JUDGMENT : 1. This is an appeal by the original plaintiffs raising challenge to the judgment and decree passed by the Jt. Civil Judge, Jr.Dn., Kannad in Regular Civil Suit no. 94/76 on 28-8-1976 which has been confirmed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Aurangabad in Regular Civil Appeal no. 281/86 by judgment delivered on 20-12-1990. 2. The plaintiffs instituted a suit seeking declaration that the order passed by the Tahsildar/Special officer in file No. 75/MAG, dt. 23-7-1976 directing the plaintiffs to handover the possession of the suit house bearing Municipal No. 1822 situated at Kannad as invalid, illegal and in excess of the jurisdiction conferred on the authority. The defendant had tendered an application before the Special Officer appointed under the provisions of Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1975 for releasing of the house property which is said to have been mortgaged in favour of grand father of the plaintiffs. It is contended that by virtue of mortgage transaction entered into in 1310 fasli i.e. 1910 A.D., the disputed house has been mortgaged in favour of the grand father of the plaintiffs. As per the terms of the deed of mortgage, it appears to be usufructuary and the same was to be redeemed within a period of 10 years. The defendant filed an application before the Special officer/Tahsildar, Kannad on 5-11-1976 praying therein that by virtue of operation of provisions of Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1975, the debt which was outstanding is deemed to have been repaid and as a consequence thereof, the mortgage shall be deemed to have been redeemed. The defendant as such claimed possession of the property which was in the hands of the plaintiffs. It further transpires that the Tahsildar on receipt of the application, issued notice to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs caused appearance before the Tahsildar and sought adjournment to file say. However, the plaintiffs were not allowed time for the purpose of filing say and the decision was pronounced by the Special Officer on 23-7-1976 granting relief to the defendant as contemplated by provisions of Section 6 of the Act whereby the debt which was outstanding was directed to be liquidated. The plaintiffs were directed to handover the possession of the mortgaged property in favour of the defendants. 3. The plaintiffs were directed to handover the possession of the mortgaged property in favour of the defendants. 3. The plaintiffs have challenged the order passed by the Tahsildar/Special Officer by instituting a suit contending therein that the debt which was incurred by virtue of transaction that has taken place in 1910 was not to be deemed to be outstanding. It is further contended that the provisions of Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1975 are not attracted to the facts of the case. The Special Officer had no jurisdiction to entertain the application as the debt was not outstanding and recoverable on the appointed day. The plaintiffs contend that as per the terms of the mortgage, the same was required to be redeemed within a period of 10 years. The provisions of Limitation Act, 1908 were applicable whereunder limitation prescribed for redemption of mortgage was 60 years. However, by virtue of provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period prescribed for redumption of mortgage is 30 years. Even if, it is considered that the debtor had right to redeem the mortgage within a period of 60 years, limitation for seeking redumption has expired on 29-7-1970 much prior to coming into force of Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1975. It is therefore contended that the application tendered by the defendant itself was not entertainable by the Special Officer. The order passed consequent upon such an application by the Special Officer is without jurisdiction and therefore liable to be declared as illegal and ultra virus. 4. The defendant appeared and controverted the contentions raised by the plaintiffs. It is contended by the defendant that the Special Officer was within his jurisdiction in entertaining the application and granting relief. It is contended that inspite of lapse of limitation the debt remain payable and as such the Special Officer appointed under the provisions of the act was justified in entertaining the application tendered by the defendant. The defendant as such prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. The trial court on consideration of the pleadings as well as the the evidence, came to the conclusion that the Special officer was within his jurisdiction in entertaining the application and further it was held that the suit instituted by the plaintiffs is not entertainable. The lower appellate court has confirmed the findings recorded by the trial court while dismissing the appeal. 6. The lower appellate court has confirmed the findings recorded by the trial court while dismissing the appeal. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/appellants has vehemently contended that the courts below have erred in holding that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is contended that it was an error on the part of the courts below to hold that the Special Officer exercised powers under the provisions of Maharashtra Debt Relief Act and had jurisdiction to entertain the application tendered by the defendant. 