JUDGMENT Hon’ble R.K. Agrawal, J.—By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 14.7.1993 passed by the Appropriate Authority, Income Tax Department, Lucknow, respondent No. 1, whereby the property of the petitioner situate at Tonk House, Prayag Narain Road, Lucknow having land of an area of 27,520 sq. feet and the built up area of 5220 sq. feet had been purchased by the Central Government under the provision of Chapter XXC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present writ petition are as follows : According to the petitioner, she is the owner-in-possession of the premises, known as, Tonk House, Prayag Narain Road, Lucknow. It is a residential accommodation in which the petitioner is living alongwith her family. The bungalow was constructed on lease hold plot No. 60 of Butlerganj Scheme, Prayag Narain Road, Lucknow and was leased to one Mr. Shagir Khan of Nazirabad, Lucknow on 27.8.1941 for a period of 90 years. On 28.8.1941, Mr. Shagir Khan transferred the land in question with all his rights to Her Highness Aminuzamini Begum Maharani of Tonk, who constructed a Kothi and outhouses etc. The plot was sub-divided by the Nazul Officer. The petitioner purchased the land in question including the construction thereon from Maharani of Tonk on 15.5.1965. On account of some financial difficulty faced by her husband, the petitioner decided to sell the land including the construction in question to one M/s Qadir Industries Private Limited for a consideration of Rs. 27,00,000/-. Under Section 269UC of the Act, the petitioner made an application in the prescribed form 37-I for permission/no objection. The agreement for sale was executed on 11.7.1990 and the application in Form 37-I was filed soon thereafter. Certain information was sought for by the Appropriate Authority, which was given. However, the Appropriate Authority, vide order dated 26.9.1990 directed for pre-emptive purchase of the premises in question under Section 269UD of the Act. The order dated 26.9.1990 was subject matter of challenge before this Court in Writ Petition No. 10634 of 1990 on the ground that the order has been passed in gross violation of equity, fair play and natural justice. This Court, vide judgment and order dated 17.5.1993, allowed the writ petition and set aside the order dated 26.9.1990 passed by the Appropriate Authority. This Court, vide judgment and order dated 17.5.1993, allowed the writ petition and set aside the order dated 26.9.1990 passed by the Appropriate Authority. The Court directed that the issue regarding pre-emptive purchase of the property owned by the petitioner be decided after giving an opportunity of hearing to show cause against the pre-emptive purchase. In compliance with the direction given by this Court, in its order dated 17.5.1993, the Appropriate Authority issued show cause notice on 17.6.1993 calling upon the petitioner to appear before him on 12.7.1993 and to submit whatever she wanted to say. The petitioner appeared before the Appropriate Authority on the date fixed and submitted her reply which was considered by the Appropriate Authority. The Appropriate Authority, however, passed an order on 14.7.1993 directing for presumptive purchase of the property in question. The Appropriate Authority, however, directed that while making the payment, the amount of Rs. 18,16,320/-, demanded by the Nazul Officer towards mutation and Rs. 45,408 for annual rent and any other arrears will be retained by the Central Government out of the whole consideration of Rs. 27,00,000/- agreed between the petitioner and M/s Qadir Industries Private Limited. It may be mentioned here that before the Appropriate Authority M/s Qadir Industries Private Limited, the purchaser, who had entered into an agreement to purchase the property in question with the petitioner, had given its no objection meaning thereby that it had no interest or grievance in the property if it is purchased by the Central Government under Chapter XXC of the Act. 3. The order dated 14.7.1993 is under challenge in the present writ petition on several grounds. 4. The writ petition was taken up on 30.7.1993 when the Court passed the following order : “Sri S.C. Misra, appearing on behalf of opposite parties states that he would be filing a counter affidavit by 3.8.1993. Rejoinder affidavit, if any, may be filed on 4.8.1993. Put up on 4.8.1993. Sri S.C. Misra, learned Counsel for the opposite parties, on the basis of the instructions received from the pairokar of the department present in Court, makes a statement that till the next date, the opposite parties are not going to take possession of the property or disturb the same in any manner. In view of the above, no interim order is required to be passed.” 5. In view of the above, no interim order is required to be passed.” 5. By way of an amendment application, which was allowed on 1.11.2004, a specific averment has been made in paragraph 21T that the Appropriate Authority has failed to tender or deposit the whole or any part of the amount of consideration in terms of Section 269UG(1) and as such the impugned pre-emptive purchase order deserves to be quashed. 6. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents denying the allegations made in the petition. So far as the averments made in paragraph 21T of the petition, as amended, is concerned, in paragraph 31 of the counter affidavit filed by Mohd. Syed Raza Qazmi, working as Income Tax Officer with the Appropriate Authority, Income Tax Department, Lucknow, it has been stated that as the property was never handed over to the Appropriate Authority and as such the question of payment of apparent consideration does not arise. It has further been stated that the petitioner is free to hand over possession of the property to the Appropriate Authority and have the payment of apparent consideration as admissible and the purchase order dated 14.7.1993 is liable to be maintained. 