Judgment :- P.K. Misra, J. Heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties. 2. Petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the order passed by the State Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.1020 of 2000. Such Original Application was filed by the present petitioner for quashing the order dated 211. 1999 passed by the Director of Survey & Land Records, Chennai. 3. The petitioner was working as Sub-Inspector of Survey in Thondiarpet during the year 1984. At that time he was also put in charge of distributing flood reliefs to the slum dwellers. On the complaints received regarding alleged malpractice and irregularities, initially before the Tribunal, for disciplinary proceedings, an enquiry was initiated as D.E.No.44 of 1989. However, such charge memo was challenged by the petitioner by filing O.A.No .3339 of 1991. By order dated 212. 1992, the charge memo was set aside and the disciplinary authority was directed to consider the matter afresh. At that stage, the Assistant Director took up the matter and framed charges dated 30.8.1993 under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. After obtaining the explanation, without following the procedure contemplated under Rule 17 (b), the petitioner was let-off with a warning. This irregularity was noticed by the Reviewing authority, the Director of Survey & Settlement, who set aside the order of the Assistant Director and directed that a fresh charge memo be issued to hold enquiry. This later order of the Director came to be challenged by the petitioner by filing O.A.No.1020 of 2000 contending that he was being penalised twice for the same allegation. It was also contended that there was long delay and, therefore, departmental proceedings should not be continued. The Tribunal, considering the facts and circumstances, rejected the Original Application. Such order is being challenged in this writ petition. 4. The main contention raised by the petitioner is to the effect that the allegations related to the period 1984 and the disciplinary proceedings were initiated belatedly. 5. We are not impressed by the aforesaid submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It appears that before the disciplinary Tribunal, D.E.No.44 of 1989 had been initiated. But, the petitioner himself had challenged such enquiry and the State Administrative Tribunal, while setting aside the enquiry, directed the disciplinary authority to consider the matter afresh. 5. We are not impressed by the aforesaid submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It appears that before the disciplinary Tribunal, D.E.No.44 of 1989 had been initiated. But, the petitioner himself had challenged such enquiry and the State Administrative Tribunal, while setting aside the enquiry, directed the disciplinary authority to consider the matter afresh. At that stage, even though charges were framed under Rule 17(b), the Assistant Director, however, simply let-off the petitioner by issuing a warning without holding any enquiry. Issuing such warning itself cannot be considered as a punishment. Moreover, the Director being the Reviewing authority, came across such irregularity and directed that the proceedings should be continued. The delay was obviously on account of the pendency of such proceedings either before the State Administrative Tribunal or before the Reviewing authority. Keeping in view such circumstances and also seriousness of the allegations, it cannot be said that any illegality has been committed by the Director nor it can be said that there is any error apparent on the face of the order of the Tribunal. 6. The question relating to quashing of charge memo has been repeatedly dealt with by the Supreme Court in several cases. In (1987) 2 SCC 179 (STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. BRAHM DATT SHARMA AND ANOTHER), while dealing with the question of quashing of charge memo at show-cause notice, the Supreme Court had observed :- "9. The High Court was not justified in quashing the show cause notice. When a show cause notice is issued to a government servant under a statutory provision calling upon him to show cause, ordinarily the government servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any authority of law. The purpose of issuing show cause notice is to afford opportunity of hearing to the government servant and once cause is shown it is open to the Government to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submissions placed by the government servant and only thereafter a final decision in the matter could be taken. Interference by the court before that stage would be premature, the High Court in our opinion ought not have interfered with the show cause notice." 7. Interference by the court before that stage would be premature, the High Court in our opinion ought not have interfered with the show cause notice." 7. Similarly in (1996) 3 SCC 157 (SECRETARY TO GOVERMENT, PROHIBITION AND EXCISE DEPARTMENT v. L. SRINIVASAN), the Supreme Court observed :- "3. We are informed that charge-sheet was laid for prosecution for the offences of embezzlement and fabrication of false records etc. and that the offences and the trial of the case is pending. The Tribunal had set aside the departmental enquiry and quashed the charge on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings. In the nature of the charges, it would take a long time to detect embezzlement and fabrication of false records which should be done in secrecy. It is not necessary to go into the merits and record any finding on the charge levelled against the charged officer since any finding recorded by this Court would gravely prejudice the case of the parties at the enquiry and also at the trial. Therefore, we desist from expressing any opinion on merit or recording any of the contentions raised by the counsel on either side. Suffice it to state that the Administrative Tribunal has committed grossest error in its exercise of the judicial review. The member of the administrative Tribunal appears to have no knowledge of the jurisprudence of the service law and exercised power as if he is an appellate forum dehors the limitation of judicial review. This is one such instance where a member had exceeded his power of judicial review in quashing the suspension order and charges even at the threshold. We are coming across such orders frequently putting heavy pressure on this Court to examine each case in detail. It is high time that it is remedied." 8. In a very recent decision reported in 2007 AIR SCW 1639 (GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS v. APPALA SWAMY), the Supreme Court observed as follows :- "10. So far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is concerned, in our opinion, no hard and fast rule can be laid down therefore. Each case must be determined on its own facts. So far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is concerned, in our opinion, no hard and fast rule can be laid down therefore. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are: .(1) Where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of the employee. .(2) Where the delay cause prejudice to the employee. Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the Inquiry Officer." 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1998 SC 1833 (STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. N. RADHAKISHAN). In this case, the Supreme Court had observed inter alia :- "19. It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations." 10. Keeping in view the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court and the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we do not think it is a fit case where the High Court could interfere with the order of the Tribunal, particularly keeping in view the limited scope of interference in such matters under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is accordingly liable to be dismissed. 11. The disciplinary proceedings should now be completed as expeditiously as possible on its own merits without being influenced by any of the observations made in this writ petition and the present order should not be construed as expressing any opinion on merits of the case. 12. With the above direction and observations, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.