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2008 DIGILAW 495 (GAU)

Lalsanglora v. State of Mizoram

2008-07-03

H.BARUAH

body2008
JUDGMENT H. Baruah, J. 1. By filing the above three Writ Petitions (WP(C) Nos. 58, 71 & 89 of 2006), the respective writ petitioner [Ex-SI(M)] Laldinliana, in writ petition No. 71 of 2006, Shri Lalsanglora in Writ Petition No. 58 of 2006 and Smt. Anne Zosangliani in Writ Petition No. 89 of 2006 has challenged the legality and correctness of the order under Memo No. AZL/DEF/DE-LDL(SI(M))/99/983 dated 6.3.2002 issued by the respondent No. 5 whereby the writ petitioner was removed from service with immediate effect and also the order under Memo No. C.16014/Range/LDL/02/46 dated 13.6.2006 issued by respondent No. 4 by which the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of removal was rejected; order under Memo No. AZL/DEF/DE-LSR(SI(M))/99/98 dated 6.3.2002 issued by Superintendent of Police, Aizawl (respondent No. 4) removing the petitioner from service with immediate effect and order under Memo No. C.I6014/Range/lS 1/02/41 dated 6.6.2006 issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Range), Mizoram (respondent No. 3); and order Memo No. AZL/ DEF/DE-ZSL(SI(M))/99/982 dated 6.3.2002 issued by Superintendent of Police, Aizawl(respondent No. 4) and order under Memo No. C.16014/Range/ZSL/02/76 dated 7.9.2006 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Mizoram (respondent No. 3) respectively. 2. All these three writ petitioners were members of police personnel serving under DEF, Aizawl and they were all terminated in other words removed from service on account of misappropriation of money and thereby misconducting themselves within the meaning of Section 7 of the Indian Police Act read with Rule 66 of Assam Police Manual Part-III. It would be appropriate at this stage to mention that writ petitioner, Ex-SI(M) Laldinliana was at the relevant point of time serving as cashier while the writ petitioner, Shri Lalsanglora and writ petitioner, Smt. Anne Zosangliani were discharging their duties as Accountant and LDC(Bill Assistant) respectively in the DEF under the overall control of the Superintendent of Police, Aizawl. 3. Since the facts involved in the writ petition are found to be analogous to each other and the law involved therein would be same, it is proposed to dispose of all the three writ petitions by a common judgment. 4. 3. Since the facts involved in the writ petition are found to be analogous to each other and the law involved therein would be same, it is proposed to dispose of all the three writ petitions by a common judgment. 4. For better appropriation and understanding the merit of the writ petition, this Court thinks it appropriate to place the case of the respective petitioner at this stage which can be noticed as under : Writ Petition No. 71 of 2006 The writ petitioner was initially appointed as ASI(M) on 21.9.1979 and confirmed in the said post with effect from 1.7.1990 vide Memo No. E/PHQ/C/40-A/43-A dated 6.7.90 issued by the respondent No. 3, Inspector General of Police, Govt. of Mizoram. He was temporarily promoted to the rank of SI(M) on the recommendation of the DPC held on 23.6.1993 vide order under Memo No. E/PHQ/A/122/93/48 issued by the Assistant Inspector General of Police, Aizawl. The Petitioner while serving as such was placed under Suspension with immediate effect vide an order under Memo No. E/DEF/14/98/99/85 dated 16.2.99 issued by respondent No. 5, the Superintendent of Police. He was thereafter served with a Memorandum No. LDL/PF-1/82/103 dated 14.10.1999 with article of charges issued by respondent No. 5 and sought for an explanation from him. The articles of charge referred under the aforesaid memorandum are as follows (Annexure-1): "Article-I That the said SI(M) Laldinliana of Aizawl DEF while posted at S.P. Office and working as Cashier w.e.f. 6.8.93 had intentionally and wilfully withdrawn Rs. 92,04,007/- from the Govt. Treasury in excess of the actual amount of the salary of constables for his own benefit w.e.f. May 1995 to July 1998. The said SI(M) Laldinliana had, therefore, acted in a manner unbecoming of a police officer thereby rendering himself liable to be dealt with under Section7 of Indian Police Act (Act V of 1861) r/w Rule 66 of APM Part-III. Article-II That the said SI(M) Laldinliana of Aizawl DEF while posted at S.P. Office and working as Cashier had manipulated cash books, pay cheque and other documents which he kept as a Cashier in order to cover up the fraudulent of Rs. 92,04,007/- on 39 occasions w.e.f. May 95. Article-II That the said SI(M) Laldinliana of Aizawl DEF while posted at S.P. Office and working as Cashier had manipulated cash books, pay cheque and other documents which he kept as a Cashier in order to cover up the fraudulent of Rs. 92,04,007/- on 39 occasions w.e.f. May 95. The said SI(M) Laldinliana had, therefore, acted in a manner unbecoming of a police officer thereby rendering himself liable to be dealt with under Section 7 of Indian Police Act (Act V of 1861) r/ w Rule 66 of APM Part-III. 5. Pursuant to the Memorandum of article of charges the petitioner submitted written statement denying all the charges. It would be appropriate to mention at this stage that for misappropriation of money a criminal case was registered against the petitioner. 6. Being not satisfied with the explanation so offered, respondent No. 5 appointed Sri C. Laldina, Addl. S.P.(C) as Inquiry Officer to enquire into the charges. After conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report to respondent No. 5 vide letter No. DE/LDL/SI(M)/2001/99 dated 12.9.2001, copy of which was forwarded to the petitioner asking him to file representation within 10(ten) days from the date of receipt of the Inquiry Report. Petitioner submitted representation on 7.11.2001 wherein he contended that without holding the DDO liable he could not be held responsible. 7. Respondent No. 5 thereafter having considered the representation so submitted and the findings of the Inquiry Officer in respect of the article of charges in exercise of his power conferred under Section7 of the Indian Police Act read with Rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual Part-III removed the writ petitioner from service with further direction that for the period of suspension the petitioner would not be entitled to any pecuniary benefit except the subsistence allowance already drawn. 8. Being aggrieved thereby the petitioner approached the appellate authority, the respondent No. 4, who after a long lapse of time dismissed his appeal holding that the action taken by the respondent No. 5 was in accordance with law. Hence, this writ petition. 9. Writ Petition No. 58 of 2006 The writ petitioner was initially appointed as LDA on 15.11.1974 by respondent No. 4, the Superintendent of Police vide Order No. 191 of 1974 under Memo No. E/2532-3 8/V-13/74 and joined in the service on 16.11.1974. Hence, this writ petition. 