7. We have heard Sri R.C. Gupta, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri D.D. Chopra, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents. 8. Sri R.C. Gupta, learned Counsel, raised all the grounds to challenge the order dated 14.7.1993 which have been taken by the petitioner in the writ petition. However, it is not necessary to go into all the grounds raised by the petitioner as the Court is of the view that the petition can be disposed of on the short ground of non-compliance of the provisions of Sections 269UE and 269UH of the Act. 9. In paragraph 21T of the writ petition, as amended, a specific plea has been raised by the petitioner that the Central Government had not made the payment of the amount of apparent consideration as the Central Government had neither tendered the amount of apparent consideration after making the deductions mentioned in the impugned order dated 14.7.1993 to the petitioner nor had deposited the same with the Appropriate Authority within the time provided under Section 269UE of the Act and, therefore, in view of Section 269UH of the Act, the property stood revested with the petitioner. 10. 10. Sri D.D. Chopra, learned Senior Standing Counsel, on the other hand, submitted that under sub-section (2) of Section 269UE of the Act, the petitioner was under an obligation to surrender or deliver possession of the property in question to the Appropriate Authority within 15 days from the date of the order and as, in the present case, the possession has not been delivered, may be on account of the undertaking given by the then Senior Standing Counsel of the Income Tax Department, the provisions of Section 269UH regarding revesting is not attracted. He submits that the payment is to be made only after the delivery of possession and not before, even though the property may vest with the Central Government on the passing of the order under Section 269UD of the Act. 11. We have given our anxious consideration to the various pleas raised by the learned Counsel for the parties. 12. We find that the Appropriate Authority had passed the order of presumptive purchase on 14.7.1993 by directing that a sum of Rs. 18,16,320/-, demanded by the Nazul Officer towards mutation and Rs. 45,408/- for annual rent and any other arrears be retained from the apparent consideration of Rs. 27,00,000/- payable to the petitioner. This Court while entertaining the writ petition on 30.7.1993, had not stayed the operation of the order dated 14.7.1993 passed by the Appropriate Authority under Section 269UD of the Act. On the other hand, on the basis of the statement given by the learned Senior Standing Counsel at that time, which was based on the instructions received from the pairokar present in the Court, that the opposite parties were not going to take possession of the property and disturb the same in any manner, this Court was of the view that no interim order was required to be passed. The operation of the order of vesting having not been stayed by this Court, we are of the considered opinion that the provisions of Sections 269UE and 269UH of the Act would come into play. 13. Sections 269UE, 269UF, 269UG and 269 UH of the Act, for ready reference, are reproduced below : “Section 269UE. The operation of the order of vesting having not been stayed by this Court, we are of the considered opinion that the provisions of Sections 269UE and 269UH of the Act would come into play. 13. Sections 269UE, 269UF, 269UG and 269 UH of the Act, for ready reference, are reproduced below : “Section 269UE. Vesting of property in Central Government.—(1) Where an order under sub-section (1) of Section 269UD is made by the Appropriate Authority in respect of an immovable property referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (d) of Section 269UA, such property shall, on the date of such order, vest in the Central Government in terms of the agreement for transfer referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 269UC : Provided that where the Appropriate Authority, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the transferor, the transferee or other persons interested in the said property, under sub-section (1A) of Section 269UD, is of the opinion that any encumbrance on the property or leasehold interest specified in the aforesaid agreement for transfer is so specified with a view to defeat the provisions of this Chapter, it may, by order, declare such encumbrance or leasehold interest to be void and thereupon the aforesaid property shall vest in the Central Government free from such encumbrance or leasehold interest. (2) The transferor or any other person who may be in possession of the immovable property in respect of which an order under sub-section (1) of Section 269UD is made, shall surrender or deliver possession thereof to the Appropriate Authority or any other person duly authorised by the Appropriate Authority in this behalf within fifteen days of the service of such order on him : Provided that the provisions of this sub-section and sub-sections (3) and (4) shall not apply where the person in possession of the immovable property, in respect of which an order under sub-section (1) of Section 269UD is made, is a bona fide holder of any encumbrance on such property or a bona fide lessee of such property, if the said encumbrance or lease has not been declared void under the proviso to sub-section (1) and such person is eligible to continue in possession of such property even after the transfer in terms of the aforesaid agreement for transfer. (3) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the provisions of sub-section (2), the Appropriate Authority or other person duly authorised by it under that sub-section may take possession of the immovable property and may, for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Appropriate Authority may, for the purpose of taking possession of any property referred to in sub-section (1), requisition the services of any police officer to assist him and it shall be the duty of such officer to comply with such requisition. (5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing in this section shall operate to discharge the transferor or any other person (not being the Central Government) from liability in respect of any encumbrances on the property and, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, such liability may be