JUDGMENT (Rajiv Sharma, J.) - Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of this appeal are that the petitioner was elected as a Chairman to the Panchayat Samiti, Nahan. Respondent No. 3 received on 15th January, 2008, a copy of notice whereby a resolution of no-confidence was to be moved against the Chairman as well as Vice Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti, Nahan. In sequel to the notice dated 15th January, 2008 respondent No. 3 issued a notice on 16th January, 2008 whereby meeting of Panchayat Samiti was called on 23rd January, 2008 to consider the motion of no-confidence against the Chairman and Vice Chairman. It appears from the record that on the basis of report from the Station House Officer, Nahan on 21st January, 2008, respondent No. 3 cancelled the proposed meeting of 23rd January, 2008 on 22nd January, 2008. He sent a communication to the Director, Panchayati Raj on 22nd January, 2008 seeking guidelines from him in view of sub-rule (1) of rule 131 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997. The Director informed respondent No. 3 on 23rd January, 2008 that no-confidence motion against Chairman and Vice Chairman was required to be convened within 15 days and in the present case on or before 30th January, 2008 so that meeting could be convened on 7 days notice as per Rule 131 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997. The text of letter dated 23rd January, 2008 reads thus : “I am directed to refer to your letter No. PCN-SMR-(15)12/08-8813 dated 22nd January, 2008 and to say that under the provisions of rule 129 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997 on receipt of notice of intention to move no confidence motion against the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti under rule 128, the District Panchayat Officer shall convene a meeting with a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of such notice. Sub-rule (1) of rule 131 of the rules ibid provides that the District Panchayat Officer shall issue, not less than seven days before the appointed date of meeting, a notice of such meeting and of the date and time appointed therefore to every elected member of the Panchayat Samiti (including the Chairman and Vice Chairman). The notice shall be in Form 33 and shall be served on the members of the Panchayat Samiti. The notice shall be in Form 33 and shall be served on the members of the Panchayat Samiti. In view of the above provisions, the meeting for the purpose of consideration of no confidence motion against Chairman and Vice Chairman of Panchayat Samiti is required to convene within 15 days and in the instant case on or before 30th January, 2008. You are, therefore, advised to issue fresh notice latest by 23rd January, 2008 so that the meeting could be convened on 30th January, 2008 for meeting the condition of seven days notice as per the requirement of Rule 131 of the rule ibid.” 2. Respondent No. 3 issued a fresh notice on 23.1.2008 for convening the meeting on 30th January, 2008 under rule 131 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997. The petitioner received the copy of this notice on 26th January, 2008. He approached this Court by way of present petition. The Court passed the following order on 28th January, 2008 : “Issue notice of the respondents, which is accepted by Mr. P.M. Negi, Dy. Advocate General. Let a short reply be filed on or before the next date. Record be also produced. List on 15th February, 2008. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that his client shall not discharge any functions as Chairman/President/ Panchayat Samiti, Nahan, till the next date of hearing. He further submits that notice dated 23.1.200 (Annexure P-70 was served upon him on 26th January, 2008 for a meeting to be convened on 30th January, 2008. According to him, statutory period of 7 days of prior notice, as stipulated under Rule 131 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997 has not been compiled with. In the meanwhile, no meeting of Panchayat Samiti, Nahan, in terms of notice dated 23rd January, 2008 shall be held on 30th January, 2008.” 3. The order dated 28th January, 2008 was modified by the Court on 15th February, 2008, which reads thus :- “Reply filed. Rejoinder be filed within 15 days. List thereafter. In modification of earlier order, it is clarified that it is open for the authorities including respondent No. 3 to issue a fresh notice in accordance with law for convening the meeting, for the purpose which is the subject matter of the writ petition.” 4. Rejoinder be filed within 15 days. List thereafter. In modification of earlier order, it is clarified that it is open for the authorities including respondent No. 3 to issue a fresh notice in accordance with law for convening the meeting, for the purpose which is the subject matter of the writ petition.” 4. Respondent No. 3 after the modification of the order by this Court issue fresh notice dated 16.2.2008 for convening a meeting on 25th February, 2008 to consider the no confidence motion. The petitioner received copy of notice on 21st February, 2008. In the meantime, the Court passed the following orders on 22nd February, 2008 in CMP No. 153/2008 : “CMP No. 153/2008 Heard. No case is made out for interim order. Put up before the court after Winter Vacation. The meeting may be held as scheduled which shall be subjected to the writ petition. 5. In sequel to notice dated 16th February, 2008, the meeting was convened on 25th February, 2008. The no-confidence motion was moved and passed, which led to the issuance of office order dated 25th February, 2008. Thereafter fresh elections were held for the post of Chairman and Vice Chairman on 11th March, 2008. The petitioner sought amendment of the writ petition for impleading respondents No. 4 and 5. The application was allowed. The petitioner was permitted to file amended writ petition. The respondents filed replies to the amended writ petition. 6. Mr. Ajay Sharma, Advocate has strenuously argued that the petitioner was not served with a seven days notice as stipulated under sub-rule 1) of Rule 131 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997. His precise contention is that the notice was issued under rule 131(1) of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997 on 16th February, 2008 and he has received the copy of the same on 21st February, 2008 and the meeting was conceived on 25th February, 2008. His further contention is that respondent No. 3 has abdicated his statutory function by seeking guidelines/clarification from Director, Panchayati Raj i.e. respondent No. 2 on 22nd January, 2008. He further contended that the meeting to be convened for 23rd January, 2008 could not be deferred merely on the basis of FIR registered at Police Station, Nahan. He has strongly relied upon Annexure P-1 whereby Smt. Sunita Devi has denied that she was illegally confined by the petitioner. He further contended that the meeting to be convened for 23rd January, 2008 could not be deferred merely on the basis of FIR registered at Police Station, Nahan. He has strongly relied upon Annexure P-1 whereby Smt. Sunita Devi has denied that she was illegally confined by the petitioner. He lastly contended that once the meeting was to be convened and if could not be convened for whatsoever reason, the motion deemed to have been defeated. 