JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. The petitioner is a society, registered in the name and style of 'Dibrugarh Fishery Co-Operative Society Ltd., Dibrugarh' ('the petitioner society') and formed by 100% actual fishermen belonging to the Scheduled Caste community and fishing is their only means of livelihood. The petitioner, by this writ petition, is assailing order of the Government of Assam being No. FISH 237/86/pt-II/250 dated Dispur, the 31st March, 2008 for extending the settlement period of the Brahmaputra Part-Ill, IV and V Fishery for three years in favour of the sitting lessee, i.e., M/s. Brahmaputra Part-Ill, TV and V Fishery Co-operative Society Ltd. (the respondent No. 5 society) with an enhanced rate of 10% over the annual revenue w.e.f. 1.4.2008 to 31.3.2011. 2. Heard Mr. A.K. Goswami, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the learned G.A., Assam appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 4 as well, as Mr. N.C. Das, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 5. 3. A short factual panorama, leading to the filing of the present writ petition, which would be sufficient for deciding the matter in issue in the present writ petition, is that: the respondent No. 5, i.e., M/s. Brahmaputra Part-Ill, IV and V Fishery Co-operative Society is also a registered society. The said fishery, i.e., Brahmaputra Part-III, IV and V ('the fishery'), Dibrugarh District was settled with the respondent No. 5/society in the year, 1976 which was cancelled in the year 1978. Immediately after cancellation, the fishery was again settled with respondent No. 5 society for a period from 1978 to 31.3.1984 at the rate of Rs. 1,04,500. The fishery was again settled with the respondent No. 5 society at the rate of Rs. 92,640 w.e.f. April 1984 and since then the respondent No. 5 society has been the lessee of the fishery till date, i.e., for a period of 24 years, either through fresh settlement and/or extension. The fishery was again settled with the respondent No. 5 society vide order dated 8.11.2000, issued in exercise of power conferred under proviso to Rule 12 of the Assam Fishery Rules, 1953 for a period from 1.4.2001 to 31.3.2008. The fishery was again settled with the respondent No. 5 society vide order dated 8.11.2000, issued in exercise of power conferred under proviso to Rule 12 of the Assam Fishery Rules, 1953 for a period from 1.4.2001 to 31.3.2008. As the settlement period of the fishery to the respondent No. 5 society was coming to an end, the petitioner society and tow other societies namely, M/s. Dehing Part-I Fishery Co-operative society Ltd. and Morichagaon Fishery Co-operative Society Ltd. had separately applied for direct settlement of the fishery. 4. Rules 8 and 12 of the Assam Fishery Rules, 1953 are relevant for deciding the matter in issue in the present writ petition. Accordingly, for easy reference Rules 8 and 12 of the Assam Fishery Rules, 1953 are quoted hereunder: 8. Settling authority - (a) The Deputy Commissioners or the Additional Deputy Commissioners in the case of Sadar Sub-Divisions and the Sub-Divisional Officers in case of other Sub-Divisions shall be the authorities for settlement of all registered fisheries under tender system of sale in their respective jurisdiction. (b) Extension of the term of lease. - (i) Where...the period of lease of registered fisheries being ordinarily not less than three years is interfered with, due to any natural cause or for any unavoidable reasons beyond the control of the lessees, Government may extend the period of such lease supported by official reports as to the nature of cause in exceptionally special cases for a reasonable period so as to enable such lessees to make good the loss; (ii) The State Government may also on the recommendation of the Director of Fisheries extend the period of lease of a fishery with an intending pisciculturist who should invariably be the sitting lessee and who agrees to accept such an extension at a revenue and for such other additional terms and conditions as may be specified by Government: Provided that one of the conditions or extension of lease against pisciculturel plan shall invariably be the implementation of approves Scheme or Schemes of Development and improvement of such a fishery at the lessee's own cost within a target period to be fixed by Government. The orders of extension of lease on the aforesaid grounds, passed by the State Government shall be final and no appeal shall lie against such orders of extension. (c) Development of Fisheries and their consequential settlement. The orders of extension of lease on the aforesaid grounds, passed by the State Government shall be final and no appeal shall lie against such orders of extension. (c) Development of Fisheries and their consequential settlement. - (i) The State Government on expiry of the term of settlement, may at any time by a notification in the Official Gazette, stop any fishery from further settlement under tender system and vest management of such a fishery with the Director of Fisheries for development. On publication