ORDER :- This civil revision petition is filed by the revision petitioner aggrieved by the order, dated 19.3.2008, made in I.A. No.25 of 2008 in I.A. No.1327 of 2006 in O.S. No.1 of 2006 on the file of the II Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. 2. It is no doubt stated that yet another application, being I.A. No.224 of 2008, was filed to condone the delay, and both the applications, I.A. Nos.224 and 225 of 2008 in I.A. No.1327 of 2006 in O.S. No.1 of 2006, had been disposed of by a common order, dated 19.3.2008, and it is stated there is connected CRP No.2152 of 2008, pending at the stage of admission. It is needless to say that the result of the said CRP would also depend on the order to be made in the present CRP. 3. Sri Suryanarayana, learned Senior Counsel representing the respondents, would maintain that inasmuch as the revision petitioner is in huge arrears and in view of the interim stay granted by this Court, the respondents-plaintiffs are put to serious loss, there is grave urgency and hence, this CRP to be disposed of. 4. However, Ms. Manjiri S. Ganu, the learned, Counsel representing the revision petitioner, submitted that inasmuch as both the CRPs., arise out of a common order, it would be just and convenient to dispose of both the CRPs., together. 5. It is needless to say that this C.R.P., had already been admitted and this matter is coming up for hearing before this Court and the other C.R.P., is at the stage of admission. Be that as it may, in the light of the submissions made by the learned Counsel on record, this Court had taken up the final hearing of this CRP and heard the learned Counsel at length. 6. Ms. Manjiri S. Ganu, the learned Counsel representing the revision petitioner, had taken this Court through the relevant clauses of the lease deed, dated 27.12.2004, and would maintain that whether the default committed would fall within the meaning of unreasonable or reasonable period may have to be decided at the appropriate stage. Even otherwise, the learned Counsel would maintain that striking off defence being an extreme step, normally not to be resorted to and the revision petitioner is prepared to comply with the condition of making deposit, if reasonable time is granted even at this stage. Even otherwise, the learned Counsel would maintain that striking off defence being an extreme step, normally not to be resorted to and the revision petitioner is prepared to comply with the condition of making deposit, if reasonable time is granted even at this stage. Further, the learned Counsel would maintain that inasmuch as still the evidence on plaintiffs' side is in progress, even if an opportunity is given to the revision petitioner permitting him to make the deposit and contest the matter, despite the fact that the order made in I.A. No.1327 of 2006 had not been questioned, no serious prejudice would be caused to the respondents-plaintiff. Further, the learned Counsel, while elaborating her submissions, would maintain that the second respondent who is said to be the purchaser came on record subsequent thereto and in fact, the first respondent had no locus to maintain the applications and this aspect also may have to be taken into consideration. The learned Counsel also would maintain that this is a matter concerned with an educational institution and in the event of the order of striking off the defence of the revision petitioner-defendant to be confirmed, the students also would be put to serious suffering. The learned Counsel, in all thoroughness, had taken this Court through the series of events and also the facts in detail. 7. Sri Suryanarayana, the learned Senior Counsel representing the respondents-plaintiffs, had taken this Court through the Order XV-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (A.P. Amendment) and would maintain that in the light of the language employed in the said order, the striking off defence on default in compliance of the order to be construed as mandatory. The learned Senior Counsel also would maintain that here is a case where the revision petitioner even as on this day had not chosen to challenge the order made in I.A. No.1327 of 2006. The learned Senior Counsel also placed the orders made by the learned II Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in I.A.No.1327 of 2006 in O.S. No.1 of 2006, dated 13.11.2006 and also 23.11.2006. The learned Senior Counsel also placed the orders made by the learned II Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in I.A.No.1327 of 2006 in O.S. No.1 of 2006, dated 13.11.2006 and also 23.11.2006. While further elaborating his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel also would maintain that on a careful comparison of the language used in the U.P Amendment i.e., sub-rule (5) added to Order XV, and in the A.P. Amendment i.e., Order XV-A, there is difference and hence, it cannot be said that even while striking off the defence on default of compliance of the directions of the Court, discretion is vested with the Court and in the light of the language employed in Order XV-A of CPC, the defence automatically to be struck off. Even otherwise, this question need not detain this Court any longer since the said order passed in I.A. No.1327 of 2006 is not challenged even as on today. But only the order made in I.A. Nos.224 and 225 of 2008 in I.A. No.1327 of 2006 in O.S. No.1 of 2006 alone had been challenged. The learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. 