JUDGMENT: On 31.5.2006 the second appeal was admitted on the strength of the substantial questions of law raised in ground No.2 (a) and (b) which read as hereunder: (a) Whether the civil court has got jurisdiction to try the suit filed by the respondent for eviction from the plaint schedule property in which admittedly a structure was existing at the time of leasing out the premises and the rent payable is Respondents.1,000/- per month? (b) Whether the jurisdiction of the civil court is not excluded in respect of the premises fetching a rent not exceeding Respondents.1,000/- situated in Nellore Municipality under the provisions of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960? 2. S.A.M.P.No.1932 of 2007 is filed by the appellant under Section 148 read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, praying for enlargement of time for depositing rents as directed in S.A.M.P.No.1268 of 2006 in S.A.No.537 of 2006, dated 31.5.2006, as made absolute in S.A.M.P.No.806 of 2007, dated 19.4.2007, by condoning delay in depositing the rents from October 2006 to May 2007 and pass such other suitable orders. 3. Several facts had been narrated in the affidavit filed in support of the application. It is stated that the appellant came to know that the respondent filed E.P.No.300 of 2007 for executing the decree in O.S.No.493 of 1999 and the executing court straight away ordered delivery on 05.4.2007 and when the court Amin sought to execute the order, the appellant informed him about the interim stay granted by this Court. It is stated that the appellant came to know that the respondent filed S.A.M.P.No.806 of 2007 for vacating the stay and the matter came up for hearing on 19.4.2007 and the appellant came to know that his counsel addressed a letter about the filing of vacate stay application and for the reasons best known the letter did not reach him. Under such circumstances, since the appellant came to know that the stay was made absolute on the condition of appellant depositing rents regularly with a default clause, the appellant was advised to file the application for enlargement of time. Under such circumstances, since the appellant came to know that the stay was made absolute on the condition of appellant depositing rents regularly with a default clause, the appellant was advised to file the application for enlargement of time. When this application was taken up for hearing, the counsel on recorded advanced elaborate submissions and made a request to dispose of the second appeal itself and, thus, inasmuch as the second appeal itself is taken up for final hearing and the same is being disposed of finally, no further orders need be passed on the present S.A.M.P.No.1932 of 2007 and accordingly the same is hereby closed. 4. Sri P. Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel representing the appellant had taken this Court through the oral and documentary evidence available on record and the findings recorded by both the court of first instance and also the appellate court and would maintain that even in the light of certain admissions made by P.W.1 it is clear that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature, since such jurisdiction of civil court is clearly excluded by the provisions of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The learned counsel had pointed to the relevant findings recorded by both the court of first instance and also the appellate court and would maintain that the decision relied upon in Nandam Mohanamma and others V. Markonda Narasimha Rao and another1 is distinguishable on facts and, hence, the second appeal to be allowed. 5. On the contrary, Sri M. Ravindra, representing Sri M. Venkata Narayana, the counsel for respondent would maintain that the appellant-defendant herein clearly admitted the lease for the vacant site in the written statement and also in the reply notice, in the evidence as well and, hence, it would be futile to contend that there had been certain superstructures on the land and, hence, the provisions of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960, would be applicable to the case on hand. The learned counsel also pointed out to the relevant portions of the evidence of D.W.1 and also the specific plea taken in the written statement. 6. Heard the counsel on record. 7. The substantial questions of law on the strength of which the second appeal had been admitted already had been specified supra. 8. The learned counsel also pointed out to the relevant portions of the evidence of D.W.1 and also the specific plea taken in the written statement. 6. Heard the counsel on record. 7. The substantial questions of law on the strength of which the second appeal had been admitted already had been specified supra. 8. For the purpose of convenience, the parties hereinafter would be referred to as plaintiff and defendant as shown in O.S.No.493 of 1999 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Nellore. 9. The suit was filed for eviction from the plaint schedule vacant site and for other ancillary reliefs. It was pleaded in the plaint that the property specified in the plaint schedule, which was a vacant site, originally belonged to Sowdagar Abdullah Khan, father of the plaintiff, and the said Abdullah Khan executed a registered settlement deed dated 22.4.1986 settling the schedule mentioned property in favour of the plaintiff. The said vacant site was leased out to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs.1,000/- for the purpose of Kata business. Subsequently, a lease agreement was also executed between the plaintiff and defendant on 17.9.1996 to be in force for a period of eight months i.e., from 01.8.1996 and the said period expired by 31.3.1997. As per the recitals of the lease agreement dated 17.9.1996, the plaintiff had been demanding the defendant to vacate the schedule mentioned site, as the same was required by him for construction of a house therein. But, at the request of the defendant, the time for vacating the site was extended and another lease deed was executed between the plaintiff and the defendant on 18.10.1997 for a further lease period from 31.3.1997 to 30.3.1999. But, even after the expiry of the said lease period, the defendant failed to vacate the site as agreed. As per the lease deed