7. Mr. Rajinder Dogra, Additional Advocate General has argued that the requirement of seven days notice is directory and not mandatory. He also contended that once respondent No. 3 has received the communication from the office of Sub Divisional Magistrate about the registration of FIR, he was bound to postpone the meeting on 22nd January, 2008. He further contended that respondent No. 3 had merely sought clarification from respondent No. 1 and Annexure P-5 dated 23rd January, 2008 cannot be treated as a dictation by the higher authorities the manner in which the subordinate has to discharge his duties. 8. Mr. V.D. Khidta, Advocate has adopted the arguments of the learned Additional Advocate General and in addition thereto he has relied upon the affidavit filed by Smt. Sunita Devi dated 17th July, 2008. 9. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully. 10. It will be pertinent to take note of Rules 128, 129, 130, 131 and 132 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997. These rules read thus “128. No confidence motion against Chairman and Vice Chairman of Panchayat Samiti and Zila Parishad (Section 129(2)]. - A notice of intention to move an resolution requiring the Chairman or Vice Chairman or both, of Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad as the case may be, to vacate offices shall be given in Form-32. These rules read thus “128. No confidence motion against Chairman and Vice Chairman of Panchayat Samiti and Zila Parishad (Section 129(2)]. - A notice of intention to move an resolution requiring the Chairman or Vice Chairman or both, of Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad as the case may be, to vacate offices shall be given in Form-32. Such notice shall be signed by not less than majority of its total elected members having right to vote of the Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, as the case may be, and shall be addressed to :- (a) the Chairman, if the resolution is to be moved against the Vice Chairman; (b) the Vice Chairman, if the resolution is to be moved against the Chairman, and (c) the District Panchayat Officer, if the resolution it to be moved against both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of a Panchayat Samiti and to the Deputy Commissioner in case of both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Zila Parishad. 129. Meeting to be convened with 15 days. - On receipt of notice under rule 128, the Chairman, Vice Chairman, the District Panchayat Officer or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, to whom the notice has been addressed, shall convene a meeting with a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice. 130. Failure to convene meeting. - If on receipt of the notice the Chairman or Vice Chairman as the case may be, fails to call a meeting within the period specified in rule 129, all or any of members of the Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, as the case may be, who had given notice of the intention to move a resolution under rule 128 may forward to the District Panchayat Officer or Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, a copy of the notice together with a copy of motion requesting him to convene a meeting of the Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, and the District Panchayat Officer the Zila Parishad, and the District Panchayat Officer or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, shall, within 15 days of the receipt of such request, convene a meeting of the Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, as the case may be, for the consideration of the motion at such date and time as may be appointed by him. 131. Notice of meeting. 131. Notice of meeting. - (1) The Chairman or Vice Chairman or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, shall issue, not less than seven days before the appointed date of meeting, a notice of such meeting and of the date and time appointed therefore, to every elected member of the Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad (including the Chairman and the Vice Chairman). The notice shall be in Form 33 and shall be served on the members of the Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, as the case may be, in the manner given below :- (a) by giving or tendering such notice to the elected member; (b) by leaving such notice at his last known place of residence or business or by giving or tendering the same to some adult member or servant of his family, if any member is not found; (c) if any member does not reside in the Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad area and his address elsewhere is known to the Chairman or Vice Chairman or the District Panchayat Officer or the Deputy Commissioner, by sending the same to him by registered post; (d) if service is not practicable through any of the means specified in clauses (a) and (c) by affixing the same at some conspicuous part of the member’s place of residence or business. (2) The copy of the notice of meeting shall be sent to the Deputy Commissioner or Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) for making arrangement to maintain law and order. 132. Defeat motion. - If within two hours after the time appointed for the meeting, the quorum is not present, the meeting shall stand dissolved and motion shall be deemed to have been defeated.” 11. The sequence of events as noticed above by this Court gathered from the pleadings of the parties is that respondent No. 3 has received a notice of no confidence motion to be moved against the petitioner on 15th January, 2008. Respondent No. 3 issued notice on 16th January, 2008 for convening the meeting on 23rd January, 2008. He received a communication from the office of Sub Divisional Magistrate, Nahan about the registration of FIR by the husband of Smt. Sunita Devi. He adjourned the meeting on 22nd January, 2008 vide Annexure P-3. He sought guidance from respondent No. 2 vide letter dated 22nd January, 2008. Respondent no. He received a communication from the office of Sub Divisional Magistrate, Nahan about the registration of FIR by the husband of Smt. Sunita Devi. He adjourned the meeting on 22nd January, 2008 vide Annexure P-3. He sought guidance from respondent No. 2 vide letter dated 22nd January, 2008. Respondent no. 2 called upon respondent No. 3 on 23rd January, 2008 to issue fresh notice of the meeting for 30th January, 2008. The notice was issued on 23rd January, 2008, which was received by the petitioner on 26th January, 2008. In view of the interim order passed by this court on 28th January, 2008, the meeting dated 30.1.2008 could not be convened. The order dated 28.1.2008 was modified by this Court on 15th February, 2008. A fresh notice was issued by respondent No. 3 on 16th February, 2008 whereby the meeting was convened for 25th February, 2008. The notice has been received by the petitioner on 21st February, 2008. The motion was carried on 25th February, 2008 which led to the ouster of the petitioner from the post of Chairman and new elections were held on 11th March, 2008 whereby respondents No. 4 and 5 were elected as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti, Nahan. 