ORDER D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J.—Petitioners are all exhibitors of cinematograph shows and are owners of theatres where such cinematograph shows are arranged for public viewing by collecting an entrance fee. 2. The state of Karnataka has enacted the Karnataka Entertainments Tax Act, 1958 [Karnataka Act No 30 of 1958] (for short, the Act), which enables the state government to levy and collect a tax known as entertainment tax at a percentage of the admission charges charged by the theatre owners on the viewers who come to the theatres to watch movies. Section 3 of the Act, which is the charging Section, which reads as under: 3. Tax on payments for admission to entertainments - (1) There shall be levied and paid to the State Government entertainments tax on each payment for admission excluding the amount of tax, to an entertainment.- (a) specified in Sub-clause (i) of Clause (e) of Section 2 at 70 per cent of such payment; and (b) specified in Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (e) of Section 2 at 40 per cent of such payment. TABLE xxxxx: xxxxx. (1-A) In respect of entertainments referred to in Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (e) of Section 2, other than an entertainment on which tax is levied under Section 4-E or 4-F, there shall be levied and paid to the State Government on each payment for admission excluding the amount of tax, to such entertainment, entertainments tax at the rate of ten per cent, if such payment for admission, excluding the amount of tax, is not less than fifty rupees: Provided that no tax shall be levied in the case of admission to a circus or drama or magic show or game or sport, where it involves no participation. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (1-A) there shall be levied and paid to the State Government (except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act) on every complimentary ticket issued by the proprietor of an entertainment, the entertainments tax at the appropriate rate specified in Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (1-A) in respect of such entertainment, as if full payment had been made for admission to the entertainment according to the class of seat or accommodation which the holder of such ticket is entitled to occupy or use; and for the purpose of this Act, the holder of such ticket shall be deemed to have been admitted on payment: Provided that where the seat or accommodation which the holder of such a ticket is entitled to occupy or use is different from the classes of seat or accommodation inside the auditorium or place of entertainment and for admission to the said seat or accommodation no payment is fixed, the holder of such ticket shall be deemed to be entitled to occupy or use the highest class of seat or accommodation and shall for purposes of this Act, be deemed to have been admitted on payment of the charges for such highest class of seat or accommodation. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1-A) there shall be levied and paid to the State Government on every admission made by the proprietor of an entertainment on payment as defined in Sub-clause (iv-a) of Clause (i) of Section 2, the entertainment tax at the rate specified in Sub-section (1-A) in respect of such entertainment as if full payment had been made for admission to the entertainment according to the class of seat or accommodation which the person admitted occupies or uses; and for the purpose of this Act, the person admitted shall be deemed to have been admitted on payment: Provided that where the admission made to an entertainment whether or not having different classes of seat or accommodation inside the place of entertainment is wholly on payment as defined in Sub-clause (iv-a) of Clause (i) of Section 2, the payment made to such entertainment shall be deemed to have been made by the person or persons admitted levies tax known as tax on the payments for admission to entertainments and such tax in respect of the films is at 40% of the amount charged for entries for viewing movies in the theatre. However, in terms of Section 3-C of the Act, which reads as under 3-C. Special provision in respect of certain films.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 3 and 3-A. - (a) in the case of a cinematograph show of a Kannada film (other than a remake or a dubbed version of a film of other language, which has secured a Censor Certificate from the Central Board of Film Certification on or after First day of September, 1993) or a, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara film produced in the State of Karnataka, the rates of entertainments tax payable shall be nil. Provided that in case of a Kannada film which is remake of a film of other language, which has secured a Censor Certificate from the Central Board of Film Certification on or before 31st day of March, 2002, no tax shall be levied under Sections 3 and 3-A Provided further that tax at the rate of seventy-five per cent of the tax pay able under Sections 3 and 3-A shall be levied from 1st day of April, 2002 on a Kannada film which a remake of a film of other language and which has secured a Censor Certificate from the Central Board of Film Certification. (b) in the case of a cinematograph show of a Kannada, Kodava, Konkani or Tutu film produced outside the State of Karnataka and which has secured Censor Certificate issued by the Central Board of Film Certification on or before the Thirty-first day of December, 1987, the rates of entertainments tax payable shall be nil xxxxx. Explanation-xxxxx. (c) in the case of a cinematograph show of a Kannada film which is a remake of a film of any other