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2008 DIGILAW 489 (RAJ)

Chotu Lal v. Judge, Labour Court

2008-02-18

MAHESH CHANDRA SHARMA

body2008
JUDGMENT 1. - By way of this writ petition the petitioner has prayed that the award dated 20.03.2002 (Annexure-5) passed by the learned Labour court, Jaipur be quashed and set aside. He has also prayed that the respondents be directed to take the workman/petitioner on duty with all consequential benefits and also prayed for, other appropriate order or direction to this court. 2. The petitioner has set up his case before this court that he was appointed on 18.02.1988 as Beldar in Mechanical Division, Bisalpur Pariyojana and he continued upto 8.12.1988. 3. But, his services were verbally terminated w.e.f. 31.12.1988. According to the petitioner, no reason was given to him and no compliance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act was made. After that petitioner raised an industrial dispute which was ultimately referred to the learned Labour Court No. 2, Jaipur for adjudication. The petitioner submitted the statement of claim stating therein that he worked continuously from 18.2.1988 to 8.12.1988. His services were terminated without compliance of Section 25F, G, H, N, L etc. He had completed 240 days service in one calendar year and he should be reinstated with full back wages. 4. The respondent submitted reply to the statement of claim stating therein that petitioner only worked for 92 days and he did. not appear in service from January 1988 and so that no violation of any provision of law was made. 5. Although the petitioner submitted an affidavit stating therein all the facts about his termination and about the violation of Section 25G and H of the Industrial Disputes Act. 6. On the other hand the respondent-department submitted an affidavit of Shri S.P. Rao, Assistant Engineer, and he denied all these facts. 7. The learned Labour Court on the basis of evidence led by both the parties, vide impugned award dated 20.03.2002 held that the petitioner has not completed 240 days, therefore, termination of his services is justified. 8. The Division Bench of this court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 423/1997 Management M/s. Bharatpur Nutritional Products Ltd. v. Ishwar Chand and in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 422/1997 The Management M/s. Bharatpur Nutritional Products Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan has considered the case decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 9. 8. The Division Bench of this court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 423/1997 Management M/s. Bharatpur Nutritional Products Ltd. v. Ishwar Chand and in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 422/1997 The Management M/s. Bharatpur Nutritional Products Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan has considered the case decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 9. Having carefully scanned the impugned order, I notice that all the contentions raised before me were analyzed and considered in great details by the Labour Court. The scope of supervisory jurisdiction was explained by the Supreme Court in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Company Limited [2003(2) WLC (SC) Civil 255 : 2003(3) SCC 524 ] which runs in (Para 7) : "The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or the tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision." 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 11. The wide jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 has to be exercised with great circumspection. The High Court cannot constitute itself into an appellate court over Tribunals. Article 226/227 is a device to secure and advance justice and not otherwise. In a case of this nature, it is true, the High Court exercising the power of judicial review, would not interfere with the discretion of a Tribunal unless the same is found to be illegal or irrational. In an application for a Writ of Certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing an award of an Industrial Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court is very limited. It can quash the award, inter alia, when the Tribunal has committed an error of law apparent on the face of record or when the finding of facts of the Tribunal is wholly perverse. It can quash the award, inter alia, when the Tribunal has committed an error of law apparent on the face of record or when the finding of facts of the Tribunal is wholly perverse. It is also a settled law that in the exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court acts only in a supervisory capacity and not as an appellate tribunal. It does not review the evidence upon which the inferior tribunal proposed (sic) to base its conclusion, it simply demolished the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or manifestly erroneous, but does not, as a rule, substitute its own view for those of the inferior tribunal. 12. In the present matter, I do not find any jurisdictional error, perversity and illegality in the award passed by the labour court. The finding of the labour court is based on the basis of material placed before him. There is no error apparent in the face on record. I, therefore, do not find any justification to interfere with the award. In my view the writ petition (sic) does not call for any interference. The same is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******