ORDER B.D. Agarwal, J. 1. In all these three Revision Applications two common questions of law are involved. The questions are whether any order of dismissal of complaint under Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (briefly "Cr.P.C.") is appealable and secondly, what other recourse of law are available to the complainant in such a situation. 2. All the aforesaid three Revision Applications have been filed by the Complainant against the orders dated 14-1-08 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Shillong in Complaint Case No. 644/645/649(S) of 2008, dismissing the complaints and acquitting the accused persons for non-production of witnesses. Being aggrieved with the orders passed in the aforesaid Complaint Cases, the Complainant i.e. Cantonment Board has filed these Revision Applications, seeking restoration of the complaint cases. Since the impugned orders are identical in nature and common questions of law are involved the revision applications filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Sections 397 401 and 482 of Cr.P.C. are being disposed of by this common order. 3. Heard Shri S.R. Sen, learned senior counsel for the petitioners. The respondents were represented by Smt. T. Yangi, Mr. M.F. Qureshi and Mr. R. Chaudhury, learned advocates respectively. 4. The complaints were filed by the Cantonment Board through its Estate Officer under Section 184of the Cantonments Act, 1924 alleging illegal constructions on the land belonging to the Cantonment Board without due permission. Since the Offences were triable under summons procedure, the learned Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Chapter XX of Cr.P.C. and proceeded with the cases by way of explaining the substance of accusations to the accused persons Under Section 251. Since the accused persons declined to plead guilty the Court fixed the case for production of witnesses and adducing evidence by the complainant. Despite adjourning the cases on several dates, the complainant failed to proffer its evidence. Having failed to get evidence from the prosecution, the learned Judicial Magistrate finally dismissed the cases by passing impugned orders, purportedly under Section 256 of Cr.P.C. 5. Shri S.R. Sen, learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that in all the cases attendance was given by way of filing 'Hazira', and as such, the cases could not have been dismissed for default. Shri S.R. Sen, learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that in all the cases attendance was given by way of filing 'Hazira', and as such, the cases could not have been dismissed for default. On the question of maintainability of the revision applications, the learned Counsel contended that since the impugned orders are not speaking judgments, its legality, propriety can be examined under revisional jurisdiction. 6. Per contra, Shri M.F. Qureshi, learned Counsel for the respondents in one of the cases, submitted that the result of dismissal of complaint is acquittal of the accused persons and the order of the acquittal can be challenged only by way of filing an appeal Under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. The learned Counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court given in the case of Krishna Kumar Gupta v. Mohammed Jaros 2003 Cri LJ 149 and the judgment rendered by the Bombay High Court in the case of Om Gayatri and Co. v. State of Maharastra reported in 2006 Cri LJ 601. At this initial stage of the judgment I make it clear that the complaints were filed Under Section 184 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 which provides punishment of imposing fine of Rs. 5000/-. Hence, the offences are non-cognizable and bailable one. The same offence has been brought under the new enactment, The Cantonments Act, 2006 with the same nature of punishment. 7. To resolve the legal controversy, it is also necessary to reproduce Section 256 of Cr.P.C. and relevant provisions of appeal under Section 378 for ready reference. The provisions are as below : 256. Non-appearance or death of complainant -- (1) If the summons has been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day : Provided that where the complainant is represented by a pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution or where the Magistrate is of opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may, dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case. (2) The provisions of Sub-section (1) shall, so far as may be, apply also to cases where the non-appearance of the complainant is due to his death. 378. Appeal in case of acquittal.-- ((1) Save as otherwise provided in subsection (2), and subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (3) and (5)-- (a) the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the Court of Session from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence; (Emphasis supplied) (b) the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court (not being an order under Clause (a)) or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision. (Emphasis supplied) (2) x x x (3) (No appeal to the High Court) under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. (4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. (5) and (6) x x x 8. A bare perusal of Section 256 of Cr.P.C. clearly shows that in the eventuality the complainant being absent the Judicial Magistrate has three options before it -- (i) it may acquit the accused, or (ii) adjourn the hearing of the case, or (iii) proceed to hear the case, if the complainant is represented by a pleader or by an officer conducting the prosecution. 