9. Writ Petition No. 58 of 2006 The writ petitioner was initially appointed as LDA on 15.11.1974 by respondent No. 4, the Superintendent of Police vide Order No. 191 of 1974 under Memo No. E/2532-3 8/V-13/74 and joined in the service on 16.11.1974. By order under Memo No. F/ PHQ/23 dated 19.3.1982, the Inspector General of Police, Mizoram along with others remustered the petitioner with effect from 1.4.1982 as per direction received from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India under Memo No. 13034/115/79-MZ dated 16.7.1981 and converted the petitioner into uniform cadre placing him at Serial No. 56. The petitioner was confirmed in the post of LDC with effect from 23.4.1979 vide order dated 22.7,1982 under Memo No. CB/ PHQ(F) 82. He was promoted to the rank of UPCVAccQuntant/Account Asstt, which is the rank of SI of uniformed cadre vide order dated 23.11.1982 under Memo No. CB/PHQ(F)/17/79. The Petitioner while serving as accountant in the office of the S.P., Aizawl, he was placed under Suspension vide an order under Memo No. E/DEF/14/98-99/84 dated 16.2.99 issued by respondent No. 4, the Superintendent of Police for holding a disciplinary proceeding under Article of various charges. He was thereafter served with a Memorandum No. PF/SLR-SI(M)/83/67 dated 14.10.1999 with article of charges issued by respondent No. 4 and sought for an explanation from him. The articles of charge referred under the aforesaid Memorandum are as follows (Annexure-1) : Article-I That the said SI(M) Lalsanglora of Aizawl DEF while posted at S.P. Office Aizawl as an accountant had falsely prepared demand under salary head, in the LOC w.e.f. May 1995 to July 1998 in excess of the actual requirements for his own ulterior motives. The said SI(M) Lalsanglora had, therefore, acted in a manner unbecoming of a police officer thereby rendering himself liable to be dealt with under Section 7 of Indian Police Act (Act V of 1861) r/w Rule 66 of APM Part-III. Article-II That the said SI(M) Lalsanglora of Aizawl DEF while posted at S.P. Office and working as Accountant had prepared false monthly expenditure statement since May 1995 to July 1998 so as to coyer up fraudulent excess drawal of 'money Under salary head. Article-II That the said SI(M) Lalsanglora of Aizawl DEF while posted at S.P. Office and working as Accountant had prepared false monthly expenditure statement since May 1995 to July 1998 so as to coyer up fraudulent excess drawal of 'money Under salary head. The said SI(M) Lalsanglorahad, therefore, acted in a manner unbecoming of a police officer thereby rendering himself liable to be dealt with under Section 7 of Indian Police Act (Act V of 1861) r/w Rule 66 of APM Part-III. Article-III That the said SI(M) Lalsanglora while posted at S.P. Office Aizawl as Accountant had wilfully give wrong information to his superior officer in the file regarding fraudulent over-drawal of Rs. 6.88 lakhs under salary head. The said SI(M) Lalsanglora had, therefore, acted in a manner unbecoming of a police of ficer thereby rendering himself liable to be dealt with under Section 7 of Indian Police Act (Act V of 1861) r/w Rule 66 of APM Part-III. Article-IV That the said SI(M) Lalsanglora while posted at S.P. Office Aizawl as Accountant had instructed pay bill assistant SI(M) A. Zosangliani to add additional amount in the monthly salary bill prepared by her since May 1995 to July 1998 for their own ulterior motives in connivance with the said bill assistant and cashier SI(M) Laldinliana. The said SI(M) Lalsanglora had, therefore, 'acted in a manner unbecoming of a police officer thereby rendering himself liable to be dealt with under Section 7 of Indian Police Act (Act V of 1861) r/w Rule 66 of APM Part-III. 10. Pursuant to the Memorandum of Article of charges, Disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and the Inquiry Officer after completion of the investigation submitted the Inquiry Report under Memo No. DE/LSR/SI(M)/2001/98 dated 12.9.2001. 11. Having considered the findings of the Inquiry Officer in respect of the article of charges, respondent No. 4, the Superintendent of Police, in exercise of his power conferred under Section 7 of the Indian Police Act read with Rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual Part-in removed the writ petitioner from service vide impugned order under Memo No. AZL/DEF/DE-LSR(SI(M))/99/ 98 dated 6.3.2002 (Annexure-11). 12. Being aggrieved thereby the petitioner approached the appellate authority, the respondent No. 3, by filing an appeal on 18.4.2002, who after a long lapse of time dismissed his appeal holding that the action taken by the respondent No. 4 was in accordance with law. 12. Being aggrieved thereby the petitioner approached the appellate authority, the respondent No. 3, by filing an appeal on 18.4.2002, who after a long lapse of time dismissed his appeal holding that the action taken by the respondent No. 4 was in accordance with law. Hence, this writ petition. 13. Writ Petition No. 89 of 2006 The writ petitioner was initially appointed as LDC on 1.3.1979 and joined in the said post on the same day. Along with others the petitioner remustered as Assistant Sub-Inspector (Ministerial) with effect from 1.41982 vide order of the Inspector General of Police dated 19.3.1982 pursuant to the direction received from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India under Memo No. 13034/115/ 79-MZ dated 16.7.198 i and Government of Mizoram, Hofhe Department letter No. A-11015/1/76-HMP dated 21.7.1981. She was confirmed as Assistant Sub-Inspector (Ministerial) with effect from 1.7.1990 by respondent No. 3, the Inspector General of Police, vide order dated 6.7.199 under Memo No. E/PHQ/G/40-A/143-A. Thereafter she promoted to the rank of Sub-Inspector (Ministerial) vide order dated 23.6.1993 of the Assistant Inspector General of Police-I. The Petitioner while serving in the office of the S.P., Aizawl, she was placed under suspension vide an order under Memo No. E/DEF/ 14/98-99/86 dated 16.2.99 issued by respondent No. 4, the Superintendent of Police for holding a disciplinary proceeding under article of various charges. She was thereafter served with a Memorandum No. PF/ ZSL-SI(M)/72/15 dated 14.10.1999 with article of charges issued by respondent No. 4. The articles of charge referred under the aforesaid Memorandum are as follows (Annexure-1) : Article-I That the said SI(M) A. Zosangliani while posted at S.P. Office, Aizawl w.e.f. 26.6.1993 and working as Bill Asstt. Had manipulated the total figures of bills in respect of Constables within Aizawl town for 39 times w.e.f. May 1995. The said SI(M) A. Zosangliani had, therefore, acted in a manner unbecoming of a police officer thereby rendering herself liable to be dealt with under Section 7 of Indian Police Act (Act V of 1861) r/w Rule 66 of APM Part-III. Article-II That the said SI(M) A. Zosangliani of Aizawl DEF while posted at Section P. Office and working as Bill Asstt. had been a party who received for their own personal benefit the amount of Rs. 92,04,007/- fraudulently drawn from the Treasury against the salary of Police Constables 39 times. Article-II That the said SI(M) A. Zosangliani of Aizawl DEF while posted at Section P. Office and working as Bill Asstt. had been a party who received for their own personal benefit the amount of Rs. 92,04,007/- fraudulently drawn from the Treasury against the salary of Police Constables 39 times. The said SI(M) A. Zosangliani had, therefore, acted in a manner unbecoming of a police officer thereby rendering herself liable to be dealt with under Section 7 of Indian Police Act (Act V of 1861) r/w Rule 66 of APM Part-III. 14. Pursuant to the Memorandum of Article of charges the Inquiry Officer submitted his report and vide order dated 6.3.2002 of the Superintendent of Police, Aizawl (respondent No. 4) under Memo No. AZL/DEF/DE-ZSL(SL(M))/99/982 removed the petitioner from service. 