7. In order to understand the controversy involved in the matter it would be useful to refer to certain provisions incorporated in the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1975. Section 2(b) of the Act prescribes ’appointed day’ for the purpose of extending benefits as contemplated by the enactment. Section 2(b) prescribes the ’appointed day’ as 22nd day of August 1875. The term ’debt’ has been defined in section 2(e) thus :- "debt" means any liability in cash or kind, outstanding on the appointed day, being a liability arising out of a loan (with interest if the loan is taken by a worker, and with or without interest, in any other case), whether secured or unsecured, due from a debtor whether payable under a decree or order of any court or otherwise; . Term ’debtor’ has been defined in Section 2(f) thus :- ’debtor’ means a marginal farmer, rural artisans, or rural labourer whose total income from all sources did not exceed two thousand and four hundred rupees during the year immediately before the 1st day of August 1975 and a worker whose total income from all sources did not exceed, if living in an urban area six thousand rupees during the year immediately before the said date, and if living elsewhere four thousand and eight hundred rupees during that year; Term ’worker’ has been defined in Section 2(o) of the Act as :- ’worker’ means a person who earns his livelihood through any profession, calling or trade and also a person who is working in any factory (including a badli worker therein); Section 4 of the Act lays down thus : 4. notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract or other instrument having force by virtue of any such law, and save as otherwise expressly provided in this act, every debt of a worker whose immovable property, if any, does not exceed twenty thousand rupees in market value and every debt of any other debtor, outstanding on the appointed day, including the amount of interest, if any, payable by a debtor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged; and the consequences as hereinafter set forth shall, with effect from the appointed day, ensue, namely :- (a) no such debt due from a debtor on the appointed day shall be recoverable from him or from or against any moveable or immovable property belonging to him, nor shall any such property be liable to be attached and sold or proceeded against in any manner in the execution of any decree or order relating to such debt against him; (b) no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding against such debtor for the recovery of any amount of such debt, including interest, if any : Provided that, where a suit or proceeding is instituted jointly against such debtor or any other person, nothing in this clause shall apply to the maintainability of a suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to such other person; (c) all suits and proceedings (including appeals, revisions, attachment or execution proceedings) pending on the appointed day for the recovery of any such debt against such debtor shall abate: . Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to the sale of - (i) any movable property, held and concluded before the appointed day; (ii) any immovable property, confirmed before such day; (d) every debtor undergoing detention in a civil prison in execution of any decree for money passed against him by a Civil Court in respect of any such debt shall be released; (e) every property pledged or mortgaged by such debtor shall stand released in favour of such debtor, and the credit shall be bound to return the same to the debtor forthwith on the debtor making an application in writing in that behalf; and the creditor shall pass a receipt to the debtor of having received the application. If the creditor refuses to pass a receipt, then the debtor may get the application endorsed to that effect under the signature and date of any of the officers referred to in section 6 or by any person authorised by them in this behalf. Explanation 1 - Nothing in this section shall be construed to entitle any such debtor to the refund of any part of a debt already repaid b him or recovery from him before the appointed day. Explanation 2- For the purposes of this section, the expression ’debt of a worker’ includes a debt arising out of loans taken from more than one creditor. Section 54 of the act is in respect of bar of the jurisdiction of civil court which lays down thus :- Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, no Civil Court shall entertain or proceed with any suit or proceeding in respect of - (a) any matter pending before the Court under this Chapter; (b) the validity of any procedure or the legality of any award, declaration, decision or order of the Court under this Chapter; and (c) the recovery of any debt made payable under such award. 8. It is not disputed that father of the defendant had entered into a mortgage transaction with the grand father of the plaintiffs and a deed of mortgage was got executed on 29th Sharvida 1380 Fasli i.e. 29th July 1970. As per the terms of the deed of mortgage, the transaction was in the nature of usufructuary mortgage. The debt was required to be repaid within a period of 10 years and it was the responsibility of the plaintiffs to redeliver the property in that event. The cause of action therefore to initiate any action accrues in the year 1910. By application of provisions of old Limitation Act, the limitation prescribed for redumption of mortgage was 60 years. As such, as per the terms of mortgage deed, the right to redeem the mortgage could have been exercised till July 1970. Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1975 prescribes ’appointed day’ as 22nd day of August 1975. Right to recover the debt or right to redeem the mortgage in the instant matter extinguishes much prior to enforcement of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act. Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1975 prescribes ’appointed day’ as 22nd day of August 1975. Right to recover the debt or right to redeem the mortgage in the instant matter extinguishes much prior to enforcement of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act. It is further contended by the plaintiffs that the provisions of the Act are not attracted in the instant case and as such the Special Officer could not have assumed jurisdiction in issuing the order directing liquidation of the debt. The debt was not at all in existence on the day on which the application was tendered, and the same stood extinguished much prior to enforcement of Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1975. 9. Section 4 of the act provides for discharge of certain debts and consequences thereof. The said section provides certain pre-conditions namely; existence of a debt of a worker which shall not exceed Rs.20,000/- and shall be payable by the debtor. The terms therefore ’existence of debt of a worker’ and ’payable by a debtor’ assume importance. It is to be seen as to whether the debt existed on the appointed day and whether it was payable by the debtor on the said date. In order to ascertain as to whether a person may be entitled to tender an application to authority claiming relief under provisions of Act, the conditions which are required to be satisfied are ; A) he must be a debtor within meaning of the Act; B)_ the debt must be outstanding on the appointed day; and C) the debt must be extinguished by operation of Section 4. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has vehemently contended that the questions arising in the matter are required to be considered by the Special Officer or authorised officer only. It is his contention that although the remedy to recover the debt is lost, the debt very well remains payable by the debtor. Existence of debt cannot disputed and as such exercise of powers by the authorised officer by taking recourse of the provisions of the Act cannot be said to be in excess of jurisdiction conferred on him. Learned counsel has placed reliance on Full Bench decision reported in AIR 1985 Bombay 211 in the matter of Namdeo Asruba Mail vs. State of Maharashtra. Learned counsel has placed reliance on Full Bench decision reported in AIR 1985 Bombay 211 in the matter of Namdeo Asruba Mail vs. State of Maharashtra. It is the contention of the respondent that the question whether the debt was outstanding on the appointed day or that it stood extinguished much earlier thereto and as well as the question relating to eligibility, is to be decided at thresh-old by the authorised officer only. The argument advanced by the learned counsel cannot be accepted on close scrutiny of the judgment on which reliance is placed. It is laid down by the Full Bench thus :- The legislative intent however appears to be very clear that it intends to relieve the burden of certain class of debtors whose debts were outstanding on the appointed day. Section 6 and 7 do not apply to all debts. They only apply to a ’debt’ and the ’debtor’ within the meaning of the Act whose debt stood extinguished as laid down in section 4. Only in the course of implementing section 4, objections under section 7 have to be considered and not independent of it. If the debts of the debtor stood extinguished much earlier, the Act does not permit re-opening of such transactions under section 4, 6 and 7. Only if according to one or the other party the debt was outstanding on the appointed day and the Authorised Officer finds that it stood extinguished by the operation of section 4 he acquires jurisdiction to afford relief under section 6 read with section 7 of the Act. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant has rightly placed reliance on judgment of this court in the matter of Shivgonda Ravaji Sankpal vs. Chandrakant Dnyanu Sutar reported in 1978 Mh.L.J. 169. The learned Judges of the Division Bench while deciding the matter took divergent view and as such the matter came to be referred to the third learned Judge. The question cropped up before the court was relating to a situation wherein in case of a possessory mortgage, the debtor had taken no steps to redeem the mortgage within prescribed period of limitation as laid down in the Limitation Act. The question cropped up before the court was relating to a situation wherein in case of a possessory mortgage, the debtor had taken no steps to redeem the mortgage within prescribed period of limitation as laid down in the Limitation Act. While determining the question, the court by majority adopted a view that a debtor who has executed a mortgage of immovable property and has failed to redeem the mortgage within a period of limitation as provided by virtue of provisions of Indian Limitation Act, is not entitled to claim possession or return of the immovable property mortgaged by him taking recourse to the provisions of Maharashtra Debt Relief Act in as much as the provisions of Section 4(e) r/w Section 4(c) of the said Act are not applicable as the title of the mortgagor in respect of the mortgaged property stood extinguished on the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation in view of the provisions of