JUDGMENT (Surinder Singh, J.) - The landlord-petitioners have filed this revision petition feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order of the learned Appellate Authority (II) Shimla passed in CMA No. 72-S/14 of 1997 decided on 28th November, 2001 whereby the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller (I) Shimla in Rent Petition No. 43-2 of 1991 dated 30.9.1997 against the respondent-tenant was set aside and the petition for eviction was dismissed mainly on the ground that the premises in question fell within the definition of “public premises”, and it is the `Public Premises Act’ and not the `Rent Control Act’, which was applicable to the facts of this case. 2.Precisely, the facts giving rise to the instant revision petition may be noticed thus. The petitioners are the landlords of five storeyed building, known as ‘Ramesh Bhawan’, situated at Jakhu, Shimla-1, hereinafter to be referred as ‘suit premises’. The landlords let out the ‘suit premises’ to the respondent-Bank in the year 1979 for housing its officers and employees along with their families. It has eight residential sets alongwith two stores on the ground floor. Monthly rent of the suit premises was fixed at Rs. 5,250/- as alleged by the petitioners. However, no formal rent deed was executed inter se the parties. The petitioners had also sent a notice terminating the tenancy of the respondent and hand over its possession. The respondents did not vacate the suit premises. Thus the petitioners sought eviction of the respondent-Bank under the “H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987” in short the “Rent Act” on the ground of bonaifde use and occupation, as they did not have any residential house or property within the municipal area of Shimla Town preceding five years from the date of filing, the petition for eviction. 3.The aforesaid petition for eviction was resisted and contested by the respondent-Bank. According to them they had sent the suitable reply to the notice. The respondent-Bank took up the objections that the tenancy of the respondent-Bank is composite i.e. partly for residential and partly for commercial purpose and the petition was not properly verified, therefore, eviction by the petitioners could not be sought on the grounds pleaded. 4.The petitioners herein had filed a rejoinder to the above reply whereby they refuted the objections, raised by the respondent-Bank and reiterated even paras of their petition elaborating their stand. 4.The petitioners herein had filed a rejoinder to the above reply whereby they refuted the objections, raised by the respondent-Bank and reiterated even paras of their petition elaborating their stand. 5.On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues on 12.11.1993; 1. Whether the petitioners require the premises in question for their own use and occupation, as alleged ? OPP 2. Whether the petition is not property verified ? If so its effect ? OPR 3. Relief. 6.The petitioners, to prove their case, examined their witnesses. The respondent-Bank did not produce any witness but only tendered documents Ex.RA to Ex.RE, mark X and Mark Y in their evidence. 7.After hearing the parties and appreciating their contentions, the learned Rent Controller decided issue No. 1 in favour of the petitioners and issue No. 2 against the respondents-Bank. Consequently, he passed the order of eviction, qua the suit premises, which were occupied for residential purpose except two stores on the basement against the respondent-Bank. 8.Dissatisfied with the eviction order, the respondent-Bank filed an appeal before the learned Appellate Authority (II), Shimla, on the ground that the learned Rent Controller had wrongly appreciated the evidence on record, therefore, eviction order was unsustainable. 9.The learned Appellate Authority framed the following points for determination :- 1. Whether the provisions of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 are applicable to the tenanted premises, which is admittedly taken on lease by the appellant/tenant i.e. State Bank of India Zonal Officer, Lakhar Bazar, Shimla ? 2. Whether the findings of the learned Rent Controller are liable to be interfered with ? 3. Relief. 10.After hearing the parties, the learned Appellate Authority held that the main purpose for which the demised premises were/are being used is the determining factor. The Rent Controller should have seen whether the said premises were being used mainly for the purpose of business or trade. On facts, the Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the building in question was being used for residence purposes by the tenant-State Bank of India, thus merely because a small part of the building is being used as store for keeping stationery etc. the demised premises cannot be termed to be partly residential and partly non-residential. On facts, the Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the building in question was being used for residence purposes by the tenant-State Bank of India, thus merely because a small part of the building is being used as store for keeping stationery etc. the demised premises cannot be termed to be partly residential and partly non-residential. However, the Appellate Authority found and held that the respondent-Bank is a body corporate, duly constituted under the Central Enactment thus the ‘suit premises’ fell within the mischief of Section 2(e) of “Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971”, to be referred as ‘Public Premises Act’ for the sake of brevity, therefore, the provisions of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, in short the ‘Rent Act’, would not apply, as such the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller was set aside and ordered to dismiss the petition, filed by the landlords for eviction. Consequently, the appeal of the respondent-Bank was allowed. 