15. Being aggrieved thereby the petitioner approached the appellate authority, the respondent No. 3, who after a long lapse of time dismissed his appeal vide Memo No. C. 16014/Range/ZSIV02/76 dated 7th September, 2006 by accepting the finding of the Inquiry Officer. Hence, this writ petition. 16. Against the writ petition filed by the above writ petitioners, all the respondents in W.P. No. 58 of 2006 and W.P.(C) No. 89 of 2006 filed affidavit-in-opposition supporting removal of the writ petitioners for their acts and omission while discharging their duties as such in the office of the Superintendent of Police. While in W.P.(C) No. 71 of 2006 respondent Nos. 1 and 2 only filed affidavit-in-opposition remaining three respondents however, did not file any affidavit in opposition supporting their action. 17. For and against all these writ petitions, learned Counsel of the respective parties were heard at length. 18. The counsel for the writ petitioners while supporting the writ petition raised the following issues contending that the action on the part of the respondent authorities are erroneous and illegal in awarding punishment of Dismissal: (1) that the evidence so recorded by the Inquiry Officer are insufficient to hold the writ petitioners guilty of charges framed against them and, therefore, the finding of the Inquiry Officer are not based on legal evidence. Findings are based on surmises and presumption only, (2) that the appellate au throaty before whom the writ petitioners preferred appeal failed to adhere to the conditions/requirements as provided under Rule 66(VI) of Assam Police Manual, Part-m for which the finding of the appellate authority cannot sustain,. Findings are based on surmises and presumption only, (2) that the appellate au throaty before whom the writ petitioners preferred appeal failed to adhere to the conditions/requirements as provided under Rule 66(VI) of Assam Police Manual, Part-m for which the finding of the appellate authority cannot sustain,. (3) that a simultaneous departmental proceeding against the writ petitioners are not desirable in view of pendency of simultaneous proceeding against the each of them before an appropriate forum in view of the same facts and circumstances appearing on the face of the records of all the cases, (4) that the order of removal of the writ petitioners on the basis of the finding of the inquiry officer by respondent No. 5, Superintendent of Police (W.P.(C) No.71 of 2006), respondent No. 4, Superintendent of Police (WP(C) No. 89 of 2006) and respondent No. 4, Superintendent of Police (W.P.(C) No. 58 of 2006), is violative of Article 311(1) of the Constitution, and (5) that the penalty of removal is highly excessive and disproportionate to the Articles of Charges. 19. From the facts involved in the writ petitions it is noticed that the respective writ petitioner was discharging his/her duty as such in the office of the Superintendent of Police, Aizawl in the Bill Section. Writ petitioner Laldinliana at the relevant point of time was the cashier while Sh. Lalsanglora and Smt. Anne Zosangliani were discharging their duties as Accountant and Bill Assistant respectively. Each of the writ petitioners while discharging their respective duties as such by manipulating the relevant documents to wit by bills, cash book, pay cheques withdrew huge sum of money from the bank amounting to Rs. 92,04,007/- after preparing a false demand under salary head to the Government. Misappropriation when detected First Information was lodged with police for making appropriate investigation into the allegation of misappropriation. Simultaneously a show cause notice to each of the writ petitioners were issued requiring them to explain about the misappropriation of the money under the salary head! Having received show cause reply and the same being found not satisfactory, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the respective writ petitioner. Inquiry Officer was appointed and after due inquiry, inquiry report was submitted before the appropriate authority. Having received show cause reply and the same being found not satisfactory, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the respective writ petitioner. Inquiry Officer was appointed and after due inquiry, inquiry report was submitted before the appropriate authority. Having accepted the findings of the Inquiry Officer the Superintendent of Police removed the respective writ petitioner from their service vide order dated 6.3.2002(Annexure-10) namely, Ex-SI(M) Laldinliana (Petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 71 of 2006), vide order dated 6.3.2002 (Annexure-11) Sh. Lalsanglora (Petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 58 of 2006) and vide order dated 6.3.2002 (Annexure -7) Smt. Anne Zosangliani (Petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 89 of 2006) respectively. Appeal was preferred by the respective writ petitioner before the appellate authority and the same was also dismissed. 20. In regard to issue No. 1, learned Counsel for the writ petitioners submitted that the manner in which Inquiry Officer proceeded with the inquiry was not in accordance with the established procedure for conducting departmental inquiries against the delinquent officer. The delinquent officer/officers, herein the writ petitioners were not afforded adequate opportunity to present their case in the manner in which the same was required to be placed, which resulted the inquiry report unacceptable and unsustainable. Learned Counsel representing the writ petitioner Laldinliana (W.P. (C) No. 71 of 2006) very specifically submitted that the evidence on record do not justify to hold the writ petitioner guilty of the charges framed against him. Evidence so recorded are wanting to show that the writ petitioner was guilty of making excess drawal of salary from the Government treasury but even in spite of such availability of evidence on record, the concerned inquiry officer held the writ petitioner guilty of the charges which according to the learned Counsel was incorrect and erroneous finding on the part of the Inquiry Officer. The findings are according to Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned Counsel for the writ petitioner are all based on surmises and presumption devoid of any legal evidence. The writ petitioner was held guilty by the Inquiry Officer under the Charge No. 1 and Charge No. 2. Mr. The findings are according to Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned Counsel for the writ petitioner are all based on surmises and presumption devoid of any legal