dated 18.10.1997 the defendant undertook to fill up the pit dug for Kata at the time of handing over the site. It is also averred that the plaintiff was residing in a rented house at Chennai and he wants to shift his residence to Nellore. The plaintiff had no other site or house at Nellore, except the plaint schedule site. Hence, he wants the suit schedule site for construction of a house. It is also averred that the plaintiff was residing in a rented house at Chennai and he wants to shift his residence to Nellore. The plaintiff had no other site or house at Nellore, except the plaint schedule site. Hence, he wants the suit schedule site for construction of a house. The plaintiff sent a registered notice on 21.4.1999 calling upon the defendant to vacate the suit site as required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by 31.5.1999. The defendant gave a reply with false allegations. Hence, the suit. 10. The appellant herein, defendant in the suit, filed written statement pleading that this defendant is not aware that the property mentioned in the plaint schedule originally belonged to Sowdagar Abdullah Khan, father of plaintiff. Defendant was also not aware that said Abdullah Khan executed a registered settlement deed, dated 22.4.1986, settling the plaint schedule mentioned site in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant also was not aware that plaintiff had become absolute owner of plaint schedule site. It is also stated that it should be ascertained on ground after survey and measurement as to whether the plaint schedule property was part of PWD channel poramboke. It was admitted that the plaint schedule vacant site was leased out to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs.2,000/- by plaintiff for the purpose of running a weighbridge and it was periodically extended till 30.3.1999 as claimed by the plaintiff. There was also earlier lease agreement dated 13.2.1995 between the plaintiff and the defendant showing the existence of one ankanam AC sheet roofed room for office purpose of the business constructed by Boddu Krishnareddi, the erstwhile tenant of plaintiff on behalf of the defendant. The defendant never promised to plaintiff to vacate the plaint schedule site by 30-3-1999, as the weighing machine fixed underground was valued Rs.1.00 lakh, besides installation charges of Rs.25,000/-. The said Boddu Krishnareddi purchased the machine under sale agreement dated 11.10.1979 for a valuable consideration of Rs.30,000/- from Yousuf Sait. There was no necessity for the plaintiff to construct a house in the plaint schedule site for residential purpose. The defendant had been regularly paying monthly rent to the plaintiff. After expiry of the lease on 30.3.1999, the plaintiff agreed to extend the lease for a further period of five years on the same monthly rent of Rs.1,000/-. There was no necessity for the plaintiff to construct a house in the plaint schedule site for residential purpose. The defendant had been regularly paying monthly rent to the plaintiff. After expiry of the lease on 30.3.1999, the plaintiff agreed to extend the lease for a further period of five years on the same monthly rent of Rs.1,000/-. The defendant had been paying electricity consumption charges relating to plaint schedule site i.e., for HSC No.6926 in a sum of Rs.400/- to Rs.500/- average. It is also stated that the civil court had no jurisdiction and the plaintiff had to file the application under Rent Control Act, since the schedule property was not vacant and there was a structure. 11. On the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties, the court of first instance settled the following issues. (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to vacant possession of plaint schedule property? (2) To what relief? 12. On behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.A-1 to A-10 had been relied on. Likewise, on behalf of the appellant-defendant D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-5 had been relied upon. 13. On appreciation of evidence, the court of first instance came to the conclusion that what had been let out was only a vacant site by virtue of lease deed and, hence, the suit was perfectly maintainable and accordingly decreed the suit with costs. Aggrieved by the same, the matter was carried by way of appeal A.S.No.88 of 2003 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Nellore, and the appellate court at para 6 formulated the following points for consideration. (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession of the suit schedule property? (2) Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction for the reasons mentioned by the defendant? (3) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the learned Junior Civil Judge is legal and sustainable? (4) To what relief? 14. The appellate court, at paras 7 and 8, recorded reasons in detail, referred to the decision in Nandam Mohanamma and others V. Markonda Narasimha Rao and another? (3) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the learned Junior Civil Judge is legal and sustainable? (4) To what relief? 14. The appellate court, at paras 7 and 8, recorded reasons in detail, referred to the decision in Nandam Mohanamma and others V. Markonda Narasimha Rao and another? (supra) and also relied upon specific admissions made by the defendant in the written statement to the effect that what had been leased out is only vacant site and, hence, the appellant cannot be allowed to contend that the provisions of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960, would be applicable and accordingly dismissed the appeal with costs. Aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal had been preferred. 15. The respondent, as plaintiff-landlord, filed the suit for eviction as against the appellant-defendant-tenant. Both the court of first instance and also the appellate court, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, came to the conclusion that what had been leased out is only a vacant site and, hence, the suit for eviction before civil court is perfectly maintainable. This is the only point which had been argued in elaboration. 