Section 28 of the Limitation Act. The facts in the reported judgment are strikingly similar to the facts arising in the instant matter. The court has adopted a view that time barred debt is not recoverable. However, technically, the debt may be good for some purpose. However, the same cannot be termed as a debt due and payable and outstanding from a debtor. The term ’such debt’ appearing in Section 4(a) is referable to the debt which is due and recoverable from a debtor. A time barred debt cannot be said to be a debt due and recoverable. The Division Bench while considering the question has observed in para nos. 7 and 8 of the judgment as below :- 7. According to me, the Act has been enacted with the specific purpose of granting relief from indebtedness to debtors, which also means that relief is necessary in respect of the particular debt. When a debt is a time barred, there can be no recovery in any Court of law though technically the debt may be good for some purposes. It cannot be described as a debt due and payable and outstanding from a particular debtor. For time barred debts, if the debtor is not inclined to pay, relief is already granted by the Limitation Act. It cannot be described as a debt due and payable and outstanding from a particular debtor. For time barred debts, if the debtor is not inclined to pay, relief is already granted by the Limitation Act. Where relief is already granted by the existing laws of the land, it is difficult to imagine that a superfluous and additional relief in respect of the same is sought to be given by the Legislature. It was argued that a time barred debt can always be a good consideration for the renewal of a transaction. That is a correct legal position. But of what practical use is this discussion when we consider the case of needy people who have got to go to the door of the creditor for want of any alternative source of credit. In the absence of any alternative source of credit, the creditor is bound to add the old amount to the additional advance that will be given and compel the debtor to sign a document for such an amount, as if it is a wholly fresh amount advanced on the day. The fact that technically the previous debt is declared discharged will be of no assistance to the debtor unless the State has provided him with an alternative source of credit. if such a source is available he need not go to the previous creditor at all and whether the debt is time barred under the existing laws of the land or it stands discharged under the present Act the situation seems to be identical so far s the indebtedness of the debtor is concerned. 8. This interpretation seems to be substantially supported by the consequences enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) of section 4 which follow upon the discharge of the debt. Clause (a) states that no ’such’ debt due from a debtor on the appointed day shall be recoverable from him or against any movable or immovable property belonging to him nor shall any such property be liable to be attached and sold or proceeded against in any manner in the execution of any decree or order relating to such debt against him. The entire concept incorporated in this clause is the possibility of recovery in various manners regarding the outstanding debt which is styled as ’such debt’ as mentioned in the opening part of that clause. The entire concept incorporated in this clause is the possibility of recovery in various manners regarding the outstanding debt which is styled as ’such debt’ as mentioned in the opening part of that clause. When a debt is time barred, where is the question of it being recovered either under a decree or order of a court of Law " When the Legislature declared that such debt shall not be recoverable, is it to be supposed that a debt which is already time barred and therefore not recoverable is again declared not recoverable by committing the fault of tautology ? It, therefore, appears clear to me that Legislature provided relief only against debts which are recoverable on the appointed day, and never had in its mind, debts which are already time barred and as such not recoverable according to the existing laws of the land. There being difference in opinion expressed by the two Judges of the Division Bench, the matter came up before the third learned Judge and while considering the questions referred, learned Justice Deshmukh has observed in para no. 12 of the judgment thus : 12. Let us now consider the special provisions relating to mortgages where the quity of redemption is barred by limitation. The first question that must be considered is the nature of the suit for redemption. It is essentially a suit for taking accounts of the mortgage with an offer to pay ay outstanding amount due under the mortgage and on payment of such amount a claim for return of property. Such a suit must be brought within limitation as was prescribed under the Limitation Act 1908 if that Act applies, or under the period of limitation now prescribed by the 1963 Act. Though the debtor has to make payment where it is due, what he essentially claims from the creditor-defendant is the return of his property. In other words it is a suit for possession of immovable property. That being so the plaintiff must always assert that he has a subsisting title to the property of which he claims possession. This has been expressly held by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of parmanand Misr v. Sahib Ali. 12. In other words it is a suit for possession of immovable