ORDER S.R. Waghmare, J. 1. This criminal revision has been filed under Section 397/ 401 of the Cr.PC challenging order dt. 7th July, 2004 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Neemuch, in Criminal Revn. No. 64 of 2004 directing the custody of the material seized to be produced before the concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the Magistrate was directed to deposit the same in the treasury and consequent to the decision of the case to be handed over to the appropriate person who would be entitled to the same. 2. Brief facts in a nutshell as alleged by the prosecution was that the police, Neemuch, Cantonment had on 24th April, 2004 seized 123.233 kgs. of silver from Maruti van bearing registration No. RJ-01-5373 on suspicion of the goods being stolen property. The proceedings of seizure were undertaken by P.S. Neemuch, Cantonment under Section 41/ 102 of the Cr.PC and an application by the petitioner, the Director of IT, Bhopal as well as an application by M/s Payal Selection & Company, Jodhpur was filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Neemuch who ordered the handing over the custody of the seized silver to the Director of IT and being aggrieved by this order dt. 29th May, 2004, Revn. No. 64 of 2004 was filed by respondent M/s Payal Selection & Company before the Sessions Judge Neemuch, who by the impugned order dt. 7th July, 2004 issued the directions to the Chief Judicial Magistrate to handover the silver to the treasury as mentioned above and being aggrieved the Director of IT has filed the present revision. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner averred that since a similar application was also filed by the Department under Section 451/ 457 of the Cr.PC r/w Section 132A of the IT Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity) and under Section 132A of the IT Act, the Director General or the other officer so named in the section was empowered to search any building, place, vessels, vehicle or craft etc. and under Section 132A(3) of the Act could seize any document money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles etc. and under Section 132A(3) of the Act could seize any document money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles etc. and the authorized official could requisition the services of any police officer to assist him and therefore, in the said circumstances the officer had issued warrant which was presented to the police and the Police Department had no objection if the property under seizure was given to IT Department. The warrant of authorization of the said official was presented before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Neemuch and the Chief Judicial Magistrate by order dt. 29th May, 2004 accepted the contention of the IT Department and directed that the seized property may be given to the authorized officer of the IT Department as per Section 132A of the IT Act and under the requisition under Section 132A of the Act, the possession of the silver was taken by IT Department. 4. The order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate Neemuch, however, was challenged by the respondent M/s Payal Selection & Company, Jodhpur, by filing Criminal Revn. No. 64 of 2004 and in deciding the said revision the impugned order has been passed allowing the revision and the case has been remanded by the Sessions Judge to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. 5. However, since the Court had also directed that the silver seized should be placed in the treasury; learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that such an order was contrary to the provisions of law. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised another objection that writ petition bearing No. 2495 of 2004 before the Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan, Bench at Jodhpur, which was pending consideration regarding the jurisdiction of the IT Department to issue the authorization under Section 132A of the Act. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the IT Act is a special law, which has been enacted for a specific purpose of realization of taxes, due from the citizens. The provisions of a special law always override the provisions of a general law and under Section 132A of the Act the requisition officer would be the person entitled to seize assets. The provisions of a special law always override the provisions of a general law and under Section 132A of the Act the requisition officer would be the person entitled to seize assets. Relying on Union of India v. Chief Judicial Magistrate AIR 1983 All 553 learned Counsel has stressed the fact that the Court had in the said case held that it was not the function of the Magistrate to embark upon an inquiry into the nature of the assets and ownership of the same in a summary way and when the Chief Judicial Magistrate had directed the delivery of the assets to the assessee, the Court had on revision held that the order passed by the Magistrate was erroneous and illegal and directed that the seized assets be handed over to the ITO or the authorized officer. 7. To bolster his submissions, learned Counsel relied on CIT v. [2005] 272 ITR 562 (Delhi) ; Ibrahim Othayoth v. [1998] 232 ITR 320(Ker) ; Shikharchand Jain v. [1983] 140 ITR 552 (MP) ; Suresh Bhai Bhola Bhai Jani and Anr. v. ; Dinesh Chandra and Ors. v. [2000] 241 ITR 780 (MP) ; Wakil Kumar v. [2003] 259 ITR 698(Patna) ; Amar Agrawal and Anr. v. [2005] 276 ITR 182(MP) ; Rajiv Agrawal, Dy. Director of IT, or His Successor in Office v. [2007] 290 ITR 449(Guj) . 