L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J :- This appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, 'the Cr.P.C.') is preferred by A 1 and A2 in SC ST SC No.3 of 2001 on the file of the Special Sessions Court for Trial of Cases under the SC and ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (I Additional Sessions Court) East Godavari, Rajahmundry. 2. The appellants and ten others were tried for the offence under Section 302, read with Section 34 I.P.C. for causing the death of one Sri Bondada Sadhu Sundar Singh, on 7.12.1996 at about 8.00 p.m. at Kakinada. The trial Court convicted the first appellant for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life, and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The second appellant was convicted for the offence under Section 324 I.P.C. and the sentence against him was restricted to pre-trial custody. A3 to A12 were acquitted. 3. At about 9.00 p.m. on 7.12.1996, the Sub-Inspector of Police, II Town Police Station (Law and Order), Kakinada received information that Sadhu Sundar Singh was murdered and his dead body was in the Government Hospital at Kakinada. He proceeded to the hospital, got the inquest and post-mortem conducted. The Test Identification Parade was also conducted enabling P.Ws.1 and 2 to identify the persons, who were said to have attacked the deceased. His investigation revealed that on 3.12.1996, at about 1.00 p.m., the deceased Sadhu Sundar Singh and P.W.2, Barre Bulliraju, were taking in a hotel at Karanamgari Centre and at that time, the first appellant came there. The deceased is said to have called the first appellant in a derogatory manner and the latter is said to have taken exception to the same, resulting an altercation. The owner of 5 the hotel is said to have asked all of them to leave the hotel. On 7.12.1996, at about s 7.30 p.m. when the deceased and P.W.2 2 were taking tea at the same hotel, the appellants, A.9 to A.12 and some other numbering more than 12 are said to have come to that place. The appellants and A9 were said to have dragged the deceased from the hotel, beat him with a stick on head. The appellants and A9 were said to have dragged the deceased from the hotel, beat him with a stick on head. When P.W.2 and another person, by name Chille Devananda, were said to have gone to rescue the deceased, the first appellant is said to have threatened them with dire consequences by showing knife and thereupon, they went back. The death is said to have taken place on account of the stabbing injuries caused by the first appellant and others. 4. Necessary charges were framed and the appellants and other accused pleaded not guilty. The trial Court rendered its judgment in the manner referred to above. 5. Smt. K. Sesharajyam, the learned Counsel for the appellants submits that the very manner in which the process of law was set in motion is doubtful and questionable in this case, in view of the fact that there are conflicting versions as to the origin of the complaint. She submits that the first complaint is said to have been received from one Devananda, which is marked as Ex.P.21, and the prosecution has not chosen to examine the complainant. It is also her case that assuming that Ex.P.21 can be taken into account notwithstanding the non-examination of the person, who submitted it, in his deposition, P.W.2 and other alleged eye-witnesses categorically stated that the signature upon EX.P.21 is not that of Devananda. Further, the Investigating Officer, PW.12, stated that he received intimation of death from the hospital, but has not chosen to file it. The learned Counsel takes objection to the manner in which the First Information Report was registered; apart from raising certain other contentions. 6. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submits that when the process of law in a criminal case can be set at motion through several methods, the mere failure to" examine a complainant does not vitiate the proceedings or tell upon the credibility of the case of the prosecution. He contends that on receiving the information about the death of the deceased, the police swung into action and necessary steps were taken during the course of investigation. He contends that the trial Court examined the matter in a dispassionate and objective manner and the judgment of the trial Court does not warrant interference. 7. On behalf of the prosecution, P.Ws.1 to 14 were examined and Exs.Pl to P26 were marked. He contends that the trial Court examined the matter in a dispassionate and objective manner and the judgment of the trial Court does not warrant interference. 7. On behalf of the prosecution, P.Ws.1 to 14 were examined and Exs.Pl to P26 were marked. On behalf of the defence, portions of statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. from P.W.2, 3 and 4 were marked as Exs.D1 to D3. P.W.1, who was cited as one of the eyewitnesses, was declared hostile. Similarly, P.Ws.5 and 6, who are the eye-witnesses, were declared hostile. The other eye-witness who was examined in detail, was P.W.2. P.Ws.3 and 4 are the parents of the deceased and since they are not eyewitnesses, their evidence is not much of significance. P.W.7 is the doctor, who was present in the hospital when the deceased was taken immediately after the occurrence and who declared him as dead. PW.8 is a mediator for the scene of occurrence panchanama and P.W.9 is a photographer. PW.10 is a mediator for seizure of M.O.1 and M.Os.8 to 29. P.W.11 is the Magistrate in whose presence the Test Identification Parade was conducted. P.Ws.12 and 13 are Investigating Officers. PW.14 is the doctor, who conducted the post-mortem. 8. It has been strongly urged on behalf of the appellants that the very manner in which the proceedings were initiated against them was defective. Before undertaking the discussion on this aspect, we may point out that the defect in initiating the prosecution, by itself, may not vitiate the case. However, its effect would certainly have shadow on the credibility of the case of the prosecution. 9. In his deposition, P.W.12 stated that on receiving a message on telephone about the death of the deceased, he rushed to the hospital. The first thing he did after proceeding to the hospital was to receive a written report of the incident from one Devananda, marked as Ex.P.21. That report constituted the basis for his further investigation and steps. Devananda was examined as PW.1. However, the prosecution has not chosen to examine him in the Court, nor any reason for not examining that witness was furnished. 10. That report constituted the basis for his further investigation and steps. Devananda was examined as PW.1. However, the prosecution has not chosen to examine him in the Court, nor any reason for not examining that witness was furnished. 10. It is no doubt true that under Section 190 Cr.P.C., the prosecution can be set at motion under anyone of the three modes mentioned therein, namely: (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a public report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. 