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2008 DIGILAW 532 (ALL)

RAJ NARAIN v. STATE OF U P

2008-03-05

ABDUL MATEEN, M.K.MITTAL

body2008
M. K. MITTAL, J. The appeal and revision have been filed against the judg ment and order dated 25. 8. 1981 passed by Sri Ram Prakash Pandey, the then Sessions Judge, Sultanpur in S. T. No. 223 of 1981 whereby the appellant Raj Narain s/o Ganga Prasad, r/o Taranpur Majre Jag-dishpur, P. S. Kurwar, district Sultanpur was found guilty under section 304 (I) IPC and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. Co-accused Smt. Sonkali was given benefit of doubt and was acquitted under section 302/34 IPC. Informant Nageshwar Prasad being aggrieved by the judgment, also filed Criminal Revision praying that the accused Raj Narain be convicted under section 302 IPC instead of section 304 (I) IPC and his sentence be enhanced and that the co-accused Smt. Sonkali be also convicted. The cri. rjr. rj revision as against Raj Narain was admitted vide order dated 21. 10. 1981, whereas, it was summarily rejected as far as acquittal of Sonkali was concerned. 2. The facts of the case are that Nag eshwar Prasad s/o Ram Abhilakh, r/o vil lage Taranpur Majre, P. S. Kurwar, lodged the written-report (Ext. Ka-1) at police station Kurwar on 22. 4. 1981 at 5. 15 p. m. alleg ing that there was some dispute regarding the land in front of his house and that of the accused (his cousin and next-door neighbour ). On 22. 4. 1981 at about 3. 00 p. m. , the accused started putting mud in front of the door of the informant. At that time, the informant was not present in the house and his wife Smt. Chinta Devi ob jected to the act of Raj Narain. Smt. Sonkali w/o Raj Narain caught hold Smt. Chinta Devi and Raj Narain gave blows with pansa (blunt side) of the spade. A hue and cry was raised. Mata Prasad, Pyare Teli, Sharda Prasad Pandey, Dwarika Prasad Pandey and others came and intervened and saw the incident. Smt. Chinta Devi re ceived injuries and could not speak. 3. The information was sent to the informant and when the father of the in formant and others were taking Smt. Chinta Devi to the police-station, the in formant met them in the way and he pre pared the report and lodged the same at the police-station. The distance between village and police-station Kurwar is about 6 kilometres as per the chik-report. 4. The distance between village and police-station Kurwar is about 6 kilometres as per the chik-report. 4. The chik-report (Ext. Ka-3) was prepared by the constable clerk and the case was registered under section 308 IPC in the G. D. at rapid No. 11 at 5. 15 p. m. Copy of G. D. is Ext. Ka-4. Smt. Chinta Devi was referred to District Hospital, Sultanpur and was examined by the Medical Officer on 22. 4. 1981 at 7. 15 p. m. She was brought by constable Chhatrabali Singh. Medical Officer found the following injuries on her person: - 1. Lacerated wound 3 cm. x. 5 cm. x scalp deep over head 75 cm. above the left ear. 2. Lacerated wound 2 cm. x 0. 5 cm. x scalp deep over head 3 cm behind injury No. 1. 3. Lacerated wound 6 cm x 0. 5 cm. x scalp deep over head 10 cm. above the base of nose. 4. Lacerated wound 3 cm x 0. 5 cm x scalp deep over head 1 cm. behind injury No. 3. 5. Contusion 9 cm x 1 cm over lateral aspect of left upper arm 8 cm above the elbow joint. The patient was unconscious : The gen eral condition was low. Fresh bleeding from injuries on head was present. Injuries were fresh and were caused by some blunt weapon X-ray was advised for the injuries No. 1 to 4 and No. 5 was simple. The medi cal report is Ext Ka-14. 5. Injured Smt. Chinta Devi suc cumbed to her injuries in the hospital at 7. 40 p. m the same day and a memo (Ext. Ka-15) was sent to the police-station on the basis of which the case was converted to section 304 IPC. 6. The Sub-Inspector Banwari Lal Pathak started investigation in the case. He interrogated the witnesses. He inspected the place of occurrence and prepared Fard of spade (Ext. Ka-5 ). He took bloodstained and plain earth and sealed them in separate containers and prepared the Fard (Ext. Ka-6 ). He inspected the place of occurrence and prepared the site-plan (Ext. Ka-7 ). The Investigating Officer also prepared the in quest report (Ext. Ka.-9), Naksha-nash (Ext. Ka-10), form 13 (Ext. Ka-11) letter to Civil Surgeon (Ext. Ka- 12) and sample seal Ext. Ka-13. The dead body was sealed and was sent for post-mortem examination. 7. Dr. Ka-6 ). He inspected the place of occurrence and prepared the site-plan (Ext. Ka-7 ). The Investigating Officer also prepared the in quest report (Ext. Ka.-9), Naksha-nash (Ext. Ka-10), form 13 (Ext. Ka-11) letter to Civil Surgeon (Ext. Ka- 12) and sample seal Ext. Ka-13. The dead body was sealed and was sent for post-mortem examination. 7. Dr. C. K. Gupta who was posted as Medical Officer in District Hospital, Sultanpur conducted the post- mortem exami nation of Smt. Chinta Devi on 23. 4. 1981 at 1. 00 p. m. The death had taken place as per hospital record on 22. 4. 1981 at 7. 