JUDGEMENT: The writ petitioner is the elected President of the 4th respondent-Society. This writ petition is filed questioning the proceedings of the 3rd respondent/Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies dated 4.07.2008 issued under Section 34-A of the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (for short, "the Act") thereby convening a meeting on 23.07.2008 for consideration of the no-confidence motion against the writ petitioner. 2. It is not in dispute that there are 13 elected Directors in the 4th respondent-Society including the President and the Vice President. Out of them, 9 Directors i.e., respondent Nos.5 to 13 herein, submitted a representation dated 9.5.2008 in person to the 3rd respondent expressing lack of confidence in the President of the Society i.e., the writ petitioner. On the basis of the said representation, the 3rd respondent initially, vide proceedings dated 25.05.2008 convened a meeting on 13.06.2008 for consideration of the no-confidence motion against the petitioner. However, the said meeting could not be conducted on 13.06.2008 and once again the 3rd respondent issued the impugned notice dated 4.07.2008 proposing to convene the meeting of the Society on 23.07.2008 to consider the no-confidence motion against the writ petitioner. In the said notice it has been mentioned that the meeting scheduled to be held on 13.06.2008 could not be held since the 3rd respondent had applied for Medical Leave from 12.06.2008 to 20.06.2008 due to ill-health. The impugned notice dated 4.7.2008 is challenged by the petitioner primarily on the ground that it is in contravention of sub-section (3) of Section 34-A of the Act since the meeting proposed to be conducted on 23.07.2008 is beyond 30 days from the date of notice dated 9.05.2008. It is also contended that the postponement of the meeting to 23.07.2008 from 13.06.2008 is impermissible since under sub-section (5) of Section 34 of the Act adjournment, if any, could be only to the next day. 3. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos.5 to 13, apart from making various allegations of mismanagement of funds of the society and several other irregularities against the petitioner, it is also alleged that the meeting for considering the no-confidence motion originally fixed on 13.06.2008, was adjourned at the instance of the petitioner himself who brought influence on the 3rd respondent and compelled him to go on sick leave. 4. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Government Pleader for Co-operation appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 3 and the learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.5 to 13. 5. Since the dates as pleaded by the petitioner are not in dispute and are borne out of the original record placed before this Court by the learned Government Pleader, the main writ petition itself is heard and decided with the consent of the learned counsel for both the parties. 6. The procedure for making a motion expressing want of confidence in the President or the Vice-President of a Committee has been laid down in Section 34-A of the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (for short, 'the Act') in detail. The said section, to the extent it is necessary, may be extracted hereunder: "34-A. Motion of no-confidence in the President and Vice-President of the committee:-- (1) A motion expressing want of confidence in the President or the Vice-President of a Committee may be made in accordance with the procedure laid down in the following sub-sections. (2) A written notice of intention to make the motion, in such form as may be prescribed, signed by not less than one-half of the total number of members of the Committee together with a copy of the proposed motion shall be delivered in person, by any two of the members signing the notice, to the Registrar having jurisdiction over the Society. Explanation :- ................. (3) The Registrar shall then convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion at the office of the society on a date appointed by him which shall not be later than thirty days from the date on which the notice under sub-section (2) was delivered to him. He shall give to the members notice of not less than fifteen clear days of such meeting in such manner as may be prescribed : Provided that where the holding of such meeting is stayed by an order of a Court the meeting on a date not later than thirty days from the date on which he received the intimation about the vacation of stay, after giving to the members notice of not less than fifteen clear days of such adjourned meeting. (4) ..........…... (4) ..........…... (5) If the Registrar is unable to preside at the meeting he may after recording his reasons in writing adjourn the meeting to the next day to be presided over either by himself or by an officer authorized by him in his behalf. The person authorized under this sub-section shall be deemed to be the Registrar for purposes of sub-sections (7), (10) and (11). (6) Save as provided in sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) a meeting convened for the purpose of considering a motion under this section shall not for any reason be adjourned. 7. On a plain reading of sub-section (3) of Section 34-A, it is clear that the same provides for two requirements. Firstly, that the meeting for consideration of no-confidence motion shall be convened by the Registrar on a date which shall not be later than thirty days from the date on which the notice of intention to make the motion was delivered to him. Secondly, the members shall be given notice of not less than fifteen clear days of such meeting. 8. In the present case, the allegation of the petitioner is that the impugned notice under which the meeting is proposed to be conducted on 23.7.2008 is in contravention of the first requirement. It is contended that since the notice of no-confidence motion was delivered to the 3rd respondent on 9.5.2008, the meeting now proposed to be convened on 23.7.2008 on the face of it is beyond thirty days period prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 34-A and therefore it is illegal. 9. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of this Court in KAMISETTY NARAYANA MURTHY v. REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER, ELURU. 10. As noticed above, there is no dispute about the fact that the notice of no-confidence motion was delivered to the 3rd respondent - Registrar on 9.5.2008. Whatever may be the reason, admittedly the meeting which was initially proposed to be conducted on 13.6.2008 was postponed, and the same is now scheduled to be held on 23.7.2008. Thus, it is beyond thirty days and therefore impermissible under Section 34-A(3) of the Act. 11. Whatever may be the reason, admittedly the meeting which was initially proposed to be conducted on 13.6.2008 was postponed, and the same is now scheduled to be held on 23.7.2008. Thus, it is beyond thirty days and therefore impermissible under Section 34-A(3) of the Act. 11. However, the learned counsel for the respondents 5 to 13 while relying upon a decision of the Division Bench in D. MADHAVA REDDY vs. COLLECTOR (CO- OPERATION), WARANGAL contended that irrespective of the expiry of 30 days time- limit, the impugned notice cannot be held to be illegal. 