evidence. The writ petitioner was held guilty by the Inquiry Officer under the Charge No. 1 and Charge No. 2. Mr. S.N. Meitei, representing writ petitioner Lalsanglora, then Accountant argued that the evidence on record basing on which the Inquiry Officer arrived at a decision against the writ petitioner are all apparently in favour of the writ petitioner but the Inquiry Officer most illogically and arbitrarily held the writ petitioner guilty of the Articles of charges (Article Nos. I, II, III & IV). In the inquiry report name of six persons appeared as defence witness but despite such mention the Inquiry Officer was pleased to refer in the inquiry report as defence witness "Nil". It was further argued by Mr. Meitei that the Inquiry Officer was apparently guided by his pre-de-termination and accordingly prepared the inquiry report with such pre-determination even in spite of evidence appearing in the face of the record in favour of the writ petitioner. Dismissal of the writ petitioner on the basis of the such report is not tenable in law. Mr. Jeol Denga, learned Counsel for Smt. Anne Zosangliani criticized the inquiry report on the ground that there was no legal evidence on record to substantiate the charges brought against the writ petitioner. None of the witnesses examined during the departmental inquiry in support radiated direct involvement of the writ petitioner in the misappropriation of the huge amount of salary drawn from the Government treasury. When the evidence of the witnesses do not reflect any incrimination of the writ petitioner in the drawal of the huge amount, the finding of the Inquiry Officer according to the learned Counsel is unjust and incorrect. A finding cannot be adhered to an mistaken presumption. 21. Mr. N. Sailo, learned Addl. Advocate General representing the State respondents in all the writ petitions refuting the contention of the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners submitted that as per records each of the departmental inquiry was proceeded and ended under the established procedure for holding departmental inquiry against erring/officer/officers. It was argued by him that all formalities were adopted before start of the departmental inquiry against the writ petitioners. It was argued by him that all formalities were adopted before start of the departmental inquiry against the writ petitioners. Departmental concerned appointed Inquiry Officer for the purpose and while inquired into allegation/article of charges, the writ petitioners were afforded reasonable opportunity to project their case by adducing evidence both oral and documentary. The writ petitioners in support of their case examined themselves as witnesses. Therefore, the claim of the writ petitioners that they were not given reasonable opportunity to adduce adequate evidence is not an acceptable claim in view of the report of the Inquiry Officer so placed before the appropriate authority. It was further argued by him that there was no oblique motive on the part of the Inquiry Officer to make a deviation from the evidence on record for the purpose o f holding the wit petitioners guilty and guilty alone. According to Mr. IN. Sailo, findings are based on evidence and the same cannot be challenged. 22. It is apparent from the record that each of the writ petitioners approached the appellate authority challenging the legality of order of removal under Rule 66(VI) of the Assam Police Manual, but the appellate authority did not find any illegality in the findings of the Inquiry Officer and, therefore, did not interfere with the order of removal of the writ petitioners. It was argued during the course of argument by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners that while disposing an appeal under this rule, the appellate authority is bound to consider the conditions/requirements and any deviation therefrom, the finding of the appellate authority cannot receive any legal sanction. Referring to the conditions/requirements incorporated in the rule as aforesaid it was argued by the counsel for the writ petitioners that the order of the appellate authority does not contain or reflect that while disposing the appeal so preferred by the writ petitioners the conditions were adhered to, therefore, it was contended by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners that the order of the appellate authority acknowledging the validity of the order of removal on the basis of the inquiry report is not based on sound findings. Mr. N. Sailo, learned Addl. Mr. N. Sailo, learned Addl. Advocate General for the State respondents argued while refuting the claim of the writ petitioners that it is not incumbent on the appellate authority while disposing an appeal to make a detail examination of the report vis-a-vis the findings on record for arriving at a decision is assertion or in negation, it would be sufficient for the appellate authority, if he makes a reference in his report that a careful scrutiny of the facts and evidences on record was made, would be sufficient to give an inference that conditions/requirements incorporated in the Rule are compiled with. A vivid description/discussion of the evidence on record to make an appellate order acceptable is unwarranted if the report shows that an anxious consideration was given to the facts and evidence on record. According to Mr. Sailo, the appellate authorities order cannot be rejected. 23. Now, the most pertinent question to be determined is whether in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the findings of the departmental inquiry can be challenged. In this regard it was argued by Mr. N. Sailo, that it is not appropriate on the part of the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to sit or in other words act as an appellate authority unless the findings of the Inquiry Officer vis-a-vis the appellate authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all. If perversity etc. is apparent on the face of the record, it was argued by Mr. Sailo, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and in that circumstance a writ of certiorari could be issued. Mr. Sailo while supporting his argument submitted that no such perversity or patent error on the face of the record appear to have committed by the authority (Inquiry) while submitting inquiry report. Therefore, it would not be appropriate on the part of the writ petitioners to criticize the inquiry report as well as the report of the appellate authority that the same are not based on facts and evidence on record. There is nothing in the record to show that findings are not based on evidence. Reasonable opportunity was given to either party to put their respective case in support and against. According to Mr. There is nothing in the record to show that findings are not based on evidence. Reasonable opportunity was given to either party to put their respective case in support and against. According to Mr. Sailo, neither the inquiry report nor the appellate report is liable to be rejected on this ground as contended by the writ petitioners. Mr. N. Sailo in support of the contention of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in regard