Judgment : 1. O.A. No. 441 of 2008 has been filed to suspend the order of termination passed by the third respondent vide Ref. TCN.LPG.JOTHI dated 18.1.2008 pending proceedings of the Arbitrator. O.A. No. 442 of 2008 has been filed to direct the respondents herein to re-deliver the goods taken by them such as all records including SV/TV pads, entire stock of LPG filed/empty cylinders, DPRs/equipments taken from Jothi Gas service, Tirunelveli and permitting the petitioner to continue the distributorship of Bharat Gas at Tirunelveli as per the Distributorship Agreement dated 13.7.2004 pending the proceedings of the Arbitrator. 2. The brief facts as culled out from the affidavit filed in support of O.A.Nos.441 & 442 of 2008 are as under: The applicant applied for distributorship of LPG. Bharat Gas by her application dated 3.10.2000. She was selected by the Corporation for LPG distributorship. Before attending the interview on 7.2.2004, she entered into an agreement of sale with one S.M. Farooq for purchasing the lands for the purpose of construction of godown if the distributorship for LPG. Gas is allotted to her. In the Letter of Intent dated 5.3.2004, the respondents stated that she has to procure a suitable plot measuring to 36 m × 29 m for storing LPG in cylinders either purchased by her or leased to her initially for a period of 10 years with renewal option. 3. After receiving the Letter of Intent (LOI) she came to know that the land for which the agreement of sale was entered into with S.M. Farooq was already sold to a third party and without disclosing the same, the said S.M. Farooq entered into an agreement of sale with her. Therefore, she cancelled the agreement of sale and started searching for suitable lands and after selecting three such lands, she showed them to the Field Investigation Officer of the Corporation for inspection and thereafter she entered into an agreement of lease dated 20.4.2004 for 25 years with the landlord whose land was selected by the Field Investigation officer for the purpose of construction of the godown and show room. The lease agreement dated 20.4.2004 was handed over to the Corporation and third respondent entered into with an agreement for the LPG distributorship on 13.7.2004 and on and from 14.7.2004 she has been carrying on the business of distributorship of Bharat Gas in Tirunelveli Town, covering 15 Km. The lease agreement dated 20.4.2004 was handed over to the Corporation and third respondent entered into with an agreement for the LPG distributorship on 13.7.2004 and on and from 14.7.2004 she has been carrying on the business of distributorship of Bharat Gas in Tirunelveli Town, covering 15 Km. radius and supplying gas to customers numbering 15,000. 4. While so, one C.M. Rajan who stood second in the interview for the selection of distributorship, filed W.P. No. 6347 of 2004 challenging her selection for the distributorship. Though a status quo order was passed by this Court on 27.4.2004, the same was vacated on 26.5.2004. Finally, the writ petition itself was disposed of by this Court with a direction to the Corporation to consider the complaint dated 3.10.2006 given by the said C.M. Rajan within a reasonable time. In his complaint, C.M. Rajan stated that the applicant had committed four irregularities for getting the LPG distributorship, which are as follows: 1. She submitted false land documents. 2. Shesubmitted false certificate showing her work experience when she did not work in any company. 3. She submitted a fake bank balance statement and 4. She obtained forged plan from Reddiarpatty Panchayat for construction of LPG godown. 5. To these complaints, she submitted a detailed explanation, but the third respondent sent a show cause notice dated 12.12.2007 seeking her explanation for the same old complaints and asking her as to why her distributorship agreement dated 13.7.2004 should not be terminated by invoking Clause 28.1 of the distributorship agreement. To this show cause, she submitted a detailed explanation on 2.1.2008 and thereafter she appeared in person before the third respondent and explained her stand. But, the third respondent by order dated 18.1.2008 terminated her distributorship agreement and challenging the same, she filed a writ petition in W.P. No. 505 of 2008 before the Madurai Bench of this Court, but by order dated 24.1.2008, this Court dismissed the petition by holding that her remedy is only by way of arbitration. Hence, before the commencement of arbitration proceedings, by way of interim relief, the above, applications have been filed under Section 9 of the Act, 1996. 6. On 30.1.2008, this Court granted interim order as prayed for and posted the matter for respondents‘ appearance on 28.2.2008. 7. Hence, before the commencement of arbitration proceedings, by way of interim relief, the above, applications have been filed under Section 9 of the Act, 1996. 6. On 30.1.2008, this Court granted interim order as prayed for and posted the matter for respondents‘ appearance on 28.2.2008. 7. The respondents appeared before this Court through their counsel and filed Application No. 571 of 2008 praying to recall the order dated 30.1.2008 in O.A. No. 441 of 2008 and in O.A. No. 572 of 2008 praying to vacate the order dated 30.1.2008 in O.A. No. 442 of 2008. 8. In the affidavit filed in support of the above applications, the Territory Manager of the Corporation stated that as per the distributorship agreement dated 13.7.2004, the agreement is determinable by its very nature and therefore she is not entitled to specifically enforce the agreement as per Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. Even if the applicant succeeds before the Arbitrator, she is only entitled to compensation and not restoration of agency. It is further stated that after terminating the distributorship agreement on 1.8.1.2008, the Corporation took steps to ensure servicing of her customers by another distributor of the Corporation and the said agreement has been in force since then. The order of termination was passed after conducting an elaborate enquiry in which she was given complete opportunity to present her case and the termination is strictly in accordance with the distributorship agreement. 9. It is stated in the affidavit that Clause I (a) of the distributorship agreement stipulates that the distributor would be initially appointed for a period of 10 years and renewable every 5 years at the sole discretion of the Corporation. Clause 28 deals with the termination of the agreement and sub clause I stipulates that if any information given by the distributor in her application is found to be incorrect in any material particular, then the Corporation shall be at liberty to terminate the agreement forthwith or at any time thereafter. 10. Pursuant to the direction of this Court dated 1.12.2006, in W.P. No. 6437 of 2004 filed by the first empanelled candidate one C.M. Rajan the Territory Manager, Vijayawada was appointed by the Corporation to enquire into the matter. 10. Pursuant to the direction of this Court dated 1.12.2006, in W.P. No. 6437 of 2004 filed by the first empanelled candidate one C.M. Rajan the Territory Manager, Vijayawada was appointed by the Corporation to enquire into the matter. In his report dated 22.2.2007, the enquiry officer concluded that the applicant misrepresented the fact and submitted a false agreement of sale and the bank statement submitted by her to the Corporation is a forged statement. With reference to other two charges, the enquiry officer reported that her work experience in a company has no relevance and it could not be proved that she forged a plan to obtain the explosive licence. Upon the receipt of the enquiry report, the Corporation issued a show cause notice dated 12.12.2007 and after considering her detailed reply dated 2.1.2008, an order dated 18.1.2008 was passed by the Corporation terminating the distributorship. Thereafter, the Corporation went to the show room and took possession of the Corporation properties after taking an inventory of the properties with acknowledgement from her. A public notice in English and Tamil daily was published bringing to the knowledge of the customer about the termination of distributorship and the arrangement made to book their refills from another distributor. Therefore, according to the Corporation, they have followed the conditions in the agreement and conducted a detailed enquiry. Therefore, the Corporation prays for vacating the orders granted by this Court on 30.1.2008. 