of such Notification, the Deputy Commissioner or Sub-Divisional Officers, as the case may be, shall hand over the fishery to the Director of Fisheries: Provided that the Director of Fisheries may call for tenders consistent with the relevant provisions of these rules for settlement of such a fishery and submit the same with his view thereon within fifteen days of the date of opening the tenders to Government for approval. The decision of the State Government in this behalf shall be final: Provided further that such settlement shall not interfere or conflict with the work of development of such a fishery and that the provisions of Rule 50 of the Fishery Rules will not apply in case of such settlement. (ii) The State Government may at any time after constitution of the Assam Fisheries Development Corporation by a Notification in the Official Gazette, vest management of any registered fishery with the Assam Fisheries Development Corporation as considered necessary for the purpose of its development and management. On publication of such Notification the Deputy Commissioners, the Sub-Divisional Officers and the Director of Fisheries Assam, as the case may be shall hand over such fisheries to the Corporation. (d) Confirmation of sale. -All sales of fisheries in the District made by the Deputy Commissioners or Sub-Divisional Officers shall be reported not later than seven days from the date of such sales to the Commissioners of Divisions for confirmation in Form No. 100 of the Assam Land Revenue manual, Volume II Conformation orders must be passed within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of such proposals. (e) Re-sale of fisheries. (e) Re-sale of fisheries. - When for default of kist money or for violation of any of the conditions of the fishery lease including any of the provisions of these rules by a lessee the fishery shall be put to re-sale under tender system at the risk of original lessee. Notice of re-sale shall be given as in the case of the original sale with additional proviso that the re-sale shall be at the risk of and on account of the original lessee: Provided that the question of such re-sale shall not be applicable where State Government permits extension of time for payment of kist money. 12. Except those referred to in sub-rule No. 8(b) above, all registered Fisheries shall be settled under tender system of sale in place of sale auction: Provided that the Government shall settle a 60% category fishery with special category of Co-operative Societies, Non-Government Organisations and Self Help Groups consisting of 100% actual fishermen in the neighborhood of the fishery concerned by the Tender System. 5. On plain perusal of Rule 8(a) and Rule 12 of the Assam Fishery Rules, 1953, it appears that normally all the registered fisheries shall be settled under tender system of sale in place of sale, save and except those referred to in Sub-rule 8(b) of the Assam Fishery Rules, 1953. Extension of term of lease of a sitting lessee can only be made by the Government in exceptional cases for reasonable period so as to enable such lessee to make good the loss. Therefore, the core questions to be decided in the present writ petition, i.e., whether there are exceptional specie reasons for extension of the term of lease of the fishery in favour of the sitting lessee, i.e., respondent No. 5 society from 1.4.2008 to 31.3.2011 and also as to whether the impugned order dated 31.3.2008 for extension of the lease was passed in good faith and with the best of intentions to further the purpose of the legislation which confer the powers and also by taking into consideration of the grounds relevant to the object on the basis of which the authority has been so empowered and also as to whether the continued extension of the settlement period of fishery in favour of respondent No. 5 society, will amount to unfair treatment to the other societies or not? 6. 6. The petitioner society in the present writ petition alleges that Chairman of the respondent No. 5 society who was holding the post of Chairman, Dispur Municipal Board, belonged to the ruling party in power in the State was trying to have the extension of term of settlement of the fishery in favour of respondent No. 5 society. The petitioner also further contends that respondent No. 5 society earned profits from the fishery and they suffer no loss whatsoever. Taking advantage of the proximity to the power, respondent No. 5 society had applied on 21.1.2008 for extension of settlement period before the Hon'ble Minister, Fishery. The petitioner society again on 18.3.2008, in addition to the other petition dated 3.3.2008 filed an application before the Hon'ble Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Assam, Fishery Department, Dispur, stating that respondent No. 5 society was already enjoying 60% category of fishery namely, Sessanady of Dibrugarh District for more than 12 years and was also settled with Dihing Part-I fishery of Dibrugarh District since 10 12 years back till 3.6.2007. The petitioner society in their representation also contended that on the last earlier occasions also respondent No. 5 society had resorted to such tactics of getting report from the authority that the respondent No. 5 society incurred heavy loss during the period of settlement of fishery for extension of the settlement period and also that the reports were not correct. The said tactics adopted by respondent No. 5 society was to gain undue benefit at the cost of others in view of the political connection. The petitioner society and others had expressed their willingness to enter into a negotiation and also had offered to pay a higher amount as annual revenue per year for the fishery. 