language. - (i) having been remade in the State of Karnataka after a period of ten years from the date of issue of a certificate by the Central Board of Film Certification to such other language film; or (ii) which has secured a best feature film award granted by the Central Government or any State Government or has figured in the Indian Panorama section of International Film Festival and has been remade in the State of Karnataka, the rate of entertainment tax payable shall be nil. (1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), where a Kannada, Kodava, Konkani Tulu or Banjara film has secured after the First day of April, 1981, a best feature film award granted by the Central or any State Government or an internationally recognised award notified by the State Government, no entertainments tax shall be payable for a period of one year from such date as may be specified by the State Government (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3 and 3-A, in the case of a cinematograph show of a film other than a Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tutu or Banjara film which has secured, after the First day of April, 1981, a best feature film award granted by the Central Government or any State Government or an internationally recognised award notified by the State Government, no entertainments tax shall be payable for a period of six months from such date as may be specified by the State Government Explanation. - xxxxx the tax levied under Section 3 of the Act at the rate of 40% of the entry fee is a tax inevitably passed on to the viewers is reduced to nil rate in respect of cinematograph shows of Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara language films which are produced in the State of Karnataka and exhibited in a theatre in the state. 3. 3. Under the very enactment, there is an additional levy in terms of Section 4 of the Act, which reads as under: 4. Additional tax on cinematograph shows. - (1) In the case of cinematograph shows, in addition to the tax leviable under Sections 3 and 3-A or the tax leviable under Section 4-A, there shall be levied and paid to the State Government a tax calculated at the following rates, namely,: TABLE Sl. No. Payment for admission (excluding entertainment tax) of a person to the highest class of seat or accommodation Rate of tax per show a. does not exceed five rupees Forty-three rupees b. exceeds five rupees but does not exceed fifteen rupees Fifty-five rupees c. exceeds fifteen rupees but does not exceed twenty rupees Sixty-eight rupees d. exceeds twenty rupees One hundred and eighteen rupees Provided that in the case of a cinematograph show of Kannada, Kodava, Konkani or Tutu film, in addition to tax leviable under Sections 3 and 3-A, the tax payable under this sub-section shall be at the following rates, namely.: Sl. No. Payment for admission (excluding entertainment tax) of a person to the highest class of seat or accommodation Rate of tax per show a. does not exceed five rupees Eighteen rupees b. exceeds five rupees but does not exceed fifteen rupees Thirty rupees c. exceeds fifteen rupees but does not exceed twenty rupees Thirty-eight rupees d. exceeds twenty rupees Forty-eight rupees Provided further that in respect of cinema theatres paying tax in the manner specified in Section 4-A, the tax under this section shall be paid at the following rates, namely.: Sl. No. Total payment for admission of a person to the highest class of seat or accommodation Rate of tax per show a. Does not exceed eight rupees Forty rupees b. Exceeds eight rupees but does not exceed fifteen rupees Forty-five rupees c. Exceeds fifteen rupees Fifty rupees Provided also that in respect of cinema theatres paying tax in the manner specified in Section 4-A, the tax payable under this subsection in respect of cinematograph show of a Kannada, Kodava, Konkani or Tulu film shall be at the following rates, namely.: Sl. No. Total payment for admission of a person to the highest class of seat or accommodation Rate of tax per show a. does not exceed eight rupees Thirteen rupees b. exceeds eight rupees but does not exceed fifteen rupees Twenty-five rupees c. exceeds fifteen rupees Thirty-eight rupees (2) No proprietor of a cinema theatre shall collect or cause to be collected the tax payable under Sub-section (1) from the persons admitted to the cinema theatre for the entertainment which is a tax at a fixed amount depending on the admission fee or rates fixed for the entry into the theatre hall. The additional tax under this Section is at Rs. 43/- per show if the highest entry fee charged for a person to get entry into the theatre is Rs. 5/- or less; if it is between Rs. 5/- and Rs. 15/-, at Rs. 55/- per show; between Rs. 15/- and 20/-, it is Rs. 68/- per show; and if it exceeds Rs. 20/-, Rs. 118/- per show. Sub-section (3) of Section 4 again reduced such taxes in respect of Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara language films screened at the theatres and within the limits of local authorities, to be nil. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), no show tax shall be payable in respect of a cinematograph show of a Kannada, Kodava, Konkani or Tulu film screened in theatres situated within the limits of any local authority (but excluding a cantonment board) or town or village having a population not exceeding fifteen thousand. 4. The petitioners are complaining that providing for different rates of levy of entertainment tax in respect of films exhibited in the same theatre only based on the language in which the film is produced, amounts to a discriminatory act of discriminating in the matter of levy of tax between a class of films produced in Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara languages on the one hand and films produced in the rest of the languages on the other hand and therefore the petitioners have questioned the Constitutional validity of the provisions of Sections 3(1)(b), 3-A, 3-C and Section 4 of the Act. 5. 