11. Heard Mr. T.R. Rajagopal, learned senior counsel for the applicant/distributor and Mr. Krishna Srinivas, learned counsel for the respondents/Corporation. I have also gone through the documents and judgments referred to by them in support of their submissions. 12. The learned senior counsel for the applicant/ distributor submitted that the complaint itself was given by a person who also applied for distributorship and could not succeed. Further, out of the four charges, two were found to be not proved and in so far as the bank statement is concerned, it is not at all required by the Corporation for grant of distributorship. Therefore, the amount mentioned in the bank statement is immaterial and irrelevant. Apart from that, according to the learned senior counsel, the applicant has properly explained about the same but the same was not at all considered by the Corporation in the final order of termination dated 18.1.2008. Therefore, the amount mentioned in the bank statement is immaterial and irrelevant. Apart from that, according to the learned senior counsel, the applicant has properly explained about the same but the same was not at all considered by the Corporation in the final order of termination dated 18.1.2008. The learned senior counsel further urged that in so far as the document, i. e., the agreement of sale entered into with S.M. Farooq is concerned, the applicant has properly explained as to how she was cheated by her estranged husband in this regard. Further, learned senior counsel pointed out that even as per the LOI dated 5.3.2004, she has been given four months period to procure suitable plot for storing the cylinders and she did procure the same within the stipulated time that too after inspection and approval of the Corporation Field Investigation Officer and therefore the Corporation is estopped from accusing the applicant that she misrepresented and submitted a false agreement of sale. Further, the applicant being a woman believed her husband, who cheated her due to some family problem and therefore on that basis she should not be punished with the order of terminating the agency itself especially when she has been running the agency for the last 4 years without any complaint from any public and law of equity requires that the agency is to be continued till an award is passed by the Arbitrator. In support of his submission, the learned senior counsel relied on the following decisions. 1. Harbanslal Sahnia and Another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Others Harbanslal Sahnia and Another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Others Harbanslal Sahnia and Another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Others 2003 (1) CTC 189 2. An unreported judgment of this Court dated 20.6.2006 in W.A. No. 731 of 2006 Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Bommai Kadhirvelu and three Others 3. Adhunk Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals Pvt. Ltd Adhunk Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals Pvt. Ltd Adhunk Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals Pvt. Ltd . (2007) 6 MLJ 80: 2007 (4) CTC 340 (This was relied by the learned counsel for the Corporation also) 13. Adhunk Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals Pvt. Ltd Adhunk Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals Pvt. Ltd Adhunk Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals Pvt. Ltd . (2007) 6 MLJ 80: 2007 (4) CTC 340 (This was relied by the learned counsel for the Corporation also) 13. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Corporation submitted that as per the order of the writ Court, they conducted an enquiry after affording a full opportunity and as per the conditions contained in the agreement and also as per the affidavit of undertaking given by the applicant, her agency has been terminated with and therefore the same cannot be restored by this Court under Section 9 of the Act, 1996. The learned counsel further submitted that by the nature of the agreement itself, the contract is terminable and therefore the applicant cannot ask for its specific performance even before the Arbitrator and in such circumstances, she cannot do it before this Court under Section 9 of the Act. He further submitted that properties of the Corporation were removed from her show room and the entire customers of the applicant have been shifted to another distributor. In such circumstances, there cannot be any application under Section 9 to preserve any property and to restore the same. Hence, he prayed for vacating the interim orders granted by this Court on 30.1.2008. He relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions. 1) Modi Rubber Ltd. v. Guardian International Corp Modi Rubber Ltd. v. Guardian International Corp Modi Rubber Ltd. v. Guardian International Corp . 2007 (2) Raj. 556 (Del) 2) Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service and Others Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service and Others Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service and Others (1991) 1 SCC 533 3) Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals Pvt. Ltd. (supra) 4) (2002) Com. Cases Vol. 112 (Mad) 630 14. I have considered the rival submissions carefully with regard to facts and citations. 15. The following facts are not in dispute. The applicant applied for distributorship of LPG by her application dated 3.10.2000. Cases Vol. 112 (Mad) 630 14. I have considered the rival submissions carefully with regard to facts and citations. 15. The following facts are not in dispute. The applicant applied for distributorship of LPG by her application dated 3.10.2000. In the application under part II, para (1) it is stated as under: In any statement made in the application or in the documents enclosed therewith or subsequently submitted in pursuance of the application by the candidate at any stage is found to be incorrect or false. His/her application is liable to be rejected without assigning any reason and incase he/she has been appointed as a dealer/distributor, his/her dealership/ distributorship is liable to be terminated. In such cases, the candidate/dealer/distributor shall have no claim whatsoever against the Oil company. 16. It is also mentioned in the application that for LPG distributorship a complete LPG godown is a must. Further, the initial tenure of the agreement will be for 10 years renewable for every 5 years thereafter by the oil company. 17. She has sworn to an affidavit of undertaking stating that if selected, she would be a full time distributor and if any information/declaration given by her in her application or in any document submitted by her in support of her application shall be found to be untrue or incorrect or false, the corporation would be within its rights to withdraw the Letter of Intent or if already appointed, to terminate the distributorship and she would have no claim whatsoever against the Corporation for such withdrawal/termination. 18. As the applicant became successful in the interview, a Letter of Intent dated 5.3.2004 was issued in her favour followed by a distributorship agreement dated 13.7.2004. 