7. Although the management of fishery is under the District Authority of Dibrugarh, in fact, the fishery falls under 5 revenue circles of three districts, namely, Tinsukia, Dibrugarh and Sibsagar and names of the said five revenue circles are Tinsukia Revenue Circle (for Part III of the fishery), Chabua Revenue Circle (for Part III of the fishery, in part), Dibrugarh East Revenue Circle, Dibrugarh West Revenue Circle (for Part IV and V of the fishery, in part) and Demow Revenue Circle (for Part V of the fishery, in part). The authority concerned, called report on the application filed by the respondent No. 5 society for extension of period of settlement of fishery only from the Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh who had submitted vague report on 27.3.2008 basing on a joint verification report submitted by the Circle Officer of Dibrugarh East Circle with Circle Officer of Jonai and Sissiborgaon and Range Officers of Jonai on 13.5.2002. In the said report dated 27.3.2008 the Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh, stated that respondent No. 5 society incurred loss but nothing is mentioned even about the approximate amount of loss incurred. In that report dated 27.3.2008, reasons for the alleged loss incurred by respondent No. 5 society was that Jonai MP and Murkung Selek AP had settled a part of Brahmaputra Part III in the name and style of' 'Lali' and that the Block Development Officer, Lahowal Development Block had settled a portion of the Fishery to 'Madhur Self-Help Group' (SHG), vide order No. LAP 1/2002-03 dated 1 7.2002 during the peak season of fishing but the report does not mention the period of settlement of part of Brahmaputra Part III fishery in the name and style of 'Lali' and also the approximate area of part of the Brahmaputra Part III settled by the Jonai MP and Murjung Selek Ali and the Block Development Officer, Lahowal Development Block. The said report dated 27.3.2008 is annexed as Annexure-IV to the writ petition and on plain perusal of the same it is clear that even the approximate amount of loss incurred by respondent No. 5 society is not mentioned and the reasons for incurring the loss by respondent No. 5 society are so vague and cryptic. Over and above, even though the fishery admittedly falls within five revenue circles the Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh did not even call the verification report from all the five revenue circles before submitting the said vague report dated 27.3.2008. For easy reference, report dated 27.3.2008 is quoted hereunder: OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER: DIBRUGARH DISTRICT DIBRUGARH Dated Dibrugarh the 27th March 2008 No. DFF-1/2008/55 To The Commissioner and Secretary Govt. of Assam, Fishery Department Dispur, Guwahati-6 Sub : Extension of lease term of M/s. Brahmaputra Pt. For easy reference, report dated 27.3.2008 is quoted hereunder: OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER: DIBRUGARH DISTRICT DIBRUGARH Dated Dibrugarh the 27th March 2008 No. DFF-1/2008/55 To The Commissioner and Secretary Govt. of Assam, Fishery Department Dispur, Guwahati-6 Sub : Extension of lease term of M/s. Brahmaputra Pt. III, IV & V FCS Ltd. Sir, With reference to the subject cited above and as desired by the Government I have the honour to furnish herewith the required report on the petition submitted by Shri Harish Ch. Das, Secretary M/s. Brahmaputra Part III, IV and V FCS Ltd. for extension of the lease term of the co-operative society. The following factual position is adduced hereby for your kind information and perusal. 1. M/s. Brahmaputra Part III, IV and V FCS Ltd. is a registered Cooperative Society bearing Registration No. D-119, dated 26.4.1976. The society is reorganized one as per government policy. 2. The society comprises of actual fishermen only belonging to the Scheduled Caste Community exclusively and totally as per rules. 3. The society falls within the area of operation of the following villages situated on both sides of the River Brahmaputra from Jonai Mukh to Milankur in the Nrth Bank and from Laikamukh to Dehingmukh in the south Bank. The villages are Mayan, Amaraguri, Tekela Chiring, Natun gaon, Sukanpukhuri, Sengamari, Bogidol and Tulsigaon. 4. It is a fact that as per order of the Government on 8.11.2000, vide No. FISH 237/86/Pt. 11/145 the Government of Assam settled the Brahmaputra Part III, IV and V Fishery of Dibrugarh district with M/s. Brahmaputra Part III, IV and V Fishery Co-operative Society Ltd. Dibrugarh for a period of 7(seven) years w.e.f 1.4.2001 to 31.3.2008. 