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2008 DIGILAW 5 (AP)

Lanjapalli Venkanna v. State of Andhara Pradesh

2008-01-08

B.PRAKASH RAO, L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2008
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J :- Accused No.1 in Sessions Case No.122 of2002 on the file of the learned II Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Khammam, is the appellant. He along with his mother A2 were tried for the offences under Sections 498-A and 302 read with Section 34 IPC i.e. harassing wife of the appellant, by name Ramana for dowry and murdering her by pouring kerosene. Through its judgment, dated 17.9.2004, the trial Court acquitted A2 and convicted the appellant herein, for the offences under Sections 498-A and 302 IPC. It sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life, and to pay a fine of Rs.100/- for the offence under Section 302 IPC. Sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year, and fine of Rs.100/- was imposed for the offence under Section 498-A IPC. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. This appeal is filed against the same. 2. The appellant was married to the deceased Ramana, in or about 1998. The said lady was admitted into the Government Hospital, Khammam, on 11.7.2001 with bum injuries. On receiving information about the same, P.W.B, the Head Constable of Khammam Rural Police Station, went to the hospital, and recorded statement of the patient, marked as Ex.P.10. She stated that her husband, the appellant, and mother-in-law were harassing her in the past and that on 11.7.2001 at 4 p.m. both of them poured kerosene and set her on fire. 3. P.W.13 informed the same to his superior officials and simultaneously gave a requisition to the local Magistrate, P.W.18 to record the statement. The statement of Ramana was recorded by P.W.18, after P.W.l9, the doctor, certified that the patient is in a proper and fit condition to give statement. The same was marked as EX.P.l6. First Information Report was registered. 4. While undergoing treatment for bum injuries, Ramana died on 25.7.2001. Immediately, thereafter, the police arrested the appellant and his mother, and the provision in the FIR was altered, and offences under Sections 498-A and 302 IPC were alleged. Necessary charges were framed by the trial Court, and the appellant pleaded not guilty. The trial Court found that the appellant is guilty of the offences under Sections 498-A and 302 IPC, and accordingly convicted and sentenced him. 5. Necessary charges were framed by the trial Court, and the appellant pleaded not guilty. The trial Court found that the appellant is guilty of the offences under Sections 498-A and 302 IPC, and accordingly convicted and sentenced him. 5. Sri Prabhakar Peri, learned Counsel for the appellant, submits that there is no reliable evidence, to support the version of the prosecution and that the trial Court had based its conc1usiom only on the dying declaration of the deceased, marked as Ex.P.l6. He submit that the two witnesses, who were said to have seen the deceased, immediately after occurrence, viz., P.Ws.3 and 4, have been declared hostile, and there was no evidence on record as to the reliability and credibility of the dying declaration of the deceased. Learned Counsel further submits that there are several improbabilities and contradictories in EX.P.16 and it is not at all safe to base the conviction of the appellant on it. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Sonapur Tea Co. Ltd. and Mst. Mazirunnessa v. Deputy Commissioner and Collector of Kamrup and others, AIR 1962 SC 137 and State of Gujarat v. Mohan Bhai Raghbhai Patel and another, 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 87. 6. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submits that the dying declaration, Ex.P.16, is so clear and perfect in its content and form, that it hardly leaves any doubt as to its credibility. He contends that being the husband of the deceased, the appellant did not state the circumstances, under which the bum injuries occurred to the deceased and on the other hand, a weak attempt was made by him by pleading alibi. He submits that EX.P.16 completely accords with the requirements prescribed by law for dying declaration. He further submits that Ex.P.10, the earliest statement, recorded by P.W.13 from the deceased, corroborates Ex.P .16. 