enforced against the transferor or such other person. (6) Where an order under sub-section (1) of Section 269UD is made in respect of an immovable property, being rights of the nature referred to in sub-clause (ii) of clause (d) of Section 269UA, such order shall have the effect of—(a) Vesting such right in the Central Government; and (b) Placing the Central Government in the same position in relation to such rights as the person in whom such a right would have continued to vest if such order had not been made. (7) Where any rights in respect of any immovable property, being rights in, or with respect to, any land or any building or part of a building which has been constructed or which is to be constructed, have been vested in the Central Government under sub-section (6), the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2), (3) and (4) shall, so far as may be, have effect as if the references to immovable property therein were references to such land or building or part thereof, as the case may be. Section 269UF. Consideration for purchase of immovable property by Central Government.—(1) Where an order for the purchase of any immovable property by the Central Government is made under sub-section (1) of Section 269UD, the Central Government shall pay, by way of consideration for such purchase, an amount equal to the amount of the apparent consideration. Section 269UF. Consideration for purchase of immovable property by Central Government.—(1) Where an order for the purchase of any immovable property by the Central Government is made under sub-section (1) of Section 269UD, the Central Government shall pay, by way of consideration for such purchase, an amount equal to the amount of the apparent consideration. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where, after the agreement for the transfer of the immovable property referred to in that sub-section has been made but before the property vests in the Central Government under Section 269UE, the property has been damaged (otherwise than as a result of normal wear and tear), the amount of the consideration payable under that sub-section shall be reduced by such sum as the Appropriate Authority, for reasons to be recorded in writing, may by order determine. Section 269UG. Payment or deposit of consideration.—(1) The amount of consideration payable in accordance with the provisions of Section 269UF shall be tendered to the person or persons entitled thereto, within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the immovable property concerned becomes vested in the Central Government under sub-section (1), or, as the case may be, sub-section (6) of Section 269UE : Provided that if any liability for any tax or any other sum remaining payable under this Act, the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (27 of 1957), the Gift-tax Act, 1958 (18 of 1958), the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (34 of 1953), or the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 (7 of 1964), by any person entitled to the consideration payable under Section 269UF, the Appropriate Authority may, in lieu of the payment of the amount of consideration, set off the amount of consideration or any part thereof against such liability or sum, after giving an intimation in this behalf to the person entitled to the consideration. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount of consideration amongst persons claiming to be entitled thereto, the Central Government shall deposit with the Appropriate Authority the amount of consideration required to be tendered under sub-section (1) within the period specified therein. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount of consideration amongst persons claiming to be entitled thereto, the Central Government shall deposit with the Appropriate Authority the amount of consideration required to be tendered under sub-section (1) within the period specified therein. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if the person entitled to the amount of consideration does not consent to receive it, or if there is any dispute as to the title to receive the amount of consideration, the Central Government shall deposit with the Appropriate Authority the amount of consideration required to be tendered under sub-section (1) within the period specified therein : Provided that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of the amount of consideration for any immovable property vested in the Central Government under this Chapter to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. (4) Where any amount of consideration has been deposited with the Appropriate Authority under this section, the Appropriate Authority may, either of its own motion or on an application made by or on behalf of any person interested or claiming to be interested in such amount, order the same to be invested in such Government or other securities as it may think proper, and may direct the interest or other proceeds of any such investment to be accumulated and paid in such manner as will, in its opinion give the parties interested therein the same benefits therefrom as they might have had from the immovable property in respect whereof such amount has been deposited or as near thereto as may be. Section 269UH. Section 269UH. Re-vesting of property in the transferor on failure of payment of deposit of consideration.