5. It is true that Jonai MP and Murkung Selek AP had settled a part of Brahmaputra Part III in the name and style of "Lali" with resultant losses being incurred by M/s. Brahmaputra Part III, IV and V FCS Ltd. In this connection the aggrieved society had filed a case before the Hon'ble High Court Guwahati. 5. It is true that Jonai MP and Murkung Selek AP had settled a part of Brahmaputra Part III in the name and style of "Lali" with resultant losses being incurred by M/s. Brahmaputra Part III, IV and V FCS Ltd. In this connection the aggrieved society had filed a case before the Hon'ble High Court Guwahati. Similarly Sissibor Gaon AP under Dhemaji district has settled some portion of Brahmaputra in the name and style of "Rekha Chapory", "Botum Suti" to some individual Mahaldars for which financial repercussions were faced by M/s. Brahmaputra Part III, IV and V Fishery Co-operative Society Ltd. A Joint verification report in respect of the dispute was filed by Circle Officer of Dibrugarh East Circle with Circle Officers of Jonai and Sissiborgaon and Range Officers of Jonai on 13.5 2002. 6. It has been reported by concerned Circle officer, Dibrugarh (East) that the Block Development Officer, Lahowal Development Block had settled a portion of the fishery to "Madhur Self-Help Group" (SHG), vide order No. LAP 1/2002-03, dated 1.7.2002 during the; peak season of fishing. As a result of which the lessee society incurred losses. 7. It is pertinent to mention that for purposes of settling the fishery, Government vide notification No. FISH.2/2000/171, dated 31.3.2005 made certain amendments in Fishery Rule 12, whereupon it was stated that henceforth the 60% categorized fisheries should be settled by "Tender system" forbidding permission for direct settlement. But Govt. again amended the Fishery Rule 50, 11(2) wherein it is stated that after expiry of the lease term the same may be renewed again subject to submission of an application by the lessee and payment of the fixed fee (Please see copy of Assam Gazette Extraordinary, Notification No. FISH.2/2000/171, dated 31.3.2005 enclosed). In this case, the current lessee has submitted the application for extension of period of lease of Brahmaputra Part III, IV and IV Fishery, which may be examined and considered as per rules. This report is in compliance with the direction of Hon'ble High Court, Guwahati order No. WP(C) 873/2008 (Please refer copy of the order enclosed). Enclo : As stated above. Yours faithfully Sd/ Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh. 8. In the said report dated 27.3.2008 it has been mentioned that the said report is in compliance with the order of Gauhati High Court passed in WP(C) No. 873 of 2008. Enclo : As stated above. Yours faithfully Sd/ Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh. 8. In the said report dated 27.3.2008 it has been mentioned that the said report is in compliance with the order of Gauhati High Court passed in WP(C) No. 873 of 2008. The WP(C) No. 873 of 2008 is a writ petition filed by respondent No. 5 society and disposed of vide order dated 7.3.2008 at the motion stage with a direction to the concerned authority to consider and dispose of the application dated 21.1.2008 filed by the respondent No. 5 society for extension of period of settlement for a further period so as to enable them to make good the loss. The order of this Court dated 7.3.2008 passed in WP(C) No. 873 of 2008 read as follows: Heard Mr. N.C. Das, learned Counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner is a sitting lessee in respect of the Brahmaputra Part III, TV and V fisheries in the District of Dibrugarh and the settlement of the petitioner would expire on 31.3.2008. During the currency of the lease period, the petitioner has made prayer for extension of the lease vide application dated 21.1.2008 but the same has not been attended to although necessary report has been called for from the Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh. In view of the aforesaid limited question raised for consideration in this writ petition and taking note of the fact that the period of lease would expire on 31.3.2008, this writ petition stands disposed of with the direction that the concerned authority shall dispose of the aforesaid application of the petitioner as expeditiously as possible at any rate before expiry of the period of settlement. This disposes of the writ petition. 