8. To stress the fact that the IT Department was entitled to the custody of the seized assets pointing out Section 132A of the Act, learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that on a requisition under Sub-section (1), the officer or the authority referred to in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) as the case may be, of the sub section shall deliver the books of account, other documents or assets to the requisitioning officer either forthwith or when such officer or authority is of the opinion that it is no longer necessary to retain the same in his custody and once the warrant of authorization is issued against any person, then the seized asset is required to be retained by the IT authority and without taking over that asset, no further proceedings can be started against the said person from whose custody, the asset was recovered. It would be fruitful to refer to Parasnath v. [1997] 225 ITR 365(MP) whereby Madhya Pradesh High Court held as under: (i) The Criminal Court had no authority to order handing over of property i.e., jewellery or cash to persons claiming it. (iv) Once an assessment is over the seized property is to be disposed of as per the determination made by the assessing authority. (v) Where assessment is not complete the authority issuing the warrant shall take further steps within the stipulated period as required under Section 132(5) of the Act. 9. All the authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner above more or less stress the same fact that the requisition once issued under Section 132A of the Act is made on the basis because the authorized requisitioning officer has reason to believe on the basis of information in his possession that the assets are not disclosed or are not likely to be disclosed and he can therefore, take action under Section 132A of the Act. Moreover, learned Counsel for the petitioner has also urged that the respondent company would have ample opportunity to satisfy the authority and the assets seized could be returned back by the Department after following the due procedure of law. 10. Learned Counsel for the respondent company, on the other hand has opposed the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and stated that the seized assets were not in pursuance to any action taken by the IT Department, since the employees of the respondent company were merely returning with the silver from Ratlam Jewellers, Mandsaur where it was taken for executing the job work and the police had seized the silver under Section 102 of the Cr.PC suspecting it to be stolen property which was also contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case. The respondent company had made due application under Section 451/ 457 Cr.PC for returning of the goods on Supurdginama stressing that the time factor was an important aspect in the entire case; learned Counsel for the respondent stated that the application was moved before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Neemuch on 26th April, 2004, thereafter, by the alleged authorization under Section 132A of the IT Act, the IT Department also filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Neemuch for Supurdgi of the goods. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Neemuch rejected the application of the respondent company for Supurdgi of the goods and ordered that the custody of the seized property be given to the IT Department under Section 132A of the Act by order dt. 29th May, 2004. 11. Being aggrieved, respondent company filed a revision as already stated above and which was admitted by the Sessions Judge on 31st May, 2004 and a stay order was granted by the Sessions Judge against the order dt. 29th May, 2004, however, the police entrusted the wrongfully seized silver/property to the Department and in this respect the authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable according to the learned Counsel for the respondent since in the said revision, the Sessions Judge has clearly come to a conclusion that in view of the settled legal position, it was necessary for the Chief Judicial Magistrate to conduct an inquiry regarding the ownership and the rights of the authority claiming custody of the goods and also record evidence if necessary to come to a proper conclusion. Further learned Counsel stressed the fact that the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate has been rightly set aside by the Sessions Judge and the matter has been remanded to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate for recording evidence and thereafter taking proper decision in the matter and more correctly learned Counsel stated that the Sessions Judge had rightly directed the Department to produce the goods in question before the Chief Judicial Magistrate for being deposited in the treasury and since a stay of the impugned order has been granted by this Court, the IT Department has not deposited the seized silver before the Chief Judicial Magistrate to be kept in the treasury till the final determination of the rights of the parties which would have been just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 12. Learned Counsel for the respondent company stated that the requisition under Section 132A of the Act was uncalled for, since the seized silver was not an undeclared asset and the proceedings were totally uncalled for. 12. Learned Counsel for the respondent company stated that the requisition under Section 132A of the Act was uncalled for, since the seized silver was not an undeclared asset and the proceedings were totally uncalled for. Moreover relying on K. Choyi v. [1980] 123 ITR 435(SC) learned Counsel stated that the apex Court had clearly demarcated the stage at which requisition could be issued under Section 132A of the Act; only if the seizure relates to pre-assessment stage its assessment was computed then the custody from the Court could be obtained by the Department by filing application under Section 226(4) of the IT Act. 13. I find from the perusal of the said case that the apex Court has refused to look into the question whether under Section 132A of the Act 'the Court' would mean custody of the Court also since words in the section pertain to 'officer' or 'authority'. The apex Court clearly stated that it would not go into the question as to who may physically seize the assets since the situation had not arisen in the said case as the assessment had been completed. 