Judgment :- Gopala Gowda, J. The appellant-ITI Employees Housing Co-operative Society Limited filed this Writ Appeal questioning the correctness of the order of the learned Single Judge passed in Writ Petition No.5110/2001 (LA-HB) wherein the learned Single Judge has declined to quash the notification impugned in the Writ Petition by which the first respondent-State Government in exercise of its power u/s 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (hereinafter called as L.A Act) denotified 1 acre 15 guntas of land out of 7 acres 15 guntas including 7 guntas of phut kharab in Sy.No.18 of Mallathahalli village, Yeshwanthapur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore District in favour of the appellants society urging various grounds. .2. There is no need for us to advert to the facts in this judgment as the learned Single Judge has elaborately referred to the same. We are referring only the rival legal contentions urged in this appeal for the purpose of examining the same to find out whether the order of the learned Single .Judge or the notification impugned in the Writ Petition warrants interference. by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and power. 3. The principal ground of attack of the impugned order, placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State Government Houseless (Harijan) Employees Association Vs. State of Karnataka And Others ILR 2001 KAR 1096, is that the State Government has not complied with the principles of natural justice before exercising its power under Section.48(1) of the L.A Act. Therefore, the notification impugned in the Writ Petition is issued is in violation of principles of natural justice and on this ground alone the same is bad in law. The said notification is also contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. Therefore, the learned counsel contends that the notification is liable to be set aside by allowing the Writ Petition. 4. To know the correctness of the submissions, this Court by order dated 18.2008 directed the learned Government Advocate to secure the original records pertaining to the denotification proceedings initiated u/s 48(1) of the L.A Act by the State Government in respect of the land in question and the same is produced before us for our perusal. 4. To know the correctness of the submissions, this Court by order dated 18.2008 directed the learned Government Advocate to secure the original records pertaining to the denotification proceedings initiated u/s 48(1) of the L.A Act by the State Government in respect of the land in question and the same is produced before us for our perusal. Learned Counsel further submits that reliance was placed by respondent 2 (a & b) on the agreement entered into between the land owners and the Society wherein the society stated to have agreed to give up 1 acre 22 guntas including 7 guntas of phut kharab land and on the basis of this agreement the deceased respondent No.2 filed Writ Petition No.16055 & 16056/94 for issuance of a direction to the 6th respondent therein to publish the withdrawal notification u/s 48-A(1) of the L.A Act and those petitions came to be dismissed. Further, it is contended by learned counsel that the notification issued by the State Government is vitiated in law as the alleged agreement is a disputed one. It involves question of fact which has to be determined by a competent Civil Court and not in the writ petition by this Court under writ jurisdiction. 5. The learned Additional Government Advocate Smt. Vijaya on the basis of the records has sought to justify the impugned notification and also the order passed by the learned Single Judge contending that the same is in accordance with law, therefore, the same does not call for interference. .6. Learned Counsel Sri R.V.Jayaprakash, appearing on behalf of the owners of the land in question submits that though the State Government acquired the land bearing Sy.No.18 measuring 7 acres 15 guntas, for 5 acres 33 guntas consent award was passed and possession was taken under notification dated 2/8/89 issued under Section 16(2) of L.A.Act and later the possession of the said extent was handed over to the society. Therefore the Society being the beneficiary, has no right to question the denotification of the land by the State Government in respect of the remaining area. In support of this contention he placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay And Others Vs M/S Godrej And Boyce AIR 1987 SC .2421 and submits that the beneficiary has no right to challenge the denotification issued by the Government. In support of this contention he placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay And Others Vs M/S Godrej And Boyce AIR 1987 SC .2421 and submits that the beneficiary has no right to challenge the denotification issued by the Government. He further placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court to rebut the submission of the appellants counsel that even accepting the case pleaded by the beneficiary that the denotification was not in compliance with the principles of natural justice, no prejudice is caused to the society for the reason that it has agreed to give up 1 acre 22 guntas of land including 7 guntas of phut kharab and thereforea consent award was passed only to the extent of 5 acres 33 guntas. The counsel further submitted that the Government has not taken possession of the remaining extent of the land measuring 1 acre 15 guntas. Therefore, no prejudice is caused to the Society. Compliance of the principles of natural justice is not required in each and every case. In support of this legal submission he has placed strong reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag Vs General Manager (Pj), Indian Oil Corporationltd., Haldia And Others (2005) 7 SCC 764 : 7. Elaborating the submissions, learned counsel contended that compliance of principles of natural justice by the State Government is not required unless it is shown by the society that Government has exercised its power malafide. Further the beneficiary-Society is required to prove to the satisfaction of this Court that prejudice is caused by not complying with the principles of natural justice. Further, the learned Counsel placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of R.M.S Telephone Employees H.B Co-Op. Society Ltd., Vs Government Of Karnataka & Others ILR 1997 KAR 75 wherein this Court, after referring to the decision of the Godrej And Boyce Case (Supra) and also another decision of this Court in the case of K.P.C. Employees Co-Op. Housing Society Ltd., Vs State Of Karnataka 1991 (2) KLJ 608 and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/S Jethmull Bhojraj Vs. Housing Society Ltd., Vs State Of Karnataka 1991 (2) KLJ 608 and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/S Jethmull Bhojraj Vs. State Of Bihar 1972 (1) SCC 714 , has held that the question required to be examined is as held by the Supreme Court in Godrej case, whether the Government is competent to withdraw acquisition of certain lands sought to be acquired. It has been further held that the beneficiary has no right to question the denotification unless it is shown that the State Government has exercised its power mala-fide. Therefore, he submits that even accepting the case of the appellant-Housing Society that the de-notification is not preceded by principles of natural justice no prejudice is caused and therefore, there is no need for this Court to interfere either with the impugned de-notification or with the order of the learned Single Judge. 8. With reference to the above said rival legal contentions, the following points would arise for our consideration and determination: 1. Whether the beneficiary-Society is entitled to be heard before denotifying a portion of the acquired land, having regard to the undisputed fact that in respect of 1 acre 15 guntas of land Award is not passed and possession is not taken by the Deputy Commissioner of the District and delivered to the society? 2. Whether the appellant his shown that prejudice is caused to it for ncn-compliance of the principles of natural justice? 3. Whether the order passed by the learned Single Judge is vitiated on the ground of erroneous reasoning or error in law? 9. All the above points are required to be answered against the beneficiary-Society for the following reasons: 10. In the case of Godrej and Boyce ( AIR 1987 SC 2421 ) at Para 5 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has dealt with similar contention as has been urged in this Appeal, examined the powers of the State Government u/s 48(1) of the L.A Act and observed as hereunder. "5. We are of opinion that the High Court erred in striking down the order under Section 48 and compelling the State Government to acquire the lands of the respondent. "5. We are of opinion that the High Court erred in striking down the order under Section 48 and compelling the State Government to acquire the lands of the respondent. Under the scheme of the Act, neither the notification under S.4 nor the declaration under S.6 nor the notice under S.9 is sufficient to divest the original owner of, or other person interested in the land of his rights therein. Section 16 makes it clear beyond doubt that the title to the land vests in the Government only when possession is taken by the Government. Till that point of time, the land continues to be with the original owner and he is also free (except where there is specific legislation to the contrary) to deal with the land just as he likes, although it may be that on account of the pendency of proceedings for acquisition intending purchasers may be chary of coming near the land. So long as possession is not taken over, the mere fact of a notification under S.4 or declaration under S.6 having been made does not divest the owner of his rights in respect of the land or relieve him of the duty to take care of the land and protect it against encroachments. Again such a notification does not either confer on the State Govt. any right to interfere with the ownership or other rights in the land or impose on it any duty to remove encroachments, therefrom or in any other way safeguard the interest of the original owner of the land. It is in view of this position, that the owners interests remain unaffected until possession is taken, that S.48 gives a liberty to the State Government to withdraw from the acquisition at any stage before possession is taken. By such withdrawal, no irreparable prejudice is caused to the owner of the land and if at all he has suffered any damage in consequence of the acquisition proceedings or incurred costs in relation thereto, he will be compensated therefore under S.48(2). In this view of the matter, it does not matter even if there is lapse of considerable time between the original notification and the withdrawal under S.48 as held in Trustees of Bai Smarth Jain Shvetambar Murtipujak Gyano-dhaya Trust V. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 GUJ. 107 . In this view of the matter, it does not matter even if there is lapse of considerable time between the original notification and the withdrawal under S.48 as held in Trustees of Bai Smarth Jain Shvetambar Murtipujak Gyano-dhaya Trust V. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 GUJ. 107 . It also follows that the State can be permitted to exercise its power of withdrawal unilaterally and no requirement that the owner of the land should be given an opportunity of being heard before doing so should be read into the provision." 11. From the original records of the State Government, it is evident that possession of 1 acre 15 guntas of land is not taken by the Deputy Commissioner of the District as required under Section. 16 (2) of the Land Acquisition (Karnataka Extension and Amendment) Act 1961 (hereinafter called as the L.A Act). This fact is not disputed by the appellants society. 12. Now the question for our consideration in this Appeal is whether there is non-compliance of the principles of natural justice by the State Government. In this regard it is worthwhile for us to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ravi S. Naik Vs. Union of India and others AIR 1994 SC 1558 upon which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the owners. The Supreme Court has elaborately referred to the 7 Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in the case of Smt. maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 and laid down the principle which has been summed up by Prof.H.W.R.Wade: Administrative Law:6th Edn. P.530. The same is extracted: "20. Principles of natural justice have an important place in modern Administrative Law. They have been defined to mean "fair play in action" (See Smt.Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCR 621 at p.676, ( AIR 1978 SC 597 at P.625), Bhagwati,J). As laid down by this Court "they constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men (Union of India vs. Tulsi Ram, 1985 supp(2) SCR 131 at p.225):( AIR 1985 SC 1416 at p.1456). An order of an authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is procedurally ultra vires and, therefore, suffers from a jurisdictional error. That is the reason why in spite of the finality imparted to the decision of the Speakers/Chairmen by paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule such a decision is subject to judicial review on the ground of non-compliance with rules of natural justice. But while applying the principles of natural justice, it must be borne in mind that "they are not immutable but flexible" and they are not cast in a rigid mould and they cannot be put in a legal strait jacket. Whether the requirements of natural justice have been complied with or not has to be considered in the context of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. (Emphasis is made by the Court) 21. The approach of the English Courts has been thus summed up by Prof. Wade: "The judges, anxious as always to preserve some freedom of maneuver emphasize that "it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply nor as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject matter. The so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone. Their application, resting as it does upon statutory implication, must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and with the subject matter of the case. In the application of the concept of fair play there must be real flexibility. There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice." (Emphasis made by the Court) 22. (H.W.R.Wade, Administrative Law, 6 Edn., p.530) Similarly, Clive Lewis has stated: "The fact that the applicant has suffered no prejudice as a result of the error complained of may be a reason for refusing him relief. It is necessary to keep in mind the purpose of the public law principle that has technically been violated, and ask whether that underlying purpose has in any event been achieved in the circumstances of the case. If so, the courts may decide that the breach has caused no injustice or prejudice and there is no need to grant relief. It is necessary to keep in mind the purpose of the public law principle that has technically been violated, and ask whether that underlying purpose has in any event been achieved in the circumstances of the case. If so, the courts may decide that the breach has caused no injustice or prejudice and there is no need to grant relief. The courts may, for example, refuse relief if there has been a breach of natural justice but where the breach has in fact not prevented the individual from having a fair hearing." (Clive Lewis: Judicial Remedies in Public Law (1992) p.290) 23. In the words of Lord Wilber force: "A breach of procedure, whether called a failure of natural justice or an essential administrative fault, cannot give him a remedy in the courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The court does not act in vain." (Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation (1971) 2 All ER 1278 at p.1294 ) 24. The approach of the Courts in India is no different. In A.M. Allison. B.L.Sentence, 1957 SCR 359 : ( AIR 1957 SC 227 ), it has been laid down that while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court has the power to refuse the writs if it was satisfied that there has been no failure of justice." 