5. The petitioners in both these writ petitions while have sought for a declaration that Sections 3(1)(b), 3-A and 3-C of the Act, are all bad in law being unconstitutional, there is a prayer seeking for a direction to the respondents to consider the cases of the petitioners in WP No 11520 of 2007, for refund of the entertainment tax and additional tax so far paid by the petitioners under Section 3, 3-A of the Act. In WP No 19802 of 2007, it is additionally sought for a declaration that no tax can be collected under Section 3-A of the Act, as there is no corresponding liability on the Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara language films and in respect of Section 4-A, a declaration is sought for that the rate of tax payable under this section in respect of non-Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara language films shall be at the same rate of tax as is in respect of Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara language films under this Section i.e. all movies should attract tax at the same rate as is applicable to screening of Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara language films. 6. The petitioners have also claimed that their fundamental right for freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and the fundamental rights for carrying on a profession or business of their choice is also affected and it is for these reasons the impugned provisions are found fault with. 7. 6. The petitioners have also claimed that their fundamental right for freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and the fundamental rights for carrying on a profession or business of their choice is also affected and it is for these reasons the impugned provisions are found fault with. 7. The principal challenge to the validity of these provisions is on the premise that the provisions though occur in a taxing statute, is nevertheless discriminatory, for the reason that different rates of taxes are sought to be levied while exhibiting movies of different languages; that making a distinction in the matter of rate at which the taxes are levied based only on language is a gross discriminatory act and can lead to a division in society on lines of language; that it is capable of creating a rift and discontent among people following a language, if the viewing of a movie produced in such language is made costlier; that the Supreme Court has emphatically disapproved levy of tax at different rates solely based on the language criterion and the statutory provisions challenged in these writ petitions should be declared to be unconstitutional applying the law as declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Aashirwad Films Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, JT (2007) 8 SC 398. 8. The respondents - state and its officers functioning under the Act - had been notified and they have entered appearance through the learned government pleader. The union of India has also been impleaded as a part}' respondent in WP No 19802 of 2007, who has also been notified and represented by the learned standing counsel. 9. The state has filed its statement of objections in WP No. 11520 of 2007 and adopted it in the other writ petition - WP No 19802 of 2007 also. 10. In the statement of objections on behalf of the state, the distinction in the matter of levy of tax and differential rate of tax between Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara on the one hand and the movies produced in languages other than those languages, such as in Hindi, Tamil, Telugu etc. 10. In the statement of objections on behalf of the state, the distinction in the matter of levy of tax and differential rate of tax between Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara on the one hand and the movies produced in languages other than those languages, such as in Hindi, Tamil, Telugu etc. languages on the other hand is sought to be justified on the premise that Kannada film industry, which is comparatively younger to the film industries of other languages, and is in doldrums not having sound financial base, deserves protection for its survival and encouragement for its progress. languages on the other hand is sought to be justified on the premise that Kannada film industry, which is comparatively younger to the film industries of other languages, and is in doldrums not having sound financial base, deserves protection for its survival and encouragement for its progress. The main object of differential rates of tax is to encourage the Kannada film industry: that if such protection is not given, Kannada film industry may perish leading to the affectation of the culture and spreading of Kannada language and its people; that the taxation measures are also measures which can be used to achieve social welfare objectives; that the number of persons who patronize and view Kannada films is far less compared to viewers of films produced in other languages such as Hindi, Telugu, Tamil etc., which have a larger market territory-wise and audience number-wise and therefore making a classification between Kannada film industry and the film industries producing movies in other languages such as Hindi, Telugu, Tamil etc., is a reasonable classification and having the object of promoting almost a sick Kannada film industry; that the petitioners cannot complain of any act of discrimination