—(1) If the Central Government fails to tender under sub-section (1) of Section 269UG or deposit under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of the said section, the whole or any part of the amount of consideration required to be tendered or deposited thereunder within the period specified therein in respect of any immovable property which has vested in the Central Government under sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, sub-section (6) of Section 269UE, the order to purchase the immovable property by the Central Government made under sub-section (1) of Section 269UD shall stand abrogated and the immovable property shall stand re-vested in the transferor after the expiry of the aforesaid period : Provided that where any dispute referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 269UG is pending in any Court for decision, the time taken by the Court to pass a final order under the said sub-sections shall be excluded in computing the said period. (2) Where an order made under sub-section (1) of Section 269UD is abrogated and the immovable property re-vested in the transferor under sub-section (1), the Appropriate Authority shall make, as soon as may be, a declaration in writing to this effect and shall— (a) Deliver a copy of the declaration to the persons mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 269UD; and (b) Deliver or cause to be delivered possession of the immovable property back to the transferor or, as the case may be, to such other person as was in possession of the property at the time of its vesting in the Central Government under Section 269UE.” 14. From a reading of the provision of Section 269UE of the Act, it is seen that the property in respect of which an order under Section 269UD is made by the Appropriate Authority, it vests with the Central Government from the date of such order which, in the present case, would be 14.7.1993. Under Section 269UF of the Act, the Central Government is required to pay the amount equal to the amount of apparent consideration for purchase of immovable property where an order has been made under sub-section (1) of Section 269UD of the Act. 15. Under Section 269UF of the Act, the Central Government is required to pay the amount equal to the amount of apparent consideration for purchase of immovable property where an order has been made under sub-section (1) of Section 269UD of the Act. 15. Section 269UG of the Act provides for making or tendering payment of the amount of consideration within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the immovable property became vested in the Central Government under sub-section (1) or sub-section (6) of Section 269UE of the Act. It provides for certain deductions to be made while tendering the payment. 16. Section 269UH provides for revesting of the property on failure of the Central Government to deposit apparent consideration within the stipulated period under Section 269UG of the Act. The language of Section 269UH of the Act is very clear and categorical. It provides that on the failure of the Central Government to deposit or tender the amount of consideration within the stipulated period, the order of purchase the immovable property by the Central Government made under sub-section (1) of Section 269UD, shall stand abrogated and the immoveable property shall stand vested in the transferor after the expiry of the aforesaid period. 17. The provisions of Sections 269UE-269UG and 269UH of the Act came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the cases of Asgar S. Patel and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 2000 SC 2222 , and Ramesh Bhai J. Patel etc. etc. v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 339 , wherein the Apex Court has held that in view of the categorical provision regarding payment and deposit of consideration, as a consequences of failure to make such tender, the presumptive purchase would stand abrogated and the property shall stand revested with the transferor. 18. Admittedly, in the present case, the respondents have failed to tender or deposit the apparent consideration, after deducting the amount mentioned in the impugned order dated 14.7.1993, within the stipulated period, i.e., by 31.8.1993. Under Section 269UH of the Act, the property stands revested on 1.9.1993 with the petitioner. 19. 18. Admittedly, in the present case, the respondents have failed to tender or deposit the apparent consideration, after deducting the amount mentioned in the impugned order dated 14.7.1993, within the stipulated period, i.e., by 31.8.1993. Under Section 269UH of the Act, the property stands revested on 1.9.1993 with the petitioner. 19. The submission of Sri D.D. Chopra, learned Senior Standing Counsel, that as the possession was not taken by the Appropriate Authority on account of the statement given by the then learned Senior Standing Counsel on 30.7.1993, the property would not stand vested with the Central Government on 14.7.1993, is wholly misconceived. It is to be remembered that in taxation laws there is no equity and the provisions have to be strictly construed. 20. So far as the interpretation of taxing statute is concerned the principles have been well settled by the numerous decisions of Apex Court. A taxing statue is to be strictly construed. The Apex Court in the case of the Member Secretary, Andhra Pradesh State Board for Prevention and Control of Water Pollution v. Andhra Pradesh Rayons Ltd. and others, AIR 1989 SC 611 has held as follows : “6. It has to be borne in mind that this Act with which we are concerned is an Act imposing liability for cess. The Act is fiscal in nature. The Act must, therefore, be strictly construed in order to find out whether a liability is fastened on a particular industry. The subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose; and also that every Act of Parliament must be read according to its natural construction of words. See the observations in Re Nicklethwait, (4885) 11 Ex 452 at p. 456. Also see the observations in Tenant v. Smith, (1982) AC 150 and Lord Halsbury’s observations at page 154. See also the observations of Lord Simonds in St. Aubyn v. Att. Gen., (1951) 2 All ER 473 at p. 485. Justice Rowlatt of England said a long time ago, that in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One has to look fairly at the language used. See the observations in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC, (1921-1 KB 64 at p. 71). There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One has to look fairly at the language used. See the observations in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC, (1921-1 KB 64 at p. 71). This Court has also reiterated the same view in Gursahai Saigal v. C.I.T., Punjab, (1963)3 SCR 893 : AIR 1963 SC 1062 ; C.I.T. Madras v. V.MR. P. Firm, Muar, (1965-1 SCR 815); Controller of Estate Duty, Gujarat v. Kantilal Trikamal, (1977-1 SCR 9 : AIR 1976 SC 1935 ).” 