9. The respondent No. 5 society also filed affidavit-in-opposition in the present writ petition. In their affidavit in opposition it is stated that respondent No. 5 society incurred financial loss and the said financial loss was because of the settlement of a part of Brahmaputra Part III, in the name and style of, 'Lali' by the Jonai Makhuma Parishand and Murkong Selek Anchalik Panchayat. In the affidavit-in-opposition respondent No. 5 society did not mention approximate amount of loss or the extent of amount incurred by them and also the area of the part of Brahmaputra Part III, fishery settled in the name and style of ''Lali' and period of settlement. In the affidavit-in-opposition respondent No. 5 society did not mention approximate amount of loss or the extent of amount incurred by them and also the area of the part of Brahmaputra Part III, fishery settled in the name and style of ''Lali' and period of settlement. As stated above, the extension of period of lease under Rule 8(b)(1) of the Assam Fishery Rules, 1953 will be only in exceptional case so as to make good the loss. As directed by this court, the relevant government file was also placed before this Court by the learned Government Advocate for perusal. On perusal of the same it clearly depicts that the impugned order dated 31.3.2008 for extending the period of settlement of fishery in favour of respondent No. 5 society is based on the said report dated 27.3.2008 submitted by the Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh. Admittedly, respondent No. 5 society has been enjoying the fishery for the last more than 24 years. 10. The Apex Court in Mahinder Singh Sita Ramji v. Governor of Delhi and Ors. AIR 1974 SC 1868 held that when a procedure is prescribed by the Legislature, it is not for the court to substitute by a different one according to its opinion of justice; when the Legislature has spoken, judge cannot afford to be the wiser. The procedure and requirement for extension of period of settlement of fishery is clearly and unambiguously mentioned in Rule 8(b)(1) of the Assam Fishery Rule 1953. 11. The Apex Court in a case arising from this court, i.e., in Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam and Ors. AIR 1978 SC 17 held that it is a cardinal rule of construction that no words should be considered redundant or surplus in interpreting the provisions of a statute or a rule. Again, the Apex court in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P.) Ltd. and Anr. (2003) 2 SCC 111 held that the scope of the legislation on the intention of the Legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words, statutory enactments must ordinarily be considered according to its plain meaning and no other words would be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. 12. In other words, statutory enactments must ordinarily be considered according to its plain meaning and no other words would be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. 12. The true meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what it proves by its clear language with due regard to the scheme of law. Ref.: Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P.) Ltd. and Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 111 , The maxim 'Expressum facit cessare taciturn' (when there is expression mentioned of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) had been discussed by the Apex Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 (CB) and also by this Court in Heman Bihari Singh v. State of Manipur (2004) 1 GLT 1. 13. It is cardinal rule of construction that no word should be construed redundant or surplus in interpreting the provision of a statute or rule (Ref.: Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam and Ors. AIR 1978 SC 17 ). The Apex Court in State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Santosh Shanker Acharya (2000) 7 SCC 463 held that it is too well known principle of construction of statute that the Legislature engrafted every part of the statute for a purpose. The legislative intention is that every part of the statute should be given effect. Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the Legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. 14. It is well settled law that power of judicial review, generally speaking, is not directed against a decision making process and also that courts are more concerned with a decision making process rather than the decision itself while exercising the power of judicial review. Ref.: (1) Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611 (2) Style (Dressland) v. Union Territory Chandigarh and Anr. (1999) 7 SCC 89 . But it is also equally well settled that the court can see while exercising the power of judicial review, as to whether the administrative decision was made reasonably or not and also as to whether that administrative decision is an irrational one based on irrelevant consideration. (1999) 7 SCC 89 . But it is also equally well settled that the court can see while exercising the power of judicial review, as to whether the administrative decision was made reasonably or not and also as to whether that administrative decision is an irrational one based on irrelevant consideration. Ref.: Decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and Anr. v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463 . Paras 12 and 14 of the SCC in G. Ganayutham (supra) are quoted hereunder: The Wednesbury case (1948) 12. This case is treated as laying down various basic principles relating to judicial review of administrative or statutory discretion. Before summarizing the substance of the