because of such classification for the reason that there is no discrimination so far as the petitioners are concerned; that they have not faced any disadvantage vis-a-vis other exhibitors in comparison to whom the petitioners can be sought to be at a disadvantage; that the provisions operate uniformly on all exhibitors; that the tax which is ultimately passed on the viewers is not even borne by the exhibitors; that the tax exemption given to regional language films is more an affirmative action in favour of such regional language films than an act of discrimination against other languages; that at the time when exemption was granted to films in regional languages viz., Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara by Act No 7 of 1997, simultaneously the rate of tax on films in other languages, which was 70% was reduced to 40% with effect from 1-4-2006; that it resulted in a substantial relief to the films produced in languages other than Kannada. Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara; that the petitioners cannot complain of levy of any higher rate of tax in view of such reduction; that the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Aashirwad Films [supra] is not applicable to the present set of facts; that while there is no attempt on the part of the state of Andhrapradesh in that case to place before the court as to whether theatres exhibiting Telugu films were at any disadvantage, in the instant case, the state has successfully demonstrated that Kannada film industry is in a most disadvantageous position compared to film industries producing films in other languages and therefore the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Aashirwad Films [supra] is distinguishable and cannot be applied to the present case; that Kannada film industry is at an infant stage, even technology-wise and therefore being not in a position to produce movies technically superior in quality and is not able to command a good audience and therefore unable to get good returns and is caught up in this vicious circle of financial instability and encouragement in the form of tax concession under the provisions of the Act cannot be construed as an act of discrimination against movies of other languages; that the provision is one which can ensure a greater audience to view the films produced in Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara languages; that it has a nexus to the object of the Act and therefore has sought for dismissal of the writ petitions. 11. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners by way of rejoinder that encouraging a tottering Kannada film industry can be achieved by providing commensurate subsidies by the state government and not by resorting to an act of discrimination by providing for such statutory provisions in a taxing statute, which amounts to discrimination and therefore the act is not free from the vice of discrimination; that the stand taken by the state to defend the statute is neither made out on facts nor tenable in law and therefore urged for allowing the writ petitions. 12. It is on the premise of such pleadings, Sri B G Sridharan, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP No 11520 of 2007 and Sri K.V. Dhanajay, learned Counsel for the petitioners in WP No 19802 of 2007. have made submissions and are heard. 12. It is on the premise of such pleadings, Sri B G Sridharan, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP No 11520 of 2007 and Sri K.V. Dhanajay, learned Counsel for the petitioners in WP No 19802 of 2007. have made submissions and are heard. Sri Udaya Holla, learned Advocate General argued on behalf of the State and its officers, defending the statutory provisions. 13. Sri B G Sridharan, learned senior counsel, has submitted that Section 3-C of the Act, reducing the rate of tax in respect of Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara films to be nil, which amounts to granting total exemption from payment of entertainment tax in respect of such films, and also Section 4 of the Act, particularly the provisos which provide for a lower rate of tax in respect of movies made in languages in Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara is also discriminatory and therefore bad in law; that the present situation is clearly covered by the ratio of the law laid down by the Supreme court in the case of Aashirwad Films [supra] and the writ petitions are to be allowed. 14. Sri K.V. Dhananjay, learned Counsel for the petitioners in WP No 19802 of 207, in addition to such submissions, also submits that the act of discrimination, whether is found in the very Section i.e. the very charging section, as is the case in Section 4 of the Act or is so achieved by a combined effect of Sections 3-A, 3-B and 3-C and in the petitioners' case, Section 3-C being the provision causing discrimination, the net result being only to bring about an act of discrimination is nevertheless bad in law, and therefore the case is clearly covered by the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Aashirwad Films [supra]. Sri Dhananjay has also relied upon a host of other authorities in support of the submission that the impugned provisions are clearly unconstitutional. 15. Prominent among the other authorities being relied upon by Sri Dhananjay, learned Counsel for the petitioners in WP No 19802 of 2007, is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Srinivasa Theatre and Others Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others, AIR 1992 SC 999 . 