation of Hon’ble Apex Court in support of his argument. 5. I have considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellant as well as the controversy involved in this matter. It was the case of the respondents/plaintiffs that the property in dispute at the time of letting out was an open plot. That the defendant/appellant illegally raised construction in the property in dispute without consent of the landlord-respondents. Both the parties produced oral as well as documentary evidence before the trial Court. But the main reliable evidence was produced before the appellate Court and the appellate Court placed reliance on these evidence for drawing the presumption on the basis of circumstance that the property in dispute was a plot initially and the constructions were raised by the appellants illegally afterwards. It has been alleged by the respondents before the appellate Court that as the appellant raised illegal construction over the property in dispute in violation of the bye-laws of the G.D.A. That an F.I.R. was lodged against the illegal construction. It has been alleged by the respondents before the appellate Court that as the appellant raised illegal construction over the property in dispute in violation of the bye-laws of the G.D.A. That an F.I.R. was lodged against the illegal construction. It was specifically alleged in this F.I.R. that the appellant raised illegally two rooms in the property indispute. This F.I.R. has been filed as Annexure-1 paper No. 6 of second supplementary affidavit dated 21-2-2008 by the appellant. A map has also been annexed with this F.I.R. showing the existing position of the property in dispute and it has not been disputed that this map is not relating to the property in dispute. Paper No. 8 is the notice dated 1-9-1994 served to the appellant Roshan Lal Khandelwal for making illegal construction and thereafter the case was also filed in the Court of Magistrate Ist Class, Ghaziabad. The Prescribed Authority also passed an order for demolition of the construction as is evident from the copy of the order Paper No. 11 dated 17-1-1975. All these documents were certified copies obtained from the G.D.A. And the learned First appellate Court placed reliance on these documents and decreed the suit. It has been argued by learned Counsel for the appellant that these documents are not the public documents as provided under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act. He also argued that even if the certified copies were issued by the G.D.A. in accordance with law i.e. then there no mention on these copies, that these copies were checked/examined by a competent person. And hence these cannot be treated as a certified copy of the original documents of the G.D.A. In this connection Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act is material. It has been provided Section 74 of the Act. “74. Public documents.—The following documents are public documents : (1) documents forming the acts or records of the acts— (i) of the sovereign authority, (ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and (iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, [of any part of India or the commonwealth], or of a foreign country; (2) public records kept in any State of private documents.” 6. Hence, it has been provided in Section 74 (1) and (2) that the documents forming the part of a records of the public bodies and tribunals shall be a public documents. Hence, it has been provided in Section 74 (1) and (2) that the documents forming the part of a records of the public bodies and tribunals shall be a public documents. And it has also provided in Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. “76. Certified copies of public documents.—Every public officers having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fee therefore, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof, as the case may be, and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorised by law to make use of a seal; and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies.” Hence, in view of Section 76 certified copy can be issued by a public officer of a public documents certifying that it is a certified copy and it must be sealed and sign by person issuing the certified copy. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondent argued that G.D.A. is also an official body within the meaning of Section 74 hence the documents forming the acts or record of the act of the G.D.A. shall be public document. And the true copy is to be issued by the competent authority of the G.D.A. According to provisions of Section 76 of Evidence Act, G.D.A. has issued the certified copy of the documents. And these certified copies are admissible in evidence. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on Section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act. And on the basis of this provision the learned Counsel argued that it is a secondary evidence which can be accepted as admissible evidence. And he also placed reliance on Section 65 (e) and (f). I disagree with the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant that certified copies issued by the G.D.A. cannot be considered as secondary evidence. 9. In view of Section 63 (1) certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter referred as secondary evidence. It has also been provided in Section 65 (e) “when the original is a public document within the meaning of Section 74. 9. In view of Section 63 (1) certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter referred as secondary evidence. It has also been provided in Section 65 (e) “when the original is a public document within the meaning of Section 74. (f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in (India), to be in evidence.” 10. It has further been provided in Section 74 that “In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible.” In view of Section 74 a certified copy is admissible in evidence in the circumstance when the original is public douments as provided in Section 74 and I have already stated above that in view of Section 74 the documents forming the acts or records of official bodies are also public documents. And in view of Section 65 the secondary evidence of public documents. And in view of Section 65 the secondary evidence of public document is admissible evidence. And the secondary evidence is of a public document of a certified copy. I disagree with the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant that the documents of G.D.A. cannot be treated as a public document under Section 74 of the Act. I am of the opinion that if certain document is public document then certified copy is admissible of that evidence. And how the certified copy is to be issued has been provided under Section 76 of the Act. 11. Learned Counsel for the appellant cited the following judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court : (1) AIR 1959 SC 960 , Bhinka and others v. Charan Singh. (2) AIR 1966 SC 1457 , Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras. (3) AIR 1987 Ori 138 , Bhaskar Sahu v. Anama Swara and others. (4) AIR 1977 All 470 , Abdul Rahman v. Rameshwar Prasad and others. 12. But the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court, High Court of Orissa and Allahabad are not applicable to the facts of the present case. The judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bhinka and others v. Charan Singh is in connection of certified copy of Khatauni and it has been provided that if a certified copy has been issued in accordance with law then the same is not admissible. The judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bhinka and others v. Charan Singh is in connection of certified copy of Khatauni and it has been provided that if a certified copy has been issued in accordance with law then the same is not admissible. But in the present case the certified copy was issued by the G.D.A. from the original record. And in the matter of Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras, the documents filed before the Court were only the copies. These copies were not the certified copies of public documents as provided in Section 74 of the Act. But the copies were of a private document and the originals were not produced. And it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the originals were not produced at any time nor any foundation laid for the establishment of the right to give secondary evidence. But in the present case, the certified copies filed by the respondents were of the public documents issued by the G.D.A. The High Court of Orissa in AIR 1987 Ori 138 held : “9. Now coming to the admissibility of Ext.1, the certified copy of the sale deed dated 28-9-1934 it is beyond controversy that the said sale deed is a private document as distinguished from a public document.” 