principles laid down therein we shall refer to the passage from the judgment of Lord Greene in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation. It reads as follows: ...It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word 'unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could even dream that it lay within the powers of the authority....In another, it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and in fact, all these things run into one another. Lord Greene also observed: ...it must be proved to be unreasonable in the sense that the court considers it to be a decision that no reasonable body can come to. It is not what the court considers unreasonable.... The effect of the legislation is not to set up the court as an arbiter of the correctness of one view over another. It is not what the court considers unreasonable.... The effect of the legislation is not to set up the court as an arbiter of the correctness of one view over another. (emphasis supplied) Therefore, to arrive at a decision on "reasonableness" the court has to find out if the administrator has left out relevant factors or taken into account irrelevant factors. The decision of the administrator must have been within the four corners of the law, and not one which no sensible person could have reasonably arrived at having regard to the above principles, and must have been a bona fide one. The decision could be one of many choices open to the authority but it was for that authority to decide upon the choice and not for the court to substitute its view. 14. In other words, to characterize a decision of the administrator as "irrational" the court has to hold, on material, that it is a decision "so outrageous" as to be in total defiance of logic or moral standards. Adoption of "proportionality" into administrative law was left for the future. 15. The Apex Court in Consumer Action Group and Anr. v. State of T.N. and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 425 held that when a wide power is vested in the Government it is to be exercised with great caution. Para 30 of the SCC in Consumer Action Group (supra) read as follows: 30. When such a wide power is vested in the Government it has to be exercised with greater circumspection. Greater is the power, greater should be the caution. No power is absolute, it is hedged by the checks in the statute itself. Existence of power does not mean to give one on his mere asking. The entrustment of such power is neither to act in benevolence nor in the extra-statutory field. Entrustment of such a power is only for the public good and for the public cause. While exercising such a power the authority has to keep in mind the purpose and the policy of the Act and while granting relief has to equate the resultant effect of such a grant on both, viz., the public cause, the grant would be within the permissible limit of the exercise of power. 16. This Court in Chandrapur Anchalik Mean Samabai Samity Ltd. v. State of Assam, secretary to the Govt. of Assam Fisheries Deptt. 16. This Court in Chandrapur Anchalik Mean Samabai Samity Ltd. v. State of Assam, secretary to the Govt. of Assam Fisheries Deptt. Director of Fisheries, Assam Kshiroda Kanta Bishaya (1994) 1 GLR 105 had quashed the order for extending the settlement period of lease under Rule 8(b)(1) and Rule 8(b)(2) of the Assam Fishery Rules on the ground that the authority issued the extension order in abuse of its power by acting on bad faith thereby causing unfair treatment to the others. This Court further held that extension can only be grantee in exceptional cases for reasonable cause. The period of extension must have close nexus with the loss sustained by the lessee and also that the purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment. Para 14, 15, 16 and 18 of the GLR in Chandrapur Anchalik Mean Samabai Samity (supra) are quoted hereunder: 14. A bare reading of Rule 8(b) it will appear that the Deputy Commissioner or, the Additional Deputy Commissioners or Sub-Divisional Officers, as the case may be, may extend the period of such lease when the lessee suffers loss due to any natural cause or for any unavoidable reasons beyond the control of the lessees. However, such actions can be made only when there is an official report to this effect, even though such power can be exercised exceptionally in special case for a reasonable period. From the materials available before me I do not find any such official report favouring extension of lease for the loss sustained by the lessee. On the contrary, the Commissioner & Secretary gave a report which only suggests that no extension should be granted. It is true, the authorities have power to grant extension in an appropriate case, but before granting extension the conditions referred to in Rule 3(b) must be fulfilled. If the conditions referred to in the said rule are not in existence, the authority has no power to grant extension. 15. The action of the authority can be challenged before a court of law and the court may determine the legality of the impugned decision on its own independent judgment. If the decision of the authority is contrary to what the court considers to be the right, the action of the authority is liable to be upset. 