to consideration of an inquiry report on the basis of which penalty is imposed and challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution relied on the decisions in the case between Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Ashok Kumar Arora reported in AIR 1997 SC 1030 ; State of U.P. and Ors. v. Nand Kishore Shukla anhd Anr. reported in (1996) IILLJ 672 SC. 24. In Paragraph 20 of the case in between Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Ashok Kumar Arora reported in AIR 1997 SC 1030 the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under : 20. At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate court/authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence, and/or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee. There is a catena of judgments of this Court which had settled the law on this topic and it is not necessary to refer to all these decisions. Suffice it to refer to a few decisions of this Court on this topic viz. State of A.P v. S. Sree Rama Rao, State of A.P v. Chitra Venkata Rao, Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra and Nelson Motis v. Union of India. 25. In para 7 of the judgment in the case between the State ofU.P. and Ors. v. Nand Kishore Shukla and Anr. reported in (1996) IILLJ 672 SC, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under 7. It is settled law that the court is not a court of appeal to go into the question of imposition of the punishment. 25. In para 7 of the judgment in the case between the State ofU.P. and Ors. v. Nand Kishore Shukla and Anr. reported in (1996) IILLJ 672 SC, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under 7. It is settled law that the court is not a court of appeal to go into the question of imposition of the punishment. It is for the disciplinary authority to consider what would be the nature of the punishment to be imposed on a government servant. Its proportionality also cannot be gone into by the court. The only question is whether the disciplinary authority would have passed such an order. It is settled law that even one of the charges, if held proved and sufficient for imposition of penalty by the disciplinary authority or by the appellate authority, the court would be loath to interfere with that part of the order. The order of removal does not cast stigma on the respondent to disable him from seeking any appointment elsewhere. Under these circumstances, we think that the High Court was wholly wrong in setting aside the order. 26. From the perusal of the Inquiry Report so prepared and submitted, it is nowhere found that there was denial of reasonable opportunity of being heard by adducing evidence in support of the claim of the writ petitioners. On the basis of the facts and evidence on record both oral and documentary, the Inquiry Officer based its report and accordingly recorded a finding of guilt. When no perversity etc. are appearing in the face of the record, the scope of jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has been limited or in other words circumscribed. 27. This Court in view of the facts and evidence on record and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases (supra) does not find that the inquiry report submitted by the Inquiry Officer is open for scrutiny by this Court while resorting judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. Argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners failed to inspire this Court on this ground. 28. It is true that against each of the writ petitioners a criminal proceeding is subjudiced before the appropriate forum. It is also proved that those criminal proceedings are not ended till date. Argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners failed to inspire this Court on this ground. 28. It is true that against each of the writ petitioners a criminal proceeding is subjudiced before the appropriate forum. It is also proved that those criminal proceedings are not ended till date. It is also proved that facts appearing in the departmental proceeding are one and the same in criminal proceedings also. During the pendency of the criminal proceedings this departmental proceedings were initiated, disposed of and the delinquent officers (writ petitioners) were removed from service. In the face of those facts it was argued by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners that it was not wise on the part of the respondent authorities to conduct a parallel disciplinary proceeding against the writ petitioners in view of the pendency of the criminal proceeding against each of them. It would have been wise on the part of the respondent authorities to start with a disciplinary proceeding basing on the results of a criminal proceedings pending against them, since the findings of the criminal forum would have binding effect on the findings of the Inquiry Officer under the departmental proceedings inasmuch as findings in a criminal proceeding are based on Rule "beyond reasonable doubt" while the findings of the departmental proceeding based on preponderance of evidence. Learned Counsel for the writ petitioners in support of their contention relied in the case between Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan reported in (1960) ILLJ 520 SC, wherein the Apex Court summed up the legal position in paragraph 3 of the judgment, which reads as follows: 3. It is true that very often employers stay enquiries pending the decision of the criminal trial courts and that is fair; but we cannot say that principles of natural justice require that an employer must wait for the decision at least of the criminal trial court before taking action against an employee. In Shri Bimal Kanta Mukherjee v. Messrs. Newsman's Printing Works 1956 LAC 188, this was the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. In Shri Bimal Kanta Mukherjee v. Messrs. Newsman's Printing Works 1956 LAC 188, this was the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. We may, however, add that if the case is of a grave nature or involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced. 29. But, in the case of Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Coal Mine reported in, Hon'ble Supreme Court taking into consideration of various decisions earlier laid down held that disciplinary proceeding and criminal proceeding can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in there being conducted thus, disciplinary authority may opt for taking departmental action first to dismissed the delinquent from the service after holding a full-fledged inquiry for criminal proceeding and appeal thereafter. The same view was adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case between State of Andhra Pradesh v. Section Sree Rama Rao reported in wherein Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.C. Shah then was held as under : Held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the orders. The High Court was wrong in its view that in a departmental inquiry the rule followed in a criminal trial that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the court must be applied and that if such a rule was not applied the High Court