15. Prominent among the other authorities being relied upon by Sri Dhananjay, learned Counsel for the petitioners in WP No 19802 of 2007, is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Srinivasa Theatre and Others Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others, AIR 1992 SC 999 . Submission following the dicta of the Supreme Court in this case is that entertainment tax is not linked to language, but is linked to the content; that the language is only a medium to convey the sequences of the story in the movie, which constitute entertainment and therefore levy of tax linked to language and making a distinction in the rates of tax based on the languages in Entertainment Tax Act is while opposed to the very object of tax, the tax being only on entertainment, it also results in dividing the society on language lines, acts as a divisive force, which has been strongly disapproved by the Supreme Court in the case of Aashirwad Films [supra] and therefore submits that the present statutory provision is one clearly contravening the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and it is therefore to be declared as bad in law and unenforceable. 16. One another argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that Section 3-C of the Act, though is indicated to be an independent Section in the scheme of the Act, it is virtually in the nature of the proviso to Section 3 and should be read as part of Section 3 itself and if so read, the charging section produces an act of discrimination, as urged earlier and therefore Section 3-C being a separate section or in the nature of exemption cannot make much difference to get over the allegations of discrimination and the provisions should be declared as unconstitutional and void. 17. Sri Udaya Holla, learned Advocate General, appearing for the state and its officers, has made a valiant efforts to defend the validity of the statutory provisions. 17. Sri Udaya Holla, learned Advocate General, appearing for the state and its officers, has made a valiant efforts to defend the validity of the statutory provisions. It is firstly contended that it is a well settled principle of interpretation of Constitution and the taxing laws; that in the matter of levy of tax, the legislature has a larger freedom to choose a specific person, place or goods, which should be brought within the net of taxation and as to who should be left out of the net of taxation and likewise, even in the matter of rates, as to who should be subjected to tax at a higher rate and who should be subjected to tax at a lower rate; that such measures are of essentially within the policy domain of the State and the courts will not unduly interfere with the freedom enjoyed by the state in the matter of choosing either a subject of taxation or rates at which the state should impose tax on different persons. Learned Advocate General has placed reliance on the following decisions of the Supreme Court in support of these submissions: Ashutosh Gupta Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, AIR 2002 SC 1533 Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Association of India, etc., Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1990 SC 1637 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kamla Palace AIR 2000 SC 617 Swaroop Vegetables Products Industries Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1984 SC 20 ] Superintendent of Central Excise and Others Vs. Gandhiji Cottage Match Works and Others, AIR 1974 SC 2349 Vishal Properties Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 2008 SC 183 - PARA 12 & 16 18. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1984 SC 20 ] Superintendent of Central Excise and Others Vs. Gandhiji Cottage Match Works and Others, AIR 1974 SC 2349 Vishal Properties Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 2008 SC 183 - PARA 12 & 16 18. It is also submitted on behalf of the state that a taxing measure can also be utilized to achieve social objectives and to reduce social inequalities; that it can be used to protect the weak and economically inferior; that it can be achieved either by subjecting the economically superior class alone to tax or even by taxing the weak at a lower rate and taxing the affluent at a higher rate; that the state government had in response to the appeals made by Kannada film industry has caused a survey and was convinced that the Kannada film industry was very weak economically and the return was also low and in support of this submission, while draws attention to the fact and figures not only placed by the petitioners themselves but also facts and figures placed by the state before the court, which clearly indicates that the revenue in a movie theatre while Kannada films are exhibited is far less in comparison to the revenue generated while movies of other languages are exhibited; that the health of the industry directly depends on the revenue collection at the gates, as it is the payment made by the movie goers that ultimately reaches the producers in the nature who produce the movies of different languages; that a reduction or total exemption in the matter of levy of entertainment tax in favour of Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara language films acts as a great incentive to the movie goers to view more and more Kannada films and in turn it can augment the collection by viewing Kannada movies, which can ultimately reach the producers of Kannada movies in the industry and can pave the way for the betterment of the Kannada film producers and that can definitely help Kannada film industry to raise and improve in quality and even can achieve technical superiority in production, and all these things fully subserve the object of achieving the social causes even in terms of the provisions of part-IV of the Constitution of India and therefore submits that the statutory provisions are not in any way discriminatory nor in any way affect the rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and in this regard has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Elel Hotels and Investments Limited and Others Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1664 and Sri Srinivasa Theatre and Others Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others, AIR 1992 SC 999 . 