16. The relevant portion of the written statement filed by the appellant-defendant reads as hereunder. "It is true that the plaint schedule vacant site was leased out to defendant on a monthly rent of Respondents.2,000/- by plaintiff for the purpose of the business of running a weigh bridge. It is also true that subsequently a lease agreement was executed between defendant and plaintiff on 17.9.1996 for a period of 8 months from 01.8.1996 onwards incorporating various terms and conditions, which are not referred to in full disclosure in the legal notice dated 21.4.1999 issued on behalf of plaintiff to defendant." No doubt, specific stand had been taken that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In the evidence of P.W.1, no doubt in chief-examination, this witness deposed that the defendant is running a weighbridge in the suit property and on the strength of this evidence elaborate submissions had been made that inasmuch as an admission was made even by P.W.1, the same cannot be ignored though the documents may speak otherwise. 17. In the evidence of P.W.1, no doubt in chief-examination, this witness deposed that the defendant is running a weighbridge in the suit property and on the strength of this evidence elaborate submissions had been made that inasmuch as an admission was made even by P.W.1, the same cannot be ignored though the documents may speak otherwise. 17. Here is a case where appellant-defendant had been taken a specific plea in the written statement which had been already specified above and in cross-examination D.W.1 deposed that it is true it was recited in the lease deed about the issuance of lawyer's notice to him by the plaintiff requiring him to vacate the vacant site and it is true that Ex.A4 was executed between him and the plaintiff and it is also true as per Ex.A-4 he agreed that he would vacate the premises on 30.3.1999. As per Ex.A-4 he did not vacate the premises as agreed by him. It is true that he agreed as per lease deed Ex.A-4 to fill up the pit dug for Kata business in the suit site at the time of vacating and delivering the same to the plaintiff. It is true that it is recited in the schedule of Ex.A-4 that the suit schedule site was a vacant site. Further, in cross-examination this witness deposed it is true that Ex.A-4 recitals are correct. It is true as per Ex.A-4 he had taken lease of the vacant site. These are the admissions made by D.W.1 in the written statement and also in his evidence. 18. Further strong reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Nandam Mohanamma and others V. Markonda Narasimha Rao and another (1 supra) wherein the learned Judge of this Court at paras 13, 14 and 23 observed as hereunder. "It needs to be observed that the lease in favour of Hemasundara Rao, was granted under Ex.A-1, on 15.11.1968. A perusal of the same discloses that an open land, described in the suit schedule, was given on lease, for a monthly rent of Respondents.75/-. There is a recital in Ex.A-1, to the effect that it shall be open to the lessee, to put up a shed, at his own cost, to do his business. He was put under the obligation to remove the same, while vacating the premises. There is a recital in Ex.A-1, to the effect that it shall be open to the lessee, to put up a shed, at his own cost, to do his business. He was put under the obligation to remove the same, while vacating the premises. Through out the document, the property is referred to as open land, even in the context of liability to pay municipal tax. The lease was to be in force, for a period of ten years. Ex.A-2 is dated 23.6.1978, in between Hemasundara Rao and the second respondent. Reference is made to the lease under Ex.A-1. It makes little difference whether Ex.A-2 constituted a fresh lease, or renewal of the one under Ex.A-1. The fact, however, remains that it is in continuation of Ex.A-1, and here again, the property was referred to as open land. The rent was enhanced to Respondents.175/- per month, and it was to be in force, for a period of ten years. The obligation of the lessee to remove the shed was reiterated in Ex.A-2. Two subsidiary questions arise in this regard, viz; (a) whether it is permissible for the appellants to lead any oral evidence, touching on the terms of Exs.A-1 and A-2? And (b) whether the provisions of the Act have the effect of annulling the terms of contract? When Exs.A-1 and A-2 are clear to the effect that it was only the vacant land that was leased, there is no way the transaction attracts to the provisions of the Act. The improvised shed referred to in the plaint, as well as in the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, is nothing but the one raised by Hemasundara Rao, on the strength of the clause contained in Ex.A-1, and he undertook to remove it, on his own, at the time of vacating the leased land. Once it had emerged that it was only a land, at the commencement of the lease, the fact that the lessee had put up a shed, that too, with the specific understanding that it does not alter the nature of the subject-matter; the relations between the parties do not get altered. If the contention of the appellants is to be accepted, the easiest thing for the lessee of a land, to perpetuate his possession, on it, would be, to put a shed on his own accord and claim the benefit under the Act. If the contention of the appellants is to be accepted, the easiest thing for the lessee of a land, to perpetuate his possession, on it, would be, to put a shed on his own accord and claim the benefit under the Act. That was never the object or intention, under the Act, and the submission of the appellants, in this regard, cannot be accepted." 19. Whether what had been leased out originally was only a vacant site or along with certain superstructures? so as to decide the question whether a civil suit is maintainable or not, this is predominantly a question of fact to be decided on the strength of oral evidence and also the documentary evidence available on record. Both the courts recorded concurrent findings to the effect that a civil suit is perfectly maintainable, since what had been leased out was only a vacant site. In the light of the concurrent findings recorded by both the court of first instance and also the appellate court, it being a finding of fact, this Court is not inclined to disturb such findings. 20. Accordingly, the second appeal shall stand dismissed with costs.