14. Further learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on CIT and Anr. v. whereby the High Court of Punjab & Haryana discussing the scope of power under Section 132A of the Act held that the order in question can be issued only to an officer or authority and the order on requisition in respect of assets in custody of the Court and when the Court had issued an order to the Treasury Officer held that the refusal of the Treasury Officer to release the money held that it had no independent jurisdiction over the assets and the remedy availed to the ITO was to apply to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for release of the money in its favour. It could not be issued requisition under Section 132A of the Act, which was without jurisdiction. Moreover, relying on Abdul Khader v. [1999]240ITR489(Ker) , learned Counsel averred that Section 132A of the IT Act, 1961 empowered the CIT to order requisition of assets if in the opinion of the officer the assets represent either wholly or partly income or property which has not been, or would not have been, disclosed for the purpose of the IT Act. On being satisfied, the officer empowered may authorize any officer under subs. On being satisfied, the officer empowered may authorize any officer under subs. (2) of Section 278D to require the officer or authority to deliver such books of account, other documents or assets to the requisitioning officer. Sec. 132A does not empower the CIT to require the Court to deliver the assets. The provision refers only to an "officer" or "authority" referred to under Sub-section (1) and not the Court. This proposition of law has also been followed in several cases. 15. To buttress his submissions, learned Counsel for the respondent also relied on CIT v. [1997] 224 ITR 614 (SC) whereby the apex Court had held that the power to issue warrant of authorization under Section 132A of the Act was not valid, when there was no material sufficient for reasonable belief that sum recovered represented income would not be disclosed and learned Counsel urged that in the present case also there was no evidence either on records or taking by the CIT to raise apprehension that the silver seized was an undisclosed asset. Further relying on Sadruddin Jaueri v. [2000] 243 ITR 579(AP) where it was held as follows: Though the police may seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence, the law clearly enjoins that every police officer seizing any such property shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction and where the property seized is such that it cannot be conveniently transported to the Court he may give custody thereof to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to produce the property before the Court as and when required and to give effect to the further orders of the Court as to the disposal of the same. There can be no transfer or appropriation of any property seized by the police except under the order of the Court. Sec. 132A of the IT Act, 1961 does not authorize any notice to the Court as by no stretch of imagination can the Court be identified as any officer or authority under any other law for the time being in force as contemplated under Clause (c) of Section 132A r/w Clause (a) thereof. Sec. 132A of the IT Act, 1961 does not authorize any notice to the Court as by no stretch of imagination can the Court be identified as any officer or authority under any other law for the time being in force as contemplated under Clause (c) of Section 132A r/w Clause (a) thereof. Held (i) that the petitioners' rights under Article 21 of the Constitution had been violated by the search and seizure of the properties as per the seizure list; (ii) Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 had acted contrary to law and in fact contravened laws in the course of search and seizure, and by changing the records of investigation had committed serious violation to the system of the discipline of law under which alone they were required to act; (iii) There was no occasion for respondent Nos. 4 to 6 namely, the ITO in Writ Petn. No. 17700 of 1996 to intervene and in any case respondent Nos. 3 to 5 in Writ Petn. Nos. 4926 of 1996 and respondent Nos. 4 to 6 in Writ Petn. No. 17700 of 1996 had bypassed the Court which alone was competent to decide about the custody of the properties allegedly seized in the course of investigation of a case registered with the police under Section 102 of the Cr.PC. There had been gross violation of law by the entry of the ITOs to take delivery of the properties from the police before the seizure was reported to the Court and the Court passed any order as to its custody. The order passed under Section 132A was liable to be quashed. 16. Then, considering the submissions and the authorities cited by both the counsel, I find that the sole question that arises for adjudication in the present revision is whether the requisition issued by the Department under Section 132A of the Act before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Neemuch was maintainable, then first considering the views held by the Court in the matter of CIT and Anr. v. Balbir Singh (supra) regarding the provisions of a special law always overriding that of the general law, the fact averred by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the silver seized was in pursuance to Section 102 of the Cr.PC and the law was set in motion under the Cr.PC and not under the IT Act, cannot be blinked away or marginalized. Moreover, it is also crucial at this stage to consider the fact that there was a stay by the Sessions Court on the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Neernuch regarding the handing over the silver by the police authority to the IT Department, despite which the silver seized is said to have been handed over in post-haste to the Department, so also considering the fact as to who would be entitled to Supurdgi, the application was filed by the respondent company prior to that of the IT Department; the seizure of the silver was by the police in pursuance to Section 102 of the Cr.PC as noted above. 