40 p. m. The rigor mortis was present in the lower part of the body. The doctor found the following ante-mortem injuries on her body: - 1. Lacerated wound 6 cm. x. 8 cm. x scalp deep on the top of head 10 cm. above the base of nose. 2. Lacerated wound 3 cm x. 5 cm. x scalp deep over the right side head 1 crn. below and toward injury No. 1. 3. Lacerated wound 3. 5 cm. x. 5 cm. x scalp deep over the left occipital region of head 7. 5 cm above and behind the left ear. 4. Lacerated wound 2 cm x 2 cm x scalp deep over the left occipital region of the head 3 cm below the injury No. 3. The wound was sur rounded by contused swelling of 3 cm. diameter. 5. Contusion 10 cm x 3. 5 cm. over the left side of neck just below the left ear. 6. Contusion 18 cm. x 7 cm over the left upper back extending up to left upper arm back side. 7. Contusion 6 cm x 3 cm over the lateral aspect of the left upper arm 8 cm. above the elbow joint. On internal examination, the doctor found fracture of left parietal temporal bones under injury Nos. 1 and 2 and frac ture of occipital bones in multiple pieces under injury Nos. 3 and 4. Brain was pale and surface was full of semi clotted blood. According to the post-mortem report, the death was caused due to head injuries re sulting in coma. The post-mortem report is Ext. Ka-16. 8. The Fard (Ext. Ka-8) regarding Dhoti that was tied on the head of Smt. Chinta Devi to stop bleeding, was prepared by Investigating Officer on 30. 4. According to the post-mortem report, the death was caused due to head injuries re sulting in coma. The post-mortem report is Ext. Ka-16. 8. The Fard (Ext. Ka-8) regarding Dhoti that was tied on the head of Smt. Chinta Devi to stop bleeding, was prepared by Investigating Officer on 30. 4. 1981. P. W. 4 Baijnath Ram was posted as Station Officer, Kurwar on 23rd May, 1981. He took the investigation from SI Banwari Lal Pathak on account of his transfer. He interrogated the accused on 28. 5. 1981 and after complet ing the investigation, he submitted the charge-sheet (Ext. Ka-2) against the ac cused. 9. The case of the accused was committed to the Court of Sessions by Sri R. P. Pandey, 1st Judicial Magistrate, Sul-tanpur vide order dated 29. 6. 1981. On 28. 7. 1981, the accused Raj Narain was charged under section 302 IPC and 302/34 IPC. Smt. Sonkali was charged under sec tion 302/34 IPC. They pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 10. In support of its case, the prose cution led the evidence and examined Nageshwar (P. W. I), Durga Prasad (PW. 2) and Sharda Prasad (P. W. 3) as witnesses of fact and occurrence besides the above noted formal witness. The defence admit ted the genuineness of the prosecution pa pers and, therefore, other formal witnesses including Chik/gd writer, medical officers and first Investigating Officer were not ex amined in the Court. Out of the three wit nesses of fact, P. W. I is the informant and other two witnesses are eye-witnesses. They have supported the prosecution case. 11. The accused were examined un der section 313 Cr. P. C. and they denied the prosecution case. According to the ac cused Raj Narain, the witnesses deposed on account of enmity and they were made ac cused on account of enmity. The accused did not adduce any oral or documentary evidence in defence. 12. The learned Trial Court after con sidering the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the prosecution witnesses were reliable and the prosecution had been able to establish the case against accused Raj Narain. However, the learned Trial Court held that quarrel had started sud denly and that it appeared that Smt. Chinta Devi might have said some thing on which Raj Narain lost his temper. However, the learned Trial Court held that quarrel had started sud denly and that it appeared that Smt. Chinta Devi might have said some thing on which Raj Narain lost his temper. He also held that it is a matter of common knowledge that pansa of the spade is heavy and the accused must have been knowing the result of the blows given by pansa and that Raj Narain must have been knowing that death was possible from said injuries. However, he held the accused guilty under section 304 (1) IPC and consequently convicted him as aforesaid. The learned Trial Court also concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the case against accused Sonkali and giving her benefit of doubt, acquitted her of the charge under section 302/34 IPC. Feeling aggrieved by this judgment and order, the appeal and revi sion have been filed 13. We have heard Sri Amit Chaudhary, learned Amiens Curiae for the appel lant, Sri Mukesh Sharma, learned Addi tional Government Advocate for the State and Sri S. P. Pathak learned Counsel for the complainant and have perused the Trial Court record. 