12. Mr. Ajay Sharma has also argued during the course of hearing that once the meeting stood deferred, in view of the language employed in rule 132 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997, the motion shall be deemed to be defeated. In the present case, no meeting was convened on 23rd January, 2008 in view of order dated 22nd January, 2008. The meeting was adjourned for 30th January, 2008, however, the same could not be convened after the interim orders passed by this Court. The only meeting which has taken place as per the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997 was of 25th February, 2005. 13. The court will concentrate only whether the meeting convened on 25th February, 2008 was in conformity with sub-rule (1) of Rule 131 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997 or not ? The only meeting which has taken place as per the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997 was of 25th February, 2005. 13. The court will concentrate only whether the meeting convened on 25th February, 2008 was in conformity with sub-rule (1) of Rule 131 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997 or not ? It is evident from the language employed in sub-rule 1 or Rule 131 that the Chairman or Vice Chairman or the District Panchayat Officer or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, shall issue, not less than seven days before the appointed date of meeting, a notice of such meeting and of the date and time appointed therefore, to ever elected member of the Panchayat Samiti. The notice is required to be in form 33. The mode of serving the notice has also been provided under sub-rule (1) of rule 131. Mr. Ajay Sharma has strenuously argued that expression ‘not less than’ seven days should be clear seven days before the appointed date of meeting. He submitted that the fresh notice was issued on 16th February, 2008 and he has received the copy of the notice on 21st February, 2008 and the meeting was held on 25th February, 2008. The learned Additional Advocate General and Mr. V.D. Khidta have argued that requirement of serve days notice is directory and the petitioner knew that the meeting was to be convened for 25th February, 2008. Mr. Sharma has relied upon Damineni Sangayya and another v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1962 AP 462 to strengthen his argument that ‘not less than seven days’ before the appointed date of meeting shall be clear seven days. He also argued that in expression ‘not less than seven days’, there are terminal points and the period specified must be outside those two terminal points. The learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court has interpreted the expression ‘not less than six weeks’ as under : “It now falls to consider whether under the terms of Section 57(2) of the Act, there should be six clear weeks i.e. 42 days, exclusive of the date on which the applications for permits were made and the date on which it is desired that they should take effect. In Maxwell on the interpretation of statutes (10th Edition page 351) it is stated : “Again, when so may `clear days’ or so many days `at least’ are given to do an act, or `not less than’ so many days are to intervene, both the terminal days are excluded from the computation.” The above principle is sustained by a long line of authority. The learned Advocate General, however suggests that this is by no means an unalterable rule, but depends upon the independent of the enactment and the purpose for which the time-lag between the two events is prescribed. He relied upon a few observations of Chitty J., in Re. Raiwaly Sleepers Supply Co. 1885(29) Ch.D. 204. In that case, the words ‘not less than 14 days’ occurring in Section 51 of the English Companies Act, 1862, before the meeting passing a special resolution and the meeting confirming it had to be construed. Chitty, J., held that the words ‘not less than 14 days’ mean that there should be an interval of 14 clear days exclusive of the respective days of the meetings. It is true that the learned Judge observed that the object of having 14 clear days was to assist the share-holders. But I cannot agree that the supposed intention of the Legislature was the governing factor in the decision. Nor can I assent to the contention that the words ‘not less than six weeks’ must be construed in the light of the requirement of Section 57(3) and when so constructed, it may not be necessary to have six clear weeks. When expressions ‘not less than so many days’ occur in enactments, it seems to me that there are two terminal points, and the period specified must be outside those two terminal points. The following passage in the judgment of Stone, C.J., in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ekbal and Co., AIR 1945 Bom 316 is well worth citation : “Time can be infinitely divided. There is no fraction of a second which is so short in duration that it cannot be divided into something smaller. In my judgment expressions `within 30 days’ and `not less than 30 days’ are two quite different things. `Within 30 days’ is within two points of time, one at which the period begins and the other at which it expires. In my judgment expressions `within 30 days’ and `not less than 30 days’ are two quite different things. `Within 30 days’ is within two points of time, one at which the period begins and the other at which it expires. On the other hand, `not less than 30 days’, is outside these two points of time. There must be an interval of not less than 30 days and that means 30 days clear : see (1855) 29 Ch.D. 204. The period must continue beyond the expiration of the stated time. Whereas `within’ the stated period must mean that it says, something less than the moment of expiration. In my opinion, therefore, the notice is invalid and the question referred to must be answered in the negative. The Commissioner must pay the costs of the reference.” In Sneath v. Valley Gold Ltd., 1893(1) Ch. 477, the expression ‘at least fourteen days before the date’ in connection with the debenture holders’ meeting, was construed as fourteen clear days’ between the issue of the circular calling for the meeting, and the meeting. In Rex v. Turner, 1910(1) KB 346, the same view was taken : in Browne v. Black, 1912(1) KB 316 the Court of Appeal, in construing the scope of the expression ‘one month’ under Section 37 of the Solicitors Act, 1843, construed the expression as ‘one clear calendar month’. In Re Hector Whaling Ltd. 1936(1) Ch. 208 Benent J. held that the words ‘not less than 21 days’ occurring in Section 117 of the Companies Act, 1929, mean ‘21 clear days’ exclusive of the date of service of the notice and exclusive of the date on which the meeting is to be held. In Nagappa Chettiar v. Madras Race Club, 1949(1) Mad LJ 662 : AIR 1951 Mad 831(2) after a review of some of the authorities herein cited, Satyanarayna Rao, J., held that the expression in Section 81(2) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, means and can only mean 21 clear days, that is, exclusive of the date of service and the date of the meeting. In the light of the above authorities, I have no doubt in my mind that the expression ‘not less than six weeks’ occurring in Section 57(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, means six clear weeks, i.e, 42 days, exclusive of the date of the applications and the date in which they are desired to take effect.” 