1. 1. All these writ petitions may be disposed off by the common judgment as they arise out of common judgment passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in a group of original applications. 2. 2. To state in brief, the respondents, had filed a group of nine original applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal (C.A.T.) According to the nature of the dispute and for the sake of convenience, the C.A.T. divided the said original applications into two sets. The first set consisted of Original Applications Nos.989 of 2000, 584 of 2000, 655 of 2000 and 124 of 2001 and the second set consisted of Original Applications Nos.855 of 2000, 857 of 2000, 858 of 2000, 859 of 2000 and 860 of 2000. The first four writ petitions are pertaining to the first set and the remaining five writ petitions are pertaining to the second set. The applicants in first set are those apprentices, who were admitted to NDA School under the Apprentices Act, 1961 in pursuance to their selection in an open competition for 58, 59 and 60th batches. Dockyard is within the ambit of Apprentices Act. They were imparted training to fill up the technical vacancies in the N.D.A. Schools. After qualifying the preliminary test as well as physical and medical test, they were selected for these jobs and were also employed. When they signed the contract, Dockyard Memo (DM) No.6/85 was in force in respect of allocation of grades to the apprentices for the purpose of employment on completion of training on the basis of merit list. As per Clause ’e’ of that contract, the petitioners were to offer suitable appointment in grade I or grade II to the apprentices depending upon their merit based on performance in the training . Some of them had to undergo two years apprentice training course and some had to undergo three years apprentice training course. The respondents, who were admitted to two years training course and who belong to batch no.58 had joined in April, 1995 and completed the course in March, 1997, those, who belong to 59th batch joined in October, 1995 and completed course in October, 1997 and those from 60th batch had joined in April, 1996 and completed course in March, 1998. The apprentices, in each of these batches, who had to undergo three years course, completed their course within their stipulated period. The apprentices, in each of these batches, who had to undergo three years course, completed their course within their stipulated period. As per DM 6/85, the weightage for terminal examination, final examination and overall conduct was to assigned in ratio 40:50:10 out of 100 marks. Ten marks were awarded by Officer-in-Charge on the basis of several components and factors regarding overall performance of the apprentice. Based on their performance, they were to be given grades in highly skilled or skilled category and they would get certain increments in the said grades depending upon their performance and marks secured. There was also a category of journeyman in H.G. Grade-I for which special training for a further period of one year was required as per DM 9/73. Admittedly, when the training of respondents belonging to 58th, 59th, 60th and 61st batches were in progress, DM 6/85 was revoked by Dockyard Temporary Memo (DTM) 4 of 97. It was further revised by DTM 35/97 dated 17th March, 1997 and finally by another DTM 117/99 issued on 21-9-1999. By these three DTMs, parameters for the purpose of fixation of merits were changed. The provision for giving appointment in highly skilled grade was abolished as well as category of journeyman also came to be abolished. According to the respondents, this was detrimental to their interest. Therefore, they challenged the revocation of DM 6/85 with retrospective effect. In second set of original applications, it was contended by the respondents/original applicants that the procedure of giving marks out of 10 by the officer-in-charge on the basis of overall performance was arbitrary and was also not properly followed. They challenged the assessment made by the officer-in-charge and allotment of marks out of 10 marks because according to them, this had adversely affected their prospects of getting jobs, pay and also future prospective. 3. It was also contended that DM 6/85 was issued on approval of the Head Quarter’s office while the subsequent DTMs were issued without any such approval and, therefore, they had no sanction of law. 3. It was also contended that DM 6/85 was issued on approval of the Head Quarter’s office while the subsequent DTMs were issued without any such approval and, therefore, they had no sanction of law. It was contended that in view of the terms of the contract entered into at the time of the respondents’ admission as apprentices, doctrine of promissory estoppel and doctrine of legitimate expectation operate against the petitioner and lastly, it is contended that once, the selection process has started, the criteria can not be altered by the authorities in the middle or after the process of selection. 