JUDGMENT Per Manik Mohan Sarkar, J. :- This matter has been directed against the judgment and order dated November 13, 1997 passed by the learned Judge, Employees Insurance Court, West Bengal in Case No. 33 of 1988. In brief, the petitioner's case is that the Insurance Inspector of the petitioner Corporation visited the factory of opposite party at Birlapur, P.O. Birlapur within the District of 24-Parganas (South) in between the period from 17.6.1986 to 19.6.1986 for the purpose of inspection of records of the factory covering the period from June, 1984 to January, 1985 and reported that he found the employees of the said factory were paid overtime allowances for the period from 27.1.1985 to 31.3.1986 amount to Rs. 13,67,560.42 p. but the opposite parties did not pay any contribution on the said sum, an amount of Rs. 99,148/- being @ 7.25%. Petitioner Corporation issued letter vide No. C/Ins. - V/41-4203/978-79 dated 21.8.1986 to the opposite party requesting them to pay the amount of said contribution. The opposite parties disputed and claimed the overtime allowances as not being wages within the meaning of section 2(22) of the Act in their letter vide No. Fib./ESIC/2284 dated 16.9.1986. Petitioner Corporation intimated the opposite party in its letter vide No. 41-4203-12/INS-V/1410 dated 14.11.1986 that in view of the judgment by the Hon'ble Supreme Court overtime payments were wages within the meaning of the said section. Subsequently, Petitioner Corporation issued another letter bearing No. C/Ins-V/41-4203/1-307/195 dated 2.2.1985 calling upon the opposite party to pay the said amount on contribution of Rs. 99,148/- for the period from January, 1985 to March, 1986 within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the said letter failing which recovery of the said amount together with interest would be done as arrear of land revenue provided under section 45 of the said Act. Even then the opposite party failed and neglected to pay the said sum and so the petitioner Corporation made a requisition being No. C/Ins-V/41-4203(1)/303 before the Collector, 24-Parganas at Alipore under section 5 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 for recovery of the sum of Rs. 1,08,682.85 p., together with interest and also for further interest @ 16.52 on and from 11.3.1988. 1,08,682.85 p., together with interest and also for further interest @ 16.52 on and from 11.3.1988. Being aggrieved by the said requisition/notice dated 10th March, 1988 the opposite party made an application before Employees' Insurance Court, West Bengal under section 75 of the said Act, on or about 18th April, 1988, praying for a declaration, inter alia, that the opposite party was not liable to pay the said sum of Rs. 1,08,682.85 p. or any portion thereof as contribution of overtime payments and that the said requisition/notice dated 10.3.1988 was invalid, illegal, void and unenforceable in law. The present petitioner - Corporation contested the said case being No. 33 of 1988 by filing its written statement and claimed therein that 'wages' has been defined in section 2(22) of the said Act and it is there in the Statute Book since 1948 followed by change of that definition by way of amendment by Act, 53 of 1951 and Act, 44 of 1966, the last amendment being effective on and from 28.1.1968. It is the further case of the petitioner that prior to 1979 different High Courts as well as Hon'ble Apex Court held to the effect that overtime payment was 'wages' within the moaning of section 2(22) of the said Act and claimed that the decision of the Division Bench of this High Court in Hindusthan Motors Case along with the doctrine of prospective overruling do not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is the further case of the petitioner that the overtime payment was/is 'wages' paid or payable to the employees, covered under the said Act with effect from the date when the said Act came into force in 1948 and not from the date when the sain Bench decision of the Hon'ble Court was delivered in 1979. In such circumstances, the position of the employer came to the stage of deducting and/or pay ESI contributions on overtime payments made to the employees during the relevant period. In such circumstances, the position of the employer came to the stage of deducting and/or pay ESI contributions on overtime payments made to the employees during the relevant period. Case No. 33 of 1988 came up for hearing before the learned Judge, Employees Insurance Court, West Bengal on or about 5.11.1997 and the learned Judge subsequently passed judgment and order on 13th November, 1997 by allowing the application of the respondent as petitioner there and declared the impugned notice issued by the present petitioner claiming contribution towards overtime payment from January, 1985 to September, 1986, as illegal, inoperative and bad in law. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order the petitioner filed the present application claiming that the learned Judge failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested upon it by law in not directing the opposite party to pay LSI contribution as claimed by the present petitioner in the concerned notice and has acted illegally and with material irregularity and also in excess of jurisdiction giving upon the said Court in declaring the contribution of overtime payment for the period from January, 1985 to March, 1986 as illegal, inoperative and bad in law and the learned Judge has wrongly applied the doctrine of prospective overruling in the facts and circumstances of the present case since the reliance by the learned Judge of the trial Court on the decision of this High Court in Hindusthan Motors Case which was overruled by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court and was not a good law when the impugned case being No. 33 of 1988 before the learned trial Judge was being heard. In course of hearing of the present application two questions cropped up for decision by this Court are as follows : (i) Whether the company/employer is liable to make contribution to the petitioner - corporation over the amount of overtime payment made to its employees ? (ii) If the employee is liable to make contribution, whether it should be prospective or retrospective ? (iii) Whether the impugned order can be challenged within the jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution ? Submission and counter - submission from both the sides has been made over the liability of the respondent in making such contribution to the petitioner - corporation on payment for overtime work to its employees. (iii) Whether the impugned order can be challenged within the jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution ? Submission and counter - submission from both the sides has been made over the liability of the respondent in making such contribution to the petitioner - corporation on payment for overtime work to its employees. From the side of the petitioner - corporation it was a strong submission that the provision of section 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 gives a definition of 'wages' and thereby, among other allowances, the overtime allowance paid to the employees, from time to time, has been included within the said definition of 'wages'. On the other hand, from the side of the opposite party it was initially denied that the opposite party had no liability to make such contribution on overtime payment and if the opposite party is found at all liable to make such payment, it cannot be with retrospective effect covering the claim of contribution for the period from January 1985 to September, 1986. Initiating submission on his part on behalf of the petitioner - corporation, Mr. Subal Maitra, learned advocate representing it, submitted with reference to section 40 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 whereby the provision of law entrusted an obligation on the principal employer to pay in respect of every employee, both the employer's contribution and the employees' contribution irrespective of the nature of employment either made by him or by or through an immediate employer. In this respect, it is the further submission of Maitra that the definition of 'wages' as given in section 2(22) of the Act, has not been defined exhaustively and claimed that the overtime payment comes within the said definition of 'wages' on the principle that remuneration paid or payable in cash to an employee on the terms of contract of employment, express or implied including other additional remuneration. In this connection, Mr. Maitra also refers to the provision of section 9(iii)(b) of the Act for defining an 'employee' in the present context meaning any person employed for 'wages' in or in connection with the work of factory or establishment to which this Act applies and not to include any person so employed whose wages (excluding remuneration for overtime work) except such wages as may be prescribed by the Central Government in a month. In referring to the said provision of law, Mr. In referring to the said provision of law, Mr. Maitra submitted that the provision therein is very much clear to show that remuneration for overtime work comes within the purview of 'wages'. For the opposite party Mr. P. S. Sengupta, learned senior advocate representing if submitted in a modest way that the financial duty of the present opposite party will be as per provision of law in that respect. It is his submission that the opposite party employer never disregarded the legal provision and/or obligation upon it to make contribution to the petitioner - corporation as and when required. Though initially the stand of the opposite party before the learned trial Court was in respect of denial of any obligation of the opposite party to make any contribution in respect of amount paid for overtime work claiming the same as not included within the term 'wages'. Mr. Sengupta submitted that the provision of section 2(22) of the Act is not exhaustive nor any other provision of the Employees' State Insurance Act has given any hint specifically that the employer has got the liability to contribute rateably towards the remuneration paid for overtime work to the employees, to the petitioner - corporation and that the said obligation or liability upon the employer has been interpreted by different Hon'ble Courts in different decisions. Mr. Sengupta submitted that his client relied upon the interpretation of the 'wages', whether it includes emoluments for overtime work, on the basis of the provision of the Act in that respect since the definition of 'wages' as provided in section 2(22) of the Act has not exhaustively or specifically included payment towards overtime work. It is further submitted by him that the opposite party employer got alerted in respect of liability to make contribution on payment of overtime work sooner after the interpretation of the provision of section 2(22) of the Act as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court and since then the opposite party is making regular contribution in that regard. Though the respective parties made reliance upon different decisions of different Hon'ble Courts including Hon'ble Apex Court, the controversy over the liability of the opposite party towards the making contribution in respect of payment for overtime work has been eliminated when Mr. Though the respective parties made reliance upon different decisions of different Hon'ble Courts including Hon'ble Apex Court, the controversy over the liability of the opposite party towards the making contribution in respect of payment for overtime work has been eliminated when Mr. Sengupta submitted that the earlier stand of the respondent about its denial of liability for such contribution is not there in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. & Ors. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Ors. as reported in 1997 I CLR 193 SC. This decision has been relied upon by both the sides. Mr. Subal Maitra, learned advocate for the petitioner Corporation clarified his claim on the basis of the said decision as being the clear interpretation of the definition of 'wages' as provided in section 2(22) of the Act. Mr. Sengupta, on the other hand, by giving a respectful reliance upon the said decision, submitted that the liability of his client cannot be denied after such interpretation by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Continuing his submission, Mr. Sengupta submitted that though the opposite party does not deny its liability to make contribution over the amount paid for overtime work to the employees, it is claimed that such liability should not be forced upon the opposite party to make contribution for the period in the past before the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. & Ors. (supra) since the opposite party employer acted at the dictum of the decision of the Court as reported in 1979 (1) CLJ 503 in the case of M/s. Hindusthan Motors Limited v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Ors. wherein the Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta clearly held that "Overtime payments were not wages under the Employees' State Insurance Act and as such overtime payments should be disregarded while calculating the quantum of contribution payable by the employer". It is the submission of Mr. Sengupta that since the definition of 'wages' in section 2(22) of the Act has not given any hint that the amount of payment for overtime work comes within the purview of wages, the opposite party acted as per interpretation of the term 'wages' as given by the Hon'ble Court in the above referred decision. It is the submission of Mr. Sengupta that since the definition of 'wages' in section 2(22) of the Act has not given any hint that the amount of payment for overtime work comes within the purview of wages, the opposite party acted as per interpretation of the term 'wages' as given by the Hon'ble Court in the above referred decision. Though both the parties relied upon another decision reported in AIR 1984 Supreme Court 1680 in the case M/s. Harihar Polyfibre v. Regional Director, ESI Corporation. Mr. Sengupta specifically submitted in reference to the said decision that while deciding term 'wages' by the Hon'ble Apex Court it was stated to include specifically House Rent Allowance, Night Shift Allowance, Heat, Gas & Dust Allowance and Incentive Allowance with specific terms but the payment of overtime allowance has not been specifically mentioned there to come within the purview of the term 'wages'. Mr. Sengupta submitted that the liability of the opposite party employer for contribution to the Corporation over the amount for overtime work should be limited for the period on and from the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Limited & Ors. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Ors. as reported in 1997 I CLR 193 SC (supra) in the nature of prospective operation of the said liability. In that case first deduction as claimed by the Corporation should be waived. Mr. Sengupta, further submitted that first the opposite party is directed to contribute the past deduction to be contributed, as claimed by the Corporation, severe complication would arise since the employees may hesitate over the said deduction and a labour unrest may ensure (sic ensue). It is further submitted that such claim of the Corporation is absurd in all jurisprudential thought. As it transpires from the respective parties' submissions that the opposite party acknowledged its liability to make the contribution proportionately for the amount claimed towards overtime work and claimed the liability to be fixed from the date after the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in IDPL case, a controversy has been placed for discussion and decision as to whether the said liability of the opposite party should be assessed either retrospectively or prospectively. It is fact that the definition of 'wages' as given under section 2(22) of the Act is not exhaustive since it included all remunerations paid or payable in cash to an employee. If the terms of the contract of employment express or implied were fulfilled. This definition of 'wages' has been decided in different decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court. Earlier, as already discussed in previous paragraphs, the Hon'ble Apex Court defined 'wages' in M/s. Harihar Poly-fibres v. The Regional Director. ESI Corporation that it includes House Rent Allowance, Night Shift Allowance and Incentive Allowance. Though, in the said decision the inclusion of payment towards overtime allowance has not been specifically mentioned that the Hon'ble Court viewed in reference to the definition of 'wages' in section 2(22) of the Act to include remunerations paid or payable under the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, but further extending to that additional remuneration, if any, paid at intervals not exceeding two months, through oversight the terms of employment. The overtime allowance was not made a specific step for discussion by the parties before the Hon'ble Apex Court. But the said definition of wages was further cleared by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision reported in (1997) I CLR 193 SC, in the case of Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. & Ors. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Ors. (supra) wherein the said decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Harihar Polyfibres was followed and in the said decision in IDPL case, the Hon'ble Court held that - "The contract of employment is entered into only at the initial entry into the service. In the course of the employment, as and when the employer finds the need to have work done expeditiously, in addition to the normal work during the course of the working hours, the employer offers to the employee to do overtime work after the working hours. When an employee does overtime work, it amounts to acceptance of the same. There emerges concluded implied contract between the employer and employee. There is no need to write on each occasion separately on the letter of appointment. It becomes an integral part of original or revised contract of employment from time to time. The employer is obligated to pay wages when the employee does work. There emerges concluded implied contract between the employer and employee. There is no need to write on each occasion separately on the letter of appointment. It becomes an integral part of original or revised contract of employment from time to time. The employer is obligated to pay wages when the employee does work. This will be, in addition to payment of the wages he receives for normal work. In other words, both the remunerations received during the working hours and overtime constitute composite wages and thereby it is a wage within the meaning of section 2(22) of the Act." In doing so, the Hon'ble Apex Court in IDPL Case as discussed the decision of this Hon'ble Court in Hindusthan Motors Ltd. v. ESI Corporation and viewed that the said Hon'ble Calcutta High Court "being applied technical rules of construction, namely, the legislature does not expressly say so and, therefore, remuneration paid for overtime work is not wages. We think that the approach adopted by this High Court is clearly unsustainable and illegal". Thus, the said view of this High Court taken in Hindusthan Motors Case was overruled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in IDPL case. Now, question remains to decide whether the decision in IDPL case will operate prospectively or retrospectively ascertaining the liability of the employer to make contribution to the Corporation in respect of amount paid for overtime work by the employees. To decide this question, it is to be ascertained what was the nature of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in IDPL case. Before going to scrutinise the finding of the learned trial Judge, the meaning of prospective operation is to be ascertained. In respect of legislation or enactment of any law, the past question of retrospective loss and thus in which the date of commencement is earlier than enactment. As per interpretation of the statute, a statute does not become a retrospective one because a part of requisites for its action is drawn from the time antecedent to its passing. 'Retrospective' means looking backward having reference to state of things exist, before the act in question retrospective statute contemplates the past and gives to a previous transaction some different legal effects from that which it had under the law when it occurred or transpired. 'Retrospective' means looking backward having reference to state of things exist, before the act in question retrospective statute contemplates the past and gives to a previous transaction some different legal effects from that which it had under the law when it occurred or transpired. In respect of any legislation, it is, prima facie, prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. In IDPL case, the Hon'ble Court has not stated that the decision held by the said Court in defining the term 'wages' to include amount paid for overtime work, to be prospective or retrospective since the Hon'ble Court interpreted the said term 'wages' as it is exhaustive in section 2(22) of the Act. Though the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court while interpreting Statute, becomes an authority or law in that regard the Courts do not legislate, they only interpret the law. In this regard, one decision may be relied as reported in (2000) 6 SCC 224 (Lilit Thomas & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.) wherein the Hon'ble Court held that while interpreting law in a judicial process, interpretation of a legal provision relates back to the date of law itself and such interpretation by the Court cannot be prospective since the Court do not legislate and they only interpret law. The Hon'ble Court has held that - "We are not impressed by the arguments to accept the contention that the law declared in Sarala Mudgal case cannot be applied to persons who have solemnised marriages in violation of the mandate of law prior to the date of judgment. This Court had not laid down any new law but only interpreted the existing law which was in force. It is a settled principle that the interpretation of a provision of law relates back to the date of the law itself and cannot be prospective from the date of the judgment because concededly the Court does not legislate but