14. Learned Counsel for the appellant did not dispute the incident but contended that the appellant had no pre-meditation or intention to commit the murder and the incident was the result of sudden quarrel and on that basis he contended that the accused should have been punished under section 304 part two IPC and prayed for the sentence already undergone. Against it, learned Counsel for the State and complainant contended that the accused gave the repeated blows to the deceased with pansa of the spade on the head, causing fracture of parietal, temporal and occipital bones and was aware that the blows would result in death and it definitely shows his intention to cause bodily injuries sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death of Smt. Chinta Devi. 15. It comes out from the evidence on record that the informant Nageshwar and the appellant Raj Narain are cousins. They had partitioned the house and the Sadar doors of the two, were towards north. The appellant was making some constructions in the Sehan towards north of the door and, in that connection, he was digging the foundation of sehariya on the date of the incident. He was collecting the mud of the foundation in front of the door of Nag eshwar. The appellant was making some constructions in the Sehan towards north of the door and, in that connection, he was digging the foundation of sehariya on the date of the incident. He was collecting the mud of the foundation in front of the door of Nag eshwar. At the time of the incident, Nag eshwar was not present and his wife Smt. Chinta Devi objected to the act of stocking of the mud in front of her door but the ac cused continued. Smt. Sonkali, his wife, challenged Smt. Chinta Devi and asked her not to come towards them, otherwise she would have to face the consequence. But Smt Chinta Devi continued with her objection. At this, Smt. Sonkali caught the neck of Smt. Chinta Devi. At this point of time, the accused Raj Narain proceeded towards Chinta Devi with spade in his hand. Smt. Sonkali left the neck of Smt. Chinta Devi and accused-appellant gave blows with pansa of the spade on the head of Smt. Chinta Devi as a result of which she received injuries and fell down unconscious. The accused ran away leaving behind the spade. The statements of two eye-witnesses Durga Prasad (P W. 2) and Sharda Prasad (P. W. 3) show that the incident had taken place in the manner as alleged by the prosecution. These witnesses were present at the time of the incident and had reached at the time when there was exchange of words. The medical evidence shows that the accused gave four blows on the skull of the deceased causing grievous injuries re sulting in her death. The witness Sharda, Prasad (P. W. 3) has also stated that the ac cused even gave two blows to Smt. Chinta Devi after she fell down on the ground. 16. Learned Counsel for the accused-appellant has contended that the accused-appellant had no pre- meditation and in tention to kill Smt. Chinta Devi and the incident was sudden. The accused was al ready possessed of the spade as he was digging the foundation. He proceeded to wards the victim with spade and gave blows. Learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that the act of the accused is covered by Exception 4 to section 300 IPC. Section 300 IPC is reproduced as under: - "300. The accused was al ready possessed of the spade as he was digging the foundation. He proceeded to wards the victim with spade and gave blows. Learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that the act of the accused is covered by Exception 4 to section 300 IPC. Section 300 IPC is reproduced as under: - "300. Murder - Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or 2ndly.- If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the. person to whom the harm is caused, or 3rdly.- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any per son and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or 4thly.- If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. Five exceptions have been given under which culpable homicide is not murder. The relevant Exception 4 is as under: - Exception 4.- Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 17. The evidence on record shows that there was altercation between two la dies perhaps heated one. The co-accused had caught the neck of Smt. Chinta Devi but when accused proceeded towards them with spade, she left the neck and the ac cused gave blows on the head of Smt. Chinta Devi. There was no sudden fight and there was only exchange of words. The witness Sharda Prasad (P. W. 3) was put a question in cross-examination regarding (scuffle) between the appellant and Smt. Chinta Devi but the witness re plied in negative. The instrument of attack i. e. pansa was heavy. There was no sudden fight and there was only exchange of words. The witness Sharda Prasad (P. W. 3) was put a question in cross-examination regarding (scuffle) between the appellant and Smt. Chinta Devi but the witness re plied in negative. The instrument of attack i. e. pansa was heavy. The accused being a young man of 28 years and the victim be ing a lady, the blows, although appear to have been given in heat of passion, landed heavily fracturing the parietal, temporal and occipital bones of the deceased. 