4. The writ petitioners, who were original respondents, raised several defences in the applications filed by the respondents. According to them in view of provisions of Section 20 of the Apprentices Act, in respect of any dispute between the employer and apprentices, dispute has to be referred to the advisor for decision and that decision is appellable. Secondly, the respondents had not exhausted alternative remedy of making representation. Jurisdiction of the C.A.T. was also challenged on the ground that the apprentice is not an employee and the conditions of the contract in apprenticeship agreement can not be enforced before the Court. It is further contended that DM and DTMs both are administrative instructions and are valid in law. The petitioners had every right to alter the procedure as well as the gradation in the larger interest of the requirement of navy and, therefore, DM 6/85 was superseded by the later DTMs. In respect of grant of 10% marks on the basis of conduct and performance of a 5. After hearing the parties, the C.A.T. rejected all the contentions of the present petitioners in respect of first set of applications and partly allowed the said applications setting aside Clause 9(a) in DTM 117/97 and the petitioners were directed to reconsider grading given to the respondents as per DM 6/85 having apprentice, it is contended that evaluation is at the discretion of the Admiral Superintendent, who has judiciously exercised that discretion. regard to the marks secured in final examination of apprenticeship and accordingly, re-allocate them from the date of appointment as per grading as well as increments, with all consequential benefits. In respect of second set of original applications, the C.A.T. did not find any fault in grading system as to the award of 10% marks at the discretion of officer-in-charge. regard to the marks secured in final examination of apprenticeship and accordingly, re-allocate them from the date of appointment as per grading as well as increments, with all consequential benefits. In respect of second set of original applications, the C.A.T. did not find any fault in grading system as to the award of 10% marks at the discretion of officer-in-charge. However, the C.A.T. found that the concerned officer-in-charge had not considered relevant requisite certificates in various fields and, therefore, officer-in-charge was directed to review the marks awarded to the said applicants as to the conduct and reconsider allocation of marks as per the various disciplines and possession of certificates by the applicants and their performance. The C.A.T. also directed that in the event their marks were enhanced, they will be suitably employed to the grade with all consequential benefits. All this exercise was to be completed within six months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. These orders passed by the C.A.T. in two sets of original applications have been challenged before this Court. As noted earlier, the first four writ petitions are against the judgment and order in respect of first set of original applications and remaining five writ petitions are in respect of the order passed in second set of original applications. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the Parties. The learned counsel have taken us through the impugned judgment, several documents and particularly, the impugned DTMs and DM 6/85. At the outset, it may be stated that the C.A.T. rejected the preliminary objections to the tenability of the original applications. The C.A.T. noted that applicants had approached the petitioners with their representations and their representations were rejected by passing certain orders and as representation had been rejected, they could approach the administrative tribunal and the objection to the tenability of such original applications could not be taken under Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunal Act. It was also observed by the C.A.T. that the dispute is not pertaining to agreement of apprenticeship but the terms of the contract, which pertain to the appointment process, which carries an incumbent to the stage of being placed in select list and it should be treated as a matter concerning recruitment including method providing indu- ction of a person in public service. For this purpose, the learned Administrative Tribunal relied upon wherein the Supreme Court observed that recruitment is a process of enlisting a man including providing for inducting a person in public service and appointment. It was noted that the DM and DTMs provided for grading applicants Highly Skilled or Skilled grades with consequent benefit of increment, which is a process preceding appointment after completion of apprentice training and a part of the recruitment process and can be equated with the selection process carried before the enlistment of an incumbent in Government service. It was noted that as the process of gradation is continuing process leading to induction in the Government process, it is to be treated as pre-recruitment process and a matter concerning recruitment. As the respondents were appointed to civil posts as a result of the recruitment, the matters pertaining to recruitment are within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal. With these observations, preliminary objections relating to jurisdiction came to be rejected. 7. Admittedly after selection for being appointed as an apprentice, the respondents were required to enter into contract with the petitioners and the contracts were actually signed by them. When the contracts were signed by members of 58, 59 and 60th batches, the DM 6/85 was in force and the instructions contended therein were applicable. Clauses ’d’ and ’e’ in paragraph 15 of the contract of apprenticeship, which reads as follows are relevant: **d) It shall not be obligatory on the part of employer to offer any employment to the passed out trade apprentice on completion of period of Apprenticeship Training in his establishment nor shall it be obligatory on the part of Apprentice to accept an employment under the employer. **e) The employer shall after successful completion of Apprenticeship Training offer suitable appointment in any Naval Repair Organization in India a tradesman Grade I or Grade II depending on the merit of the apprentices passing out in the final examination on the completion of the Apprenticeship and apprentice shall serve the employer in that capacity for 5 years on the pay scales and allowances admissible from time to time in the grade to which he is appointed. 