only gives an interpretation to an existing law." In this context, it is to be kept in mind that the retrospectivity or prospectivity differs in the field of legislation and the judgment of a Court interpreting the said legislation. In the case of legislation of an Act, in general rule however Statute is due to be prospective unless by express or necessary implication it is to have retrospective effect and it depends on its interpretation having regard to well settled rule of constitution. In the case of an enactment of Act, retrospection is not to be presumed. A new law should ordinarily effect future transactions and not past ones. While a judgment of the Court interpreting an Act is always retrospective from the date of enactment of such Act and it should not be treated as prospective from the date of passing of such a judgment by a Court. However, a judgment can be treated as a prospective judgment, if the Court passing such judgment has clearly directs that the decision of the said judgment should be prospective as in the case of prospective overruling. The mere principle that the Court does not legislate but only gives an interpretation to an existing law, is to be kept in mind while following the said judgment of acting upon such interpretation of the existing law. A Court, while passing a judgment and relying upon any decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court or any Hon'ble High Court on interpretation of law cannot itself interpret the judgment about its prospective applicability since such interpretation of law of the Hon'ble Apex Court or Hon'ble High Courts normally effects retrospectively to the date of enactment of the law so interpreted unless such Hon'ble Court while interpreting a law gives an express direction about the prospective applicability of such interpretation of law. I have also gone through the finding of the learned trial Judge in deciding the notice claiming back contribution for overtime payment from 1/1985 to 9/1986 is illegal, inoperative and bad in law on the principle of prospective overruling by elaborating discussion the decision reported in AIR 1967 SC 1643 , in Goloknath's case and thereby deciding that the operation of the decision in IDPL case as prospective. The learned trial Court has quoted different paragraphs from the said decision in Goloknath's case and also referred another decision reported in 1993 CCLR - 188 (Rita Sengupta v. State) and found that the principle laid down in Goloknath's case leading with the principle laid down in the case as reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 it is opined by the learned trial Judge that the present case is governed by the principle of prospective overruling and thereby came to the decision that the claim of the ESI Corporation demanding contribution over overtime payments for some back dates as being illegal not binding upon the applicant. I have gone through the decision reported in AIR 1967 SC 1643 in Goloknath's case and I am of the view that the learned trial Judge became confused over the said finding and could not follow the principle of prospective overruling as defined and discussed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said decision. It is found that the learned trial Court has misinterpreted the decision of Goloknath's case to find the liability of the present opposite party as to be prospective from the date of decision in IDPL case and thus, come to a wrong decision. In this context, it is to be seen what the Hon'ble Apex Court directed the said Goloknath's case for designing the said decision to be treated as 'prospective overruling'. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Goloknath's case was pleased to hold that - "There are two doctrines familiar to American jurisprudence, one is described as Blackstonian theory and the other as "prospective overruling", which may have some relevance to the present enquiry. Blackstone in his Commentaries, 69 (15th Edn., 1809) stated the common law rule that the duty of the Court was "not to pronounce a new rule but to maintain and expound the old one". It means the Judge does not make law but only discovers or finds the true law. The law has always been the same." If a subsequent decision changes the earlier one, the latter decision does not make law but only discovers the correct principle of law. The result of this view is that it is necessarily retrospective in operation. But Jurists, George F. Canfield, Robert Hill Freeman, John Henry Wigmore and Cardozo have expounded the doctrine of "prospective overruling" and suggested it as "a useful judicial tool". The result of this view is that it is necessarily retrospective in operation. But Jurists, George F. Canfield, Robert Hill Freeman, John Henry Wigmore and Cardozo have expounded the doctrine of "prospective overruling" and suggested it as "a useful judicial tool". In the words of Canfield the said expression means : "... a Court should recognize a duty to announce a new and better rule for future transactions whenever the Court has reached the conviction that an old rule (as established by the precedents) is unsound even though feeling compelled by stare decision (sic decisis) to apply the old and condemned rule to the instant case and to transaction which had already taken place. ... It was contended before the Supreme Court of the United States of America that a decision of Court overruling earlier decision and not giving its ruling retroactive operation violated the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Rejecting that plea, Cardozo said : "This is not a case where a Court in overruling an earlier