19. Sri Udaya Holla, has also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D.A.V. College, Bhatinda, etc. Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, AIR 1971 SC 1731 . 20. While the general principles as emerges from the decisions relied upon by the learned Advocate General are well known and are not in dispute, in so far as the reliance placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dav College [supra] is concerned, the ratio of this case is neither applicable nor advances the case of the State in the present situation. It is rather difficult to accept the submissions on behalf of the State that the very object of the Act or even the particular provision is to ameliorate the difficulties and the problem faced by the Kannada film industry and therefore there is nexus in this object that can sustain the validity of the provisions from the vice of falling foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not an argument that can be accepted, as firstly levy of entertainment tax has nothing to do with promoting a particular film industry based on a particular language, but more importantly, the argument cannot be accepted in the wake of the law declared by the Supreme Court on the very question which was directly in issue on the aspect of language being made the criterion for levy of different rates of tax under the provisions of the Andhrapradesh Entertainment Tax in the case of Aashirwad Films [supra] and the law declared therein has to be applied to the present case. 21. In so far as the act of discrimination is concerned, there is no denial of the fact that a distinction is made in the matter of levy of entertainment tax based on the language of the film for the purpose of levy of entertainment tax. The question is as to whether it amounts to an act of discrimination? In so far as the legislative competence for levy of entertainment tax is concerned, it is not disputed nor is not an issue here. 22. The question is as to whether it amounts to an act of discrimination? In so far as the legislative competence for levy of entertainment tax is concerned, it is not disputed nor is not an issue here. 22. Any argument based on the ground of violation of Article 19(1)(a) or 1(g) of the Constitution of India is concerned, I am afraid that such an argument cannot be accepted for the reason that no embargo is placed on exhibition of films in other languages. This position takes care of the allegation of violation of either Article 19(1)(a) or 1(g) of the Constitution of India A differential rate of tax or total exemption from levy of tax while can be a matter for examination on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India can not be a matter for examination on the touchstone of Article 19 of the Constitution of India and is the well settled legal position. It is only when the levy of tax reaches the level of confiscation, it can be said that it is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and not otherwise. 23. In so far as the attack based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India is concerned, while the petitioners per se alleged an act of discrimination and the learned Counsel for the petitioners submit that the matter is squarely covered by the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Aashirwad Films [supra], the stand of the State is that there is a distinguishing feature in the present case and particularly as explained by the state in its counter, which was conspicuously absent in the case of Andhrapradesh legislation and which was the main cause for frowning upon that legislation. Strong reliance is placed by the learned Advocate General on this aspect by referring to para-25 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Aashirwad Films [supra], which reads as under: 25. The purported classification only on the basis of language without anything more and in particular having regard to the difference in the rate of tax, in our opinion is ex fade arbitrary. The burden was, therefore, on the State to show that the imposition was justified. The purported classification only on the basis of language without anything more and in particular having regard to the difference in the rate of tax, in our opinion is ex fade arbitrary. The burden was, therefore, on the State to show that the imposition was justified. Different rates of entertainment tax had not been levied having regard to the nature of theatre, the area where they were situated or extent of occupancy, etc It has not been explained as to whether cinema theatres exhibiting Telugu films suffer from any disadvantage which others had not been. It has not been shown as to why the same theatre where films in different languages are exhibited would be a class apart, only because at different times it exhibits films produced in different languages. Moreover, how Telugu films have been treated as a separate class has not been stated. Although the legislature enjoys a greater freedom and latitude in choosing persons upon whom and suggest upon which it can levy tax, it is trite that taxing legislations are not immune from attack based on Article 14. It is also not the case of the respondent State that in imposing different rate of tax, they intend to achieve an avowed object envisaged under Part IV of the Constitution of India. 