13. By a careful reading of the above principles laid down by the Apex Court, we find that even, if there is non compliance of the principles of natural justice by the State Government no prejudice is caused to the society and therefore non-compliance with the principles of natural justice has not vitiated the de-notification of the land. 14. The learned Counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ajitkumar Nags Case (Supra) in which case the Seven Judges Constitutional Bench decision of Maneka Gandhis Case is referred to. The relevant paragraphs are extracted from the above case. "40. Negativing the contention, Bhagwati J. (as she then was) stated (SCC p.658, para 147) "It must be remembered that merely because power may sometime be abused, it is no ground for denying the existence of the power. The relevant paragraphs are extracted from the above case. "40. Negativing the contention, Bhagwati J. (as she then was) stated (SCC p.658, para 147) "It must be remembered that merely because power may sometime be abused, it is no ground for denying the existence of the power. The wisdom of man has not yet been able to conceive of a government with power sufficient to answer all its legitimate needs and at the same time incapable of mischief." (emphasis supplied) 44. We are aware of the normal i. e that a person must have a fair trial and a fair appeal and he cannot be asked to be satisfied with an unfair trial and a fair appeal. We are also conscious of the general principle that pre-decisional hearing is better and should always be preferred to post-decisional hearing. We are further aware that it has been stated that apart from Laws of Men, Laws of God also observe the rule of audi alteram partem. It has been stated that the first hearing in human history was given in the Garden of Eden. God did not pass sentence upon Adam and Eve before giving an opportunity to show cause as to why they had eaten the forbidden fruit.(See R v. University of Cambridge) (1723) 1 Str.557:93 ER 698. But we are also aware that the principles of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be imprisoned in a strait-jacket. They must yield to and change with exigencies of situation. They must be confined within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been stated "To do a great right" after all it is permissible sometimes "to do a little wrong" (Per Mukharji, C.J in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India ( 1990(1) SCC 613 (Bhopal Gas Disaster), SCC p.705, para 124). While interpreting legal provi-sions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard realities of life. In our opinion, the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases, should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than precedential". (emphasis supplied) 15. The very same principle has been laid down by the Apex Court regarding compliance of natural justice in another case in M.C. Mehta Vs Union Of India And Others (1999) 6 SCC 237 . (emphasis supplied) 15. The very same principle has been laid down by the Apex Court regarding compliance of natural justice in another case in M.C. Mehta Vs Union Of India And Others (1999) 6 SCC 237 . The relevant paras 17 and 18 are extracted below: "17. We shall initially refer to two cases where discretion was exercised not to grant relief and the first one was a case where relief was refused even though there was breach of natural justice. The first one is Gadde Venkateswara Rao Vs Govt. of A.P (AIR1966 SC 828: (1966) 2 SCR 172 ). There the Panchayat Samithi, in exercise of its statutory powers passed a resolution on 28.1960 to locate a Primary Health Centre at Dharmajigudem. Later, it passed another resolution on 29.5.1961 to locate it at Lingapalem. On a representation by the villagers of Dharmajigudem, the Government passed orders on 7.3.1962 setting aside the second resolution dated 29.5.1961 and thereby restoring the earlier resolution dated 28.1960. The result was that the Health Center would continue at Dharmajigudem. Before passing the orders dated 7.3.1962, no notice was given to the Panchayat Samithi. This Court traced the said order of the government dated 7.3.1962 to Section 62 of the Act and if that were so, notice to the Samithi under Section 62(1) was mandatory. Later, upon a review petition being filed, the Government passed another order on 18.4.1963 cancelling its order dated 7.3.1962 and accepting the shifting of the primary center to Lingapalem. This was passed. without notice to the villagers of Dharmajigudem. This order of the Government was challenged unsuccessfully by the villagers of Dharmajigudem in the High Court. On appeal by the said villagers to this Court, it was held that latter order of the Government dated 18.4.1963 suffered from two defects, it was issued by the Government without prior show cause notice to the villagers of Dharmajigudem and the Government had no power of review in respect of Government orders passed under Section 62(1). But that there were other facts which disentitled the quashing of the order dated 18.4.1963 even though, it was passed in breach of the principles of natural justice. This court noticed that the setting aside of the latter order dated 18.4.1963 would restore the earlier order of the Government dated 7.3.1962 which was also passed without notice to the affected party, namely the Panchayat Samithi. This court noticed that the setting aside of the latter order dated 18.4.1963 would restore the earlier order of the Government dated 7.3.1962 which was also passed without notice to the affected party, namely the Panchayat Samithi. It would also result in the setting aside of a valid resolution dated 29.5.1961 passed by the Panchayat Samithi. This Court refused relief and agreed that the High Court was right in not interfering under Article 226 even if there was violation of natural justice. Subba Rao J. (as he then was) observed (at SCR p.189) as follows: "Both the orders of the Government, namely, the order dated 7.3.1962 and that dated 18.4.1963, were not legally passed; the former, because it was made without giving notice to the Panchayat Samithi, and the latter, because the Government had no power under Section 72 of the Act to review an order made under Section 62 of the Act and also because it did not give notice to the representatives of Dharmajigudem village;" (emphasis supplied) His Lordship concluded