ORAL JUDGMENT : 1. Heard. 2. The question involved in this Second Appeal was to be considered in the light of Substantial Question of Law, as framed, which reads as follows:- What is the scope and effect of Clause 13-A on the decree already passed and against which the appeal is pending? 3. Case proceeds on admitted facts, namely:- [a] The suit for eviction of the property being an open plot when leased, was filed on .. 14-4-1985. [b] Suit was decreed on .. 28-4-1989. [c] Clause 4-A of the C.P. & Berar Letting of Premises & Rent Control Order, 1949, was enacted and came into force on 27-6-1989. [d] Clause 13-A of the said Order was enacted on .. 26-10-1989. 4. Admittedly, the decree is passed before enactment of Clause 4-A, as well enactment of Clause 13-A. 5. The aggrieved tenant filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 199 of 1989, which was admitted and ultimately decided on 16th February, 1995. 6. Therefore, the tenant is before this Court, urging that the decree of the Appellate Court is nullity, since the decree of Trial Court merges in the decree of First Appellate Court, which is a decree of eviction. 7. According to the appellant, appeal is a continuation of suit and until re-hearing thereof, finality to a decree of suit is contingent upon the decree of Appellate Court. 8. Appellant further submits that only after the Appellate Court decides the appeal, dismissing it, the decree of Trial Court merges in it, and for all purposes, it amounts to passing of a decree by the Appellate Court directing eviction. Such a decree cannot be drawn in view of Clause 13-A remaining on the rule book during pendency, hearing and disposal of appeal. 9. Learned Advocate for the Appellant has placed reliance on various judgments, which are as follows:- [a] Lakshmi Narayan Guin & ors. Vs. Niranjan Modak [ (1985) 1 SCC 270 ], [b] Gangubai Dashrath Makode & ors. Vs. Nilkanth Sripat Gokhale [1991 Mh. L. J. 1178], [c] Dilip Vs. Mohd. Azizul Haq & another [ (2000) 3 SCC 607 ], and [d] Vasudeo Tulsiram Jambhale Vs. Raghuvir Singh Umedh Tahkur & another [2002 (3) Mh. L.J. 596]. 10. It is not necessary to go into and scrutinize all the Judgments, since the question involved is already settled by the Judgment in case of Dilip Vs. Mohd. Mohd. Azizul Haq & another [ (2000) 3 SCC 607 ], and [d] Vasudeo Tulsiram Jambhale Vs. Raghuvir Singh Umedh Tahkur & another [2002 (3) Mh. L.J. 596]. 10. It is not necessary to go into and scrutinize all the Judgments, since the question involved is already settled by the Judgment in case of Dilip Vs. Mohd. Azizul Haq & another [cited supra]. 11. The Lordships of Supreme Court have ruled and now it is a precedent that in view of pendency of appeal, though Clause 13-A is not retrospective, appeal being a continuation of lis, and passing a decree by the First Appellate Court upholding the decree of eviction would be governed by Clause 13-A. 12. In these premises, the Question of Law framed is liable to be answered in affirmative, holding that when a decree is already passed, against which an appeal is pending, Clause-13-A would govern the jurisdiction of Appellate Court in passing a decree of eviction or confirming a decree already passed. Thus, the rigour created by Clause 13-A has same effect on the Appellate Court as on Trial Court as if Appellate Court was, for the first time, passing the decree of eviction. 13. In the result, the Appellate Court is put under the same embargo under which the Trial Court was, and it would be incompetent to the Appellate Court as much to the Trial Court to pass a decree [confirm a decree of eviction already passed], and has to hold its hands until landlord has in hand permission in his favour, under Clause 13 [1] thereof. 14. Learned Advocate Mr. A.T. Purohit states that in the present case, due to the dilemma as to retrospectiveness of Clause 13-A, the landlord remained under confusion and has failed to apply for permission under Clause 13 [1]. 15. Learned Advocate Mr. Purohit for the respondent-landlord states that the landlord would apply for leave, and prays that in the event the appellnt succeeds, case be remanded to the First Appellate Court where the appeal would remain pending and shall remain sine die so long the landlord's application under Clause 13 [1], which would be filed within three months now. 16. Purohit for the respondent-landlord states that the landlord would apply for leave, and prays that in the event the appellnt succeeds, case be remanded to the First Appellate Court where the appeal would remain pending and shall remain sine die so long the landlord's application under Clause 13 [1], which would be filed within three months now. 16. Therefore, it shall meet ends of justice to remand the appeal by allowing this Second Appeal and let the appeal before District Court remain sine die as the landlord wants to elect to proceed to apply under Clause 13 [1] for leave within three months. 17. If the landlord brings on record in the Appeal in District Court that the application has been filed, the Court would stay its hands until the decision of proceedings according to law under Clause 13 [1]. The Appellate Court need not wait, and shall be free to decide the appeal if nothing, as above, is placed on record by the landlord. 18. In the premises, the Second Appeal is allowed in following terms:- [a] The impugned Judgment and Decree is set aside. [b] Regular Civil Appeal No. 199 of 1989 is remanded to the District Court, Akola. [c] The appeal shall remain pending in terms of para nos.16 to 17 of this Judgment. [d] In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear own costs.