8. 8. The learned counsel Mr.Chavan for the petitioners vehemently contented that as per Clause ’d’, it was not obligatory on the part of the employer to offer any employment to the apprentice even after completion of period of apprenticeship training and it was also not obligatory on the part of apprentice to accept the employment under the employer. However, Mr.Singh the learned senior counsel for the respondents, vehemently contended that even though under clause ’d’, it wasnot obligatory either for the employer to offer an employment or for the apprentice to accept the employment under the employer, the clause ’e’ specifically provided that after successful completion of apprenticeship training, the employer shall offer suitable employment as Highly skilled or skilled grade 1 or grade 2 depending upon the merits of apprentice passing out in final examination on completion of apprenticeship and the apprentice shall serve the employer in that capacity for five years on the pay-scales and allowance admissible from time to time in the grade to which he is appointed. Admittedly, some of the apprentices would get training in such trades that they could not get any employment except with Navy or the Dock Yard and some would get training in the trades for which they could get employment outside also. If training is given in the second category, Clause (d) would be clearly applicable and there would be no obligation on the part of employer to offer the employment or on the part of the apprentice to accept the employment. In case of training in trades for which there is no scope for employment outside, Clause (d) would be inapplicable and clause (e) would make mandatory provision that on successful completion of apprenticeship training, suitable appointment in the Naval Repair Organisation would be offered to such candidate. At the same time, if Clauses (d) and (e) are carefully read together, it must also be held that even if a candidate, who can be covered under Clause (d) and it is not obligatory on the part of employer to offer employment but if the employer offered employment on successful completion of training, the offer shall be for suitable appointment, naturally depending on the merits of the concerned candidate. In the present case, admittedly, the employment has been offered and the respondents have been employed, therefore, clause ’d’ is not relevant. In the present case, admittedly, the employment has been offered and the respondents have been employed, therefore, clause ’d’ is not relevant. Only question is whether in view of the clause ’e’ , the petitioners were required to offer suitable employment in grade I or grade II depending upon the merits of the apprentices. It is material to note that clause ’d’ and ’e’ both were deleted from the format of the contract by the latter DTMS but these clauses were in contract when 58, 59 and 60th batches had entered into contract. Admittedly, at that time DM 6/85 was in force and the suitable employment referred to in Clause (e) would naturally mean suitable employments and grades as prescribed in DM 6/85. Therefore, it may be held that when the respondents were required to sign apprenticeship contracts, they were promised or assured the appointments and the grades as prescribed in DM 6/85 according to their merits. 8. DTM 4/97 was issued by the Admiral Superintendent on 16th January, 1997. DTM 35/97 was issued on 17th March, 97 and DTM 117/99 was issued on 21-9-1999. All these DTMs were issued by the Admiral Superintendent. Admittedly, as per Clause 9 of DTM 117/99, the new grading system given in paragraph 6 was made applicable for all the apprentices of 58th to 62nd batches. 58th to 62nd batches had joined as apprentices prior to issuance of DTM 117/99 on 21st September, 1999. It is material to note that the apprentices of all these batches having two years training course had completed the training prior to DTM 117/99 was issued and even the members of 60th batch having three years course had passed out after completing the training on 31st March, 1999. The members of 61st batch with three years training course completed training and passed out on 30th September, 1999 and even members of 62nd batch with three years course passed out after completing their training on 31st March, 2000. Members of these two batches with three years course were practically in the last semester. As the procedure and basis of gradation was substantially changed by DTM 117/99, it adversely affected large number of apprentices from 58th to 62nd batches. Some examples may be given. As per DM 6/85, there were two grades, namely, Highly skilled grade II and skilled grade. As the procedure and basis of gradation was substantially changed by DTM 117/99, it adversely affected large number of apprentices from 58th to 62nd batches. Some examples may be given. As per DM 6/85, there were two grades, namely, Highly skilled grade II and skilled grade. The candidates, who secured 62-70% and above in the first attempt would be in highly skilled would be entitled to be placed in highly skilled grade II and depending upon marks, the candidates securing 65% and above would be entitled to two or one increment in that grade. On the other hand, the candidates securing marks from 45% to 59% would be entitled to be placed in skilled grade and those, who secure 55% to 59% would be entitled to two increments in that grade and those, who secure 50 to 54% would be entitled to one increment in that grade. However, by DTM 4/97, Highly Skilled grade was removed and only skilled grade was maintained and in that grade candidates would be entitled to one or two increments depending on the marks secured by them. Some modifications were made in that DTM by the subsequent DTM 35/97 whereby marks required for the candidates to get one or two increments in the skilled grade were slightly lowered. By DTM 117/99, the DM 6/85 was superseded with retrospective effect. Cumulative effect of DTM 4-97, 35-97 and 117-99 was that the procedure of assessment of the merit for the purpose of grant of grades and the appointments as well as the scales were changed with retrospective effect to the detriment of the apprentices, who had joined even prior to these three DTMs came into force. As a result of this, it was clear that they would not be entitled to Highly Skilled grade. The grading system was also changed and this was certainly detrimental and prejudicial to their interest. 