24. It is also not the case of the respondent State that in imposing different rate of tax, they intend to achieve an avowed object envisaged under Part IV of the Constitution of India. 24. Even here also, while the attempt on the part of the state is only to answer the latter part of the observations made in this paragraph viz., that of making effort to submit that treating the Kannada film industry as a separate class is justified for the reason that Kannada film industry is at disadvantage in the sense, economically weak and is unable to sustain, in comparison to the film industries producing movies in other languages, which in fact has not been made good before the court by facts and figures as facts and figures placed before the court is only a comparative chart of gate collection during exhibition of Kannada language film and films of other languages, which may or may not lead to the inference that the Kannada film industry is weak, sick or economically unviable for this reason, and needs to be nurtured and sops provided, the earlier part of the observations of the Supreme Court in the very paragraph viz., as to the same theatre where films of different languages are exhibited, would be a class apart, only because at different times it exhibited films produced in different languages remains unanswered by the State. 25. But more importantly, the Supreme Court found fault with the statutory provisions of the Andhrapradesh enactment for the main reason that even when attempting to defend a legislative provision from the attack of vice of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the basis of a reasonable and justifiable classification, it should not result in creating a division in the society based on the artificial barriers and language being one such barrier and the provision also should not fall foul with any other provisions of Constitution viz., even part-IV of the Constitution, and therefore was held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India is a declaration which clearly applies to the present case, as language alone is made a criterion for bringing about the distinction in levying different rates of tax. 26. 26. It is no doubt true that to complain an act of discrimination, the complainant should demonstrate that the complainant is put to a disadvantage vis-a-vis another person, who is not so disadvantaged or is even at an advantageous position and an act of discrimination arises only in the context of a comparative analysis of the impact of the statutory provisions on two different persons and in the instant case, the petitioners are not complaining that they are discriminated vis-a-vis any other exhibitors, who are either at an advantageous position or who are not so disadvantaged, and therefore the very concept of discrimination may not arise, this aspect does not merit further examination as the Supreme Court in a similar situation has taken the view that making a distinction based on language which results in a division in the society cannot be a good defence for the purpose of defending a statutory provision from the allegation of discrimination and therefore the law as declared in the case of Aashirwad Films [supra] has to be inevitably applied to the present case also, and if so, the charging section in the statute which seeks to levy different rates of taxation based solely on language as is clearly the case in terms of Section 4 of the Act, the ratio squarely applies and Section 4 of the Act has to be inevitably declared as unconstitutional. In this regard, the learned Counsel for the petitioners have strongly placed reliance on para-18 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Aashirwad Films [supra], which reads as under: 18. The fact of the matter remains that it is difficult to laud the objective of the taxation statute in the instant matter which differentiates on the basis of language alone. This is definitely derisive of social attributes of the polity and Article 14 in its basic form i.e. equality before law. If any classification seeks to take refuge of exception under reasonable differentia category under Article 14, it must stay clear of the broad constitutional mandate as mentioned hereinbefore. In the instant matter, the classification solely on the basis of language, fails in its initiative to be called reasonable. The classification thus is arbitrary and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the instant matter, the classification solely on the basis of language, fails in its initiative to be called reasonable. The classification thus is arbitrary and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. But, what is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners on this aspect is a declaration of a provision of Section 4 is to be so made as to ensure that the additional tax on the exhibition of cinematograph shows of other languages also should be brought on a par with the tax as is levied in respect of cinematograph shows of Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara films i.e. the additional tax levied under Section 4 of the Act in the two situations viz., an exhibitor pays tax on collection in terms of Section 3 and 3A or on the basis of the compensation in terms of Section 4-A of the Act, the rate of tax as are applicable in terms of the proviso alone should be made applicable to non-Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara films and not at the rates as are indicated in general or in the main part of the section. Submission is that the proviso alone should be declared