14. A Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jai Bhagwan Sharma and another v. Matu Ram Bhola Ram and others, AIR 1964 Punjab 135 has held that the words ‘not less than ten days’ in rule 3(3) means ten clear days. Their Lordships have held as under :- “Mr. Anand Swarup, the learned Counsel for the appellants, contends that the expression “not less than ten days” in R.3(3) does not mean ten clear days and that on a simple arithmetical calculation 29th July, 1961 was not less than ten days before the first of the dates specified in the election programme i.e. 8th August, 1961. It has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Northern India Caterers Private Ltd. v. State of Punjab, ILR 1963(1) Punj. 761 : AIR 1963 Punj 290 that the notice contemplated under Section 4(2)(b) of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959, wherein it was provided that the notice to show cause against the proposed order on or before a specified date must be for a date “not earlier than ten days from the date of issue thereof” meant a notice of ten clear days. Tek Chand, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, made the following observations :- “The expression `earlier than’ means `before or previous to’. If the words, instead of `not earlier than ten days’, had been `not less than ten days’ then the petitioner’s contention deserved to prevail as that would have meant ten clear days. According to another rule of reckoning, where the time requisite is from a particular date to another date, then the first terminal day is to be excluded from the computation and the last day is to be excluded.” Reference was made to In Re Railway Sleepers Supply Co.,, 1885(29) Ch.D. 204 in which Section 51 of the Companies Act, 1862, provided that interval of not less than fourteen days was to elapse between the meetings passing and confirming a special resolution of a company. This was construed to mean an interval of fourteen clear days exclusive of the respective days of meetings. Similarly in Mc. Queen v. Jackson, 1903(2) KB 163 it was provided by Section 19(2) of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1899, that “in any prosecution under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act the summons shall not be made returnable in less time than fourteen days from the date on which it is served.” It was held that fourteen clear days must elapse between the dates of service and that of return. It is, therefore, quite obvious that in the present case ten clear days had to intervene between the date of publication of the election programme and the first of the dates specified in it, namely, 29th July, 1961 and 8th August, 1961. Admittedly in this view of the matter there was a contravention of the mandatory provisions of the aforesaid rule.” 15. Mr. Sharma also relied upon Pioneer Motors Private Limited v. Municipal Council, Nagercoil, AIR 1967 SC 684 decided on 27.1.1961. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court while interpreting the words ‘not being less than one month’ in the proviso held that clear one month’s notice was necessary to be given i.e. both the first and the last day of the month had to be excluded. Their Lordships have held as under :- “The words “not being less than one month” do imply that clear one month’s notice was necessary to be given, that is, both the first day and the last day of the month had to be excluded. To put it in the language used by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, p. 351 :- “When..........’ not less than” so many days are to intervene, both the terminal days are excluded from the computation.” That does not seem to have been done in the present case. But in order to decide whether this portion of the proviso is a mandatory provision, it is convenient to see the object for which it has been enacted. Under Section 78, the procedure is laid down for the levying of a new tax, which has to be done by a resolution. But in order to decide whether this portion of the proviso is a mandatory provision, it is convenient to see the object for which it has been enacted. Under Section 78, the procedure is laid down for the levying of a new tax, which has to be done by a resolution. But in the proviso, it is stated that before such a resolution can be passed, a notice to that effect has to be published in the official gazette and also in one Malyalam or Tamil newspaper having circulation within the municipality. Then comes the period for inviting objections. The object of notifying in the Gazette and Local Newspaper is both to give notice to the public and particularly to the persons who are likely to be taxed and to invite their objections. For this purpose, the proviso requires a reasonable period of not less than one month to be given. The object of the provision is to give reasonable time and opportunity and it is given as a guidance that reasonable time would be a month. The use of the words “reasonable period” before the words “not being less than one month” is significant. If sufficient time has been given for the invitation of the objections which only just falls short of the period mentioned in the proviso, then it would serve the object of the legislature. The provision in regard to time in the context must be held to be directory and not mandatory.” 16. However, their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court after taking into consideration the use of the words ‘reasonable period’ before the words ‘not less than one month’ have termed it as directory. In the present case the pre-fix ‘reasonable period’ has not been used. Thus, ‘not less than seven days’ will mean clear seven days. 17. This expression ‘not less than 30 days’ has fallen for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jai Charan Lal Anal v. The State of U.P. and others, AIR 1968 SC 5. Their Lordships have held that the expression ‘earlier than 30 days’ in sub-section (3) is to be equated to the expression “not less than thirty days”. 17. This expression ‘not less than 30 days’ has fallen for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jai Charan Lal Anal v. The State of U.P. and others, AIR 1968 SC 5. Their Lordships have held that the expression ‘earlier than 30 days’ in sub-section (3) is to be equated to the expression “not less than thirty days”. Their Lordships have further held that if the expression were to be ‘not less than so many days’ both the terminal days may have to be excluded and the number of days mentioned must be clear days but the force of the words ‘not earlier than thirty days’ is different. Their Lordships have held as under :- “The next contention is that the District Magistrate had to convene the meeting for the consideration of the motion on a date which was not earlier than thirty days from the date on which the notice under sub-section (2) was delivered to him. As the notice was delivered to the District Magistrate on October 26, the learned Counsel contends that the date fixed for the meeting, namely, November 25 was earlier than thirty days because according to him the 30th day should be excluded in addition to the date on which the notice was handed. In other words, the