12. In the above decision cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, a notice dated 20.11.1999 was issued by the Registrar under the Act convening the meeting on 7.12.1999. The said notice was challenged before this Court on the ground that it fell short of fifteen clear days and on 3.12.1999 this Court granted interim stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the notice dated 20.11.1999 which continued till the disposal of the writ petition. This Court though allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned notice dated 20.11.1999, while observing that the inability of the Registrar to conform to the legislative requirement under Section 34-A(3) to convene the meeting within thirty days from the date on which the notice of motion was delivered to him was the consequence of circumstances beyond his control and would thus be of no consequence, granted liberty to the Registrar to proceed to issue a notice for convening a meeting in accordance with Section 34-A (3) of the Act. On the basis of the said observations, the Registrar issued a fresh notice on 31.12.1999 under Section 34-A(3) convening the meeting on 29.1.2000. While considering the validity of the said notice, the Division Bench in D. MADHAVA REDDY'S case (2 supra) held that the proviso to Section 34-A(3) which takes care of the situation where the proceedings were stayed by the Court and were subsequently vacated, was attracted and saved the validity of the notice of motion already given by the Members of the Managing Committee. 13. As could be seen, the facts involved in the above decision are entirely different and therefore the conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench has no application to the case on hand. 13. As could be seen, the facts involved in the above decision are entirely different and therefore the conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench has no application to the case on hand. In D. MADHAVA REDDY vs. COLLECTOR (CO-OPERATION), WARANGAL (2 supra), not only the proviso to Section 34-A(3) was attracted but it was also a case where the Registrar sought to get over thirty days time-limit mandated under Section 34-A(3) on the basis of certain observations made by this Court while setting aside the first notice. 14. In the instant case, the meeting proposed on 13.6.2008 was never stayed by an order of a Court so as to bring it within the purview of proviso to Section 34-A(3). It is also not a case where the Registrar was granted any liberty to issue a fresh notice irrespective of the expiry of thirty days time-limit. Hence, the third respondent is bound to satisfy the thirty days limit as mandated under Section 34-A(3). Since the same could not be done, the impugned notice dated 4.7.2008 being illegal is liable to be set aside. 15. It is also relevant to note that on a combined reading of sub-sections (5) & (6) of Section 34-A, it is clear that a meeting convened for the purpose of considering a no-confidence motion can be adjourned only to the next day. It can't be adjourned to a longer period under any circumstances. Hence, the postponement of the meeting from 13.6.2008 to 23.7.2008 is also in violation of sub-section (5) of Section 34-A and on that ground also the impugned notice is liable to be declared as illegal. 16. Though the learned counsel for the respondents 5 to 13 further contended that the failure of the Registrar to fix a date in conformity with sub-section (3) of Rule 34-A does not invalidate the meeting convened beyond thirty days and for the said purpose relied upon the decision of this Court in P. RUKMAJI vs. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, NIZAMABAD3, I am unable to agree. 17. In P. RUKMAJI vs. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, NIZAMABAD (3 supra) case, the notice of no-confidence motion moved against the President of a Gram Panchayat under Rule 5 of the Statutory Rules then in force, was challenged on the ground that the Tahsildar failed to convene the meeting within 15 days from the date when he received notice of no-confidence motion. 17. In P. RUKMAJI vs. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, NIZAMABAD (3 supra) case, the notice of no-confidence motion moved against the President of a Gram Panchayat under Rule 5 of the Statutory Rules then in force, was challenged on the ground that the Tahsildar failed to convene the meeting within 15 days from the date when he received notice of no-confidence motion. Having regard to the scope, extent and the object of Rule 5 and keeping in view the aim and object of the Act, this Court while holding that the Statutory obligation imposed upon the Tahsildar to convene a meeting within fifteen days was directory and did not render any action taken in non-compliance with the said Rule void, concluded that the no-confidence motion did not lapse and the meeting would not be rendered invalid. 18. The said decision does not render any assistance to the respondents for the simple reason that the requirement of convening the meeting to consider motion of no-confidence within 30 days from the date of service of notice of intention under Section 34-A(3) of the Act is mandatory but not directory. On a combined reading of sub-sections (3), (5) & (6) of Section 34-A of the Act, the intention of the Legislature to make the requirement of conducting the meeting within the time-limit prescribed mandatory is apparent. Not only the expression 'shall' is used in sub-section (3) but the fact that under sub-section (5) the adjournment of meeting, if any, shall be only to the next day and particularly under sub-section (6) the adjournment was permitted only under two circumstances specified threunder make it clear that the first part of sub-section (3) is imperative and the non-compliance of the same would render the action taken invalid. 19. For the aforesaid reasons, I hold that the meeting proposed on 23.7.2008 under the impugned notice is illegal and impermissible. 20. In view of the above conclusion, it is not necessary for this Court to go into the two other contentions raised by the petitioner that since a copy of the proposed motion was not enclosed, the notice dated 9.5.2008 was illegal and that since the respondents 5 to 13 ceased to be members of the society in view of their continuous absence for more than 3 meetings, the respondent No.3 ought not to have entertained their representation for convening the meeting. Since this writ petition is disposed of at the stage of admission, I am not inclined to enter into the above issues and express any opinion on the same and it is left open to be agitated, if necessary, by instituting fresh proceedings. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.