could set aside the order of the departmental authority in exercise of its power under Article226 of the Constitution. The High Court does not sit as a court of appeal over the decision of the authority holding a departmental enquiry: it is only to see whether the enquiry has been held by a competent authority and according to the procedure prescribed and whether the rules of natural justice have been observed. Where there is some evidence which the authority has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. Where there is some evidence which the authority has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequately or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. In the present case, the proceedings before the departmental authorities were regular, no rule of natural justice were violated, the conclusions were borne out by the evidence and the respondent had ample opportunity of examining his witness. Therefore, the conclusions of the punishing authority were not open to be questioned before the High Court. The same view was also adopted in the case between Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce reported in AIR 2007 SC 199 . In paragraph 11 of the said judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court held asunder : 11. In our view the findings recorded by the learned single Judge are fallacious. This Court has taken the view consistently that acquittal in a criminal case would be no bar for drawing up a disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent officer. It is well settled principle of law that the yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the disciplinary proceeding. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is a proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. 30. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court does not see any force in the argument advanced by the counsel for the writ petitioners. 31. In the context of issue No. 4 a detail discussion would be required for appropriate answer thereto. Learned Counsel for the writ petitioners in the context of this issue submitted that removal of the writ petitioners from their respective services by the respondent Nos. 5,4 and 4 in writ petition Nos. 71 of 2006, 58 of 2006 and 89 of 2006 respectively is violative of Article 311(1) of the Constitution read with Rule 66(VI) of the Assam Police Manual, Part-in since Superintendent of Police, Aizawl, Mizoram is not the appointing and disciplinary authority of the writ petitioners. 5,4 and 4 in writ petition Nos. 71 of 2006, 58 of 2006 and 89 of 2006 respectively is violative of Article 311(1) of the Constitution read with Rule 66(VI) of the Assam Police Manual, Part-in since Superintendent of Police, Aizawl, Mizoram is not the appointing and disciplinary authority of the writ petitioners. Factually the writ petitioner Laldinliana, was initially appointed by order dated 3rd September 1982 by Inspector General of Police, Mizoram, Aizawl, as ASI(M) in the scale of Rs. 260-400 per month plus other allowances against the existing vacancy in the Commandant 1st. Bn. MAP and thereafter he was confirmed and promoted, (photocopy of the appointment letter dated 3.9.1982 was placed at the time of hearing by the counsel for the writ petitioner). Writ petitioner Lalsanglora (petitioner of WP(C) No. 58 of 2006) was initially appointed as LDA by respondent No. 4 on 15.11.1994 and under Memo No. F/PHQ/23 dated 19.3.1982 the Inspector General of Police, Mizoram remustered the petitioner with effect from 1.4.1982 and converted into uniformed cadre. He was thereafter promoted as UDC while Smt. Anne Zosangliani (petitioner in writ petitioner No. 89 of 2006 was appointed as LDA by Superintendent of Police on 1.3.1979 and remustered as Assistant Sub-Inspector (M) with effect from 1.4.1982 by order of the Inspector General of Police dated 19.3.1982, pursuant to the Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs letter No. 13034/115/79-MZ dated 16.7.1981 and Government of Mizoram, Home Department letter No. A-11015/1/76-HMP dated 21.7.1981. 32. Learned Counsel for the writ petitioners in the factual position of the appointment of the respective petitioners put emphasis that Superintendent of Police, Aizawl did not have the jurisdiction of remove the writ petitioners from their service, he being not the appointing authority of the writ petitioners. It was argued that though writ petitioner Lalsanglora and Smt. Anne Zosongliani were initially appointed by the Superintendent of Police they were subsequently remustered by Inspector General of Police and for that Superintendent of Police could not be the appointing authority of those two writ petitioners, removal orders thus passed by Superintendent of Police one of the State respondents of the writ petition is not justified and it is violative of Article 311(1) of the Constitution read with Rule 66, Part-in of the Assam Police Manual. 33. Per contra to the submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners, Mr. 33. Per contra to the submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners, Mr. N. Sailo, learned additional Advocate General, Mizoram submitted that the writ petitioners namely Lalsanglora and Smt. Anne Zosangliani were appointed by the Superintendent of Police and later they were remustered. Initial appointment of writ petitioner Laldinliana is not supported by requisite documents though subsequently an appointment letter was produced before the court at the time of hearing which goes to show that writ petitioner Laldinliana was appointed not by the Superintendent of Police, Aizawl. 34. Now the question is whether remuster of the writ petitioner Lalsanglora and Smt. Anne Zosangliani can be treated as initial appointment by the Inspector General of Police. In this context of the matter it was argued by the counsel for the respective writ petitioner that remuster of the writ petitioner Lalsanglora and Smt. Anne Zosangliani can be treated as initial appointment in the post and, therefore, the Superintendent of Police, Aizawl is not the appointing authority for the purpose of taking/resorting a disciplinary action against them. The order of dismissal, therefore, is illegal and violative of Article 311(1) of the Constitution. Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Laldinliana also argued in the same line that the writ petitioner being appointed by the Inspector General of Police, he (IGP) is the appropriate authority for taking a disciplinary action against him and not the Superintendent of Police, Aizawl, one of the State respondents. Thus in view of the facts of appointment of the writ petitioners, the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners submitted that removal of the petitioners from the service by the Superintendent of Police, one of the State respondents is not legal in the eye of law and the same is violative of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India. 