learned Counsel wishes to exclude both the terminal days, i.e., October 26 and November 25 and wants to count thirty clear days in between. He contends that the expression `not earlier than thirty days’ is equal to the expression `not less than thirty days’ and, therefore, thirty clear days must intervene between the two terminal days. In support of his contention the learned Counsel relies upon a ruling reported in Smt. Haradevi v. State of Andhra, AIR 1957 Andh Pra 229, in which the expression `not earlier than three days’ was equated to the expression `not less than three days, that is to say, three clear days. He also relies upon certain other rulings which deal with the expression `not less than so many days’. In our judgment the expression `not earlier than thirty day’s is not to be equated to the expression `not less than thirty days’. He also relies upon certain other rulings which deal with the expression `not less than so many days’. In our judgment the expression `not earlier than thirty day’s is not to be equated to the expression `not less than thirty days’. It is no doubt true that where the expression is `not less than so many days’ both the terminal days have to be excluded and the number of days mentioned must be clear days but the force of the words `not earlier than thirty days’ is not the same. `Not earlier than thirty days’ means that it should not be the 29th day, but there is nothing to show that the language excludes the 30th day from computation. In other words’, although October 26 had to be excluded the date on which the meeting was to be called need not be excluded the date on which the meeting was to be called need not be excluded provided by doing so one did not go in breach of the expression not earlier than thirty days’. The 25th of November was the 30th day counting from October 26 leaving out the initial day and, therefore, it cannot be described as earlier than thirty days. In other words, it was not earlier than thirty days from the date on which the notice under sub-section (2) was delivered to the District Magistrate. This reading is also borne out by the other expression “not later than thirty-five days”: which is used in the section. In this court, Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh, AIR 1957 SC 271, the expression `not later than 14 days’ as used in R. 119 under the Representation of the People Act was held to mean the same thing as “within a period of fourteen days”. In that expression the number of days, it was held, should not exceed the number fourteen. In the sub-section we are dealing with the number of days should not exceeded thirty five days. On a parity of reasoning not earlier than thirty days would include the 30th day but not the 29th day because 29th day must be regarded as earlier than thirty days. If the provision were “not earlier than thirty days and not later than thirty days” it is obvious that only the 30th day could be meant. On a parity of reasoning not earlier than thirty days would include the 30th day but not the 29th day because 29th day must be regarded as earlier than thirty days. If the provision were “not earlier than thirty days and not later than thirty days” it is obvious that only the 30th day could be meant. This proves that the fixing of the date of the meeting was, therefore, in accordance with law and we respectfully disapprove of the view taken in the Andhra Pradesh case.” 18. The expression ‘not less than’ has been explained in Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edition as under :- “Not Less. - (1) Where time is to be computed as “not less” than a given number of days, that means clear days (Chambers v. Smith, 13 L.J. Ex. 25; Re Railway Sleepers Co., 29 Ch. D. 204; but see Re Miller’s Dale Co.’ 31 Ch. D. 211). Re Railway Sleepers Co. was followed in McQueen v. Jackson, 1903(2) K.B. 163; see further WITHIN : also R. v. Turner, 1910(1) K.B. 346, cited HABITUAL. See also Associated Dominions Assurance Society Property Ltd. v. Balmford, 1950 A.L.R. 672; Bear v. Official Receiver, 65 C.L.R. 307.” 19. The expression ‘not less’ has been explained in Mitra’s Legal and Commercial Dictionary, Fifth Edition as under :- “Not less. The expression indicates a minimum. The expression `not less’ than given number of days means clear days. Re, Railway Sleepers Co. 54 LJ Ch. 720.” 20. Mr. Ajay Sharma has also cited K. Narasimhiah v. H.C. Singri Gowda and others, AIR 1966 SC 330. It is not clear whether in Mysore Town Municipal Act, 1951, Section 27(3) stipulated ‘three days notice’ or ‘not less than three days’ notice to the Councillors. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court while holding three days clear notice to the Councillors have also relied upon Section 36 of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951. The learned Counsel for the parties have not brought to the notice of the Court that provision like Section 36 of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951 exists in the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) rules, 1997 framed thereunder. 21. The learned Counsel for the parties have not brought to the notice of the Court that provision like Section 36 of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951 exists in the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) rules, 1997 framed thereunder. 21. In the present case the expression ‘not less than seven days’ employed in sub-rule (1) of Rule 131 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997 means “clear seven days” as per the definitive laid down by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Andhra Pradesh High Court and Punjab and Haryana High Court, as noticed above. The petitioner was served with a notice dated 16th February, 2008 on 21st February, 2008 and the meeting was convened on 25th February, 2008. Thus, the petitioner was not served with seven days cellar notice as per phraseology employed in sub-rule (1) or rule 131 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997. 22. Consequently, it is held that the meeting convened on 25th February, in the absence of seven days clear notice was illegal and the election held on 25th February, 2008 was not valid. The outcome of meeting dated 25th February, 2008 whereby respondents No. 4 and 5 have been elected as Chairman and Vice Chairman is also set aside. 