8. Heard the learned Counsel. 9. Several facts had been narrated in detail, apart from the grounds raised in the present civil revision petition. Equally, the second respondent filed a counter-affidavit in detail narrating several facts. Several of the facts narrated relate to the historical background of the litigation. 10. The first respondent filed a suit, being O.S. No.1 of 2006, for recovery of possession, arrears of rents and mesne profits against the revision petitioner. He had let out the plaint schedule property to the revision petitioner under a lease deed, dated 27.12.2004, for a period of five years from 25.12.2004 to be renewed at the consent of both the parties, after expiry of first five years /term, for running an educational institution. It is also stated that the first respondent had offered the premises only by completing the outer construction on all the floors without any internal construction. The revision petitioner had invested more than Rs.35 lakhs for raising internal constructions as needed by it for running an educational institution with all infrastructure. The rent of Rs.45,000/per month was agreed to be paid. The revision petitioner had invested more than Rs.35 lakhs for raising internal constructions as needed by it for running an educational institution with all infrastructure. The rent of Rs.45,000/per month was agreed to be paid. It is also the case of the revision petitioner that he paid a sum of Rs.1 ,35,000/- to the first respondent as deposit, which is adjustable in rents. Further, it is stated that as per Clause 11 of the lease deed, in the unfortunate event of the revision petitioner not paying monthly rent for any unreasonable period of time, after adjusting any deposit made, the lessor can ask him to vacate the premises. 11. Strong reliance was placed on clauses 2, 6 and 11 of the lease deed and the said clauses read as hereunder: "2. That this lease shall be for a period of five years, commencing from 25th December, 2004, to be renewed on the consent of both the parties i.e., the Lessor and the Lessee through a fresh lease deed. 6. That the Lessor has offered the schedule building to the Lessee after completing the outer construction on all the floors of the building and without any internal construction. 11. That the Lessee hereby agree that he may be asked to vacate the premises by the Lessor in the unfortunate event of not paying monthly rent for any unreasonable period of time after adjusting any deposit made." 12. It is also the case of the revision petitioner that an application was filed by the first respondent-plaintiff under Section 151 of CPC for depositing rents and the same was allowed and upon non-compliance of the said order, the learned Judge was pleased to strike off the defence by an order, dated 23.11.2006 in I.A. No.1327 of 2006. The said order, dated 23.11.2006, reads as hereunder. "Condition not complied. As per the conditional order defence of defendant is struck off." 13. The said order was preceded by an order, dated 13.11.2006, and the said order is as hereunder: "This petition is filed under Order 15A seeking to struck off the defence. The averments in the affidavit are that the petitioner is the landlord of the suit schedule premises and the respondent/ defendant is tenant Earlier I.A. No.5/06 was filed seeking deposit of admitted rents @ Rs.3,60,000/- and the same was allowed with the direction to the respondent/defendant to deposit the admitted arrears of rents. The averments in the affidavit are that the petitioner is the landlord of the suit schedule premises and the respondent/ defendant is tenant Earlier I.A. No.5/06 was filed seeking deposit of admitted rents @ Rs.3,60,000/- and the same was allowed with the direction to the respondent/defendant to deposit the admitted arrears of rents. Subsequently E.P. No.42 of 2006 was filed for attachment of movables. Meanwhile, the respondent paid Rs.2 lakhs through cheque which was dishonoured as the respondent/defendant instructed to stop payment to the bankers. Now this petition is filed to struck off the defence as the respondent/defendant failed to deposit the admitted arrears of rents. The respondent/defendant filed counter and its plea is that the petitioner/landlord has sold away the property vide registered sale deed dated 3.6.2006. Now the point for determination is whether this petition deserves to be allowed ? The admitted facts are that the plaintiff is the landlord and the defendant is the tenant. The arrears of rent @ Rs.45,000/- p.m. are unpaid since January, 2006 to June, 2006 amounting to Rs.3,95,000/-. Though the question of deciding whether the landlord has sold away the premises is premature to decide. Even assuming that to be true the defendant/tenant has to deposit the rents atleast till June 2006 amounting to Rs.3,95,000/-. The defendant failed to deposit the said arrears of rent till today. In the circumstances, the respondent/defendant is directed to deposit the arrears of rent amounting to Rs.3,95,000/- on or before 22.11.2006 failing which the defence of the defendant shall be struck off as contemplated under Order l5A proviso (2). This deemed to be the notice in the event of not depositing the arrears of rent and no notice is required to be given in view of the order passed and on failure to deposit the arrears of rent automatically the defence stands struck off. Petition allowed accordingly." 