9. In all the cases before me, no doubt attendance was filed by the learned Counsel for the complainant. At the same time, it is also the admitted fact that no witnesses were present in the Court nor the Haziras indicated the names of witnesses the complainant was going to produce in the Court, when the cases were taken up for hearing. Besides this, the records revealed that ample opportunity was given to the complainant to produce his witnesses. All the complaints were dismissed long after two to three years of adjournment. Besides this, the records revealed that ample opportunity was given to the complainant to produce his witnesses. All the complaints were dismissed long after two to three years of adjournment. In my considered opinion, filing of Hazira by the counsel or by the complainant's representative would not suffice the requirement of law. In other words, either a formal prayer ought to have been made on behalf of the complainant to adjourn the hearing to a next date, so as to enable the complainant to produce his witnesses or Haziras must have indicated that the complainant was ready with his witnesses. Since there was no material before the Court that the complainant was ready with his witnesses. I do not see any illegality in treating the complainant as absent and dismissing the complaint for want of evidence. 10. Now the question posed before me is whether the High Court can entertain a revision application either under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under different provisions of law under the Code of Criminal Procedure against an order passed by a Judicial Magistrate Under Section 256, Cr.P.C. or the High Court should direct the complainant to file an appeal under Section 378. 11. As could be gathered from the provisions of law (Section 378 Cr.P.C.) the right of a complainant or prosecution to file appeal against the orders of acquittal is restrictive in nature and circumscribed by certain "preconditions. At" the first instance, under Clauses (a) and (b) to Sub-section (1) of Section 378 of Cr.P.C. an appeal can be filed in the Court of Session from the orders of acquittal passed by the Magistrates only, if the offences are cognizable and non-bailable. (Emphasis supplied). In respect of the orders of acquittal passed by a Court other than the Magistrates, appeal would lie before the Court under Clause (b). 12. Apparently, Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 378(1) relates to the cases which are filed in the Courts by the State. However, in my opinion the pre-conditions, laid down in Clause (a) that appeals can be filed against the orders of acquittal only if the offences are cognizable and non-bailable, would also be applicable to the appeals stemming out of complaint cases before the High Court inasmuch as Clause (b) has not made any distinction of the complainants before the Court of Magistrates. In my considered view, the words "not being an order under Clause (a) employed in Clause (b) of Section 378(1)" is in relation to the hierarchy of the Court for filing appeal before the High Court and it does not dilute the pre-conditions that the offences must be cognizable and non-bailable. 13. The above apart, Sub-section (3) and 4 to 378 of Cr.P.C. deal with the procedure for filing an appeal before the High Court against an order of acquittal. It requires granting of leave by the High Court before entertaining an appeal. However, other conditions laid down in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 378(1) have not been realized. Sub-section (4) provides for appeal against the orders of acquittal in a case instituted upon a complaint. However, as noted earlier, the offences levelled against the accused persons are under Section 184 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, which are non-cognizable and bailable. Hence, no appeal can be filed against the orders of acquittal passed in such complaints as in my view to entertain an appeal Under Section 378, the offences must be cognizable and non-bailable. 14. It is also apparent from the relevant provisions of law that an appeal against the orders of acquittal in the High Court is further insulated by way of non-obstante clause in the nature of obtaining leave of the High Court. In this way, the right to file an appeal in the High Court is, in strict sense, neither a statutory nor an explicit one. The rights conferred upon the prosecution and the complaint Under Section 378, Cr.P.C. cannot be equated with the rights conferred upon a convict Under Section 374, which does not require obtaining of any leave from the High Court or from the learned Sessions Judge. In view of the limitations prescribed under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. I hold that since the right of filing an appeal, either by the State or by a complainant, in the High Court against an order of acquittal is not an absolute one there shall be no bar for the High Court to examine the legality, propriety and correctness of a non-speaking order of dismissal of complaint in its revisional jurisdiction. 