19. A perusal of the distributorship agreement reveals that Clause 28 of the agreement deals with the termination of the agreement under sub clause (e) of Clause 28, the Corporation is at liberty in its entire discretion to terminate the agreement if any information given by the distributor in her application for appointment as a distributor shall be found to be untrue or incorrect in any material particular. This right of the corporation to terminate the agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights or remedy against the distributor. In the event of the Corporation terminating the agreement, it shall not be liable to pay for any loss or compensation in respect of such termination. This right of the corporation to terminate the agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights or remedy against the distributor. In the event of the Corporation terminating the agreement, it shall not be liable to pay for any loss or compensation in respect of such termination. Further, Clause 29 enables both the parties namely, the corporation or distributor to terminate the agreement on giving 30 days notice to the other party without assigning any reason for such termination. Clause 38 deals with referring the dispute to arbitration to the sole arbitration of the Director (Marketing) of the corporation or some other officer of the corporation who may be nominated by the Director (Marketing). 20. The first empanelled person Thiru C.M. Rajan filed a writ petition in W.P. No. 6347 of 2004 praying to issue a writ of mandamus directing the corporation to cancel the LPG distributorship of the applicant. This Court by order dated 27.4.2007 ordered status quo to be maintained. On 26.5.2004, this Court vacated the order of status quo but order is clear that if the writ petitioner succeeds in the writ petition, the distributorship licence granted in favour of the applicant shall stand cancelled. Finally, the writ petition was disposed of on 1.12.2006 wherein the following order is passed by this Court. “ 6. It appears that after the Award of the Distributorship in the year 2004, the fourth respondent is running the Distributorship. Though the petitioner challenged the Award of Distributorship to the fourth respondent, on various grounds, the petitioner has now come up with certain allegations against the fourth respondent, which we need not go into for the purpose of disposal of the writ petition. On 3.10.2006, the petitioner claims to have sent a complaint to the Chief Vigilance Officer and the fact that he has sent them is borne out by the postal acknowledgement cards. It is always open to the first respondent to look into any complaint so received and the respondents actually do not require any directions from this Court. In view of the fact that the petitioner is satisfied with a direction to the first respondent to consider their complaint dated 3.10.2006, the writ petition is disposed of leaving it open to the first respondent to look into the complaint dated 3.10.2006, within a reasonable time. In view of the fact that the petitioner is satisfied with a direction to the first respondent to consider their complaint dated 3.10.2006, the writ petition is disposed of leaving it open to the first respondent to look into the complaint dated 3.10.2006, within a reasonable time. In the event of the first respondent deciding to enquire into the opportunities of-hearing to the petitioner as well as to the fourth respondent. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.” 21. Subsequent to the order of this Court dated 1.12.2006, an enquiry was conducted on the basis of the complaint dated 3.10.2006 and on the basis of the enquiry report, a show cause notice dated 12.12.2007 was issued by the Corporation. It is stated in the show cause notice that out of the four charges, alleged in the complaint dated 3.10.2006, the enquiry officer found that she misrepresented the facts by submitting false agreement of sale of land during the interview held on 7.2.2004 and the bank statement submitted at the time of Field Investigation was a forged document. To this show cause notice, an explanation was given by the applicant wherein she stated that the copy of the unregistered sale agreement dated 4.2.2004 submitted by her at the time of interview was submitted by her under the bona fide impression that the said vendor had a lawful title over the property and she never knew whether the vendor had lawful title over the property or not. After the interview was over and after the selection awarding the distributorship of Gas to her only, in February 2004, she came to know about the prior sale of the very same property to third party from her vendor who received Rs. 1 lakh by her through sale agreement by deception. Immediately, she cancelled the sale agreement dated 4.2.2004 and got back the amount of Rs. 1 lakh paid by her to him. Thereafter, she entered into registered lease agreement on 20.4.2004 with the owner of the land for a period of 25 years and thereafter she submitted the copy of the lease deed to the corporation. The officials of the Corporation also made inspection of the lands covered under lease agreement and approved the land as more suitable for construction of godown and thereafter she constructed the godown. Hence, according to the applicant, she did not submit a false land document. The officials of the Corporation also made inspection of the lands covered under lease agreement and approved the land as more suitable for construction of godown and thereafter she constructed the godown. Hence, according to the applicant, she did not submit a false land document. She also accused the above said C.M. Rajan for creating false and forged records against her to wreak vengeance upon her. 22. For the submission of bank statement, she stated that she was never called upon to produce any bank statement either along with the application or at the time of interview. She further denied that she gave any letter dated 27.2.2004 during the field investigation and the same ought to have been given by her estranged husband Jothi Sigamani by misusing the blank signed papers given by her to her husband for the bona fide purpose of using the same in her absence under necessity for the agency. Hence, she prayed for dropping the false and motivated charges levelled against her. 23. By order dated 18.1.2008, the Corporation terminated the distributorship by invoking Clause 28 (l) of the distributorship agreement dated 13.7.2004 with effect from 18.1.2008. In the order dated 18.1.2008, the Corporation stated that from the facts and evidence collected during the enquiry and from her reply dated 2.1.2008 to the show cause notice dated 12.12.2007, it was established that she misrepresented the facts by submitting false agreement of sale of land during the interview held on 7.2.2004 and the bank statement submitted at the field investigation stage was a forged document. Hence, they terminated the distributorship agreement and asked the applicant to hand over all records. It is also not in dispute that the writ petition filed by the applicant, challenging the order of termination was dismissed by the Madurai Bench of this Court on 24.1.2008, the matter has to be decided in arbitration proceedings and writ petition is not maintainable. Hence, the above applications filed by the applicant/distributor. 24. The only point that arises for consideration is whether the applicant is entitled to an interim order of suspension of the termination order dated 18.1.2008 and also for a direction directing the corporation to redeliver the goods taken by them and to permit the corporation to continue the distributorship, pending the proceedings before the Arbitrator. 25. 24. The only point that arises for consideration is whether the applicant is entitled to an interim order of suspension of the termination order dated 18.1.2008 and also for a direction directing the corporation to redeliver the goods taken by them and to permit the corporation to continue the distributorship, pending the proceedings before the Arbitrator. 25. Before proceeding further to answer this point let me consider the decisions relied on by both the counsel to cull out the legal principles enunciated thereon. 