14. No doubt, it is also the case of the revision petitioner that the respondent No.2 got impleaded as plaintiff No.2 in the suit being the purchaser and certain submissions were made in this regard too. A ground that there was no attornment of tenancy had also been raised. Petition allowed accordingly." 14. No doubt, it is also the case of the revision petitioner that the respondent No.2 got impleaded as plaintiff No.2 in the suit being the purchaser and certain submissions were made in this regard too. A ground that there was no attornment of tenancy had also been raised. It is stated that in those circumstances, two applications, being I.A. Nos.224 and 225 of 2006, praying for condonation of delay and for setting aside the order aforesaid, dated 23.11.2006, in I.A. No.1327 of 2006, were filed and inasmuch as the said applications were dismissed, the present CRP, and CRP No.2152 of 2008 had been preferred. 15. Order XV-A, A.P. Amendment reads as hereunder: "Order XV-A : (1) In a suit for recovery of possession, on termination of lease, or licence, with or without a prayer for recovery of arrears of rent, or licence fee, known with whatever description, the defendant, while filing his written statement, shall deposit the amount, representing the undisputed arrears, calculated upto that due into the Court and shall continue to deposit such amount, which becomes payable thereafter within one week from the date on which it becomes due, till the judgment is rendered in the suit. (2) Whether the defendant pleads in the written statement that no arrears of rent or licence fee exists, it shall be competent for the Court to pass an order in this regard, after affording opportunity to both the parties, and in case any amount is found due, the defendant shall be under obligation to deposit the same, within the time stipulated by the Court and continue to deposit the amount which becomes payable thereafter, as provided under Rule 1 : Provided that the time stipulated for payment of amount, as aforesaid, may be extended by the Court for reasons to be recorded for a period not exceeding 15 days. If the defendant commits default in making the deposits, as aforesaid, the Court shall strike off the defence. On such deposit it shall be competent for the plaintiff to withdraw the same." 16. If the defendant commits default in making the deposits, as aforesaid, the Court shall strike off the defence. On such deposit it shall be competent for the plaintiff to withdraw the same." 16. The learned Senior Counsel placed strong reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Anandi Devi v. Om Prakash, 1987 (Supp.) SCC 527, wherein the Apex Court observed as hereunder: "The learned Additional District Judge has failed to appreciate that the respondent having failed to comply with the requirements of Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by not making a deposit of arrears of rent together with interest and costs, the appellant's application for striking off the defence ought to have been allowed and thereafter the suit for eviction should have been decreed under Section 22(a) of the Act. In this view, the judgment and order of the High Court as well as that of the learned District Judge cannot be sustained. We accordingly set aside those judgments, allow this appeal and grant a decree for eviction under Section 20(2)(a) of the Act. The decree for arrears of rent passed by the learned Additional District Judge shall, however, stand. The respondent is given four months' time to vacate and surrender the premises subject to his filing the usual undertaking in this Court within four weeks from today. No costs. " 17. Further, the learned Senior Counsel also placed strong reliance on Pt. Rishikesh and another v. Salma Begum (Smt.), (1995) 4 SCC 718 , wherein the apex Court at Para 23 held as hereunder: "The contention that Section 20(4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, provides procedure for payment of the arrears "on the first date of hearing of the suit" and if the tenant deposited the arrears, the Court has been given power to relieve the tenant against the liability for eviction on that ground and Order 15 Rule 5, provides discriminatory procedure offending Article 14 needs no close scrutiny. The two procedures are distinct and separate. The former gives opportunity to a tenant to make amends to his conduct of default and to avail the benefit of avoiding decree for eviction under the Rent Control Act. The jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court in that behalf was expressly taken out. The two procedures are distinct and separate. The former gives opportunity to a tenant to make amends to his conduct of default and to avail the benefit of avoiding decree for eviction under the Rent Control Act. The jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court in that behalf was expressly taken out. The further contention that Order 15 Rule 5, makes arbitrary discrimination between two classes of tenants, namely, one making a bona fide mistake in not depositing the rent prior to the date of the first hearing and the other a dishonest tenant who takes a plea disputing the rent itself and permitted the latter to contest the suit by an adjudication and the former is negated by striking down the defence which violates Article 14 also is untenable. Exercising the discretionary relief and considering the previous conduct of the tenant and the mitigating circumstances, if any, the Court may, on