JUDGMENT By the Court.—The application for leave to appeal has been filed challenging the judgement and order of the learned Single Judge dated 9.1.2008 passed in Writ Petition No. 60988 of 2007 Smt. Nirmala Verma v. State of U.P. and others. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to the appeal are that one Smt. Nirmala Verma, respondent No. 4 had been elected as a Gram Pradhan and proceedings under Section 95 (1) (g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act,1947 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act) had been initiated against her on certain charges. The applicant claims himself to be the complainant on the basis whereof enquiry has been initiated. The District Magistrate found the charges prima facie established on the preliminary enquiry report and passed the order depriving the said respondent No. 4 from exercising financial and executive powers till regular enquiry is concluded for which he also appointed as Enquiry Officer. The District Magistrate further appointed a three Members Committee to look after the day to day work of the Gram Sabha. The applicant is also one of the members of the said Committee. The said respondent No. 4 challenged the order of the District Magistrate dated 22-11-2007 by means of writ petition No. 60988 of 2007 which has been allowed. The order dated 22-11-2007 withdrawing the administrative and financial powers of the said respondent No. 4 has been quashed. However, the learned Single Judge has directed that the regular enquiry be concluded within two months. The period whereof shall expire on 9-3-2008. 3. A preliminary objection has been raised by Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 regarding the right of the appellant who is the complainant and has been appointed as one of the three Members Committee to perform the duties of the Pradhan pending regular enquiry on the ground that the said applicant being the complainant can merely be a witness and not a party to the lis. More so, he is the beneficiary of the order depriving the said respondent from exercising her financial and executive powers, he cannot be permitted to file the appeal. Therefore, the application is liable to be rejected. 4. More so, he is the beneficiary of the order depriving the said respondent from exercising her financial and executive powers, he cannot be permitted to file the appeal. Therefore, the application is liable to be rejected. 4. Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Sri R.K. Awasthi, learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently opposed the preliminary objection contending that the petitioner is a citizen of the country and being the resident of the village has a legal right to raise his grievance against the Village Pradhan and therefore being a complainant he has right to file an application for maintaining the appeal. More so, he is one of members of the three Members Committee appointed to look after the work of the Pradhan, he can maintain the appeal. 5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the records. 6. Admittedly, the applicant is a complainant and has also been included by the District Magistrate in the three Members Committee to look after the work of the Pradhan pending final enquiry. The issue as to whether such a beneficiary of order, impugned in writ petition could be heard by a Court was considered at length by the Division Bench of this Court to which one of us (Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.) was a member in Smt. Kesari Devi v. State of U.P. and others, (2005) 4 A.W.C. 3563 wherein after noticing large number of judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Court reached the conclusion that such an applicant cannot be a party in litigation for the reason that he cannot be a person aggrieved. The said judgement was challenged before the Hon’ble Apex Court in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 19761 of 2005 and the same was dismissed vide order dated 3-10-2005. 7. In Northern Plastics Ltd. v. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Co. The said judgement was challenged before the Hon’ble Apex Court in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 19761 of 2005 and the same was dismissed vide order dated 3-10-2005. 7. In Northern Plastics Ltd. v. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Co. Ltd., (1997) 4 SCC 452 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the issue of locus standi while considering the provisions of Customs Act, 1962 and held that under the garb of being necessary party, a person cannot be permitted to make a case as that of general public interest or of a rival businessman rather a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced or a person who has wrongly been deprived of something, a person having a remote interest cannot be permitted to file the appeal even by seeking the leave of the Court. 8. In Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 385 , the Apex Court held that even if a person had been given a notice of some proceedings and he in pursuance thereof has made his submissions he cannot claim to be heard in appeal from an order rejecting his contention or submissions, unless he answers the description of aggrieved party. 