26. In Harbanslal Sahnia and Another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Others Harbanslal Sahnia and Another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Others Harbanslal Sahnia and Another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Others ( supra) the Hon‘ble Supreme Court held as follows: “7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, inspite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in atleast three contingencies; (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice or, (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act and is challenged. See Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai. and Others Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai. and Others Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai. and Others (1998) 8 SCC 1 . The present case attracts applicability of first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners‘ dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the Appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.” 27. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners‘ dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the Appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.” 27. In the above judgment, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court held that in an appropriate case inspite of availability of alternative remedy, High .Court can still exercise its writ jurisdiction in the three contingencies mentioned thereon and as the case before the Supreme Court attracted the first two contingencies, namely, writ petitioner seeking enforcement of Fundamental Rights and there is a failure of principles of natural justice, the Supreme Court held that the appellants in that case should have been allowed the relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings. 28. In the unreported judgment dated 20.6.2006, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Bommai Kadhirvelu and three Others Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Bommai Kadhirvelu and three Others Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Bommai Kadhirvelu and three Others ( supra), the First Bench of this Court, held as under: “ 6. A two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited , (2004) 3 SCC 553 observed that in certain cases even a disputed question of fact can be gone into by the Court entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and further held: “28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs tinder Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of their power. (see Whilrpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks Whilrpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks Whilrpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks , (1998) 8 SCC 1 ). The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of their power. (see Whilrpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks Whilrpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks Whilrpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks , (1998) 8 SCC 1 ). And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is, arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction.” 7. In Harbanslal Sahnia and Another v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Others Harbanslal Sahnia and Another v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Others Harbanslal Sahnia and Another v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Others (2003) 2 SCC 107 , LAHOTI, J. (as his Lordship then was), relied upon Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks , (1998) 8 SCC 1 , observing that in an appropriate case, inspite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in atleast three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. 8. A three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Limited State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Limited State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Limited , (2005) 6 SCC 499 referring to ( supra) held: “22(24) ……. . There are two well recognised exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. First is when the proceedings are taken before the forum under a provision of law which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they are incompetent without a party being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We may add that where the proceedings itself are in abuse of process of law the High Court in an appropriate case can entertain a writ petition. 23(24) Where under a statue there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But, normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute.” 9. In the light of the aforesaid settled legal position, we are not inclined to accept the contention that the writ petition is not maintainable. After going through the facts and circumstances of the case, we are fully satisfied that the transaction between the first respondent and A.T. Mohanraj was only a money lending transaction. In any event, the first respondent had fully settled the claim of the A.T. Mohanraj. Thus, the so-called partnership had never come into existence. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge. Consequently, the writ appeal is dismissed, and the appellant Corporation is directed to comply with the order of the learned single Judge forthwith. Consequently, connected C.M.P. is also dismissed. No costs.” 29. In the above decision also, the same principle cf the Hon‘ble Supreme Court was followed by the Division Bench to hold that in an appropriate case, inspite of availability of alternative remedies, the High Court may still exercise its writ /jurisdiction. 30. In Modi Rubber Ltd. v. Guardian International Corp. (supra), the Delhi High Court held as under: “208. The next issue which deserve to be considered is the nature of relief to which a party may be entitled. 30. In Modi Rubber Ltd. v. Guardian International Corp. (supra), the Delhi High Court held as under: “208. The next issue which deserve to be considered is the nature of relief to which a party may be entitled. Section 9 confers a discretionary power on the Court which has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously, the object of the statutory provision is to be found in the words of the Section itself which confers jurisdiction on a Court to pass orders of interim measures of protection for the preservation, interim custody or sale of goods which are the subject matter of the arbitration agreement; securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration proceedings; detention, preservation or inspection of a property which is the subject matter of the dispute in arbitration; authorise any person to enter upon a land or building; taking of samples or making of observation or experiment to be tried as may be necessary or expedient to be tried as may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence. The Court is empowered to even appoint a receiver in respect of the property which is the subject matter of the arbitration and take such interim measures of protection as may be just and convenient. The powers granted on the Court are far reaching. The statute has specifically mandated that the Court would have the same power for making such orders as it has for the purposes and in relation to any proceedings before it. 209. It is also necessary to examine the parameters within which the Court shall exercise such power. The manner and limits of exercise of such discretion‘ have fallen for consideration in several judicial pronouncements and the principles laid down can be usefully called out thus: (i) Even though Section 9 does not embody the ingredients of Order 38Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 nor the conditions of the Order 38Rule 5 can be read into it, however for the exercise of discretion thereunder, the Court can take guidance from the provisions of Order 39 as well as Order 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (Ref: 2004(111) DLT 816 : 2004(4) AD (Delhi) 618: 2004(75) DRJ 104 ; 2004(2) R.A.J. 484 (Rite Approach group Ltd. v. Rosoboron Export) (ii) The scope of Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 is in pari materia with the provisions of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The power vested in the Court by virtue of Section 9 must be exercised in consonance with equity which tempers the grant of discretionary relief as the relief of interim injunction is wholly equitable in nature. (Ref: Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola and Others Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola and Others Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola and Others (1995)5 SCC 545 ;Reliance Infocomm Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Reliance Infocomm Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Reliance Infocomm Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. 