15. The action of the authority can be challenged before a court of law and the court may determine the legality of the impugned decision on its own independent judgment. If the decision of the authority is contrary to what the court considers to be the right, the action of the authority is liable to be upset. Where the action of the authority is based on finding of fact, the court is required to examine only the reasonableness of the finding. When the finding is appeared to be rational and reasonably based on evidence, then the judicial review is exhausted even though finding may not be what the court would have come to the finding. Whether an". action is characterized as legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial, or whether it is determination of law or fact, the decision of the expert body, entrusted with power, is generally treated as final and the judicial function is exhausted when it is found to have a rational basis in law. 16. Function of the court is to see that lawful authority is not abused by unfair treatment and not to attempt itself the task entrusted to that authority by the law. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which, it is authorized by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court. A repository of power acts ultra vires when it acts in excess of his power or in abuse of his power by acting in bad faith or for an inadmissible purpose or on irrelevant grounds or without regard to relevant considerations to the object on the basis of which the authority has been so empowered. 18. Coming to the present case in hand, I find that the Minister passed the extension order without caring to know what was the exact loss suffered by the lessee, or whether the lessee actually suffered the loss or not. Moreover, while passing the extension order there was no material before the Minister to ascertain the loss. The application was filed by the lessee for remission of revenue and the official note indicates that remission in the said case could not be granted. As the remission was not possible, the Minister straight way passed the order for extension. Moreover, while passing the extension order there was no material before the Minister to ascertain the loss. The application was filed by the lessee for remission of revenue and the official note indicates that remission in the said case could not be granted. As the remission was not possible, the Minister straight way passed the order for extension. In my opinion this is not envisaged under rule. Besides, ail citizens expect enjoyment of State largess like settlement of fishery and therefore, such entitlement should not be refused unreasonably. The action appears to me is not reasonable. Besides the impugned order was passed contrary to the Rules. 17. This Court further reiterated in Basudev Barman v. Secretary, Bechamari Gaon Matshy Ajibi Samabai Samity Ltd. 1992 (1) GLT 361 that extension of the period of lease can be granted to the sitting lessee only for exceptional and justifiable reasons. 18. Keeping in view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the cases discussed above and also by this Court in the cases mentioned above, this Court has meticulously examined for answering the core question formulated above and also as to whether the impugned order for extension of period of settlement of fishery in favour of respondent No. 5 society had been issued reasonably and also as to whether the individual receives fair treatment and also whether the case of respondent No. 5 society comes under the exceptional case contemplated in Rule 8(b)(1) of the Assam Fishery rules and also that the period of extension has close nexus with the loss sustained by respondent No. 5 society. 19. For the foregoing reasons in the above paras, this Court is of considered view that the authority concerned did not even care to know what was the approximate amount of loss suffered by the respondent No. 5 society and also that there is no cogent reasons for refusing the enjoyment of the fishery by other legally eligible societies by resorting to unfair treatment to the other eligible societies and also this Court is of further view that the authority concerned acted ultra vires while issuing the impugned extension order inasmuch as the authority concerned issued the impugned order in exercise of power without considering the grounds relevant to the object on the basis of which authority had been so empowered. The present case of the respondent No. 5 society so alleged for extension of settlement period of the fishery is not the exceptional case contemplated in Rule 8(b)(1) of the Assam Fishery Rules, 1953. Therefore, this Court has no alternative except to interfere with the impugned order dated 31.3.2008. 20. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 31.3.2008 is hereby quashed and set aside. Parties are to bear their own costs. Writ petition is allowed. Petition allowed.