as follows: "In those circumstances, was it a case for the High Court to interfere in its discretion and quash the order of the Government dated 18.4.1963? If the High Court had quashed the said order, it would have restored an illegal order-it would have given the Health Centre to a village contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat Samithi. The High Court, therefore, in our view, rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power in the circumstances of the case." The above case is a clear authority for the proposition that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of the principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law. 18. We would next refer to another case, where, though there was no breach of the principles of natural justice, this court held that interference was not necessary, if the result of interference would be the restoration of another order which was not legal. In Mohd. 18. We would next refer to another case, where, though there was no breach of the principles of natural justice, this court held that interference was not necessary, if the result of interference would be the restoration of another order which was not legal. In Mohd. Swalleh Vs Iiird Adj (1988) 1 SCC 40 ) which arose under the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, the prescribed authority dismissed an application filed by the landlord and this was held clearly to the contrary to the very purpose of Section 43(2)(rr) of the Act. The District Court entertained an appeal by the landlord and allowed the landlords appeal without noticing that such an appeal was not maintainable. The tenant filed a writ petition in the High Court contending that the appeal of the landlord before the District Court was not maintainable. This was a correct plea. But the High Court refused to interfere. On further appeal by the tenant, this Court accepted that though no appeal lay to the District Court, the refusal of the High Court to set aside the order of the District Judge was correct as that would have restored the order of the prescribed authority, which was illegal." 16. Further in para 22 of the judgment, it was observed as under: "Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a "real likelihood" of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their "discretion", refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala Vs. S.K.Sharvia (1996) 3 Scc 364 : 1996 Scc (L & S) 717; Rajendra Singh Vs. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala Vs. S.K.Sharvia (1996) 3 Scc 364 : 1996 Scc (L & S) 717; Rajendra Singh Vs. State of Mp (1996) 5 Scc 460 ) that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived." (Emphasis made by this Court) The aforesaid principles laid down in the said cases with all fours are applicable to the fact situation of the case on hand. 17. The acquisition proceeding in this case started in the year 1987. Section 48(1) notification is dated 26.5.1999 after a lapse of nearly 12 years. The State Government has exercised its eminent domain power in favour of the Appellant - Housing Co-operative Society by acquiring the lands in question for the purpose of a Housing Scheme. The Housing Scheme should have been implemented by the Society within a reasonable or statutory period of 5 years as prescribed under Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act for the reason that the land is situated within the Bangalore Metropolitan Area for which the BDA has got the authority to approve the layout plan in exercise of its power u/s 32 of the Act, the same reads thus: "32.Forming of new extensions or layouts or making new private streets.-Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law for the time being in force no person shall form or attempt to form any extension or layout for the purpose of constructing buildings thereon without the express sanction in writing of the authority and except in accordance with such conditions as the authority may specify: Provided that where any such extension or layout lies within the local limits of the Corporation, the authority shall not sanction the formation of such extension or layout without the concurrence of the Corporation; Provided further that where the Corporation and the authority do not agree on the formation of or the conditions relating to the extension or layout, the matter shall be referred to the Government, whose decision thereon shall be final." 18. Learned Counsel for the appellant has invited our attention to the common award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer including the land in question. But as could be seen from the document Annexure-E at ink page 70 of Writ Appeal, possession of 5 acres 33 guntas only in respect of Sy.No.18 of Mallathahalli village was taken over. The document produced at Annexure-E, shows the handing over and taking over possession of the land is only for 5 acres 33 guntas and 7 guntas of phut kharab land. The reliance placed on the common award by the learned Counsel for the appellant is wholly unsustainable in law for the reason that the Land Acquisition Officer after passing consent Award to the extent of 5 acres 33 guntas has lost his jurisdiction to pass another Award and therefore the same is wholly unsustainable in law. The same is passed by the L.A.O beyond his statutory powers conferred under Section 11 of the L.A. Act and no compensation is deposited with the Deputy Commissioner of the District as required in law in respect of 1 acre 15 guntas of land, which is the subject matter of the de-notification issued by the State Government. 