2004 (115) DLT 219: 2004 (8) AD (Delhi) 361: 2005 (1) RAJ 52) (iii) The intention of the defendant is a sine qua non for invoking Section 9 where the claim is to secure the amount in dispute in arbitration, The Court can take guidance from Order 38Rule 5 of the C.P.C. And Sections 18 and 41 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 .for considering-whether such a relief as has been prayed for in the petition under Section 9 deserves to be granted. (Ref: Global Co. v. National Fertilisers Ltd. Global Co. v. National Fertilisers Ltd. Global Co. v. National Fertilisers Ltd. AIR 1998 Delhi 397: 1998 (3) RAJ 278 , Malakumar Engineers Pvt. Ltd. (MKE) v. B. Seenaiah and Co.(Projects) Ltd. Malakumar Engineers Pvt. Ltd. (MKE) v. B. Seenaiah and Co.(Projects) Ltd. Malakumar Engineers Pvt. Ltd. (MKE) v. B. Seenaiah and Co.(Projects) Ltd. 2005(117) DLT 183 : 2005(2) AD (Delhi) 592: 2005(1) RAJ 327) (iv) Protection under Section 9 can be granted only when a prima facie case is made out and balance of convenience and possibility of irreparable loss and injury to the petitioner is made out. Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the provision of liquidated damages is not a bar to the specific performance of the contract. The general rule of equity is also that if a thing is agreed to be done, though there is a penalty attached thereto secure its performance, yet the Court in its discretion enforces specific performance thereof. The general rule of equity is also that if a thing is agreed to be done, though there is a penalty attached thereto secure its performance, yet the Court in its discretion enforces specific performance thereof. The jurisdiction of the Court is discretionary and must be exercised on such judicial principles when balance of convenience and possibility of irreparable loss and injury is shown to the plaintiff (Ref: Geep Batteries (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Gillette (India) Ltd Pvt. Ltd. v. Gillette (India) Ltd Pvt. Ltd. v. Gillette (India) Ltd 2005 (120) DLT 387 : 2005 (2) RAJ 592.; Techno Construction v. Kunj Vihar Cooperative Group Housing Society Techno Construction v. Kunj Vihar Cooperative Group Housing Society Techno Construction v. Kunj Vihar Cooperative Group Housing Society 2005(118) DLT 591 : 2005 (81) DRJ 233 : 2005 (1) R.A.J. 640) (v) The discretionary power of the Court under Section 9 has to be exercised by the Court sparingly and cautiously, bearing in mind that the objective of the Court is to create an alternative dispute redressal mechanism and consequently, the interference by the Court is not required at every stage. Whenever the powers of the Courts are invoked under Section 9 with the objective of supporting the arbitration, the Court must act with alacrity. However, this would not justify grant of interim orders and relief on the mere asking. The scope and object of Section 9 of the statute is to grant such relief by way of interlocutory injunction so as to mitigate the risk or injustice to the petitioner during the period before that uncertainty can be resolved. Its object is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages which would be recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. (Ref: AIR 1955 SC 2372; 2006 (4) AD (Delhi). 38; 2006 (2) RAJ 414). In Shaw v. Him Neel Brewaries Ltd. Shaw v. Him Neel Brewaries Ltd. Shaw v. Him Neel Brewaries Ltd. 2996 133 DLT 153: 2996 (3) RAJ 575, learned single Judge of this Court held that the interim orders are calculated to ensure that the assets of the party are not dissipated or frittered away and that such orders do not fall within the moratorium of Section 22. (vii) The application seeking interim measures of protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 pertaining to the preservation, interim custody or sale of equipment which is the subject matter of the agreement would be covered under Section 9(ii)(a) as also under Section 9 (ii)(c), (d) and (e) of the Act. (Ref: 2006 (3) AD (Delhi) 168: 2006 (87) DRJ 225 : 2006 (127) DLT 776: AIR 2006 Delhi 134: 2006 (1) RAJ 261) (viii) The Court has the power to pass an order under Section 9 during the pendency of the arbitration or even after the arbitral award but before the award is enforced in accordance with Section 36. Such order can be passed for preservation, interim custody of sale of any goods which are the subject matter of the arbitration agreement or securing the amount in the dispute and the like. (Ref: Sanrachna ( India) Inc. v. AB Hotels Ltd. Inc. v. AB Hotels Ltd. Inc. v. AB Hotels Ltd. 2006 (128) DLT 694: 2006 (2) RAJ 511; CREE Finance Ltd: v. Puri Construction and Others CREE Finance Ltd: v. Puri Construction and Others CREE Finance Ltd: v. Puri Construction and Others 2008 (87) DLT 449: 2000 (3) R.A.J. 276 ) (ix) The power under Section § to grant interim relief is available to the Court while under Section 17, such powers to make interim measures are made available to the Arbitral Tribunal. Even though there may be some degree of overlap between the two provisions, however, the powers under Section 9 are much wider in as much as they extend to the pre and post award period as well as with regard to the subject matter and the nature of the orders which the Court is empowered to pass. Therefore, pendency of an application under Section 17 before the Arbitral Tribunal does not denude the Court of its power to make an order for interim measures under Section 9 of the statute. Therefore, pendency of an application under Section 17 before the Arbitral Tribunal does not denude the Court of its power to make an order for interim measures under Section 9 of the statute. (Ref: 2006 (3) AD (Delhi) 168: 2006 (87) DRJ 225 : AIR 2006 Delhi 134: 2006 (127) DLT 766 : 2006 (1) RAJ 261) (x) It has been held that though Section 9 enables a party, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced under Section 36 of the Act, may apply to the Court for an interim order under Section 9, however, without a substantive move for reference or declaration on the petitioners stand on the substantive relief by an appropriate forum, Section 9 cannot be invoked for grant of interim relief. (Ref: (1994) 3 SCC 155: 1994 (1) RAJ 279; AIR 1999 SC 565 : 1999 (1) RAJ 365 ; 1998 (1) AD (Delhi) 513: 1998 (44) DRJ 399 : 1998 (1) RAJ 549. (xi) So far as the questions which can be considered in a petition under Section -9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 are concerned, certainly issues which are to be decided in the substantive arbitration proceedings cannot be gone into in a petition under Section 9 of the statute. Thus, a question as to whether the agreement between the parties was validly entered into or whether it was validly terminated has to be determined only in the arbitration proceedings and cannot be determined in a petition under Section 9 of the statute. (Ref: 1992 (8) AD (Delhi) 617; 1993 (66) DRJ 239; 1993 (1) RAJ 119 A similar question had arisen before this Court in D. R. Sondhi v. Hella K. G. Hueck and Co D. R. Sondhi v. Hella K. G. Hueck and Co D. R. Sondhi v. Hella K. G. Hueck and Co MANU/D/1524/2991 : 1992 (2) RAJ 28. In para 14 of the judgment, it was held by this Court that the question as to whether the material breach has been committed or not or if there is any breach at all was agitated but it was not gone into for the reason that it is not the question for determination at present. 210. In para 14 of the judgment, it was held by this Court that the question as to whether the material breach has been committed or not or if there is any breach at all was agitated but it was not gone into for the reason that it is not the question for determination at present. 