13. Whereas, in the present case, the certified copies were the public document as provided in Section 74 of the Act. And this judgment of the High Court of Orissa is not applicable to the facts of the present case. And in the case reported in AIR 1977 All 470 , the original deed of family settlement was not filed and only a copy was filed. That copy was not the certified copy of public document. And the original document of family settlement was a private document. The law laid down in this judgment is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. 14. It has further been argued by learned Counsel for the appellant that the so called certified copies have also not been issued according to provision of law. There is no endorsement on this document that it was compared and checked by a competent authority. That there is only a seal of certified copy and there is also signature of the Officer who issued the certified copy. There is no endorsement on this document that it was compared and checked by a competent authority. That there is only a seal of certified copy and there is also signature of the Officer who issued the certified copy. But it has not been mentioned on this copy that it was compared and checked by a competent person. Learned Counsel for the appellant argued that it cannot be treated as certified copy at all. And in this connection learned Counsel cited AIR 2001 AP 394 , Badrunnisa Begum v. Mohamooda Begum (DB). It has been held in this judgment. “We hold that though ordinarily copies of copies are not to be treated as secondary evidence’ unless such copies are again compared with the original, the said principle does not apply to certified copies granted by the Sub-Registrar under the Registration Act. These certified copies are, under law, to be treated as secondary evidence.........” 15. Hence seeing the facts of the case this ruling is also not applicable to the facts of the case. In this case before Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh the certified copy of public document was not produced. Rather the copy was filed of the copy. Whereas,in the present case the certified copy was issued of a public document under the provision of Section 74 in accordance with Section 76 of Indian Evidence Act and this is perfectly admissible evidence. 16. Learned Counsel for the respondents argued that the documents filed before the appellate Court were the certified copies of the record of the G.D.A. And that this is a public document as provided under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act. And it is not going to make any difference regarding the admissibility of these documents. That it has not been mentioned in these certified copies that these copies were compared and checked. That in Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act there is no such provision. And in support of his argument learned Counsel for the respondents cited (1976) 1 SCC 54 , Banamali Das v. Rajendra Chandra Mardaraj Harichandan. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that “there is no substance in that objection. Section 74 of the Evidence Act provides that documents forming the acts or records of the acts of public officers are public documents. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that “there is no substance in that objection. Section 74 of the Evidence Act provides that documents forming the acts or records of the acts of public officers are public documents. Section 76 provides that every public officer having the custody of a public document which any person has a right to inspect shall give that person a copy of it together with the certificate that it is a true copy of the document. By Section 77, such certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the documents of which they purport to be copies. The check memo which is required to be maintained by the officer-in-charge of the counting table is a document forming record of the acts of a public officer and therefore, a certified copy thereof given by the Collector in whose custody the document is kept, can be admitted in evidence in proof of the contents of the original document.” 17. The learned Counsel for the respondents also cited AIR 1963 SC 1633 , Madamanchi Ramappa and another v. Muthaluru Bojjappa. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that “the document in question being a certified copy of a public document need not have been proved by calling a witness”. And on the strength of this judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court, the learned Counsel for the respondents argued that after filing certified copies of the public documents there was not need to prove these copies by calling the witness and these documents were admissible. Hence, I agree with the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents. Hence, on the basis of above reason, I am of the opinion that the certified copy filed by the respondents before the appellate Court were the copies of the public document of G.D.A. and were admissible in evidence and the appellate Court was justified in placing reliance on the certified copies. It has also been argued by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the rent note executed between the parties is also material. In this connection argued that the rent note shows that the open plot was let out. The rent receipt were also of Khasra No. 42 and in the rent receipt also the property has not been shown as building. In this connection argued that the rent note shows that the open plot was let out. The rent receipt were also of Khasra No. 42 and in the rent receipt also the property has not been shown as building. But in this context learned Counsel for the appellant also argued that the assessment of Nagar Palika shows that the property in dispute is a building. But, in my opinion, the evidence produced by the respondents before the appellate Court was reliable and from this document only inference can be drawn that after letting out the appellant raised construction over the property. And no evidence was produced before the appellate Court to this effect that these constructions were made with the consent of the respondents, hence benefit of Section 29-A of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 cannot be given. Rent was also not enhanced after enforcement of Section 29-A. 18. For the reasons mentioned above, I have come to the conclusion that the appellate Court recorded finding of fact on the basis of evidence that the property in dispute was an open plot at the time of letting out. And the appellant raised constructions in the plot illegally without consent of the respondents. This finding of fact is correct on the basis of evidence present on the file. The law involved in this case is clear according to the Evidence Act and the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court. The substantial question of law allegedly formulated by the appellant’s Counsel cannot be called the substantial question of law. All these questions formulated by the appellant’s Counsel are based on facts. In these circumstances there is no justification to admit this Second Appeal for hearing as no substantial question of law is involved. The appeal is liable to be dismissed summarily. 19. The appeal is dismissed summarily accordingly. ————