decision has come to the new ruling of retroactive dealing and thereby has made invalid what was followed in the doing. Even that may often be done though litigants not infrequently have argued to the contrary. ..... This is a case where a Court has refused to make its ruling retroactive, and the novel stand is taken that the Constitution of the United States is infringed by the refusal. We think that the Federal Constitution was no void upon the subject. A state in defining the elements of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may be so that the decision of the Highest Courts, though later overruled, was law nonetheless for intermediate transactions. ........... On the other hand, it may hold to the ancient dogma that the law declared by its Courts had a platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration, in which event, the discredited declaration will be viewed as if it had never been and to reconsider declaration as law from the beginning. ........... On the other hand, it may hold to the ancient dogma that the law declared by its Courts had a platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration, in which event, the discredited declaration will be viewed as if it had never been and to reconsider declaration as law from the beginning. The choice for any state may be determined by the juristic philosophy of the Judges of her Courts, their considerations of law, its origin and nature." The opinion of Cardozo tried to harmonize the doctrine of prospective overruling with that of stare decisis." In this context, the view of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Goloknath's case may be found in the said decision that how the principle of 'prospective overruling' is to be followed and what was the proposition the Hon'ble Apex Court considered in coming to a decision that the said decision in Goloknath's case will be treated in the principle of 'prospective overruling'. It was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the following language : "As this Court for the first time has been called upon to apply the doctrine evolved in a different country under different circumstances, we would like to move warily in the beginning. We would lay down the following propositions : (1) The doctrine of prospective overruling can be invoked only in matters arising under our Constitution; (2) it can be applied only by the highest Court of the country, i.e., the Supreme Court as it has the constitutional jurisdiction to declare law binding on all the Courts in India; (3) the scope of the retroactive operation of the law declared by the Supreme Court superseding its earlier decisions left to its discretion to be moulded in accordance with the justice of the cause or matter before it." The Hon'ble Apex Court in coming to the conclusion has expressed the mind of the Hon'ble Judges while the said principle in Goloknath's case should be treated under the principle of 'prospective overruling' in the case in following language : "We have arrived at two conclusions, namely, (1) the Parliament has no power to amend Part III of the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights; and (2) this is a fit case to invoke and apply the doctrine of prospective overruling. What then is the effect of our conclusion on the instant case? What then is the effect of our conclusion on the instant case? Having regard to the history of the amendments, their impact on the social and economic affairs of our country and the chaotic situation that may be brought about by the sudden withdrawal at this stage of the amendments from the Constitution, we think that considerable judicial restraint is called for. We, therefore declare that our decision will not affect the validity of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1964, or other amendments made to the Constitution taking away or abridging the fundamental rights. We further declare that in future the Parliament will have no power to amend Part III of the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights. In this case we do not propose to express our opinion on the question of the scope of the amendability of the provisions of the Constitution other than the fundamental rights, as it does not arise for consideration before us. Nor are we called upon to express our opinion on the question regarding the scope of the amendability of Part III of the Constitution otherwise than by taking away or abridging the fundamental rights. We will not also indicate our view one way or other whether any of the Acts questioned can be sustained under the provisions of the Constitution without the aid of Articles 31A, 31B and the 9th Schedule." In this context, it has to be kept in mind that the retrospectivity or prospectivity differs in the field of legislation and the judgment of a Court interpreting the said legislation. So, it is found that the Hon'ble Apex Court in Goloknath's case has given the view that 'prospective overruling' is to be applied in the arena of the Hon'ble Apex Court and only limited with the matter involving the Constitution of India. So, the learned trial Judge has come to a wrong decision by application of 'prospective overruling' in the prevailing context and thus applied a wrong jurisdiction over the matter. Next comes the question as to whether the impugned order of the learned trial Judge can be challenged within the jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution. Needless to say, the jurisdiction of Article 227 relates to the superintending or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court to assess jurisdiction of the Court below in passing