21. The aforesaid decision was followed by the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Saraswati Sugar Mills v. Haryana State Board and others, AIR 1992 SC 224 . 22. In the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Kasturi and Sons Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 1275 , the Apex Court has referred to the view expressed by Justice G.P. Singh in his famous book Principle of Statutory Interpretation while holding that the taxing statute should be strictly construed in the following words : “......the well-established rule in the familiar words of LORD WENSLEYDALE, reaffirmed by LORD HALSBURY and LORD SIMONDS, means : “The subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose; and also that every Act of Parliament must be read according to the natural construction of its words". In a classic passage LORD CAIRNS stated the principle thus : “If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of law the case might otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be admissible in any statute, what is called an equitable, construction, certainly, such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute”. VISCOUNT SIMON quoted with approval a passage from ROWLATT, J. expressing the principle in the following words : “In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. VISCOUNT SIMON quoted with approval a passage from ROWLATT, J. expressing the principle in the following words : “In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.” Relying upon this passage LORD UPJOHN said : “Fiscal measures are not built upon any theory of taxation”.” 23. In the case of Federation of Andhra Pradesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 2000 SC 2905 the Apex Court has held as follows : “It is trite law that a taxing statute has to be strictly construed and nothing can be read into it. In the classic passage from Cape Brandy Syndicate (1921 (1) KB 64) which was noticed in the judgment under appeal, it was said : “In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment there is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can look fairly at the language used.” This view has been reiterated by this Court time and again. Thus, in State of Bombay v. Automobile and Agricultural Industries Corporation, Bombay, (1961) 12 STC 122, this Court said : “But the Court in interpreting a taxing statute will not be justified in adding words thereto so as to make out some presumed object of the Legislature....... If the legislature has failed to clarify its meaning by the use of appropriate language, the benefit thereof must go to the taxpayer. It is settled law that in case of doubt, that interpretation of a taxing statute which is beneficial to the taxpayer must be adopted.” 24. In the case of Hansraj and Sons v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and others, AIR 2002 SC 2692 , the Apex Court after referring to its earlier decisions has held that Courts have to interpret provisions of fiscal statute strictly so as to give benefit of doubt to the litigants which is well established and admits of no doubt. 25. 25. Ordinarily, the rule of benevolent construction has been applied while construing the welfare legislations or provisions relating to the relationship between weaker and stronger contracting parties. Thus, the question of applying the rule of benevolent construction as canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners would not be attracted in the present case. 26. In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1992 SC 1782 , the Apex Court has held that it is settled law that the expression used in a taxing statute would ordinarily be understood in the sense in which it is harmonious with the object of the statute to effectuate the legislative animation and it is to be read and understood according to its language and logic alone will not be determinative of a controversy arising from a taxing statute. 27. In the case of Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation and others, (2003) 2 SCC 455 , the Apex Court has held as follows : “11. It is well-settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said, “Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid”, Judge Learned Hand said, “but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them” (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547). This view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, (1990) 1 SCC 277 p. 284, para 16). 12. In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr., (1977) 2 SCC 273 it was observed that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. 13. Transport Commr., (1977) 2 SCC 273 it was observed that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. 13. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 515 . The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process...” 28. In the case of Petron Engineering Construction Pvt. Ltd. and another v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and others, AIR 1989 SC 501 , the Apex Court has held that when two interpretations are possible to be made, the interpretation which is favourable to the assessee should be adopted. 29. The provision of Chapter XXC of the Act has to be construed strictly as it is expropriatory legislation. It deprives a person of his property which can only be done in accordance with the constitutional safeguards provided under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and the statutory provisions of Chapter XXC of the Act. 30. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we are of the considered opinion that as the Central Government had not tendered or deposited the amount of apparent consideration, minus the amounts mentioned in the impugned order dated 14.7.1993, to be tendered/deposited by 31.8.1993, the property stands revested and the order dated 14.7.1993 passed by the Appropriate Authority, Income Tax Department, Lucknow, respondent No. 1, stands abrogated. 31. The writ petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 14.7.1993 is set aside. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. ————