7. On its part, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 19 and marked Exs.P.1 to P.18. P.Ws.1 and 2 are the parents of the deceased. Their evidence is not of much use, except to suggest the absence of cordial relationship between the appellant and his wife, the deceased. P.Ws.3 and 4, who are said to have come to the house of the deceased on hearing the screams, have turned hostile. The other witnesses mostly relate to the procedural aspects. Their evidence is not of much use, except to suggest the absence of cordial relationship between the appellant and his wife, the deceased. P.Ws.3 and 4, who are said to have come to the house of the deceased on hearing the screams, have turned hostile. The other witnesses mostly relate to the procedural aspects. Important among them is Constable, who, on receiving information, recorded the statement, marked as Ex.P.10, and issued a requisition, Ex.P.15, to P.W.18 to record the dying declaration. The case was handled by various police officials, at different stages. Their evidence is not of much significance. P.W.18 is the Judicial Magistrate, who recorded dying declaration, EX.PI6 and P.W.19 is the doctor, who certified the condition of the deceased at the time of recording the dying declaration. 8. It is no doubt true that the two witnesses, who have witnessed the occurrence soon after it took place viz., P.Ws.3 and 4, have been declared hostile. It is also true that the Courts must be cautious while arriving at their conclusions on mere dying declarations. At the same time, if a dying declaration accords with the requirements of law, gains confidence of the Court, and is supported by other circumstantial evidence, there should not be much of the difficulty, in arriving at the necessary conclusions based upon it. The discussion undertaken by the Supreme Court, in its recent judgment in Vithal v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 1 SCC (Cri.) 91, analysed the law, in this regard. 9. In the instant case, the relationship of the parties is not in dispute. The incident occurred at 4 p.m. and immediately the deceased was shifted to hospital. By that time, no complaint was submitted either by the appellant, or by any other person.P.W.13 rushed to the hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased, which was marked as Ex.P.10. The same was treated as a complaint and further steps were taken. The statement reads as under: "My native village is Kothagudem. About 3 years ago my father and mother performed my marriage with one Lanjapally Venkanna of Gollapadu Village. We begot with a female child. My husband even for a petty matter used to quarrel with me and suspecting me. 2 days prior to this day my husband went to her mother and told that I was not served food to him. On that they abused and beat me. We begot with a female child. My husband even for a petty matter used to quarrel with me and suspecting me. 2 days prior to this day my husband went to her mother and told that I was not served food to him. On that they abused and beat me. Today evening my husband asked me to put water for his bath as I did not do so. Then my husband and my mother-in-law Atchamma this bitch is not heading our words and saying so at about 4.00 p.m. poured kerosene on my body and lit fire to me. With the burns I made hue and cry on that my neighbours Ponnekanti Sangamma, Velturn Sangamaiah and my husband took me in an auto and brought me to Government Hospital, Kharnmarn." Having recorded the statement, he immediately gave a requisition, Ex.P.15, to P.W.18. After receiving the requisition, P.W.18 visited the hospital. With a view to ascertain whether the deceased was in a condition to give the statement, he requested P.W.19, the doctor, to certify the same. Later, P.W.19 examined the patient and verified the asesheet and found her to be in a fit condition to give statement. Thereafter, P.W.18 proceeded and recorded the statement, Ex.P.16, after introducing himself as Magistrate. The statement reads as under: "Today my husband abused me as I have not put water to his mother for bath. Today i.e. on 11.7.2001, Wednesday, beat me with hands. My marriage was performed 3 years ago. Since then I was suffered in their hands. My mother-in-law Atchamma, my husband used to suspect me. They did not permit me to talk with anybody. If I talk with any person they used to beat me by asking what they were saying. Since the marriage this was happening. Today i.e. on 11.7.2001, Wednesday, my mother-in-law Atchamma, my husband Venkanna at about 4.00 p.m. poured kerosene on me. Both together lit fire to me. By making hue and cry I came out of the house. Neighbours came these. Sangamma brought me in an auto my husband also accompanied. " 10. No irregularity is pointed out, as to the process, in which Ex.P.16 was recorded. P.Ws.18 and 19 have vouched for the various steps taken by them, in the process of recording. Therefore, what remains is to be verified is the truthful nature, and acceptability of the statement made by the deceased. 11. " 10. No irregularity is pointed out, as to the process, in which Ex.P.16 was recorded. P.Ws.18 and 19 have vouched for the various steps taken by them, in the process of recording. Therefore, what remains is to be verified is the truthful nature, and acceptability of the statement made by the deceased. 