210. This Court while considering the petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration & conciliation Act, 1996 does not have the jurisdiction to return a finding on the merits of a claim made or‘ a dispute raised by the parties before the arbitrator. However, there can be no dispute that this Court is required to examine the existence of a prima facie case on the assertions of the petitioner with regard to the termination of the agreement in the facts and law applicable and as to strength in the petitioners case as to the bindingness and subsistence of the SHA. Irreparable Injury & the Balance of convenience consideration 211. In a judgment at Sociedade de Foemnto Industrial Ltd. v. Ravindranath Subraya Kumat and Others Sociedade de Foemnto Industrial Ltd. v. Ravindranath Subraya Kumat and Others Sociedade de Foemnto Industrial Ltd. v. Ravindranath Subraya Kumat and Others 1999 (4) Bom CR 809, the expression used in clause 4 of the contract which was being considered prohibited the respondent No. l from undertaking any business activity competing with the business of the plaintiff-company. The Court noticed the case of the plaintiff that the activities of the defendants business were of a similar nature to that of the plaintiff and that it was in competition with the business of the plaintiff. However, no other material was placed on record to show that there was any act of competition in the business with the plaintiff-company by the defendant. The plaintiffs had urged that the business of the defendant-company was in competition with the plaintiffs, and that they were not required to produce any further proof of such competition. This contention was rejected by the Court holding thus: “14. While appreciating the above referred contentions of the appellants, one cannot forget that this is a matter pertaining to equitable relief being sought by the appellants. No amount of weakness on the part of defence case can enure to benefit of the plaintiffs to obtain the equitable reliefs. This contention was rejected by the Court holding thus: “14. While appreciating the above referred contentions of the appellants, one cannot forget that this is a matter pertaining to equitable relief being sought by the appellants. No amount of weakness on the part of defence case can enure to benefit of the plaintiffs to obtain the equitable reliefs. It is the duty of the plaintiffs seeking the assistance of the Court for equitable relief, to disclose all the facts which can entitle the plaintiffs to justify the grant of the relief asked for. Once it is not disputed that Clause 4 clearly provides that what is sought to be restrained is the competition by the defendant No. 1 with the business of the plaintiffs company and the grievance of the plaintiff is that there is a violation or breach of the defendant No. 1 of Clause 4 in that regard it is primarily for the appellant company to plead and prima facie establish that there is violation by the defendant No. 1 in respect of Clause 4 in as much as there has been a business by the defendant No. 1 in competition with the business of the plaintiffs companies. It cannot be said that similar business will always amount to competing with each other. Whether one party is competing with another in similar business is a matter of fact and is to be established by producing sufficient material to establish such fact. In order to establish such fact, there must be pleadings on record. Competition will certainly involve doing something with the intention or purpose of gaining upper hand on someone else. Such an act can be done in different ways and methods. Each of such methods can constitute a bundle of facts giving rise to a cause of action to somebody who is aggrieved by the act of competition. But in order to succeed in such suit, it is necessary to plead and prove all such facts which constituted the act of competition Mere allegation that similar business started by the defendants amounts a competition with the business of the plaintiffs company cannot amount to a statement of fact pertaining to the competition. It would be rather a submission on the part of the plaintiff. It would be rather a submission on the part of the plaintiff. For example, in the case of claim of adverse possession it is not just, sufficient to state that the plaintiff is in peaceful possession of the land for over 12 years. It is necessary to state when it became adverse, nature of possession, the fact of the possession being to the knowledge of the owner, etc. Similarly, it is not sufficient to merely allege that the defendants have entered into competition-with the plaintiffs by starting similar business. It is necessary to disclose the facts which constitute the competition with the business of the plaintiffs by the defendants. This will include not only the nature of the business started by the defendants but also the different methods those may be adopted by the defendants for the purpose of competition with the plaintiffs in the similar business.” 31. In the above judgment, the Delhi High Court while dealing with the scope of Section 9 of Act 1996, held that (1) even though Section 9 does not embody the ingredients of Order 38Rule 5 C.P.C., the Court can take guidance from the provisions of Order 39 as well as Order 38; (2) protection under Section 9 can be granted only when a prima facie case is made out and balance of convenience and possibility of irreparable loss and injury is made out. (3) Court has the power to pass an order under Section 9 during the pendency of arbitration or even after the arbitral award but before the award is enforced under Section 36; (4) An order under Section 9 can be passed for preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject matter of the argument or securing the amount in dispute; (5) The powers under Section 9 are much wider than the powers under Section 17 of the Act; (6) Pendency of Section 17 application before the arbitral Tribunal does not denude the Court of its powers to make an order for interim measure under Section 9 of the Act. 32. In Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service and Others Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service and Others Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service and Others ( supra), the Hon‘ble Supreme Court held as under: “12. 32. In Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service and Others Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service and Others Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service and Others ( supra), the Hon‘ble Supreme Court held as under: “12. The arbitrator recorded finding on Issue No. 1 that termination of distributorship by the appellant-Corporation was not validly made under Clause 27. Thereafter, he proceeded to record the finding on Issue No. 2 relating to grant of relief and held that the plaintiff-respondent 1 was entitled to compensation flowing from the breach of contract till the breach was remedied by restoration of distributorship. Restoration of distributorship was granted in view of the peculiar facts of the case on the basis of which it was treated to be an exceptional case for the reasons given. The reasons given state that the Distributorship Agreement was for an indefinite period till terminated in accordance with the terms of the agreement and therefore, the plaintiff-respondent 1 was entitled to continuance of the distributorship till it was terminated in accordance with the agreed terms. The award further says as under: “This award will, however, not fetter the right of the defendant Corporation to terminate the distributorship of the plaintiff in accordance with the terms of the agreement dated 1.4.1976, if and when an occasion arises.” This finding read along with the reasons given in the award clearly accepts that the distributorship could be terminated in accordance with the terms of the agreement dated 1.4.1976, which contains the-aforesaid Clauses 27 and 28. Having said so in the award itself, it is obvious that the arbitrator held the distributorship to be revokable in accordance with