17. Considering the fact that all the authorities cited by the petitioner's counsel purporting to the fact that it was the IT Department which had the right to retain the seized assets under Section 132A of the IT Act are judgments passed by the Single Bench whereas in the matter of Sadruddin Javeri (supra) the order has been passed by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court that order could not have been passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 132A of the Act since it is binding precedent under these circumstances and I am bound by the same. 18. Then, it would also be profitable to consider under these circumstances the case of CIT and Anr. v. Balbir Singh (supra). I find that the question has been considered whether an order on requisition under Section 132A of the IT Act can be issued to a "Court" and not only to an "officer" or "authority" as prescribed under Section 132A of the Act and whether the Court would not amount to "officer or authority" in respect of Section 132A of the Act and has still not been settled, since there are contrary views as already stated above. However, this Court need not go into the controversy since it is dependent on the question whether the proceeding under Section 102 of the Cr.PC would bar the filing of the application under Section 132A of the IT Act by the Department and whether the provisions of a special law would prevail over a general law. However, this Court need not go into the controversy since it is dependent on the question whether the proceeding under Section 102 of the Cr.PC would bar the filing of the application under Section 132A of the IT Act by the Department and whether the provisions of a special law would prevail over a general law. In the instant case, I find that the proceedings were initiated under Cr.PC prior to time and moreover the same are already in question before the Writ Court in the High Court of Rajasthan between both the parties as already stated above. 19. Whereas considering the matter of K. Choyi v. Syed Abdulla Bafakky Thangal and Ors. (supra). I find that the apex Court did not consider it necessary to decide whether Section 132A of the Act would be applicable in the said case, because it was the stage at which the application was made which was to be considered under the IT Act and the application had been made after assessment then in these circumstances, the operation of Section 132A of the Act would not be called for. The apex Court had therefore, directed that if the assessment was completed, the IT Department had proper remedy under Section 226(4) of the Act. In the present case, the assessment has not been made by the IT Department and according to statement of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the assessment has still not been completed, then under the circumstances considering the decision of the apex Court in the matter of CIT v. Vindhya Metal Corporation and Ors. (supra), the apex Court had held that in the case of cash that was recovered, there was no proof of ownership of the sum of money and the person in whose possession the amount was found was not an assessee on the file of the ITO, besides there was no sufficient material for a reasonable belief that sum represented income that would not be disclosed and the Magistrate had ordered returning to the person, but on a revision by the IT Department, the High Court had directed the IT Department to take possession of if. 20. The respondent had filed a writ petition questioning the authority of authorization issued by the CIT under Section 132(1) of the Act. 20. The respondent had filed a writ petition questioning the authority of authorization issued by the CIT under Section 132(1) of the Act. The High Court in its jurisdiction had held that the information regarding the possession of the sum of money with the CIT was not such an information as no reasonable person could have entertained a belief that the amount in his possession represented income which would not have been disclosed by him for purpose of the Act and allowed the writ and the Supreme Court in these circumstances had affirmed the decision of the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. In the present case, the CIT was not in the possession of such information as to arrive to a conclusion that the silver pertains to undisclosed assets of the assessee. Moreover, silver was found in the possession of the employees of the respondent company and neither the police nor the CIT had at this stage of the proceedings gathered any information on record regarding the ownership of the silver to dispute the version of the respondent company. It was then fallacious on the part of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Neemuch to have entertained the application under Section of the IT Act and directed the handing over of the seized silver/assets to the Department. 21. Thus, I find that the order of the learned Sessions Judge is in accordance with law and needs no interference. The petition is dismissed as sans merit. Stay granted earlier is vacated. The petitioner is directed to handover the silver in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate to comply with the directions issued by the Sessions Court by depositing the same in the treasury.