9. In Suresh Singh v. Commissioner, Moradabad Division, Moradabad, (1993) 1 UPLBEC 414, this Court while considering the similar case under the said provision of U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 wherein issue arose as to whether an Up-Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha who was appointed to officiate as Pradhan during the period the Pradhan has been deprived of exercising his financial and executive powers has a right to be heard. The Court held that an order of removal of Pradhan is a matter between the State Government and the Pradhan. An Up-Pradhan who was petitioner in the said writ petition as well as the complainant and on whose complaint the enquiry had been initiated was held not to be a necessary party. The Court held that he has no locus standi to challenge any order passed during the enquiry. He can at the best be a witness in the said enquiry as none of his personal or statutory rights are affected. 10. The Court held that he has no locus standi to challenge any order passed during the enquiry. He can at the best be a witness in the said enquiry as none of his personal or statutory rights are affected. 10. Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Sri R.K. Awasthi, learned Counsel for the appellant has placed a very heavy reliance upon the Constitution Bench judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, AIR 1975 SC 2092 wherein the question arose as to whether in a proceeding initiated against a lawyer under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961, Bar Council may be a person aggrieved and therefore has a right to file appeal. The Supreme Court held that in such eventuality if on the complaint of a lawyer, disciplinary proceedings had been initiated and concluded against a lawyer under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961, the Bar Council can be a “person aggrieved” and has a right to challenge the outcome of such an enquiry. There can be no dispute to the law laid down by the Court in the said judgment. However, if the law laid down therein is applied to the facts of the present case, it would be seen that the District Collector would be a substitute for the Bar Council entitle to initiate the enquiry and not the applicant, complainant or a beneficiary being a member of three Members Committee. Therefore, the facts of the said case are quite distinguishable and the said judgment has no application in the present case. 11. Reliance has further been placed by Sri Ravi Kiran Jain on the judgment in S.P. Gupta and others v. President of India and others, AIR 1982 SC 149 . The said case was filed as a Public Interest Litigation wherein the doctrine of locus standi has been substantially diluted as the purpose of filing the PIL is entirely different. Therefore, the ratio of the said judgment is not applicable in the present case. 12. Further reliance has been placed upon the judgment in Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1976 SC 2602 wherein the Apex Court had given a wide meaning to the term “person aggrieved” for the purpose of maintaining the appeal. Therefore, the ratio of the said judgment is not applicable in the present case. 12. Further reliance has been placed upon the judgment in Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1976 SC 2602 wherein the Apex Court had given a wide meaning to the term “person aggrieved” for the purpose of maintaining the appeal. However that was a case under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the dispute was as to whether the land in dispute had vested in the Gaon Sabha under the provisions of Section 117 of the Act and what was the locus standi of the State Government to file appeal against the decision of the lower Court in absence of Gaon Sabha. In the said case, the Apex Court observed as under : “Of course, he who has a proprietary right, which has been or is threatened to be violated, is surely an ‘aggrieved person. A legal injury creates a remedial right in the injured person. But the right to a remedy apart, a larger circle of persons can move the Court for the protection or defence or enforcement of a civil right or to ward off or claim compensation for a civil wrong, even if they are not proprietarily or personally linked with the cause of action. The nexus between the lis and the plaintiff need not necessarily be personal, although it has to be more than a wayfarer’s allergy to an unpalatable episode." 13. The aforesaid observations had been made by the Supreme Court in a different context altogether and the same have no application in the facts of this case. 14. We may further clarify that the right of the petitioner to continue as one of the Members of three Members Committee pending regular enquiry against the Pradhan, is not a vested right nor he has a legal right to continue. More so, as the petitioner claims to be the complainant, he ought not to have been allowed to be a member of the Committee to look after the work of Pradhan. In case he was a complainant, he could be, at the most, examined as a witness in the enquiry but he cannot be permitted to become a party in the lis. In case he was a complainant, he could be, at the most, examined as a witness in the enquiry but he cannot be permitted to become a party in the lis. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner does not have any locus standi to maintain the appeal, and the application for leave to appeal is liable to be rejected. 15. In view of the above, we record that none of the rights of the petitioner has adversely been affected under the impugned judgment so as to categorize him an ‘aggrieved party’. 16. The application lacks merit and is accordingly rejected. ————