9. Administrative Tribunal referred to the observations made by the Supreme Court in 360 and v.v.v. Union of India & Ors.Union of India & Ors.Union of India & Ors. 1999 SCC (L & S) 36.1999 SCC (L & S) 36.1999 SCC (L & S) 36. 9. Administrative Tribunal referred to the observations made by the Supreme Court in 360 and v.v.v. Union of India & Ors.Union of India & Ors.Union of India & Ors. 1999 SCC (L & S) 36.1999 SCC (L & S) 36.1999 SCC (L & S) 36. In the Mandve’s case, Their Lordships observed as follows: "It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the game of the rules meaning thereby, that the criteria for selection cannot be altered by the authorities concerned in the middle or after the process of selection has commenced. Therefore, the decision of the High Court to the extent it pronounced upon the invalidity of the circular orders dated 24.6.1996, does not merit acceptance in our hand and the same are set aside." In the case of Rath, Their Lordships observed as follows: "6. When the selection process has actually commenced and the last date for inviting applications is over, any subsequent change in the requirements regarding Qualifications by the University Grants Commission will not affect the process of selection which has already commence. Otherwise it would involve issuing a fresh advertisement with the new qualifications." From these authorities, it is clear that the criteria of the selection can not be altered in the middle or after process of selection has commenced. In the present case, the selection process was determined and certain scales and grades were prescribed by DM 6/85. If they are read with clause ’e’ in paragraph 15 of the contract signed by the apprentices, it is clear that apprentices while entering into that contract were assured about the particular process of selection and allotment of particular grades on the basis of their merits in performance. However, by the subsequent DTMs, not only the whole procedure was changed but the grades and scales were also modified to the detriment of those apprentices. It appears that due to this promise or assurance incorporated in the form of DM 6/85 read with terms of the contract, the concerned apprentices had legitimate expectation to be awarded particular grades and increments based on their performance as per prevailing selection process. The petitioner could not amend or change the said procedure to the detriment of the concerned apprentices. 10. The petitioner could not amend or change the said procedure to the detriment of the concerned apprentices. 10. It is also material to note that while DM 6/85 was issued with approval of Head Quarters office and, therefore, even though it contains administrative instructions, it has certain sanctity. It could not be modified by issuing temporary memo without approval of Head Quarter’s office. Therefore, it can be said that Admiral Superintendent could not supersede DM 6/85, which was issued with approval of the Head Quarter’s office, by any order or instructions, which did not have such approval from the Head Quarter’s office. In view of this, it may be held that the supersession of DM 6 of 85 wasnot valid, atleast in respect of apprentices, who had entered into apprenticeship contract when DM 6/85 was in force. Therefore, even if subsequent DTMs could be valid in respect of persons joining as apprentices after issuance of these DTMs, such DTM couldnot be given retrospective effect in respect of apprentices, who had already joined when DM 6/85 was in force. 11. In respect of second set of original applications, the Administrative Tribunal upheld the procedure in respect of awarding 10% marks at the discretion of the officer-in-charge on the basis of various disciplines and certificates of the applicants and their performance. However, the Administrative Tribunal found that marks awarded and certificate issued to the applicants in various disciplines showed contradictions and discrepancies and lacked transparency in the action of the concerned officer. It appears that relevant documents and certificates were not taken into consideration properly while awarding marks out of the said 10% marks. In view of this, the Administrative Tribunal directed the concerned authorities to review the marks awarded to the applicants and to reconsider their allocations in view of various disciplines and possession of certificates by them. We do not find any fault in this direction. 12. The learned Administrative Tribunal in its well written judgment has considered every aspect of the matter and taking overall view of the matter, we find no infirmity or illegality in the impugned judgment in respect of both the sets of original applications. Therefore, we see no merit in the present writ petitions and see no justification to interfere in the impugned order. 13. In the result, Writ Petitions stand dismissed.