15. 15. Both the Delhi High Court and the Bombay High Court have held that an order passed Under Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is appealable since the dismissal of a complaint invariably invites an order of acquittal of the accused. No doubt, a casual approach would indicate that an order of acquittal passed Under Section 256 is appealable under Section 378, Cr.P.C. However, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and Bombay High Court did not address or examine the relevance of pre-conditions and circumstances which permit filing of an appeal against an order of acquittal. Hence, I respectfully disagree with the blanket view taken by Delhi High Court and Bombay High Court that an order of acquittal of the accused passed in exercise of Section 256, Cr.P.C. is appealable. In my considered opinion, the appeal against the order of acquittal is limited to the offences which are cognizable and non-bailable in nature and not in other cases. 16. The above apart, the nature of the orders that can be passed under Section 256 due to absence of complaint or its witnesses are abundantly clear from the law itself. Such orders, in natural course cannot be speaking one. In this eventuality also, nothing remains to be examined in the appeal. However, the correctness and propriety of such an order can be examined under revisional jurisdiction by way of browsing the record and the order-sheets, which would indicate the manner in which the case was conducted by the prosecution and defence. 17. Section 397(1), Cr.P.C. confers concurrent power to Sessions Courts and High Courts to examine the record of any proceeding before any subordinate criminal Court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order and also to the regularity of any proceeding. Besides this, Section 401 has also given the privilege to the High Courts to correct miscarriage of justice taking cognizance of the issue suo motu. The powers conferred Under Section 401 extends to all the powers of appellate jurisdiction, subject to express limitations and exceptions specified thereunder. 18. In addition to revisional jurisdiction under Chapter XXX, Cr. P.C (Section 395 to 405) High Courts are also bestowed with inherent powers Under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to secure the ends of justice. The powers conferred Under Section 401 extends to all the powers of appellate jurisdiction, subject to express limitations and exceptions specified thereunder. 18. In addition to revisional jurisdiction under Chapter XXX, Cr. P.C (Section 395 to 405) High Courts are also bestowed with inherent powers Under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to secure the ends of justice. In this way, Section 482 is an essential and inseparable family member of revisional jurisdiction of High Courts. To say it differently, while construing the length and width of revisional powers of High Courts one cannot ignore the inherent powers enshrined Under Section 482. It is followed by Section 483 which authorizes the High Courts to have superintendence over the Courts of Judicial Magistrate, subordinate to it, to ensure expeditious and proper disposal of cases. 19. The nature of powers vested upon High Courts under its revisional jurisdiction and its duties laid down Under Section 483, Cr.P.C. came to be examined before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Krishnan v. Krishnaveni reported in. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are as follows : The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to meet out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised revisional power under Section 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal Court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order. 20. 20. With regard to the scope and ambit of inherent powers of the High Court Under Section 482, Cr.P.C. the Apex Court has expressed the following view in the case of Hamida v. Rashid reported in (2008) 1 SCC 474 : 2007 CriLJ 3422 : We are in agreement with the contention advanced on behalf of the complainant appellant. Section 482, Cr.P.C. saves the inherent powers of the High Court and its language is quite explicit when it says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A procedural code, however exhaustive, cannot expressly provide for all time to come against all the cases or points that may possibly arise, and in order that justice may not suffer, it is necessary that every Court must in proper cases exercise its inherent power for the ends of justice or for the purpose of carrying out the other provisions of the code. It is well established principle that every Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitice to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone it exists or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. As held by the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad 1945 Cri LJ 413 with regard to Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Section 482, Cr.P.C. is a verbatim copy of the said provision) gives no new powers. It only provides that those powers which the Court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Code and that no inherent power had survived the passing of the Act. 21. As a whole, in my considered opinion, the very purpose of scrutinizing the record of lower Court proceeding is not only to examine the legality, correctness and propriety of any finding or order alone but also to see that the very process of arriving such a conclusion was in consonance with the established legal jurisprudence. 