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2008 DIGILAW 527 (PNJ)

Shushila Kumari v. State Of Haryana

2008-02-26

KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA

body2008
Judgment 1. In the present case, complaint was filed by Shushila Kumari against the acquittal of Gurmukh son of Krishan Chand and Damayanti wife of Krishan Chand. Both Gurmukh and Damayanti were convicted by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra for offence under Section 406, IPC to one year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/-. 2. Aggrieved against the same, Gurmukh and Damayanti respondents had filed appeal and the same was decided by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra. It was stated by the petitioner that she was married with Gurmukh Singh on 21 st January, 1991 at Thanesar, District Kurukshetra and at the time of marriage various articles of dowry were given and they were entrusted to the accused. It is further stated that accused had demanded dowry. Prosecution had examined P.W. 1 Ram Chander, father of the complainant. Shushila, petitioner-complainant has appeared as P.W. 2. Other prosecution witnesses were Amar Nath P.W. 3. Raj Kumar P.W. 4 and Devi Dayal P.W. 5 along with P.W. 6 Nripjeet Singh. Under Section 313, Cr. P.C. the accused has stated that it was a love marriage and no dowry articles were given. In defence the prosecution examined D.W. 1 Krishan Kumar Director Private Finance and Leasing Pvt. Ltd. and D.W. 2 Manohar Lal. 3. The learned appellate Court below considered various factors. It took into account that Ram Chander P.W. 1 had no capacity to give articles as suggested by the prosecution. The Court also doubted the list Annexure-A and Annexure-B, which were filed along with the complaint and after appreciating the entire prosecution, came to the conclusion that no offence is made out. The learned appellate Court below also placed reliance on letter Exs. D-l to D-6 to hold that there is no mention of demand or entrustment of dowry articles. 4. In view of the findings of fact returned by the appellate Court below, this revisional Court has a limited jurisdiction. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has stated that he will not be able to advance any arguments as complainant was not interested in prosecuting the accused respondents and had taken away the brief. 5. 4. In view of the findings of fact returned by the appellate Court below, this revisional Court has a limited jurisdiction. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has stated that he will not be able to advance any arguments as complainant was not interested in prosecuting the accused respondents and had taken away the brief. 5. It was held in AIR1968 SC 707: (1968 Cri LJ 665) Mahendra Partap Singh V/s. Sarju Singh, relying upon D. Stephens V/s. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196 : (1951 (52) Cri LJ 510), as under (Para 8) : "Only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha V/s. Polajlal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676: (AIR 1951 SC 316 : 1951 (52) Cri LJ 1248), this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is "perverse" or "lacking in true correct perspective". It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court Again in K. Chinnaswarny Reddy V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh. It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court Again in K. Chinnaswarny Reddy V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh. 1963 (3) SCR 412 : [AIR 1962 SC 1788) : (1963 (1) Cri LJ 8), it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which has been laid down by this Court, was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned Judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted breach of them." 6. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted breach of them." 6. In Akalu Ahir V/s. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 SC 2145 : 1973 Cri LJ 1404), Hon ble Apex Court observed as under (Para 8) : "This Court then proceeded to observe that the High Court is certainly entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal, but it was emphasized that this jurisdiction should be exercise only in exceptional cases when "there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice." In face of prohibition in Section 439(4), Cr. P.C. for the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering re-trial. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such excceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Courts power of ordering re-trial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision : (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been over-looked only (either ?) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. In Mahendra Pratap Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 287 : (AIR 1.968 SC 707): (1968 Cri LJ 665) (supra) the position was again reviewed and the rule laid down in the three earlier cases reaffirmed. In that case the reading of the judgment of the High Court made it plain that it had re-weighed the evidence from its own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This Court pointed out that it was not the duty of the High Court to do so while dealing with an acquittal on revision, when the Government had not chosen to file an appeal against it. "In other words" said this Court, "the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them." 7 Similar view was reiterated by Hon ble Apex Court in Bansi Lal V/s. Laxman Singh, (1986) 3 SCC 444 : (1986 Cri LJ 1603). 8. Again, Hon ble Apex Court, in Ramu alias Ram Kumar, 1995 SCC (Cri) 181 : (1994 Cri LJ 66), held that it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it has been invoked by a private complainant. In Vimal Singh V/s. Khuman Singh, (1998) SCC (Cri) 1574 : (1999 Cri LJ 16) and in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 2907 : (2002 Cri LJ 3788), the High Court has been reminded of its very limited jurisdiction in revision against acquittal. 9. It is well settled that unless any legal infirmity in the procedure or in the conduct of trial or patent illegality is pointed out, the revisional Court will not interfere. 10. I find no merit in the instant revision petition to interfere while exercising revisional jurisdiction as learned counsel for petitioner has failed to point out any illegality or irregularity. 11. There is no merit. Present revision petition is dismissed.