property. That being so the plaintiff must always assert that he has a subsisting title to the property of which he claims possession. This has been expressly held by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of parmanand Misr v. Sahib Ali. 12. Reasonable inference that can be drawn while deciding the matter is that if the time barred debts are found to be outside the purview of the provisions of enactment, the claim founded on such time barred debt also consequentially must be considered to be outside the purview of the enactment. If a time barred debt cannot be considered as ’such debt’ as contemplated by Section 4(a) and if such debt cannot be held to be due and recoverable from the debtor, in view of lapsing of the remedy for recovery of the amount, no further proceedings can be taken up for recovery of immovable property. Learned counsel for the appellants is therefore justified in contending that the authorised officer/special officer invested with the powers under the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1975 could not have exercised jurisdiction in respect of the debt which was time barred and ceased to be recoverable much prior to coming into force of the Act of 1975. 13. The Special Officer has fallen in error in exercising jurisdiction while entertaining application tendered by the defendant for liquidation of the debt which was time barred and was not due and recoverable under the provisions of the Act. The Special Officer could not have entertained the application, as the case does not fit in the parameters of Section 4 of the Act and as such it was not open for the Officer to grant relief in terms of Sections 6 and 7 of the Act. So far as the argument based on interpretation of Section 54 of the Act relating to bar of jurisdiction of the civil court is concerned, it necessarily has to be held that the suit is entertainable as there was no justification for the Authorised Officer to entertain the application tendered by the defendant. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on judgment reported in 1940 Privy Council 105 in the matter of Lord Thankerton Vs. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on judgment reported in 1940 Privy Council 105 in the matter of Lord Thankerton Vs. Secretary of State and AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1298 in the matter of The State of West Bengal vs. The Indian Iron and Steel Co.Ltd. to contend that exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court cannot be readily inferred but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In the instant matter, as has been recorded in earlier paragraphs that the action of the Authorised Officer in entertaining the application tendered by defendant was beyond his jurisdiction and the Authorised Officer had fallen in error in entertaining the application and granting relief, the civil court is very much invested with jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was an error on the part of the courts below to hold that the civil court has no jurisdiction. Infact, in the instant matter, the Authorised Officer has assumed jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter which is beyond his purview, as debt complained of by the defendant had ceased to be recoverable much prior to coming into force of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1975 and the remedy for recovery of the said debt is also lost. It was not the intention of the Legislature while enacting the provisions of Debtor’s Relief Act to extend the benefits to the class of debtors whose debt was not outstanding on the appointed day. The Legislature intended to relieve the burden of class of debtors whose debt was outstanding on the appointed day and it was not expected of Authorised Officer to assume jurisdiction in respect of debts which was not outstanding or the debt which were time barred. The very exercise of jurisdiction by the Authorised Officer/Special Officer was erroneous and the consequential order that has been passed was not contemplated. The civil court surely has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 15. For the reasons set out in the above mentioned paragraphs, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the same is thus allowed. The very exercise of jurisdiction by the Authorised Officer/Special Officer was erroneous and the consequential order that has been passed was not contemplated. The civil court surely has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 15. For the reasons set out in the above mentioned paragraphs, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the same is thus allowed. Judgment and decree passed by the trial court on 28-8-1986 in Regular Civil Suit no. 94/76 dismissing the suit presented by the plaintiffs, as well as decision rendered in Regular Civil Appeal no. 281/86 by IIIrd Additional District Judge, Aurangabad on 20-12-1990 stand quashed and set aside. The suit instituted by the plaintiffs is decreed. The order passed by the Tahsildar/Special Officer in file no. 75 MAG on 23-7-1976 directing the plaintiffs to handover the possession of the house bearing Municipal no. 1822 situated at Kannad is declared as invalid, illegal and in excess of jurisdiction and the same shall not bind the interest of the plaintiffs. The defendants are restrained permanently from taking possession of the suit house in execution of the order passed by the Tahsildar as referred to above. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.