JUDGMENT S.K. Seth, J. 1. This is an appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), at the instance of the Revenue. Appeal is directed against the order dated March 31, 2004, passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the ITAT" for short) in M.A. No. 61/Ind/2003. By the order impugned the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the application filed by the assessee under Section 254(2) of the Act. Hence, this appeal, which was admitted for final hearing on the following substantial questions of law: (i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in entertaining the application made by the assessee under Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, seeking recalling of the original appellate order dated October 17, 2003, passed in I.T.A. No. 577/Ind/98? (ii) Whether any case as required under Section of the Income-tax Act is made out for the purpose of recalling the well reasoned orders passed on the merits after giving due opportunity to the parties? 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as under. The assessee is carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of automobile tyre-tubes and fabric at Pithampur, District Dhar. The assessment period involved in the appeal is 1990-91. The assessee filed the return showing nil income. The Assessing Officer ("the AO"), did not accept the return and made certain additions, but allowed the assessee to capitalise the result of the tyre-division as pre-operative expenses. Against the addition, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The said appeal was partially allowed and so far as the additions made by the Assessing Officer were concerned, it was set aside and the matter was remanded back to ascertain the genuineness of transactions leading to the addition of income. 3. So far as the question of permitting the assessee to capitalise the results of tyre division as pre-operative expenses, it is pertinent to point out that proceeding relating to the assessment year 1991-92 was finalised during the pendency of appeal and a categorical finding was recorded that the commercial production actually started on May 4, 1988, and not on February 2, 1992, as claimed by the assessee. In view of this finding, the assessee sought leave of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to raise an additional ground to carry forward business losses of the previous years instead of pre-operative expenses. It being a pure question of law to be determined on the basis of the material already available on record, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed the assessee to raise the additional ground. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) after hearing the rival submissions, by a detailed order accepted the contention of the assessee that the pre-operative expenses intended to be capitalised, be treated as business loss and loss so determined be carried forward to set off against future income. Against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) based on this finding, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. 4. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal by order dated October 17, 2003, found that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) did not commit any mistake in permitting the assessee to raise the additional ground, however, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal based upon its own order passed in I.T.A. No. 139/Ind/1996 made scathing remarks against learned Counsel for the assessee and held that the assessee was not entitled to carry forward business losses. 5. Against the order dated October 17, 2003, the assessee filed an application under Section 254(2) of the Act seeking rectification of mistake on the ground that neither the Revenue nor the assessee relied upon the order passed in I.T.A. No. 139/Ind/1996. By the order impugned, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal after hearing the rival submissions, allowed the application filed by the assessee under Section 254(2) and recalled the order. Hence, this appeal by the Revenue under Section 260A of the Act. 6. According to Shri R.L. Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for the Revenue, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in the garb of exercising powers under Section 254(2), could not review its own order. He further submitted that under the Act, there is no provision which permits the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to review its own order. He submitted that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal being a quasi-judicial authority, it cannot review its own order unless the power is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. He further submitted that under the Act, there is no provision which permits the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to review its own order. He submitted that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal being a quasi-judicial authority, it cannot review its own order unless the power is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. In support of his submissions, Shri Jain relied upon two decisions of the Rajasthan High Court reported in CIT v. , CIT v. and a decision of this court reported in CIT v. [2007] 292 ITR 488(MP) . 7. Per contra, Shri Chaphekar, learned senior Counsel appearing for the assessee, submitted that the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal passed in appeal suffered from an error apparent from the record. When this was pointed out by filing application under Section 254(2), the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal rightly allowed the miscellaneous application and recalled its own order dated October 17, 2003, by the order impugned. According to learned Counsel by no stretch of imagination, it could be. said that in the garb of exercising powers under Section 254(2), the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal reviewed its own order. He placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. v. CIT [2007] 295 ITR 466. 8. After bestowing our considerable thoughts to the rival submissions and the decisions relied upon, we feel that there is no quarrel with the settled principles of law enunciated in various decisions. We are satisfied that in a factual context of the case in hand, the order impugned is not an out come of a review. Section 254(2) empowers of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to rectify any mistake in its order, provided it is apparent from the record, and such mistake is brought to the notice of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal within four years from the date of the order. What is "a mistake apparent from the record" was examined and explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in T.S. Balaram, ITO v. [1971] 82 ITR 50(SC) . According to the aforesaid decision, a mistake which is obvious and patent and does not require long drawn arguments to discover, would be "mistake apparent from the record'. This type of mistake in the order can be rectified under Section 254(2) of the Act. According to the aforesaid decision, a mistake which is obvious and patent and does not require long drawn arguments to discover, would be "mistake apparent from the record'. This type of mistake in the order can be rectified under Section 254(2) of the Act. In our considered opinion, reliance placed by Shri Jain on the decisions noted supra, does not advance the case of the Revenue as they are clearly distinguishable on the facts. In Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. v. CIT [2007] 295 ITR 466, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the application under Section 254(2), when it was pointed out that the decision of a co-ordinate Bench escaped the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's attention at the time of passing of the final order. The order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was challenged by the Revenue in appeal to the High Court. The said appeal was allowed and against the order of the High Court, the assessee went to the Supreme Court. In this factual back-drop, it was held that Section 254(2) is based on the fundamental principle that no party should be prejudiced on account of mistake, error or omission. Adornment to the wronged party by the court or the Tribunal for the mistake, error or omission has nothing to do with the concept of inherent power of review. In the present case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the Revenue's appeal by placing reliance on its own decision in I.T.A. No. 139/Ind/1996 causing prejudice to the assessee while deciding the question of carry forward business losses against the assessee. This mistake was acknowledged and rectified by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal when it was pointed out in the application under Section 254(2) of the Act. 9. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are clearly of the view that the Tribunal was justified in invoking its powers under Section ibid in the facts of this case because of a mistake apparent on the record rightly rectified by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal by the order impugned. We, therefore, find no ground to take any other view than what is taken by the Tribunal. 10. Our answer to both the questions would be in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 11. Before parting with the case, we would like to observe that self-restraint and temperate language is a virtue of a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. 10. Our answer to both the questions would be in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 11. Before parting with the case, we would like to observe that self-restraint and temperate language is a virtue of a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. Judicial language does not use whip-lashing; scathing or disparaging remarks. These are uncalled for deciding a lis. A presiding officer is expected to watch the forensic battle of wits from a higher pedestal rather than becoming part of the din and dust of battle. With this word of caution, we do not wish to say more in view of the fact that by the order impugned the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has recalled the order, thus the remarks stand obliterated. In the result, this appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 1,500, if certified.