19. When Section 35 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act is attracted to the facts of the case, Section 27 of the Act also must be applied to the case on hand which reads thus: “27. Authority to execute the scheme within five years,-Where within a period of five years from the date of the publication in the Official Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 19 the authority fails to execute the scheme substantially, the scheme shall lapse and the provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative." 20. The final notification published by the State Government in respect of the land in question is dated 22/10/1987. The award passed by the L.A.O is dated 110.1988 only to the extent of 5 acres 33 guntas of land. Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act notification got published after a long lapse of time on 8.1999. Therefore, the housing scheme was not implemented by the Society within five years from the date of layout plan approved by the B.D.A. 21. Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act notification got published after a long lapse of time on 8.1999. Therefore, the housing scheme was not implemented by the Society within five years from the date of layout plan approved by the B.D.A. 21. The person who has taken possession of the acquired land excluded 1 acre 15 guntas of land in Sy.No. 18 for the reason that the award to the above extent of land is not passed by the L.A.O. Therefore, the contention urged on behalf of the Society that it has got a right to be heard before the denotification was made by the State Government is wholly untenable in law. No right whatsoever accrued in favour of the beneficiary Society for more than one reason viz., (i) the possession of 1 acre 15 guntas of land was not taken even after lapse of 12 years from the date of final notification published declaring the acquisition of land. (ii) The housing scheme should have been implemented by the society within 5 years and (iii) the award is passed only in respect of 5 acres 33 guntas of land and for the remaining extent of 1 acre 15 guntas of land in Sy.No.18 neither award is passed by the L.A.O nor possession by the Deputy Commissioner of the District. When the State Government has not taken possession of the land in question and delivered the same to the beneficiary, it did not acquire any right upon the land in question. Hence the question of hearing the appellant by the State Government before de-notifying the land is an imaginary right. On the other hand the right and interest of the owners continued in respect of the land in question. 22. In the decision of the Supreme Court upon which reliance placed by the learned counsel for the society, the final notification was followed by an award and the beneficiary was directed to deposit the amount and accordingly the beneficiary deposited the amount. In the case on hand, in respect of the extent of land de-notified by the State Government there was no award, the beneficiary has not deposited any compensation amount in respect of that extent and possession of said extent of law was also not taken and handed over to the Society. Therefore, the said decision has no application to the facts of this case. Therefore, the said decision has no application to the facts of this case. But on the other hand, the decision of the Apex Court in Godrej and Boyce case referred to supra with all fours is applicable to the case on hand in support of the owners. As could be seen from the original records of the State Government, the State Government did not give effect to the orders passed by the then Revenue Ministry in the year 1993. This clearly goes to show that the beneficiary-Society has prevailed upon the then Cabinet Minister of the State Government not to give effect to the order of de-notifying the land which was passed in favour of the owners. Therefore deceased owner was compelled to knock the doors of this Court crying for justice. Helpless owners of the land were made to suffer a lot by compelling them to litigate the matter against the powerful Society, which has got enormous influence of the then two Cabinet Ministers. 23. We have carefully gone through each one of the documents made available to us from the original records. In fact, the order of de-notification of the land in question was passed in the year 1999, representation was given on behalf of the society to the State Government not to give effect to that order. For that reason State Government has not published notification under Section 48(1) of the L.A. Act. When facts stood thus, the beneficiary-Society comes before this Court and disputes that it has not been heard in the matter by the State Government eventhough it has no right and no prejudice is caused to it. Therefore, we have to make observation in this judgment that though the Society is not entitled to be heard by the State Government before passing the de-notification order, representation was given by the society to the then two Cabinet Ministers of the State Government to stall the State Government not to publish the de-notification, which document of the Society is very much available in the original file. This representation shows that the society has been well represented before the State Government and their case is considered by it. This representation shows that the society has been well represented before the State Government and their case is considered by it. This aspect of the matter has been taken note of by the subsequent Revenue Minister and he passed an order in the year 1993 and that order has been given effect to in the year 1999 and it was observed that the deceased owner has to withdraw the earlier Writ Petition pending before this Court. In fact he had withdrawn the same. Therefore, we answer both the above two contentious points against the society and in favour of the respondent Nos. 2 (a & b) owners. 