11.Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment of the learned Appellate Authority, the landlord-petitioners filed the present revision petition inter alia on the ground firstly, that the learned Appellate Authority had wrongly gone into the question of applicability of the ‘Public Premises Act’ in the absence of the specific ground taken in the reply before the learned Rent Controller and also in appeal by the respondent-Bank and secondly the ‘suit premises’ did not fall within the purview of ‘Public Premises’ qua the private landlords therefore, the impugned judgment of the learned First appellate authority is wrong, which has caused miscarriage of justice and the order passed by the learned Rent Controller was to be restored. 12.After hearing the parties, this Court vide its judgment dated 5.6.2008 passed in this revision petition held that the legal plea can be taken at any stage of the proceedings of the case or appeal, even in the absence of the specific plea taken in the grounds of appeal, therefore, this argument raised on first point on behalf of the landlords was rejected, but insofar as the question of applicability of ‘Public Premises Act’ in the facts and circumstances of this case are concerned, I differed with the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench of this court rendered in New Bank of India and others v. Sukhbir Singh Sethi and others, 1998(2) Cur.L.J. (H.P.) 69, as such made the reference to the larger Bench on the following question :- “Whether the “Public Premises Act” would apply to a private landlord for seeking the vacation of the leased premises in favour of the Government/Statutory body, situated in an urban area ?” 13.After discussing the various judicial pronouncements and examining the provisions of the ‘Public Premises Act’, the Division Bench of this Court answered the above reference in the following manner :- “In view of the above stated position, we are of the considered view that the judgment of learned Single Judge in New Bank of India and others v. Sukhbir Singh Sethi and another, 1998(2) Cur.L.J. (H.P.) 69 is not based on correct interpretation of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, besides being per incurium, because the learned Single Judge did not take into consideration other provisions of the Act, particularly Section 2(g), of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, besides being per incurium, because the learned Single Judge did not take into consideration other provisions of the Act, particularly Section 2(g), Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The said judgment is hereby over-ruled. The said judgment is hereby over-ruled. We answer the point, referred to us, as follows :- Where some premises are let out by a person to the Government or a statutory body, referred to in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and that person later on seeks to recover the possession of the leased property, the remedy open to him is either under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, if the premises are situated outside the limits of urban area, or under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, if the premises are situated in urban area, and not under the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 or the Himachal Pradesh Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971.” 14.Admittedly, the premises in question are located in the urban area and the provisions of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act 1987 would apply for the eviction of the respondent-tenant. 15.After the receipt of the record, the matter was re-heard. According to Shri R.L. Sood, Senior Advocate, the learned Appellate Authority had already held that suit premises are one and single composite tenancy and the main purpose for which the demised premises are being used is a determining factor, since the premises in question were being used in the present case, mainly for the purpose of residence and the respondent-tenant had surrendered the possession of one shop and the another was being used by them as a store, therefore, the vacation of the premises which is held by the respondents as tenants are required to be vacated on the ground that the petitioners-landlords required the said premises for their own use and occupation for which there is an unrebutted evidence on record. 