35. In view of the submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners, the writ petitioner of WP(C) No. 58 of 2006 and WP(C) No. 89 of 2006 in particular, we must adhere to the meaning of "muster". Chambers English Dictionary gives a meaning of "muster" (n) as a display, demonstration, calling together, esp. of troops, as for inspection, verification, etc. The verb transitive and intransitive form of the word "muster" gives a meaning as to assemble: to enroll: to number to summon up, to round up etc. Chambers English Dictionary gives a meaning of "muster" (n) as a display, demonstration, calling together, esp. of troops, as for inspection, verification, etc. The verb transitive and intransitive form of the word "muster" gives a meaning as to assemble: to enroll: to number to summon up, to round up etc. In the face of the meaning per Chambers English Dictionary of the word "muster" if we take the verb form of the word we may call enrollment of the writ petitioner Lalsanglora and Smt. Anne Zosangliani in the troop by the order of Inspector General of Police. As per Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, the meaning of word "muster" is "to assemble together (troops) for inspection or service. "Remuster" meaning thereby is to reassemble together for inspection or service. Meaning of enrollment as per New Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (new 7th Edition) is the act of official joining a course, school etc.; therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners that the Superintendent of Police, Aizawl is not the appointing authority of the writ petitioners rather the officer/officers to remuster the writ petitioners is/are appointing authority/authorities of the writ petitioners is a matter which warrants careful consideration/scrutiny with reference to the documents annexed to the writ petition. Writ petitioner Laldinlian's conversion into a uniformed cadre was accepted by the Inspector General of Police, Mizoram, Aizawl he was discharging his duties as LDC in the office of the DC, Aizawl and was appointed as LDC/ASI against an existing vacancy in the office of the 1st Bn. MAP and condition of a service will be governed by the Police Act 1861 and Police Manual. Shri Lalsanglora (writ petitioner in WP(C) No. 58 of 2006) and Smt. Anne Zosangliani (writ petitioner in WP(C) Nq. 89 of 2006) both were appointed by the Superintendent of Police, Aizawl in the year 1974 and 1979 as LDC respectively. By a common order dated 19.3.1982 both Lalsanglora and Anne Zosangliani were remustered under Police Act and converted into uniformed cadre with effect from 1.4.1982 in pursuance of the Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs letter No. 13034/115/79-MZ dated 16.7.1981 and Govt. of Mizoram, Home Department letter No. 11015/1/76-HMP dated 21.7.1981 by Inspector General of Police, Mizoram, Aizawl while both were working as LDC in the office of the S.P., Aizawl and FSO respectively. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs letter No. 13034/115/79-MZ dated 16.7.1981 and Govt. of Mizoram, Home Department letter No. 11015/1/76-HMP dated 21.7.1981 by Inspector General of Police, Mizoram, Aizawl while both were working as LDC in the office of the S.P., Aizawl and FSO respectively. At this stage the Court thinks it appropriate to place the text of the order for better appreciation of the underlying meaning of the order itself. (Annexure 2 & 1). Government of Mizoram Police Head Quarters: Aizawl ORDER Dated Aizawl, the 19th Mar'82. In pursuance of Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs No. 13034/115/79-MZ dated 16.7.81 and Govt. of Mizoram, Home Deptt. No. A-l 1015/1/76-HMP dated 21.7.81 and following a DPC on 4.3.82, the following Ministerial staff of Police Deptt. are remustered under the Police Act (Act V of 1861) and converted into uniformed cadre with effect from 1.4.82. 2. They will locally wear the uniforms with the rank shown against each name. These ranks are purely local and confer no other, rights of the rank and each individual will continue in their present pay scale. 3. The list in this order is prepared on the basis of the written willingness of each individual for conversion into the Police Uniformed Cadre (Ministerial) sanctioned vide Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Order No. 13034/ 115/79-MZ dated 16.7.81 and Govt. of Mizoram, Home Deptt. No. A-l 1015/1/76-HMP dated 21.7.81 and on the basis of fitness for remastering into the Uniformed Cadre as decided by the regular DPC held for the purpose on 4.3.82. In case, any individual names have been inadvertantly omitted they must inform this HQ through their Head of Officer before 1.4.1982. After conversion both the petitioners namely Lalsanglora and Smt. Anne Zosangliani were holding the post of ASI a different cadre of the service. In the order it is mentioned that such conversion was made on the basis of the written willingness of each individual and also on the basis of the decision of the departmental promotion committee held on 4.3.1982 as per wish of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs and Govt. of Mizoram, communication letter aforementioned. Thus apparently, such conversion gave birth a new cadre for the writ petitioners. By such conversion, the Inspector General of Police became the appointing authority of the writ petitioners, although the initial appointments of writ petitioner namely, Sh. of Mizoram, communication letter aforementioned. Thus apparently, such conversion gave birth a new cadre for the writ petitioners. By such conversion, the Inspector General of Police became the appointing authority of the writ petitioners, although the initial appointments of writ petitioner namely, Sh. Lalsanglora and Smt. Anne Zosangliani was made by the Superintendent of Police, Aizawl as LDC. The cadre of LDC and cadre of Assistant Sub-Inspector (for short ASI) are two different entity and all the three writ petitioners were appointed as ASI through conversion under Police Act into a uniformed cadre. 36. After careful scrutiny of the order dated 19.3.1982 of the Inspector General of Police this Court does not find any impediment in accepting the submission advanced by the counsel for the writ petitioners that the "remuster" of the writ petitioners and conversion into uniformed cadre is a fresh appointment and earlier appointment of the writ petitioner as LDC in different offices cannot make us understand that Superintendent of Police, Aizawl was appointing authority of the writ petitioners. 37. Article 311 of the Constitution reads asunder : 311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the union or an all India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reason able opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: [Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed: Provided further that this clause shall not apply-] (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) Where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (e) Where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. (3) If, in respect of any such person as afore said, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in Clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or removed such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final. Clause-1 of the Article speaks for that a civil servant of the Union or State not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Clause-2 of this Article also speaks for that such civil servant shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed about the charges level against him/her and give a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. There is no dispute at the Bar that there was no inquiry held against the writ petitioners under the Article of charges. There is no dispute that such inquiry was not proceeded and decided after giving reasonable opportunity to being heard. So the inquiry report submitted does not offend the proviso to Clause-2 of Article 311 of the Constitution. 