given facts, finding that the tenant committed bona fide mistake in depositing the rent, direct him to deposit the same. Therefore, they are treated as a class. The dispute of tenancy and right to adjudication thereon also stands as a class. The tenant in default at a suit in the Court of Small Causes is given right to contest the suit subject to his paying the admitted rent. It is a condition precedent. All those tenants are treated as a class. There is no invidious discrimination in that class. All are treated alike. There exists discernible differentia between to classes. The only class of tenants who commit default in payment of admitted rent after an order has been passed by the Court, alone are disabled to contest the suit by striking of defence due to his recalcitrant attitude in committing further default in payment of the rent. The nexus is pregnant with legislative wisdom to protect the landlord from hardship. Order 15 Rule 5 gives a right to the plaintiff to make an application to this Court. The Court after considering the respective contentions and circumstances would pass an order directing the tenant to continue to pay the admitted rent as a condition to contest the suit. On his committing default, the defence will be struck off. The classification is based on intelligible differentia. The Court after considering the respective contentions and circumstances would pass an order directing the tenant to continue to pay the admitted rent as a condition to contest the suit. On his committing default, the defence will be struck off. The classification is based on intelligible differentia. The procedure, therefore, is consistent with the just and fair procedure to mitigate the hardship to the landlord and to prevent unfair advantage of delaying the disposal of the suit by the tenant. The procedure, therefore, is neither discriminatory nor arbitrary nor capricious but one which is judicious." 18. The above decision was delivered in the context of striking off the defence in the light of Order XV Rule 5, as introduced by U.P. Amendment. 19. The Apex Court in Bimal Chand Jain v. Gopal Agarwal, AIR 1981 SC 1657 , while dealing with Order XV Rule 5(2) of CPC as amended in U.P., held that in a suit for ejectment, striking off defence on failure to make representation within terms of Order XV Rule 5, the Court still /has discretion not to strike off defence if on facts and circumstances already existing on record there is good reason for not doing so. 20. On a careful analysis, the language employed in A.P. Amendment Order XV-A and the language employed in U.P. Amendment to Order XV i.e., (5) of CPC, appear to be different. The said amendment of UP dealing with striking off defence for failure to deposit admitted rent, etc., reads as hereunder. "5. 20. On a careful analysis, the language employed in A.P. Amendment Order XV-A and the language employed in U.P. Amendment to Order XV i.e., (5) of CPC, appear to be different. The said amendment of UP dealing with striking off defence for failure to deposit admitted rent, etc., reads as hereunder. "5. Striking off defence for failure to deposit admitted rent, etc.: (1) In any suit by a Lessor for the eviction of a Lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent, per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off his defence. Explanation 1 :-The expression "first hearing" means the date for filing written statement for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. Explanation 2 :-The expression "entire amount admitted by him to be due" means the entire gross amount, whether as' rent or compensation for use and occupation, calculated at the admitted rate of rent for the admitted period of arrears after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on Lessor's account [and the amount, if any, paid to the Lessor acknowledged by the Lessor in writing signed by him] and the amount, if any, deposited in any Court under Section 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Explanation 3 :(1) The expression "monthly amount due" means the amount due every month, whether as rent or, compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority, in respect of the building on Lessor's account. Explanation 3 :(1) The expression "monthly amount due" means the amount due every month, whether as rent or, compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority, in respect of the building on Lessor's account. (2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the Court may consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within 10 days of the first hearing or, of the expiry of the week referred to in subsection (I), as the case may be. (3) The amount deposited under this rule may at any time be withdrawn by the plaintiff: Provided that such withdrawal shall not have the effect of prejudicing any claim by the plaintiff disputing the correctness of the amount deposited : Provided further that if the amount deposited includes any sums claimed by the depositor to be deductible on any account, the Court may require the plaintiff to furnish the security for such sum before he is allowed to withdraw the same." 21. Order XV-A, the Bombay Amendment, dealing with striking off defence by a Lessor reads as hereunder: "Striking off defence in a suit by a Lessor.