11. On comparison of Exs.P.10 and P.16, it emerges that hardly there exist any discrepancies, much less contradictions between them. The deceased was clear and categorical to the effect that her husband and mother-in-law poured kerosene and set her on fire. The medical evidence, in the case, in the form of Ex.P.14, clearly supports the contents of Exs.P.10 and P.16. The doctor opined that the death occurred, on account of 85% of burn injuries. The deceased struggled almost for two weeks for life. Therefore, the dying declaration, which is in conformity with the medical evidence, is sufficient to sustain the conviction against the appellant. 12. There is one strong and additional circumstance, which militates against the appellant. Whatever may be the right of silence, which the accused may exercise, when the allegation made against him, is commission of a crime against a stranger, different considerations would arise in the matters of this nature, where neither the relationship nor the occurrence are in doubt. The deceased categorically stated that not only the appellant and his mother poured kerosene and set her on fire, but also the appellant had shifted her to hospital. There is hardly any doubt that the appellant was very much in the house, when the incident took place. Therefore, he owed an explanation atleast in the form of his response to the questions under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as to what exactly had happened. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, in cases of this nature, failure on the part of the accused to offer explanation, during the course of examination, under Section 313 Cr.P.C., would lead to its own consequences. It is apt to refer the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Amit Alias Ammu v. State of Maharashtra, 2003 (2) ALD (Crl.) 806 (SC) = (2003) 8 SCC 93 = 2003 AIR SCW 3980. It is apt to refer the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Amit Alias Ammu v. State of Maharashtra, 2003 (2) ALD (Crl.) 806 (SC) = (2003) 8 SCC 93 = 2003 AIR SCW 3980. The relevant portion reads as under: "The present is a case to which the observation as aforesaid and the principle laid squarely applies and the circumstances of the case cast a heavy responsibility on the appellant to explain and in absence thereof, suffer the conviction. Those circumstances have already been noticed. In which case such an irresistible conclusion a can be reached will depend on the facts of each case. Here it has been established that the death took place on 28th March a between 3 and 4 p.m It is just about that much time that the appellant and the deceased were last seen by P.W.1 and P.W.11. No explanation has been offered in the statement by the appellant recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. His defence is of complete denial. In our view, the conviction for offence under Sections 302 and 376 has been rightly recorded by the Court of 1 Sessions and affirmed by the High Court." 14. Similarly, in Ram Briksh Singh and others v. Ambika Yadav and another, 2004 SCC (Crl.) 2009 = 2004 AILD 429 (SC), the Supreme Court held that failure to offer explanation in respect of aspects exclusively within the knowledge of accused, is an important link, which completes the chain of circumstances. Reliance was placed upon its own judgment in Ram Gulam Choudhary v. State of Bihar, 2002 (l) ALD (Crl.) 43 (SC) = (2001) 8 SCC 311 = 2001 SCC (Crl.) 1546. 15. Being the husband of the deceased, the appellant owed an explanation as to the circumstances that led to the deceased to bum injuries. The case of the prosecution that he fled away from the scene of offence is one aspect, which needs to be taken into account. Even if there is any doubt about it, the vain attempt made by the appellant in the form of suggestion to P.W.1 that the appellant and his mother were at different places, when the incident occurred, suggests the lack of truth, and his doubtful conduct. 16. Even if there is any doubt about it, the vain attempt made by the appellant in the form of suggestion to P.W.1 that the appellant and his mother were at different places, when the incident occurred, suggests the lack of truth, and his doubtful conduct. 16. Learned Counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that when even according to the deceased, the appellant accompanied her to hospital, the theory of the prosecution that the appellant fled away cannot be accepted. However, he is unable to explain the suggestion put on behalf of his client to P.W.1 that he was at a different place. Another suggestion was about the injuries being the result of fall of hot water on the deceased. 17. Therefore, from the above, it becomes clear that apart from not offering a valid and proper explanation for the injuries received by the deceased, the appellant made every attempt to extricate himself, be it by suggesting alibi, or attributing injuries to some other cause. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the' cases referred to above, get squarely attracted to the facts of the case. We are of the view that the trial Court has examined the matter from the correct perspective, and its judgment does not warrant interference. 18. In the result, the criminal appeal is dismissed.