18. Now it has to be seen as to whether the act of the accused is covered by section 300 IPC and he is guilty of mur der or it is covered by Exception 4 to sec tion 300 IPC and he is guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Learned Counsel for the appellant has ve hemently argued that the accused had no pre-meditation and no intention to commit murder. According to him, the accused had no intention of causing the death of Smt. Chinta Devi nor were the injuries caused with the intention of causing such bodily injuries as the accused knew were likely to cause death. Be that as it may, but his act is covered by third Clause of section 300 IPC as he did the act with intention of causing bodily injury and the bodily injuries in flicted were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and there fore, the act amounts to murder. Here the injuries caused by the accused were suffi cient in ordinary course of nature to cause death as they resulted in fracture of bones of skull. The contention of the learned Counsel for the State that the act of the ac cused is covered by the third clause, is therefore, correct. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the incident being the result of sudden quarrel, the act is cov ered by Exception 4 to section 300 IPC but this contention cannot be accepted. 19. The contention of the learned Counsel for the State that the act of the ac cused is covered by the third clause, is therefore, correct. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the incident being the result of sudden quarrel, the act is cov ered by Exception 4 to section 300 IPC but this contention cannot be accepted. 19. In the case of Rajendm Singh and others v. State of Bihar 2000 (41) ACC 696 (SC) the Full Bench of the Apex Court, while considering the scope of Exception 4 to section 300 IPC has held that necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to section 300 are: (a) a sudden fight; (b) ab sence of premeditation, and (c) no undue advantage or cruelty. It has also been held that the occasion must be sudden and not as a cloak for pre-existing malice. It is only an unpremeditated assault committed in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel which would come within Exception 4 and it is necessary that all the three ingredients must be found. That case was not covered by Exception 4 to section 300 IPC. 20. In the case of Kikar Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1993 SC 2426 = 1992 (Suppl.) ACC 115 (SC) it has been held in para 8 that in order to bring the case within Exception 4 to section 300 IPC, all the conditions enu merated therein must be satisfied (1) The act must be committed without pre meditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion; (2) upon a sudden quarrel; (3) without the offender having taken undue advantage; and (4) the accused had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. There fore, there must be a mutual combat on exchanging blows on each other. It has been further held that "if two men start fighting and one of them is unarmed while the other uses a deadly weapon, the one who uses such weapon must be held to have taken an undue advantage denying him the entitlement to exception 4. True the number of wounds is not the criterion, but the position of the accused and the de ceased with regard to their arms used, the manner of combat must be kept in mind when applying exception 4. True the number of wounds is not the criterion, but the position of the accused and the de ceased with regard to their arms used, the manner of combat must be kept in mind when applying exception 4. When the de ceased was not armed but the accused was and caused injuries to the deceased with fatal results, the exception 4 engrafted to section 300 is excepted and the offences committed would be one of murder. " In that case, the deceased was unarmed and did not cause any injury to the accused even following a sudden quarrel and the accused had inflicted fatal blows on the deceased, Exception 4 was not attracted. 21. In the case of Ghapoo Yadav and others v. State of M. P. , 2003 (46) ACC 725 (SC) = 2003 (4) AIC 769 while enunciating the legal position, it has been held that for the application of Exception 4, it is not suf ficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender had not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. A sudden fight implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide commit ted is then clearly not traceable to unilat eral provocation, nor could in such cases the whole blame be placed on one side. However, in that case there was a fight and out of seven, one injury on leg was griev ous and was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but after the injured had fallen no more injuries were caused, it was held that the accused had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner and the case was held to be covered under Exception 4 to section 300 IPC. 22. Learned Counsel for the appellant has cited the case of Gurdeep Singh v. jaswant Singh and others 1993 SCC (Cri) 278 In that case, it was held that the appellant had no intention to cause death of Kesar Singh but he could be attributed only with the knowledge that the injury caused by him was likely to cause death. However, there were injuries on ap pellant also and according to the prosecu tion case, that was caused by the son of the deceased while he attempted to save his father. However, there were injuries on ap pellant also and according to the prosecu tion case, that was caused by the son of the deceased while he attempted to save his father. In that case, the accused was con victed under section 304 part IIIPC by the Apex Court. However, the circumstances of the present case are different and this rul ing does not help the appellant. 