21. As a whole, in my considered opinion, the very purpose of scrutinizing the record of lower Court proceeding is not only to examine the legality, correctness and propriety of any finding or order alone but also to see that the very process of arriving such a conclusion was in consonance with the established legal jurisprudence. While exercising such supervisory powers the revisional Court may interfere with final orders on account of procedural lapses, notwithstanding correctness of the order on merit. In other words, the main thrust of the revisional Courts is to focus upon the decision making process and not the end result. It is because if the foundation of the proceeding itself is vitiated and de hors to the laid down procedure of trial and enquiry the penultimate decision cannot be said to be a judicial decision. If any such decision, which is contrary to the established and accepted procedure, is allowed to sustain it would fall within the doctrine of 'miscarriage of justice.' 22. Upon conspectus of the position of law, I hold that it is more appropriate to examine the legality, correctness and propriety of orders passed under Section 256 of Cr.P.C. acquitting the accused on default clause in revisional jurisdiction conferred u/Ss. 397, 401 and 482 of Cr.P.C. in preference to appellate jurisdiction, subject to the condition that the accused must not have been acquitted in cognizable and non-bailable offences. In other words if the acquittal is recorded in cognizable and non-bailable offences only then the prosecution/complainant may be directed to file appeal Under Section 378, Cr.P.C. 23. Although I have held that this Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality of the impugned orders passed Under Section 256, Cr.P.C. in revision applications, since the offences alleged against the accused persons under the Cantonments Act, 1924 are non-cognizable and bailable, I decline to set aside the impugned orders on merit. I find that the cases have been dismissed for non-production of witnesses despite adjournment of the cases for long period. In such a situation, it is difficult to hold that the orders are either without jurisdiction, unjust or suffers from any illegality, impropriety or manifest error. Consequently, all the three Revision Applications are hereby dismissed. 24. I find that the cases have been dismissed for non-production of witnesses despite adjournment of the cases for long period. In such a situation, it is difficult to hold that the orders are either without jurisdiction, unjust or suffers from any illegality, impropriety or manifest error. Consequently, all the three Revision Applications are hereby dismissed. 24. Despite dismissal of the Revision Applications the complainant has an alternative remedy to pursue the alleged violation of the provisions of Cantonments Act, 1924 by way of filing fresh complaint. In the case of Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar AIR 1962 SC 876 and in the case of Major General A.S. Gaurayav. S.N. Thakur 1986 CriLJ 1074, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has permitted filing of second complaint on the same facts, while rejecting the theory of revival of the same complaint dismissed by a Magistrate. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are as follows : 9. Section 249 of the Criminal P.C. enables a Magistrate to discharge the accused when the complainant is absent and when the conditions laid down in the said section are satisfied. Section 256(1) of the Criminal P.C. enables a Magistrate to acquit the accused if the complainant does not appear. Thus, the order, of dismissal of a complaint by a criminal Court due to the absence of a complainant is a proper order. But the question remains whether a Magistrate can restore a complaint to his file by revoking his earlier order dismissing it for the non-appearance of the complainant and proceed with it when an application is made by the complainant to revive it. A second complaint is permissible in law if it could be brought within the limitations imposed by this Court in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar AIR 1962 SC 876 filing of a second complaint is not the same thing as reviving a dismissed complaint after recalling the earlier order of dismissal. The Criminal P.C. does not contain any provision enabling the criminal Court to exercise such an inherent power. 25. The aforesaid view of maintainability of second complaint on new facts as well as on previous facts have been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Yash Pal v. The State of Punjab 1978 CriLJ 189. 