such order. Mr. Next comes the question as to whether the impugned order of the learned trial Judge can be challenged within the jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution. Needless to say, the jurisdiction of Article 227 relates to the superintending or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court to assess jurisdiction of the Court below in passing such order. Mr. Sengupta, learned senior advocate for the opposite party submitted that while sitting in the jurisdiction of Article 227 there is no scope to assess the right or wrong in the order of the learned Court below as being impugned order or in other words, the scope under Article 227 is limited on the jurisdictional error. Mr. Sengupta, further submitted that there had been no such jurisdictional error on the part of the learned trial Judge which can be challenged under Article 227. It is, further, submitted that in the jurisdiction under Article 227 this Court is not sitting in appeal against the impugned order and supervisory adjudication is only the limited jurisdiction in the present context. In this context, Mr. Sengupta relied upon a decision reported in 2005 (1) CLJ (Cal) 230 and has quoted the decision of this Hon'ble Court in the following lines : "The Apex Court has time and again reminded the basic guideline required to be followed while disposing of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court has made it clear that while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not expected to sit over an appeal over the order of the Subordinate Court or Tribunal. The Apex Court has further clarified that a Subordinate Court or Tribunal would be well within its jurisdiction to pass even an erroneous order and the High Court cannot correct the erroneous order while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India." Mr. Sengupta also relied upon and referred another decision reported in 2003 (2) CHN - 42 wherein it was held that - "It is a well-recognised principle that as regards findings of fact of the inferior Court, the jurisdiction of Article 227 is limited to only examining whether the Subordinate Court kept itself within the bounds of its authority in reaching such findings of fact (Babloo v. Lakshimbai, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1297 ). Hence, if there is no perversity in the impugned order, this Court cannot quash the judgment of the subordinate Court merely on the ground that its findings of facts were erroneous. This Court could interfere with such order if the Court below came of its conclusions without any evidence or upon a misreading of the evidence, or, it suffered from perversity (Gopala v. N.P. Trust, reported in AIR 1978 SC 347 ). It should not be forgotten that under Article 227 the High Court cannot be reduced into an ordinary Court of fact-finding and its task cannot be like the Courts of appeal or revision to embark on a scanning of the evidence and to see whether the finding of facts arrived at by the Courts below are correct or not. The High Court will have a positive role in a petition under Article 227 only when the above-mentioned exceptions can be alleged to have taken place." In his turn, Mr. Maitra, the learned advocate for the petitioner referred to a decision as reported in AIR 1984 Supreme Court 38 (Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & Ors.) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held : "The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority", and not to correct an error apparent on the fact of the record much less an error of law. In this case, this was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the fact of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or tribunal purports to be based on to correct errors of law in the decision." In consideration of the submissions made by the learned advocate of the respective parties and also having consideration of the reference made in support of their respective submissions. It will not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or tribunal purports to be based on to correct errors of law in the decision." In consideration of the submissions made by the learned advocate of the respective parties and also having consideration of the reference made in support of their respective submissions. I do not hesitate to hold that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 is not so much wide open as like that in the appellate jurisdiction. Needless to say, while considering an application under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not go into the fact finding and to assess the finding of the learned trial Court on the basis of the same. Article 227, no doubt, gives a very limited jurisdiction only to assess as to whether the learned trial Court acted beyond its jurisdiction or with wrong application of the jurisdiction and whether any wrong interpretation of law has been given to come to the finding and decision over the matter in dispute. None of the parties denied that the liability of the respondent for contribution in respect of payment for overtime work comes within the 'wages' as per section 2(22) of the Act concerned in view of the decision in IDPL case. The only question was left to decide by the learned trial Judge as to period from which such liability comes upon the opposite party to be obliged. At this point, the learned trial Judge, made a wrong discussion over the Goloknath's case and made a wrong application of the 'prospective overruling', a principle which was followed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said decision. The application of the