ORDER D.G.R. Patnaik, J. 1. Both these cases are disposed of by this common order, since they involve common issues. In these writ applications the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order (Annexure-1) passed by the Commissioner, Santhal Pargana Division, Dumka, (respondent No. 2) in Revenue Misc. Revision No. 130 of 1985-86, whereby the earlier order dated 18.4.1985 (Annexure-2) of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dumka (respondent No. 3), passed in Revenue Misc. Appeal No. 338 of 1979-80 and the order dated 13.1.1979 (Annexure-3) of the Sub-Divisional Officer (respondent No. 4), passed in R.E. Case No. 93 of 1977-78, whereby rejecting the petitioner's claim of title to the lands in question by way of inheritance, were confirmed. 2. The main question in these writ applications, is "whether the respondent authorities had jurisdiction under the San thal Parganas Tenancy Act to adjudicate upon the title of the petitioner over the lands in question?" C.W.J.C. No. 12032 of 1995 (P) 3. The facts of the case in this writ application in brief are that the lands under reference in this case were originally recorded in the name of one Suchita Mandlain under Jamahandi No. 51. She died issueless on 9.4.1976. Her husband had pre-deceased her. The lands in question were inherited by her from her husband. The petitioner happens to be the nephew of the lady, being the son of the lady's brother. The petitioner's father, Yogendra Mandal had come in possession of the lands and was using the same for agricultural purposes. While this was so a proceeding was initiated by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dumka vide R.E. Case No. 93 of 1977-78 under Section 42 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy Act, for eviction of the petitioner and 46 others from the lands which were in their respective possession. In response to the notices, the petitioner had appeared in the proceeding asserting his claim of title over the lands on the ground that he had inherited the same from the recorded tenant Suchlta Mandlain. The petitioner's prayer was rejected by the Sub-Divisional Officer on the ground that he did not fall in the category of heirs of the deceased-tenant under the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. Against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, dated 13.7.1989, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Additional Deputy Commissioner Dumka (respondent No. 3) vide Revenue Misc. Appeal No. 338 of 1979-80. Against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, dated 13.7.1989, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Additional Deputy Commissioner Dumka (respondent No. 3) vide Revenue Misc. Appeal No. 338 of 1979-80. The petitioner's claim was rejected and the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dumka was confirmed. Against the order of the appellate Court the petitioner had preferred a Revision before the Commissioner but here also, the petitioner could not succeed. C.W.J.C. No. 12033 of 1995 (P) 4. In this writ application, the facts of the case is that a proceeding was initiated by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dumka on the basis of an application filed by as many as 12 persons, who were residents of the Village-Ortara seeking praye for declaring the lands of Jamabandi No. 59 of Village-Ortara, as "Fouti" lands. Petitioner was one of the objectors in the proceedings. 5. Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would argue that according to the admitted facts, the deceased-lady had died intestate. Though the lands were originally held by her husband and she had inherited the same from her husband but she had died issueless and there was no other class I heir from the side of the husband and in absence of any other heir, enumerated under Section 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, the property had devolved upon the petitioner who admittedly happens to be the son of the brother of the recorded tenant. The petitioner had put forward his claim of title over the lands on the basis of inheritance which was lawful and legally valid but the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Dumka (respondent No. 3) had illegally refused to accept the claim and instead had proceeded to decide the issue of title, which was an issue beyond his jurisdiction. Learned counsel argues further that it was only the civil Court which was competent to decide on the issue of title and it was not within the competence of the Revenue Courts, to decide on the same. Learned counsel explains further that a notification was issued in the year 1978, whereby certain areas within Santhal Parganas including the district of Dumka was under revislonal survey operations and during the period of such survey operations, the power was vested with the settlement authorities to decide the issue of title. Learned counsel explains further that a notification was issued in the year 1978, whereby certain areas within Santhal Parganas including the district of Dumka was under revislonal survey operations and during the period of such survey operations, the power was vested with the settlement authorities to decide the issue of title. Learned counsel explains further that in the present case, the Sub-Divisional officer, respondent No. 3, was not called upon to act or function as a Settlement Officer. Rather a swo motu proceeding was initiated by the Sub-Divisional Officer for eviction of the persons, who are found in possession of the lands and in the process, had passed the adverse impugned order against the petitioner deciding upon the petitioner's right of title. Referring to Section 42 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy Act, learned Counsel would explain that though under Section 42 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy Act, the Deputy Commissioner has the authority to eject persons, who are found in unauthorized occupation of agricultural lands but the provision would not apply in the case of the petitioner, who had lawfully inherited the agricultural lands from the deceased tenant and, therefore, the proceeding for ejectment of the petitioner is totally without basis and illegal and the impugned orders, do therefore, suffer from the vice of illegality. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand would merely refer to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent No. 4. The contention of the respondents in the counter affidavit is that the deceased-tenant happens to be the paternal aunt of the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner is not an agnate and hence under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, the petitioner cannot inherit the property of the deceased-tenant. 7. It has not been explained by the respondents as to whether the proceedings for ejectment of the petitioner from the lands was initiated on the basis of any complaint or information that the petitioner had illegally encroached upon the agricultural lands or that he had come into possession of the lands by way of reclaiming the same. The fact, therefore, remains that the petitioner was found in possession of the agricultural lands and in order to assert his right, the petitioner had advanced his claim that he had inherited the property from the deceased tenants. 8. The fact, therefore, remains that the petitioner was found in possession of the agricultural lands and in order to assert his right, the petitioner had advanced his claim that he had inherited the property from the deceased tenants. 8. The learned Sub-Divisional Officer, appears to have made a gross mis-interpretation of the Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act by giving a meaning to it in a manner as to totally eliminate the petitioner from the line of succession. 9. It is not disputed that the petitioner happens to be the son of the brother of the recorded tenant. In the case of State of Punjab v. Balwant Singh reported in AIR 1991 SC 2301 the Supreme Court while interpreting the scope of the provisions of Section 15(2) and Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act has explained that the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act, does not alienate the line of succession to the other class of heirs totally and has observed as follows: 7. Sub-section (1) of Section 15 groups the heirs of a female intestate into Jive categories and they are specified under clauses (a) to (e). As per Section 16 Rule 1 those in one clause shall be preferred to those in the succeeding clauses and those included in the same clause shall take simultaneously. Sub-section (2) of Section 15 begins with a non obstante clause providing that the order of succession is not that prescribed under Sub-section (1) of Section 15. It carves out two exceptions to the general order of succession provided under Sub-section (1). The first exception relates to the property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother. That property shall devolve in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of the pre-deceased son or daughter), not upon the other heirs referred to in Sub-section (1) in the order specified therein but upon the heirs of the father. The second exception is in relation to the property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father-in-law. That property shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of the pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to under Sub-section (1) in the order specified thereunder but upon the heirs of the husband. 14. Section 29. That property shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of the pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to under Sub-section (1) in the order specified thereunder but upon the heirs of the husband. 14. Section 29. in our opinion shall not operate in favour of the State if there is any other heir of the intestate. Indeed, Section 29 itself indicates that there must be failure of heirs. 'Failure' of heirs means the total absence of heirs to the intestate. It is important to remember that female Hindu being the full owner of the property becomes a fresh stock of descent. If she leaves behind any heir either under Sub-section (1) or under Sub-section (2) of Section 15, her property cannot be escheated. 15. Sub-section (2) of Section 15, in our opinion was intended only to change the order of succession specified under Sub-section (1) and not to eliminate the order classes of heirs. 10. It cannot, therefore, be said that the petitioner had advanced a false or frivolous claim of title over the property. In any event, in view of the claim of title advanced by the petitioner to the lands and in absence of any evidence that the petitioner had trespassed over the lands or that he had reclaimed the Government abandoned lands and had come in possession of the same, the learned Sub-Divisional Officer ought to have referred the dispute of title for adjudication to the competent Court and could not have decided the issue on his own. 11. The impugned order (Annexure-3) of the learned Sub- Divisional Officer, Dumka passed in both the cases, namely, R.E. Case No. 93 of 1977-78 and in S.F. Case No. 171 of 1980-81, therefore, wholly illegal and without authority. For the same reasons, the impugned orders of the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Annexure-2) and that of the Commissioner (Annexure-1) are without basis and passed without application of appropriate judicial mind to the facts and circumstances involved in the case, which essentially relates to the question of jurisdiction. 12. In the facts and circumstances, involved in the present cases, I find merit in these applications. Accordingly, both these applications are allowed. 12. In the facts and circumstances, involved in the present cases, I find merit in these applications. Accordingly, both these applications are allowed. The impugned orders (Annexure-3) of the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Dumka and that of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dumka (Annexure-2) and that also of the Commissioner, Dumka (Annexure-1) are hereby quashed. 13. However, there will be no order as to costs. Application allowed.