23. Learned Counsel for the appellant has also cited the case of Deepak Bhikaji Dharmale v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 (45) ACC 832 in which it has been held that there was absence of pre-meditation on the part of the appellant to commit the murder of the deceased and that in the sudden scuffle at the spur of the moment, the appellant took out the knife and assaulted the deceased. However, the injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The convic tion of the accused was converted from 302 IPC to 304 Part II IPC by the Apex Court. But the facts of the present case are differ ent and this ruling also does not help the appellant and he cannot be given any benefit of Exception 4 to section 300 IPC. 24. Learned Counsel for the State has, thus, rightly contended that in the instant case, there was no sudden fight and physi cal combat between the deceased and the appellant and the accused took undue ad vantage and gave the repeated blows in cruel manner. He gave two blows even af ter the victim fell down on the ground and was helpless. The deceased was not armed. Thus the accused gave repeated blows with heavy pansa intending to cause such in juries which were sufficient to cause death in ordinary course. Therefore, although there was no pre-meditation, the act of the accused does not justify the applicability of Exception 4 to section 300 IPC and is cov ered by third clause of section 300 IPC. 25. Learned Counsel for the State and the complainant have contended that the learned Trial Court has erred in convicting the appellant under section 304 (I) IPC in stead of section 302 IPC. 25. Learned Counsel for the State and the complainant have contended that the learned Trial Court has erred in convicting the appellant under section 304 (I) IPC in stead of section 302 IPC. They have also contended that the learned Trial Court was aware of the fact and had given a finding that pansa is a heavy instrument and the accused was having the knowledge about the result of his blows that the death was likely to be caused and still without giving any reason hurriedly concluded and thereby erred in convicting the appellant under section 304 (1) IPC. This contention of the learned Counsel for the complainant and the learned AGA has force and is cor rect. Thus we come to the conclusion that the Trial Court was right while holding the accused guilty but erred in convicting him under section 304 (1) IPC instead of section 302 IPC. But we cannot modify the convic tion of the accused-appellant under section 302 IPC as the State has not filed any ap peal against the purported acquittal of the appellant under section 302 IPC. In case of Eknath Shankarrao Mukkaivar v. State of Ma harashtra 1978 (15) ACC 159 (SC) it has been held by the Honble Apex Court that there is no power in the High Court to change the offence if there is no State appeal regarding the offence. Al though the complainant has preferred a revision but in view of section 401 (3) Cr. P. C, the finding of acquittal (under sec tion 302 IPC) cannot be converted into one of conviction. 26. Now we have to consider the ade quacy of sentence. Punishment is the sanc tion imposed on the offender for the in fringement of law committed by him. Once a person is tried for commission of an of fence and found guilty by a competent Court, it is the duty of the Court to impose on him such sentence as is prescribed by law. The award of sentence is consequen tial on and incidental to conviction. The law does not envisage a person being con victed for an offence without a sentence being imposed there for. The concept of justice as an aim of punishment means both that the punishment should fit the offence and also that like offences should receive similar punishments. The award of sentence is consequen tial on and incidental to conviction. The law does not envisage a person being con victed for an offence without a sentence being imposed there for. The concept of justice as an aim of punishment means both that the punishment should fit the offence and also that like offences should receive similar punishments. An increasingly im portant aspect of punishment is deterrence and sentences are aimed at deterring not only the actual offender from further of fences but also potential offenders from breaking the law. The main aim of pun ishment in judicial thought, however, is still the protection of society. Penal laws, by and large, adhere to the doctrine of pro portionality in prescribing sentences ac cording to culpability of criminal conduct, The sentence ought to be commensurate with the crime. 