38. There is no dispute at the Bar that there was no inquiry held against the writ petitioners under the Article of charges. There is no dispute that such inquiry was not proceeded and decided after giving reasonable opportunity to being heard. So the inquiry report submitted does not offend the proviso to Clause-2 of Article 311 of the Constitution. 38. In regard to Clause-1 of Article 311 it was contended at the Bar that order of dismissal rendered by the Superintendent of Police, Aizawl removing the writ petitioners from their respective services, an approval thereof by the appellate authority is violative of Clause-1 of Article 311 since Superintendent of Police, Aizawl was not the appointing authority of the writ petitioners as per facts and documents annexed. We have already came to finding that due to "remuster" under the Police Act and conversion into a uniformed cadre of the writ petitioners by the orders of the Inspector General of Police, Aizawl, the affect of initial appointment of the writ petitioners as LDC made by Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police would have no overriding effect of the orders passed by the Inspector General of Police (Annexures-2 and 1 order dated 3.9.1982) and in that view of the matter Superintendent of Police cannot entertain jurisdiction in the removal of writ petitioners from their service. Argument put forward by Mr. N. Sailo, learned Addl. Advocate General failed to inspire this Court that the Superintendent of Police, Aizawl was the appropriate authority for awarding such punishment (punishment of removal from service). 39. Learned Counsel for the writ petitioner in support of the contention in regard to violation of Article311(1) of the Constitution relied in a decision in the case between Shri Gogendra Chandra Bora v. State of Assam represented by Home Secretary, Govt. of Assam and Ors. reported in 1987(2) GLR 183 wherein inpara-5 of the judgment Hon'ble Gauhati High Court held as under : 5. To save this situation Shri Das has referred us to Rule 66(1) finding place in the Assam Police Manual Part-III which has started that the appointment of the police officers mentioned in column 1 of the schedule shall be made by the authorities mentioned in column 2. A reference to the schedule shows that in so far as Sub-Inspector of Police is concerned the Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority. A reference to the schedule shows that in so far as Sub-Inspector of Police is concerned the Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority. To counter this submission Shri Bhatta-charjee has drawn our attention to Rule 37 which deals with promotion of Non-Gazatted Officers. Sub-rule (c) of this rule read as follows : Officiating promotions to fill temporary vacancies in the rank of Sub-Inspectors caused by leave deputation of reduction of six months duration or less will be made by Superintendents of Police by the promotion of Assistant Sub-Inspectors or Head Constables. Temporary vacancies of over six months will be filled up by the Inspector General. The date from which such promotions will take effect will be decided by the Inspector General or Superintendent of Police as the case may be. As such we find that Rule 37 of the rule dealing with promotion whereas Rule 66(1) deals with the appointment. The submission of Shri Bhattacharjee is that the petitioner's case being that of promotion it is covered by Rule 37(c) and not Rule 66(1), A perusal of Annexure-C quoted above shows that the petitioner came to be promoted temporarily to officiate in the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police, and that had been done on the strength of the order passed by the Inspector General of Police, Assam. We, therefore, think that the case falls within the second part of Rule 37(c) and that for this purpose Rule 66(1) may not be relevant. In any case, the constitutional requirement being that a person covered by Article 311(1) shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed there was violation of this provision in the present case inasmuch as the petitioner had come to be promoted temporarily to officiate in the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police following an order passed by the Inspector General of Police and as such he could not have been dismissed by the Superintendent of Police who is far below the rank of the Inspector General of Police. There was thus clear violation of Article 311(1) of the Constitution. The order of dismissal has, therefore, to be regarded as being without jurisdiction, void and inoperative because of what has been stated in para 14 of Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirja KasimAli Beg (1977) ILLJ 262 SC. There was thus clear violation of Article 311(1) of the Constitution. The order of dismissal has, therefore, to be regarded as being without jurisdiction, void and inoperative because of what has been stated in para 14 of Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirja KasimAli Beg (1977) ILLJ 262 SC. Having come to the conclusion, it is necessary to decide as to whether the case was covered by Clauses (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) to allow dismissal without holding any enquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. We only put on record that according to Shri Bhattacharjee Clause (b) had no operation in the present case because the reasons recorded by the Superintendent of Police in this connection cannot be said to be relevant or germane. 40. Though the appellants were found guilty under the charges levelled against them by the Inquiry Officer for misconducting themselves in misappropriating money under the head Salary, the punishment of removal made by Superintendent of Police, Aizawl, one of the respondents vide his order are found violative of Article 311(1) of the Constitution, he being not the appointing authority of the writ petitioners. 41. Orders of removal are, therefore, set aside and quashed. The respondent authorities are, therefore, directed to reinstate the writ petitioners to their respective post with all benefits as per rule from the date of removal minus the benefits already obtained by the writ petitioners. 42. However, it would be open for the respondent authorities, if so advised to start denovo departmental proceeding against the writ petitioners in view of the alleged misappropriation of money under the "salary head". 43. These writ petitions are accordingly disposed of. 44. There is no order as to cost.