-(1) In any suit by a Lessor or a licensor against a Lessee or a licensee, as the case may be, for his eviction with or without the arrears of rent or licence fee and future mesne profits from him, the defendant shall deposit such amounts as the Court may direct on account of arrears upto the date of the order (within such time as the Court may fix) and thereafter continue to deposit in each succeeding month the rent or licence fee claimed in the suit as the Court may direct. The defendant shall, unless otherwise directed, continue to deposit such amount till the decision of the suit. In the event of any default in making the deposits, as aforesaid, the Court may subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off the defence. The defendant shall, unless otherwise directed, continue to deposit such amount till the decision of the suit. In the event of any default in making the deposits, as aforesaid, the Court may subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off the defence. (2) Before passing an order for striking off the defence, the Court shall serve notice on the defendant or his Advocate to show cause as to why the defence should not be struck off, and the Court shall consider any such cause, if shown in order to decide as to whether the defendant should be relieved from an order striking off the defence. (3) The amount deposited under this rule shall be paid to the plaintiff Lessor or licensor or his Advocate and the receipt of such amount shall not have the effect of prejudicing the claim of the plaintiff and it shall not also be treated as a waiver of notice of termination. Explanation ;- The suit for eviction shall include suit for mandatory injunction seeking removal of licensee from the premises for the purpose of this rule." While dealing with the Bombay Amendment Order XV -A of CPC in Shashikant v. Suresh R. Karbotleas, 1997 AIHC 99 (Bom.), it was held that in a suit for, eviction, the defence could be ordered to be struck off for non-payment of arrears of rent only, if the plaintiff admits lease in favour of the defendant and not when the plaintiff did not plead lease in his favour and the lease is put forward only as an alternative. 22. Order XV-A(2) of the A.P. Amendment no doubt specifies that the time stipulated for payment of amount, as aforesaid, may be extended by the Court for reasons to be recovered for a period not exceeding 15 days. But it is pertinent to note that it further specifies if the defendant commits default in making the deposits, as aforesaid, the Court shall strike off the defence. The words 'the Court shall strike off the defence' would assume some importance. 23. However, that is not the case here. Even otherwise, the order made in I.A. to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off the defence. The words 'the Court shall strike off the defence' would assume some importance. 23. However, that is not the case here. Even otherwise, the order made in I.A. to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off the defence. (2) Before passing an order for striking off the defence, the Court shall serve notice on the defendant or his Advocate to show cause as to why the defence should not be struck off, and the Court shall consider any such cause, if shown in order to decide as to whether the defendant should be relieved from an order striking off the defence. (3) The amount deposited under this rule shall be paid to the plaintiff Lessor or licensor or his Advocate and the receipt of such amount shall not have the effect of prejudicing the claim of the plaintiff and it shall not also be treated as a waiver of notice of termination. Explanation :- The suit for eviction shall include suit for mandatory injunction seeking removal of licensee from the premises for the purpose of this rule." While dealing with the Bombay Amendment Order XV -A of CPC in Shashikant v. Suresh R. Karbotleas, 1997 AIHC 99 (Bom.), it was held that in a suit for, eviction, the defence could be ordered to be struck off for non-payment of arrears of rent only, if the plaintiff admits lease in favour of the defendant and not when the plaintiff did not plead lease in his favour and the lease is put forward only as an alternative. 22. Order XV-A(2) of the A.P. Amendment no doubt specifies that the time stipulated for payment of amount, as aforesaid, may be extended by the Court for reasons to be recovered for a period not exceeding 15 days. But it is pertinent to note that it further specifies if the defendant commits default in making the deposits, as aforesaid, the Court shall strike off the defence. The words 'the Court shall strike off the defence' would assume some importance. 23. However, that is not the case here. Even otherwise, the order made in I.A. No.1327 of 2006 had not been challenged before a superior Court till today. The words 'the Court shall strike off the defence' would assume some importance. 23. However, that is not the case here. Even otherwise, the order made in I.A. No.1327 of 2006 had not been challenged before a superior Court till today. Even if the conduct of the parties if carefully examined, several questions which are being canvassed at this stage touching the merits and demerits of the matter need not detain this Court' any longer for the reason that the said order of striking off defence in a way had attained finality, being not challenged as on today. 24. Hence, the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality whatsoever in the light of the facts and circumstances of this case. 25. Accordingly, the civil revision petition shall stand dismissed with costs.