0 27. Learned Counsel for the State and the learned Counsel for the complainant have contended that the punishment of seven years has been awarded to the appel lant and same is inadequate considering the gravity of the offence committed by him. They have contended that the sen tence as awarded to the appellant is liable to be enhanced in order to serve the ends of justice. Against it, learned Counsel for the accused-appellant contended that the ap pellant has been adequately sentenced and there is no necessity of enhancing the sen tence awarded to him. 28. In this case, the State has not filed any appeal for enhancement of sentence under section 377 (1) Cr. P. C. but the com plainant has filed criminal revision and has prayed for enhancement of the sentence. If a revision is filed by the complainant for enhancement of the sentence and if the exi gencies of the case require, the sentence can be enhanced. It will be useful to refer the case of Bissn Mahgoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 Cr. L. J. 1796 (SC) where it has been held that whether the State filed a revision or the complainant moved the High Court in re vision, it was competent to the High Court to go into the question of sentence and it was well within its power to enhance the sentence of transportation for life to one of death. In that matter, the High Court in revision filed by the complainant, had en hanced the sentence of transportation for life to death. In that matter, the High Court in revision filed by the complainant, had en hanced the sentence of transportation for life to death. In the case of Pratap v. State of U. P. and others, (1973) 3 SCC 690 it has been held in para 15 that the power under section 439 Cr. P. C. (old) is one which the High Court can ex ercise suo motu and all that a person filing a revision petition under that section does is to draw the Courts attention to an illegal, improper or incorrect finding, sentence or order of a subordinate Court. The fact that in this case the brother of the deceased filed revision petition and the Government did not do so, does not affect the powers of the High Court under that section. " 29. These two cases referred above deal with section 439 of the Code of Crimi nal Procedure, 1898. In the present Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, almost parallel provision has been given under section 401 Cr. P. C. Considering the question of enhancement of sentence in a revision filed by the State or the complainant, in the case of Eknath Shankanao Mukkawar (supra), it has been held by the Honble Apex Court in para 6 "we should at once remove the misgiving that the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has abolished the High Courts power of enhancement of sentence by exercising revisional jurisdiction, suo motu. The provision for appeal against in adequacy of sentence by the State Govern ment or the Central Government does not lead to such a conclusion. " Under section 401 (4) Cr. P. C. , the com plainant has no right to file appeal in a State case. Therefore, he can file a revision and in the circumstance if a revision is filed for enhancement of the sentence, that can be considered. 1 30. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, considering the nature and the gravity of the offence and the manner in which Smt. Chinta Devi was done to death by the appellant Raj Narain, we are of the considered view that the learned Trial Court has awarded inadequate sen tence to the accused. 1 30. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, considering the nature and the gravity of the offence and the manner in which Smt. Chinta Devi was done to death by the appellant Raj Narain, we are of the considered view that the learned Trial Court has awarded inadequate sen tence to the accused. Although the question of sentence is a matter of judicial discretion of the Trial Court within the statutory lim its but when the sentence appears on the facts and circumstances of the case to be so manifestly inadequate as to have resulted in failure of justice, the enhancement of the sentence is justified by the Appellate Court. In the instant case, the learned Trial Court, as observed earlier has awarded inade quate sentence and we are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be served if the sentence is enhanced from seven years to life imprisonment. 31. Thus we come to the conclusion that the criminal appeal filed by appellant Raj Narain is liable to be dismissed, whereas the criminal revision filed by in formant Nageshwar is liable to be allowed to the extent of enhancement of the sen tence as mentioned above. 32. The Criminal Appeal filed by ac cused Raj Narain is hereby dismissed. Criminal Revision filed by informant Nag-eshwar Prasad is hereby allowed as above. Raj Narain, the accused-appellant, is held guilty and his conviction is confirmed. The sentence of seven years as awarded by the learned Trial Court to accused Raj Narain under section 304 (1) IPC is enhanced to life imprisonment under this section. The appel lant is under custody and shall remain in custody to serve out the sentence. Sessions Judge, Sultanpur is directed to send the modified warrant of sentence to the con cerned jail authorities forthwith. The copy of the order be certified without any delay. The compliance report be sent within a month. 33. The record of the Trial Court be returned forthwith. Appeal Dismissed .