principle of 'prospective overruling' was not within the jurisdiction of the learned trial Court as the same was clearly directed to be done by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and that too in the matters involving the Constitution. It is, at this point, the learned trial Judge acted beyond its jurisdiction and come to a wrong decision by such application of the principle of 'prospective overruling'. To adjudicate the said Act of the learned trial Court, the present Court has got sufficient jurisdiction to consider under Article 227. It is, at this point, the learned trial Judge acted beyond its jurisdiction and come to a wrong decision by such application of the principle of 'prospective overruling'. To adjudicate the said Act of the learned trial Court, the present Court has got sufficient jurisdiction to consider under Article 227. In the present matter, though the petitioner Corporation has filed a long application even with the inclusion of different decisions of Hon'ble Courts in support of its claim, ultimately has challenged the legality of the order of the learned trial Court in rejecting the notice claiming contribution towards overtime payment from January 1985 to January, 1986, with the wrong interpretation of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court and also on application of 'prospective overruling', which is beyond the jurisdiction of the learned trial Court. This Court sitting in the jurisdiction under Article 227 has not gone into the merit of the finding of the learned trial Court as to the finding of the liability of the opposite party to make contribution over the amount for overtime work but this Court is only considering as to whether the learned trial Court acted within its jurisdiction to interpret the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in IDPL case and also to apply the principle of 'prospective overruling' in view of the decision arrived in Goloknath's case by the Hon'ble Apex Court. It has widely been discussed in earlier paragraphs that the applicability of the principle of retrospectivity or prospectivity of the judgment by Hon'ble Apex Court or High Court on the interpretation of law can be followed with prospective effect only when the said Hon'ble Court expressly directs about its applicability. The learned trial Judge in the present matter has made a wrong interpretation about the applicability of the decision in IDPL case with prospective operation and has made a wrong application of the principle of 'prospective overruling' as stated in Goloknath's case by the Hon'ble Apex Court. The learned trial Court should have followed the finding of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the language of the said decision itself and cannot make an interpretation by itself to find out the mind of the Hon'ble Apex Court about its applicability either in retrospectivity or in prospectivity. The learned trial Court should have followed the finding of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the language of the said decision itself and cannot make an interpretation by itself to find out the mind of the Hon'ble Apex Court about its applicability either in retrospectivity or in prospectivity. Since the Hon'ble Apex Court has not given any express direction in the IDPL case about the applicability of the interpretation of 'wages' include contribution in respect of overtime allowance in the normal principle of interpretation of law by a Court dating back to the date of enactment of such liability, the learned trial Judge exceeded its jurisdiction to give its own interpretation about the applicability of the said decision prospectively. This Court is not at all sitting in appeal to find whether the learned trial Judge has come to a wrong decision on the facts before it in respect of claim of the petitioner Corporation of the back contribution. This Court is acting in the supervisory capacity to find the extra jurisdictional finding of the learned trial Judge and also to assess the illegality in the order passed by the learned trial Judge in the impugned order under challenge. Such matter can be well dealt with under the jurisdiction of Article 227 and this Court is also not acting beyond its jurisdiction as provided under Article 227. I cannot agree with Mr. Sengupta that the provision of Article 227 cannot be applied in the present matter. Thus, the question of applicability of jurisdiction under Article 227 is sufficiently answered in affirmative by Mr. Maitra, learned advocate for the petitioner Corporation. In view of all the discussions made above, I am of the view that the learned trial Judge came to, not only a wrong decision but an illegal one and has acted beyond its jurisdiction to interpret the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in IDPL case by applying the principle of 'prospective overruling' as decided in Goloknath's case. So, the order of the learned trial Judge is subjected to be set aside and the illegality, inoperativeness of the impugned notice by the petitioner Corporation, as decided by the learned trial Judge on the basis of such misconceived interpretation of law, cannot stand. In such circumstances, the present application under Article 227 is allowed. The order of the learned trial Court is set aside. I pass no order as to cost. In such circumstances, the present application under Article 227 is allowed. The order of the learned trial Court is set aside. I pass no order as to cost. Urgent xerox certified copy, if applied for, be given to the learned advocates of both sides, after complying with all necessary formalities. Application allowed.