11. In a given case, there can be more sources of information than one. However, since the information on the basis of which the law is set into motion becomes significant, the prosecution must be sure and certain about it. If the starting point for the prosecution was a written complaint received from an individual, it is essential and fundamental that the person, who submits the complaint must be examined as a witness, notwithstanding the fact that the complaint, by itself, is not a substantive evidence. The accused would be in a position to confront the author of the complaint with the contents thereof and if he is able to establish any contradictions, it would certainly have an impact upon the strength of the case of the prosecution. 12. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that when it is competent for the police to initiate proceedings in the absence of a specific complaint, the failure to examine the author of EX.P.21 cannot be treated as fatal or otherwise significant. 13. In this regard, it needs to be observed that when the record discloses that the prosecution was initiated on the basis of the complaint, heavy burden rested upon the prosecution to substantiate the same by examining the complainant. They cannot fall back upon the other sources, for initiation of prosecution. A comparison, though somewhat distant in nature, is worth being undertaken. It is permissible in law for an individual to plead adoption by another. Law does not require either that there must be a deed of adoption or that such a deed must be registered. They cannot fall back upon the other sources, for initiation of prosecution. A comparison, though somewhat distant in nature, is worth being undertaken. It is permissible in law for an individual to plead adoption by another. Law does not require either that there must be a deed of adoption or that such a deed must be registered. However, if an individual pleads that he was adopted under a registered deed of adoption, but fails to produce the same before the Court, he cannot be permitted to plead that his adoption need not be under any written or registered document. Similarly, if the prosecution based its action on a report, such as Ex.P21 and for one reason or the other failed to substantiate it by examining the author thereof, it cannot take the plea that the prosecution can be initiated even on the basis of the information 'received from other sources. As already observed, the defect in this regard may not vitiate the proceedings as a whole, but would certainly tell upon the credibility of the version of the prosecution. 14. Assuming that Ex.P21 constituted the basis de hors the non-examination of the author thereof, the prosecution faced another stumbling block. P.W.2, the alleged eye-witness to the incident, who claimed to have close acquaintance with the deceased 1S well as Devananda, the author of Ex.P.1, stated as under: "I know Devananda since my childhood. I can identify the handwriting and signature of Devananda. Devananda wrote the report in my presence. The report, dated 7.12.1997, shown to him is not in the handwriting of Devananda and it does not bear the signature of Devananda." 15. This will put at rest, the authenticity of Ex.P.1 and an important witness examined by the prosecution has belied the genuinity of it. 16. Be that as it may, the evidence on record discloses that out of 4 eye-witnesses, namely P.Ws.1, 2, 5 and 6, who are said to have seen the occurrence, three have turned hostile and nothing significant was elicited in their cross-examination. P.W.2 was uncertain as to the participants in the alleged occurrence. In the cross-examination, at one stage he said that P.W.12 did not record his statement at the scene of occurrence. Soon thereafter, he said that P.W.12 recorded the statement and asked Devananda to write the report. It was elicited from him that the deceased was a rowdy sheeter. P.W.2 was uncertain as to the participants in the alleged occurrence. In the cross-examination, at one stage he said that P.W.12 did not record his statement at the scene of occurrence. Soon thereafter, he said that P.W.12 recorded the statement and asked Devananda to write the report. It was elicited from him that the deceased was a rowdy sheeter. According to him, the clothes of himself and Devananda were stained with blood, but they were not preserved for examination by the forensic laboratory. The owner of the hotel where the incident is said to have taken place was not examined. Several contradistinctions were extracted from P.W.2. Further, he is said to be a close associate of the deceased. Hence, it is not at all safe to convict the appellants on the basis of the evidence of such a solitary witness. 17. Serious infirmity has been pointed out about the manner in which the First Information Report, marked as Ex.P.22, was registered. A perusal thereof discloses that the contents of EX.P.21 were reproduced in it. Once it emerges that the very existence of EX.P.21 is doubtful, the First Information Report suffers from lack of basis and authenticity. We have examined the record of the trial Court. Though P.W.12 specifically stated that he received death intimation from the hospital, it was not made part of the record. On the other hand, the document which was prepared by the hospital, evidencing that the dead body was brought to it by one Ananda was not given any marking. In the charge-sheet, it is specifically mentioned that the deceased was a rowdy sheeter. In view of the suggestions made on behalf of the defence to various prosecution witnesses that the deceased had several opponents in the town, we are of the view that the conviction against the accused cannot be sustained in law. 18. Another important aspect of the matter is that P.Ws.1 and 2 stated in their depositions that they know all the accused in the case. However, the prosecution has arranged for a Test Identification Parade through the learned Magistrate. When even according to the said witnesses, they are acquainted with the accused, the very conducting of the Test Identification Parade was superfluous. 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed. However, the prosecution has arranged for a Test Identification Parade through the learned Magistrate. When even according to the said witnesses, they are acquainted with the accused, the very conducting of the Test Identification Parade was superfluous. 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence recorded in SC ST SC No.3 of 2001 on the file of the Special Sessions Court for Trial of Cases Under The SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 (I Additional Sessions Court) East Godavari, Rajahmundry, dated 23.12.2005, against the appellants set aside. The first appellant-A 1 shall be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. The second appeallnt-A2 was already set at liberty. The fine amount, if any, paid by the first appellant-A1 shall be refunded to him.