valid and all other parts should be declared to be unconstitutional 27. I am afraid this is an exercise that can be undertaken more by the legislature and the duty of the court is only to review and declare that legislative action which is offending. When it is found that it is the proviso which constitutes the offending part, as it seeks to carve out a class of films viz., films produced in Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara languages in which, either exempts or subjects to a lower rate of tax resulting in an act of discrimination, it is only this offending portion which can be declared as unconstitutional and not the main provision which is general in nature. Therefore, the provisions of Section 4, which constitute a proviso in the nature of levy of a lower rate of tax in the case of Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara films i.e. the following portion of the Section 4 of the Act is declared as unconstitutional: Provided that in the case of a cinematograph show of Kannada, Kodava, Konkani or Tulu film, in addition to tax leviable under Sections 3 and 3-A, the tax payable under this sub-section shall be at the following rates, namely.: Sl. No. Payment for admission (excluding entertainment tax) of a person to the highest class of seat or accommodation Rate of tax per show a. Does not exceed five rupees Eighteen rupees b. Exceeds five rupees but does not exceed fifteen rupees Thirty rupees c. Exceeds fifteen rupees but does not exceed twenty rupees Thirty-eight rupees d. Exceeds twenty rupees Forty-eight rupees And Provided also that in respect of cinema theatres paying tax in the manner specified in Section 4-A, the tax payable under this subsection in respect of cinematograph show of a Kannada, Kodava, Konkani or Tulu film shall be at the following rates, namely.: Sl. No. Total payment for admission of a person to the highest class of seat or accommodation Rate of tax per show a. Does not exceed eight rupees Thirteen rupees b. Exceeds eight rupees but does not exceed fifteen rupees Twenty-five rupees c. Exceeds fifteen rupees Thirty-eight rupees 28. In so far as Section 3-C of the Act is concerned, while Section 3 is the charging section applicable in general, Section 3-C is in the nature of an exemption provision and is not any part of the charging section. Section 3 by itself does not create any class of distinction. It is a charging section applicable to all classes of assessees who are liable under this provision. In so far as Section 3-C is concerned, it is not actually part of Section 3, as is sought to be projected on behalf of the petitioners. An exemption cannot be read to be as part of the charging section. Section 3-C cannot be read as either a proviso or as an appendage to Section 3 of the Act. In so far as Section 3-C is concerned, it is not actually part of Section 3, as is sought to be projected on behalf of the petitioners. An exemption cannot be read to be as part of the charging section. Section 3-C cannot be read as either a proviso or as an appendage to Section 3 of the Act. While it is not in doubt that a proviso, just because it is merely in the nature an exemption provision, does not get immunity from the test of an act of discrimination frowned upon by Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the scrutiny and examination for determination as to the extent of an act of discrimination by levy of tax at a different rate on different persons created by the charging section and making a distinction and classifying persons is not the same for determining an act of discrimination when the state is granting an exemption or concession. 29. While the argument of the learned Advocate General that a concession is extended in respect of Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara films in this manner under the provisions of the Act can be a relevant argument. I find that the petitioners cannot even complain of act of discrimination in the present situation, particularly in respect of Section 3-C of the Act, providing for an exemption or concession, as the exemption provision in no way affects the petitioners who arc all exhibitors of movies and who are free to choose to exhibit movies of the language of their choice. Exhibiting a movie in a language which enjoins a tax concession or tax exemption can, if at all, be to the advantage and benefit of the exhibitors and it can in no way said to be disadvantageous or even to bring about an act of discrimination against the petitioners in any manner. It is for this reason, I find no fault with the provisions of Section 3-C providing for special provisions in the nature of concession or exemption in the matter of exhibition of cinematograph shows of films in Kannada, Kodava, Konkani, Tulu or Banjara languages. I do not find any unconstitutionality in the provisions of Section 3-C as is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. The challenge to the provisions of Section 3-C on the ground of unconstitutionality therefore fails and the argument is rejected. 30. I do not find any unconstitutionality in the provisions of Section 3-C as is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. The challenge to the provisions of Section 3-C on the ground of unconstitutionality therefore fails and the argument is rejected. 30. In the result, these writ petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above. Rule issued and made absolute to the limited extent as indicated above in respect of the provisos of Section 4 of the Act as mentioned above. 31. In the light of the view taken as above, the prayer for refund does not arise for consideration and it is accordingly rejected.