26. Sri Sen, learned Sr. 25. The aforesaid view of maintainability of second complaint on new facts as well as on previous facts have been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Yash Pal v. The State of Punjab 1978 CriLJ 189. 26. Sri Sen, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners also pressed into service the authority of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur 2001 CriLJ 1015 and placed that the petitioners may be permitted to file fresh complaints before the lower Courts. 27. In the aforesaid case, the question whether a complainant has a legal right to file 2nd complaint on the same facts in the event of dismissal of original complaint for default fell for considerations. After adumbrating to previous authorities and the relevant provisions of law the Apex Court answered the question in affirmative in the following words : 9. There is no provision in the Code or in any other statute which debar a complainant from preferring a second 'complaint on the same allegations if the first complaint did not result in a conviction or acquittal or even discharge. Section 300 of the Code, which debars a second trial, has taken care to explain that "the dismissal of a complaint or the discharge of an accused is, not an acquittal for the purpose of this Section." However, when a Magistrate conducts an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code and dismisses the complaint on merits, a second complaint on the same facts cannot be made unless there are very exceptional circumstances. Even so, a second complaint is permissible depending upon how the complaint happened to be dismissed at the first instance. 12. If the dismissal of the complaint was not on merit but on default of the complainant to be present there is no bar in the complainant moving the Magistrate again with a second complaint on the same facts. But if the dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of the Code was on merits the position could be different. There appeared a difference of opinion earlier as to whether a second complaint could have been filed when the dismissal was under Section 203. The controversy was settled by this Court in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar AIR 1962 SC 876 .... 28. There appeared a difference of opinion earlier as to whether a second complaint could have been filed when the dismissal was under Section 203. The controversy was settled by this Court in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar AIR 1962 SC 876 .... 28. The question of liberty to file second complaint on the same facts after its dismissal on default also came up before the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in the case of Parimal Chakraborty v. Ranjit Debnath reported in 2004 (3) GLT 213 and Ramkrishna Singh v. Namita Das reported in 2006 (1) GLT 462. In both these cases also, this Court has approved the right of the complainant to file second complaint under special circumstances relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Pramatha Nath1962 Cri LJ 770 (supra) and Major Gen. S. Gauraya (supra). I concur with the view taken by this Court in the earlier decisions. 29. Apart from the authorities discussed hereinabove regarding the permissibility to file second complaint, I find that Section 300 of Cr.P.C. also permits this course of action. In the case of the State of Karnataka v. C. Nagarajaraswamy reported in 2005 CriLJ 4534, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that fresh proceeding after the discharge of the accused on the ground of invalid sanction for prosecution is permitted. In my considered opinion, the spirit of Section300, Cr.P.C. is also applicable for allowing the prosecution/complainant to file second complaint on the same facts due to dismissal of the earlier cases on the ground of default, provided the complainant can show that the case could not be pursued due to bona fide reasons. 30. Smt. Yangi, learned Counsel for one of the respondents submitted that since there is no prayer by the petitioner for allowing them to file 2nd complaint, this option need not be considered. In my considered opinion the objection is highly technical and cannot come in the way of passing appropriate order to set things right. In my considered opinion in exercise of inherent power conferred Under Section 482 Cr.P.C. this Court has ample jurisdiction to accede to the oral prayer of the petitioner. In the light of the aforesaid authorities from the Apex Court as well as from this Court, the petitioner is allowed to file fresh complaints in the competent Court of Judicial Magistrate. In my considered opinion in exercise of inherent power conferred Under Section 482 Cr.P.C. this Court has ample jurisdiction to accede to the oral prayer of the petitioner. In the light of the aforesaid authorities from the Apex Court as well as from this Court, the petitioner is allowed to file fresh complaints in the competent Court of Judicial Magistrate. With this liberty the Revision Applications are hereby dismissed. Under the facts and circumstances, I refrain from awarding any cost in favour of the accused persons. Application dismissed.