23. The matter is also required to be considered from another perspective. The meeting was to be convened initially for 23rd January, 2008. The meeting was adjourned by respondent No. 3 on 22nd January, 2008 after the receipt of the communication from the office of the Sub Divisional Magistrate to the effect that the FIR has been registered against the petitioner. Respondent No. 3 was required to take independent decision on 22nd January, 2008 as per the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997. He sought a guidance/clarification as per the contents of the reply filed by respondents No. 1 to 3 from respondent No. 2. The Court is of the considered opinion that it was not open to respondent No. 3 to seek guidance/clarification from respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 3 had to discharge the statutory duties independently and he could not permit himself to be guided or instructed by respondent No. 2. In other words, he could not abdicate his statutory duties and could not permit himself to be dictated by respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 3 had to discharge the statutory duties independently and he could not permit himself to be guided or instructed by respondent No. 2. In other words, he could not abdicate his statutory duties and could not permit himself to be dictated by respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 3 has proclaimed in the reply that he was discharging quasi-judicial duties and respondent No. 2 in view to help him issued the clarification Annexure P-5 and the clarification could not be constructed as interference with the quasi-judicial function of respondent No. 3. It will be apt to reproduce the following portion of the reply filed by respondents No. 1 to 3 the manner in which respondent No. 3 had sought the clarification from respondent No. 3, which reads thus :- “That in reply to the contents of this it is submitted that as the scheduled meeting of the Panchayat Samiti, Nahan was cancelled for the aforesaid reasons, the respondent No. 3 had requested the respondent No. 2 vide his office letter No. PCN-SMR-(12) 12/08/8813 (Annexure P-4) to clarify on the Rule 129 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997. The respondent No. 2 in view to help respondent No. 3, issued the clarification (Annexure P-5). As this instruction was issued only on the request to respondent No. 3, the issue of the clarification cannot be construed to be interference in the quasi-judicial function of respondent No. 3. It had rather helped the respondent No. 2 to observe the provisions laid down by the Act and Rule in the right form. As the clarification was advisory (as evident from the perusal of Annexure P-5) and was in no form a directive, therefore, the allegation of the interference in the functions of respondent No. 3 are unfounded, baseless and false and therefore, denied. In this behalf it is submitted that the action of the respondent no. 3 was absolutely in order after receipt of the registration of FIR in respect of legal confinement of one of the member of Samiti accordingly, meeting dated 23.1.2008 was in fact, not cancelled but simply postponed. On receipt of clear cut clarification from the Directorate, the meeting as required was fixed for 30.1.2008 and intimation thereof, was conveyed to all the members vide notice dated 23.1.2008. Hence, there is no irregularities or violation of the provisions of the Act in any manner.” 24. On receipt of clear cut clarification from the Directorate, the meeting as required was fixed for 30.1.2008 and intimation thereof, was conveyed to all the members vide notice dated 23.1.2008. Hence, there is no irregularities or violation of the provisions of the Act in any manner.” 24. He bare perusal of Rules 129 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997 reveals that on receipts of notice under rule 128, the Chairman or Vice Chairman or the District Panchayat Officer or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, to whom the notice has been addressed, shall convene a meeting within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice. Similarly as per rule 131, the Chairman or Vice Chairman or the District Panchayat Officer or the Deputy Commissioner as the case may be, shall issue, not less than seven days before the appointed date of meeting, a notice of such meeting and of the date and time appointed therefore, to every elected member of the Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad. It is thus evident that the District Panchayat Officer under rule 129 or 131 was required to take independent decision instead of referring the matter to respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2 has no role to play, the manner in which the meeting was to be convened or the notices were to be issued. Respondent No. 3 was only discharging administrative duties and not quasi-judicial as projected by him in the reply. Respondent No. 2 was not required to entertain the letter from respondent No. 3, the manner in which the meeting was to be convened after the postponement on 22nd January, 2008. 25. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raja Mahendra Pal and others, 1999(4) SCC 43 : 1999(2) Cur.L.J. (H.P.) S.C. 188 have laid down the following tests to determine whether a function is a quasi-judicial or administrative in nature. Their Lordships have held as under :- “Quasi judicial acts are such acts which mandate an officer the duty of looking into certain facts not in a way which it specially directs but after a discretion, in its nature judicial. Their Lordships have held as under :- “Quasi judicial acts are such acts which mandate an officer the duty of looking into certain facts not in a way which it specially directs but after a discretion, in its nature judicial. The exercise of power by such Tribunal or authority contemplates the adjudication of rival claims of the persons by an act of the mind or judgment upon the proposed course of official action as to an object of the corporate power, for the conseqencies of which the official will not be liable, although his act was not well-judged. A quasi-judicial function has been termed to be one which stands midway a judicial and an administrative function. The primary test is as to whether the authority alleged to be a quasi judicial, has any express statutory duty to act judicially in arriving at the decision in question. If the reply is in affirmative, the authority would be deemed to be quasi-judicial, and if the reply is in the negative, it would not be . The dictionary meaning of the word `quasi’ is, “not exactly”. It follows, therefore, that an authority is described as quasi-judicial when it has come of the attributes or trappings of judicial functions, but not all. This Court in Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas S. Advani, 1950 SCR 621 : AIR 1950 SC 222 dealt with the actions of the statutory body and laid down tests for ascertain whether the action taken by such body was a quasi-judicial act or an administrative act. The Court approved the celebrated definition of the quasi-judicial body given by Atkin L.J. as he then was in Rex v. Electricity Commissioner, 1924(1) KB 171 in which it was held : “Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division exercised in these writs.” The aforesaid definition was accepted as correct in Rex v. London County Council, 1931(2) KB 215 and many subsequent cases both in England and in India. Again this Court in Radheshyam v. State of M.P., AIR 1959 SC 107 relying upon its earlier decision held (At P. 116 of AIR) :- “It will be noticed that this definition insists on three requisites each of which must be fulfilled in order that the act of the body may be quasi-judicial act, namely, that the body of persons (1) must have legal authority; (2) to determine questions affecting the rights of parties, and (3) must have the duty to act judicially. Since a writ of certiorari can be issued only to correct the errors of a court or quasi-judicial body, it would follow that the real and determining test for ascertaining whether an act authorised by a statute is a quasi-judicial act or an administrative act is whether the statute has expressly or