16.Contra Shri L.C. Sood, learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank has argued that the petition was filed in the year 1991 and now with the lapse of time the ground which was taken for eviction of the premises may not be existing today, therefore, the matter is required to be remanded back to the Rent Controller for redetermining this issue. It is also argued that it is wrong to say that the respondent-Bank did not lead any evidence to rebut the case of the landlords, though no oral evidence except the documentary evidence was led before the learned Rent Controller, which is sufficient to non-suit the landlords. It is also argued that it is wrong to say that the respondent-Bank did not lead any evidence to rebut the case of the landlords, though no oral evidence except the documentary evidence was led before the learned Rent Controller, which is sufficient to non-suit the landlords. 17.I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions of the parties and have carefully examined the record. 18.As a matter of fact, the respondent-tenant had filed an appeal against the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller before the learned Appellate Authority, on the ground that the premises in question were partly non-residential and the entire building comprising of two shops and eight residential sets were let out to them on rent initially at the rate of 4,200/- per month which was later enhanced to Rs. 5,200/- per month including municipal taxes, which could not have been split. This fact goes contrary to their letter Ex.PW1/C wherein they mentioned the lease of eight sets to them. On the examination of the record, I also find that the petitioners have sought eviction of the respondent tenant from the residential premises let out to them. Om Prakash PW1 has categorically stated that the stores were not let out to the respondents. Further notice Ex.RA and other correspondence Ex.RB to Ex.PE admitted to have been sent by PW1 Om Prakash makes this position very clear. Further in letters Ex.PW1/A to K parties have referred to the suit premises as residential. Moreover, the eviction was passed qua the residential premises except shops, therefore, this point is answered against the respondent-Bank. 19.The next question is whether the ground of eviction which existed at the time of filing of the petition is not existing now and whether the case is required to be remanded back to the learned Rent Controller on the issue in question. 20.In fact the landlord petitioners have led their evidence before the Rent Controller. Om Prakash PW1 and PW3 Rajiv Sood, have testified on oath that the premises were required for their own use and occupation, as petitioner No. 2 Rajiv Sood is a married person and is a Chartered Accountant. In the year 1996 when his statement was recorded his son was 2 years of age and petitioner No. 5 Puneet Sood who is a shopkeeper, is also a married person and his daughter was 2 years of age. In the year 1996 when his statement was recorded his son was 2 years of age and petitioner No. 5 Puneet Sood who is a shopkeeper, is also a married person and his daughter was 2 years of age. They categorically deposed that petitioners No. 2 to 5 were not having any building within the municipal area. In their cross-examination, these facts were not assailed. The letter Ex.RE relied upon by the respondent-Bank also makes the position clear that premises were required for the use of the petitioners as they have become of marriageable age. The respondent-Bank did not lead any evidence in rebuttal to issue No. 1, therefore, the petitioner-landlords were rightly held to be entitled to evict the respondent-tenant with respect to the residential premises let out to them. 21.Accordingly, for the reasons aforesaid, the dismissal of the petition ordered by the first Appellate Court is set aside and the order of eviction dated 30.9.1997 passed by the learned Rent Controller is hereby restored. Consequently, the revision petition is allowed. 22.The respondent-tenant is hereby ordered to be evicted from the suit premises, as the petitioner-landlords requires the same for their use and occupation and the respondent-tenant shall put the petitioners-landlords in possession of the demised premises within three months from today. The petitioners-landlords are at liberty to seek the vacation of the store(s), if not already vacated through the process of the civil court. 23.In result, the revision petition is allowed. Civil Revision No. 23 of 2002 5.11.2008Present : Mr. Vikas Rajput, Advocate, vice counsel for the petitioners. Mr. Dinesh Thakur, Advocate vice Mr. L.C. Sood, Advocate, for the respondent. It is pointed out by the Registry that the title of the revision petition should have been “Rajeev Sood and others v. State Bank of India” instead of “Om Parkash and others v. State Bank of India.” I have gone through the records of the case. In fact Om Parkash Sood one of the petitioners had died and his name was ordered to be deleted from the array of the petitioners vide order dated 9.12.2004. Since there appears to be a clerical mistake, it be corrected and shall be read as “Rajeev Sood and others v. State Bank of India” instead of “Om Parkash and others v. State Bank of India.” The Registry is directed to carry out the necessary correction in the title of the revision petition. Since there appears to be a clerical mistake, it be corrected and shall be read as “Rajeev Sood and others v. State Bank of India” instead of “Om Parkash and others v. State Bank of India.” The Registry is directed to carry out the necessary correction in the title of the revision petition. M.R.B. ———————