24. So far as the 3rd point is concerned, the same is also required to be answered against the Society for the following reasons. The learned Single Judge in fact has extracted in the impugned order the contents of the letter addressed by A. Krishnappa, the then Minister of State Government for Horticulture to the Commissioner and Secretary to the State Government which reads as under: "In continuation of my telephonic talk had with you today, I am sending herewith a copy of the representation dated 13-9-93 from the ITI Employees Housing Co-operative Society Ltd., Bangalore, regarding de-notification of Sy.No.18 of Mallathahalli Village, Bangalore South Taluk. This land is in actual possession of this Society. Now, I am surprised to know that the Revenue Department is proposing to de-notify one acre of the land in this survey number. As the entire land in this survey number is needed for the bona-fide use of this Society, I feel that it is not fair at this juncture to de-notify any portion of the land in this survey number. Therefore, I request you to please arrange to stop any move for de-notification of any portion of lands in the above mentioned survey number in the best interest of the bona-fides of members of the Housing Society." 25. On the aforesaid representation, the society has made serious attempt with the State Government not to de-notify the land in question eventhough the owners are entitled for it. Later an ex- member of the Legislative Assembly intervened and addressed a letter to the Chief Minister bringing to his notice the terms of the agreement entered into between the land owners and the representatives of the Society and sought his intervention to undo the injustice caused to the owners. Later an ex- member of the Legislative Assembly intervened and addressed a letter to the Chief Minister bringing to his notice the terms of the agreement entered into between the land owners and the representatives of the Society and sought his intervention to undo the injustice caused to the owners. In the original record of the State Government we find number of such recommendations for and against the de-notification of the land in question. It is clear from the statement of objections filed by the State Government, the members of the Society along with the then Minister met the Revenue Commissioner as well as the Revenue Minister and put-forth the grievance of the Society. On consideration of the rival contentions of the parties and the undisputed agreement between the land. owners and the representatives of the Society, the State Government found that the request of the land owners to drop the acquisition proceedings in respect of 1 acre 15 guntas of land is just, legal and valid. Therefore, they proceeded to publish the impugned notification de-notifying 1 acre 15 guntas of land by giving effect to the order of de-notification passed by the political executive of the State Government, since possession of the same was not taken by the Deputy Commissioner of the District as no award was passed under Section 11 of the L.A. Act. 26. The learned Single Judge in the impugned order has elaborately referred to the notes from the Government original file and also examined the powers of the State Government u/s 48(1) of the L.A. Act keeping in mind the decision of the Supreme Court in Godrej and Boyce Case and rightly held that the issuance of the de-notification impugned in the writ petition does not warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The findings and reasons recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order, in our considered view, is just and proper. 27. We have carefully gone through each one of the notes put up by the then Minister of Government of Karnataka from the original file, which speak volumes about the conduct of the Society. The then 2 Cabinet Ministers of the State have influenced the State Government to deprive the valuable right of the owners who got the de-notification order in their favour on merits. The then 2 Cabinet Ministers of the State have influenced the State Government to deprive the valuable right of the owners who got the de-notification order in their favour on merits. But the same has neither been commur icated nor published in the Karnataka Gazette from the year 1993 to 1999 by the State Government for a period of 6 years. Therefore, we are of the view that the conclusion of the learned Single Judge and the reasons assigned by him in the impugned order are on proper appreciation of the facts and rival legal submissions made on behalf of the parties. 28. The further contention urged by the appellant that the agreement entered into between the parties to give up the de-notified land to the owners is a disputed document and therefore the same is required to be decided by a competent civil Court is wholly unsustainable in law. Notwithstanding the agreement referred to supra, non-compliance of the statutory requirement of law in passing the award to the extent of 1 acre 15 guntas of land, since a consent award is passed, there cannot be another general award by the L.A.O. in respect of the land in question. Therefore, the order of de-notification of the land in question on merits is neither vitiated on account of erroneous reasoning nor there is error in law in the order of the learned single Judge. Therefore, we decline to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 29. In the result, the writ appeal is dismissed with exemplary cost of Rs.15,000/- which shall be paid to the owners by the appellant.