Clauses 27 and 28 of the agreement. It is in this sense that the award describes the Distributorship Agreement as one for an indefinite period, that is, till terminated in accordance with Clauses 27 and 28. The finding in the award being that the Distributorship Agreement was revokable and the same being admittedly for rendering personal service, the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act were automatically attracted. Sub-section (1) Section 14 of the Specific relief Act specifies the contracts which cannot be specifically enforced one of which is a contract which is in its nature determinable‘. Sub-section (1) Section 14 of the Specific relief Act specifies the contracts which cannot be specifically enforced one of which is a contract which is in its nature determinable‘. In the present case, it is not necessary to refer to the other clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 14, which also may be attracted in the present case since clause (c) clearly applies on the finding red with reasons given in the award itself that the contract by its nature is determinable. This being so granting the relief of restoration of the distributorship even on the finding that the breach was committed by the appellant-Corporation is contrary to the mandate in Section 14(1) of the Specific Relief Act and these is an error of law apparent on the face of the award which is stated to be made according to the law governing such cases.‘ The grant of this relief in the award cannot therefore, be sustained. 14. The question now is of the relief which could be granted by the arbitrator on its finding that termination of the distributorship was not validly made under Clause 27 of the agreement. No doubt, the notice of termination of distributorship dated 11.3.1983 specified the several acts of the distributor on which the termination was based and there were complaints to that effect made against the distributor which had the effect of prejudicing the reputation of the appellant-Corporation; and such acts would permit exercise of the right of termination of distributorship under Clause 27. However, the arbitrator having held that Clause 27 was not available to the appellant-Corporation, the question of grant of relief on that finding has to proceed on that basis. In such a situation, the agreement being revokable by either party in accordance with Clause 28 by giving 39 days notice, the only relief which could be granted was the , award of compensation for the period of notice, that is, 39 days. The plaintiff-respondent 1 is, therefore, entitled to compensation being the loss of earnings for the notice period of 39 days instead of restoration of the distributorship. The award has, therefore, to be modified accordingly. The compensation for 39 days, notice period from 11.3.1983 is to be calculated on the basis of earnings during that period disclosed from the records of the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.” 33. The award has, therefore, to be modified accordingly. The compensation for 39 days, notice period from 11.3.1983 is to be calculated on the basis of earnings during that period disclosed from the records of the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.” 33. In the above judgment, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court held that when the distributorship agreement is revokable and the same being admittedly for rendering personal service, the provisions of Specific Relief Act are automatically attracted and sub-section (1) of Section 14 of Specific Relief Act specifies the contracts which cannot be specifically enforced and one of which is a contract which is in its nature determinable. 34. In Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon‘ble Supreme Court held as under at p. 86 of MLJ: “9. Learned counsel for O.M.M. Private Limited submitted that Section 9 leaves it to a party to approach the Court for certain interim measures and it enables the Court to pass orders by way of interim measures of protection in respect of the matters enumerated therein. Neither this Section nor the Act elsewhere has provided the conditions for grant of such interim protection leaving it to the Court to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it as a Court in it as a Court to adjudge whether any protective measure is called for. In that context, neither the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure not the provisions of the Specific Relief Act can be kept out: while the Court considers the question whether on the facts of a case, any order by way of interim measure of protection should be granted. So, the Court had necessarily to. consider the balance of convenience the question whether atleast a triable issue arises if not the establishment of a prima faciecase by the applicant before it and the other well known restrictions on the grant of interim orders, like the principle that a contract of personal service would not be specifically enforced or that no injunction would be granted in certain circumstances as envisaged by Section 14 and Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. Thus, it was contended that, grant of an injunction by way of interim measure to permit Adhunit Steels to carry on the mining operations pending the arbitration proceedings notwithstanding the termination of the contract by O.M.M. Private Limited was not permissible in law. 10. Thus, it was contended that, grant of an injunction by way of interim measure to permit Adhunit Steels to carry on the mining operations pending the arbitration proceedings notwithstanding the termination of the contract by O.M.M. Private Limited was not permissible in law. 10. It is true that Section 9 of the Act speaks of the Court by way of an interim custody or sale of any goods, which are the subject matter of the arbitration agreement and such interim measure, of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. The grant of an interim prohibitory injunction or an interim mandatory injunction are governed by well known rules and it is difficult to imagine that the legislature while enacting Section 9 of the Act intended to make a provision which was de hors the accepted principles that governed the grant of an interim injunction. Same is the position regarding the appointment of a receiver since the Section itself brings in, the concept of just and convenient‘ while speaking of passing any interim measure of protection. The concluding words of the Section, “and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose and in relation to any proceedings before it” also suggest that the normal rules that govern the Court in the grant of interim orders is not sought to be jettisoned by the provision. . Moreover, when a part is given a right to approach an ordinary Court of the country without providing a special procedure or a special set of rules in that behalf, the ordinary rules followed by that Court would govern the exercise of power conferred by the Act. On that basis also, it is not possible to keep out the concept of balance of convenience, prima facie case, irreparable injury and the concept of just” and convenient while passing interim measures under Section 9 of the Act. 11. The power and jurisdiction of Courts in arbitral matters has been the subject of much discussion. The relationship between Courts and Arbitral Tribunals have been said to swing between forced cohabitation and true partnership. The process of arbitration is dependant on the underlying support of the Courts who alone has the power to rescue the system when one party seeks to sabotage it. The relationship between Courts and Arbitral Tribunals have been said to swing between forced cohabitation and true partnership. The process of arbitration is dependant on the underlying support of the Courts who alone has the power to rescue the system when one party seeks to sabotage it. The position was stated by LORD MUSTIL in Coppee Levalin NV v. Ken-Ren Fertilisers and Chemicals Coppee Levalin NV v. Ken-Ren Fertilisers and Chemicals Coppee Levalin NV v. Ken-Ren Fertilisers and Chemicals , 1994 (2) Lloyds Report 109 at 116: “there is plainly a tension here. On the one hand the concept of arbitration as a consensual process reinforced by the ideas 6f transnationalism leans against the involvement of the mechanisms of state through the. medium of a municipal Court. On the other side there is a plain fact, palatable or not, that it is only a Court possessing coercive powers which could rescue the arbitration if it is in danger of oundering” In CONSERVATORY AND PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 9th Joint colloquim, LORD MUSTIL in COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS described the relationship further: “Ideally, the handling of arbitral disputes should resemble a rely race. In the initial stages, before the arbitrators are seized of the dispute, the baton is in the grasp of the Court; for at that stage there is no other organization which could take steps to prevent the arbitration agreement from being ineffectual. When the arbitrators take charge they take over the baton and retain it until they have ‘made an‘ award. At this point, having no longer a function to fulfill, the arbitrators hand back the baton so that the Court can in case of need lend its coercive powers to the enforcement of the award.” It is in the above background that one has to consider the power of the Court approached under the Arbitration Act for interim relief or interim protection. 13. Injunction is a form of specific relief. It is an order of a Court requiring a party either to do a Specific Act or acts or to refrain from doing a Specific Act or acts either for a limited period or without limit of time. In relation to a breach of contract, the proper remedy against a defendant who acts in breach of his obligations under a contract, is either damages or Specific Relief. In relation to a breach of contract, the proper remedy against a defendant who acts in breach of his obligations under a contract, is either damages or Specific Relief. The two principal varieties of specific relief are, decree of Specific Relief Act, 1963 was intended to be “An Act to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific relief.” Specific Relief is relief in specie. ‘It is a remedy which aims at the exact fulfilment of an obligation. According to DR. BANERJEE in his TAGORE LAW LECTURES ON SPECIFIC RELIEF, the remedy for the non-performance of a duty are: (1) compensatory, (2) specific. In the former, the Court awards damages for breach of the obligation. In .the latter, it directs the party in default to do or forbear from doing. The law of specific relief is said to be, in its essence, a part of the law of procedure, for, specific relief is a form of judicial redress. Thus, the Specific Relief Act, 1963 purports to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific reliefs obtainable in Civil Courts. It does not deal with the remedies connected with compensatory reliefs except as incidental and to a limited extent. The right to relief of injunctions is contained in Part-III of the Specific Relief Act. Section 36 provides that preventive relief may be granted at the discretion of the Court by injunction temporary or perpetual. Section 38 indicates when perpetual injunctions are granted and Section 39 indicates when mandatory injunctions are granted. Section 40 provides that damages may be awarded either in lieu of or in addition to injunctions. Section 41 provides for contingencies when an injunction cannot be granted. Section 42 enables,- notwithstanding anything contained in Section 41, particularly clause (e) providing that no injunction can be granted to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced, the granting of an injunction to perform a negative covenant. Thus, the power to grant injunction to perform a negative covenant. Thus, the power to grant injunctions by way of specific relief is covered by the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 35. Thus, the power to grant injunction to perform a negative covenant. Thus, the power to grant injunctions by way of specific relief is covered by the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 35. In the above decision, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court held that it is not possible to keep out the concept of balance convenience, prima facie case, irreparable injury and the concept of just and convenient while passing interim measures under Section 9 of the Act. The Supreme Court further held that the power to grant injunction by way of Specific Relief is covered by the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 36. In (2002) Vol 112 Comp. Cases 630, this Court held that where an agreement gives a clear right to either party to terminate the agreement, by giving not less than one months notice in writing to the other party and one of the parties has given such notice, having regard to Section 14(l)(a) & (c) and 41 (e) of the Specific Relief Act, an interim order restraining the termination of agreement 39 pending arbitration cannot be granted. 37. In the light of the above legal principles, now let me consider the facts of the present case. 38. As already narrated the clauses contained in the distributorship agreement especially Clause 28 and 29 permit the corporation as well as to any party to the agreement to terminate the agreement. If such being so, the provisions of Specific Relief Act will hold the field and this Court under Section 9 of the Act 1996 cannot enforce the Specific performance of the Contract by directing the corporation to continue the agency till the arbitration proceedings are completed. 39. Further, I do not find a prima facie case in favour of the applicant as she herself admitted that the agreement of sale entered into with her by S.M. Farooq is for a property which was already sold and she came to know about that only later on and at the time of submitting the copy of the agreement of sale, she did not know whether the vendor has got legal title or not. 40. Apart from that she alleged the illegal activities of the first empanelled person and her estranged husband in creating document to take vengeance on her. 41. 40. Apart from that she alleged the illegal activities of the first empanelled person and her estranged husband in creating document to take vengeance on her. 41. These allegations ought to be proved before the arbitrator by letting in evidence and this Court cannot go into the allegations at the stage of Section 9 application. 42. The Judgments relied on by the learned senior counsel are for the proposition that the writ petition is still maintainable even though there is an arbitration clause available in the agreement in the appropriate cases. There is no quarrel about it. But the applicant did not appeal against the order the learned single Judge dismissing her writ petition not maintainable and directing her to go before the Tribunal. Having decided to initiate arbitration proceedings, it is not open to the applicant to rely on these judgments to contend that the writ petition is maintainable. 43. Further, I find almost that balance of conveniences almost in her favour. Admittedly, the properties were returned to the corporation after the termination of the agreement and the existing customers were directed to take their refills from another agency and this arrangement has been going on since the order of termination. 44. In view of the above facts and settled legal principles, I am not inclined to grant the reliafs prayed for by the applicant in her Section 9 application. Hence, they deserve to be dismissed. Accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the applications filed by the corporation are allowed. 45. In the result, O.A. No. 441 and 442 of 2008 are dismissed. A. Nos. 571 and 572 of 2008 are allowed. No costs. Before, parting with the case, it is made clear that the observations made in the order is only for the purpose of disposing Section 9 application and they do not come in the way of the proposed arbitration proceedings and the arbitrator has to pass orders on merits uninfluenced by the observations made in this order.