impliedly imposed upon the statutory body the duty to act judicially as required by the third condition in the definition given by Atkin L.J............... Relying on paragraphs 114 and 115 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 11 at pages 55-58 and citing the case of R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee, 1952(2) QB 413 learned Counsel for the appellants contends that where a statute requires decision to be arrived at purely from the point of view of policy or expediency the authority is under no duty to act judicially. Heurges that where on the other hand, the order has to be passed on evidence either under an express provision of the statute or by implication and determination of particular facts on which its jurisdiction to exercise its power depends or if there is a proposal and an opposition the authority is under a duty to act judicially. As stated in paragraph 115 of Halsbur’s Laws of England, Volume 11, page 57, the duty to act judicially may arise in widely differing circumstances which it would be impossible to attempt to define exhaustively. The question whether or not there is a duty to act judicially must be decided in each case in the light of the circumstances of the particular case and the construction of the particular case and the construction of the particular statute with the assistance of the general principles laid down in the judicial decisions. The question whether or not there is a duty to act judicially must be decided in each case in the light of the circumstances of the particular case and the construction of the particular case and the construction of the particular statute with the assistance of the general principles laid down in the judicial decisions. The principles deducible from the various judicial decisions considered by this Court in 1950 SCR 621 : AIR 1950 SC 222 at page 725 (of SCR) : (at p. 260 of AIR) were thus formulated namely :- “(i) that if a statute empowers an authority not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act, which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties part from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially.” 26. The meeting convened for 23rd January, 2008 was adjourned on 22nd January, 2008. It was only on the basis of Annexure P-5, the contents of which have already been reproduced hereinabove, that the meeting was convened for 30th January, 2008. The Court has gone into this issue only to ensure that in future there is transparency in the entire system, more particularly, pertaining to the elections of the office bearers of the Panchayati Raj Institutions and no confidence motions moved against them. Though the meeting dated 30th January, 2008 was adjourned but the manner in which respondent No. 3 has sought the clarification/guidance from respondent No. 2 is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997. 27. Though the meeting dated 30th January, 2008 was adjourned but the manner in which respondent No. 3 has sought the clarification/guidance from respondent No. 2 is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997. 27. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Purtabpur Company Limited v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar and others, AIR 1970 SC 1896 have held that the Cane Commissioner alone could have exercised the power and while exercising that power he could not abdicate his responsibility in favour of the State Government of the Chief Minister. Their Lordships have held as under :- “In the matter of exercise of the power under Rule 6(1), the State Government and the Cane Commissioner are concurrent authorities. Their jurisdiction is co-ordinate. There was some controversy before us whether a Cane Commissioner who had reserved an area for a sugar factory for a particular period can alter, amend, or modify the area reserved in the middle of the period fixed. As seen earlier, 208 villages with which we are concerned in this case were reserved for the appellant for two seasons, i.e., 1966-67 and 1967-68. The contention was that the Cane Commissioner could not have interfered with that reservation within that period. The High Court has come to the confusion that the Cane Commissioner who had the power to make the reservation in question must be held to have had the power to alter or modify that reservation. But it is not necessary for us to pronounce on this question as we are of the opinion that the impugned orders, though purported to have been made by the Cane Commissioner, were, in fact, made by the Chief Minister and hence they are invalid. We have earlier seen that the Cane Commissioner was definitely of the view that the reservation made in favour of the appellant should not be disturbed but the Chief Minister did not agree with that view. It is clear from the documents before us that the Chief Minister directed the Cane Commissioner to divide the reserved area into two portions and allot one portion to the 5th respondent. In pursuance of that direction, the Cane Commissioner prepared two lists `Ka’ and `Kha’. Under the orders of the Chief Minister, the villages contained in list `Ka’ were allotted to the appellant and in list `Kha’ to the 5th respondent. In pursuance of that direction, the Cane Commissioner prepared two lists `Ka’ and `Kha’. Under the orders of the Chief Minister, the villages contained in list `Ka’ were allotted to the appellant and in list `Kha’ to the 5th respondent. The Cane Commissioner merely carried out the orders of the Chief Minister. It is true that the impugned orders were issued in the name of the Cane Commissioner. He merely obeyed the directions issued to him by the Chief Minister. We are unable to agree with the contention of Shri Chagla that though the Cane Commissioner was initially of the view that the reservation made in favour of the appellant should not be disturbed, he changed his opinion after discussion with the Chief Minister. From the material before us, the only conclusion possible is that the Chief Minister imposed his opinion on the Cane Commissioner. The power exercisable by the Cane Commissioner under clause 6(1) is a statutory power. He alone could have exercised that power. While exercising that power he cannot abdicate his responsibility in favour of anyone - not even in favour of the State Government or the Chief Minister. It was not proper for the Chief Minister to have interfered with the functions of the Cane Commissioner. In this case what has happened is that the power of the Cane Commissioner has been exercised by the Chief Minister, an authority not recognized by clause (6) read with clause (11) but the responsibility for making those orders was asked to be taken by the Cane Commissioner.” 28. The Visweswara and others v. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 1980 Karnataka 14, the learned Single Judge has held that the Tehsildar was the competent authority to grant the land to the petitioner, however, he sought instructions from the superior officer i.e. Assistant Commissioner while discharging his statutory duty. The Tehsildar has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by seeking instructions from his superiors. The Tehsildar has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by seeking instructions from his superiors. The learned Single Judge has held as under :- “The undisputed facts in all these cases are that each of the petitioners made an application for grant of different bits of land measuring less than 2 acres and on the basis of those applications, the taluk Darkast Disposal Consultative Committee, Bhadravathi, on consideration of the applications of the petitioners, passed a resolution on 22.11.1976 and recommended for grant of lands as prayed for by the petitioners. A copy of the proceedings of the said Committee has been produced by the petitioners at Exhibit-D and in that proceedings, the names of the petitioners have been found and the extent of the land against their names has also been mentioned. After the decision of the Consultative Committee, the Tehsildar has submitted the report to the Assistant Commissioner based upon the sketch prepared by the Taluk Surveyor, dated 4.7.1976. In the report the Tehsildar has stated that an extent of 29 acres 12 guntas of wet land is available for disposal. The extent of the land claimed by the petitioners also comes to 29 acres 12 guntas. Under the Land Grant Rules, the Tehsildar is empowered to grant the land to an extent of 2 acres. Thus, it is clear and is also undisputed that each of the applicants prayed for grant of less than two acres of land and the Tehsildar, on enquiry, came to the conclusion that the land applied for is available for grant and that the applicants are entitled for the grant of lands being the landless agriculturists. That being so, the Tehsildar himself being the authority empowered to grant the land was not justified in view in seeking a direction from the Assistant Commissioner. An authority, in the instant case, the Tehsildar, empowered under the statute to do a particular thing affecting the right of a citizen cannot, in law, seek statutory duty. That being so, the Tehsildar has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him in not considering the applications made by the petitioners for grant of lands. An authority, in the instant case, the Tehsildar, empowered under the statute to do a particular thing affecting the right of a citizen cannot, in law, seek statutory duty. That being so, the Tehsildar has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him in not considering the applications made by the petitioners for grant of lands. Therefore, the petitioner’s request made during the course of hearing for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Tehsildar, Bhadravathi, to consider the applications filed by them for grant of lands and also grant the same if they are found to be otherwise eligible is justified.” 29. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bahadursingh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamallia and others, 2004(2) SCC 65 have held that if any decision is taken by a statutory authority at the behest or on the suggestion of a person, who has no statutory role to play, the same would be ultra vires. Their Lordships have held as under :- “It is also well-settled that if any decision is taken by a statutory authority at the behest or on the suggestion of a person who has no statutory role to play, the same would ultra vires. (See Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 and Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner.) 30. A Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 825/2005, Tapinder Singh v. M.C. Paonta Sahib and others, decided on 18.10.2005 while interpreting rule 8-A of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal (Reservation and Election to the Office of the President and Vice President), Rules, 1995 has held that when the legislation has its wisdom mandated that a notice of not less than fifteen days is to be given, the notice for a lesser period cannot be said to be a valid and lawful one. Their lordships have also held that once the law mandates that the notice of clear fifteen days is to be given, the plea that no prejudice had been caused to the petitioner was rejected. Their Lordships have held as under :- “It has been urged, with a great deal of vehemence, by the counsel representing the Municipal Council as also the newly added respondents that no prejudice has been caused to the writ petitioner, on account of the short-fall of two days, in the period of notice. Their Lordships have held as under :- “It has been urged, with a great deal of vehemence, by the counsel representing the Municipal Council as also the newly added respondents that no prejudice has been caused to the writ petitioner, on account of the short-fall of two days, in the period of notice. We are not convinced by the submission. When the legislature has in its wisdom mandated that a notice of not less than fifteen days is to be given, the notice for a lesser period cannot be said to be a valid and lawful one. The legislature must have provided for this period with some purpose in its mind, which we need not venture to the speculate. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramphal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma, 2004(2) SCC 759 has held that legislature does not waste words and is presumed to have inserted every part of the statute for a purpose and hence should be given effect to.” 31. In view of the definitive law laid down by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Karnataka High Court, the Court has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that respondent No. 3 has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by writing a letter dated 22.1.2008 to respondent No. 2 and thereafter acting on the same. This act of respondent No. 3 is declared ultra vires. The meeting once convened cannot be permitted to be deferred/adjourned/postponed on flimsy grounds. The mere registration of FIR by any of the parties in normal circumstances cannot be made a pretext to defer/adjourn/postpone the meeting as has been done in the present case. The statutory authorities are required to act fairly and reasonably strictly within four corners of law. The statutory authorities are required to act fairly and reasonably strictly within four corners of law. The statutory authorities must take independent decision and should not permit themselves to be dictated/guided by their superior. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as notice above, has gone to the extent that the decision taken on the suggestion by the higher authorities is ultra vires. 32. There was a clear breach of mandatory provisions of law by not giving a seven days clear notice to the petitioner when the meeting was convened for 25th February, 2008. 33. Consequently, in view of the observations made hereinabove, the writ petition is allowed. 32. There was a clear breach of mandatory provisions of law by not giving a seven days clear notice to the petitioner when the meeting was convened for 25th February, 2008. 33. Consequently, in view of the observations made hereinabove, the writ petition is allowed. Annexure P-8 dated 25.2.2008 and Annexure P-9 dated 11.3.2008 are quashed and set aside, however, the liberty is reserved to the respondents to proceed with the matter in accordance with law and in view of the observations made hereinabove. There will, however, be no order as to costs. M.R.B. ———————