JUDGMENT : H.K. Rathod, J. Heard learned advocate Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah appearing on behalf of appellant-National Insurance Company Limited. 2. The appellant-Insurance Company has challenged the order passed by Workmen Compensation Commissioner, Baroda in Workman Compensation Petition No.58 of 1996 Exh.60 dated 6th February 2008. The Commissioner has awarded Rs.89,044/- as compensation with a direction to appellant to pay the same to the claimant. The Commissioner further directed to opponent Nos.1 and 2 principal employer and contractor to pay amount of penalty Rs.44,522/- and 6% interest from the date it fells due 10th September 1995 to the claimant with the cost of Rs.1,000/-. 3. Learned advocate Mr. Shah raised contention before this Court that learned Commissioner ought to have appreciated the fact that deceased Arvindbhai died due to electrocution while performing his natural evocation in his life i.e. while taking both. He was not died during the course of employment while working with the employer and there was no nexus with the performance of the duties of the deceased and accident occurred not only due to his official duties. On the date of accident, at about 7.00 a.m., his duty hours were not started and prior to point of time, accident occurred. The deceased had gone for bath near water cock of company compound and after taking bath when he tried to take his cloth, he came into contact of live electric cable lying on the grass and met with massive electric shock and due to electric shock, he succumbed to death on the spot in the compound of employer. The brother of deceased-Gopalbhai vide Exh.36 had admitted the fact that deceased was not doing the work at the time of accident. One Mr. Maganbhai Narsinhbhai who was examined vide Exh.40 has made clear that he engaged employee and started the work. Thereafter, only attendance of workman was secured and after relieving from the work up till next date, they were not paid wages till the next morning till they report for work. He submitted that deceased has not received any injury during the course of employment or it arose out of the employment. There was no casual connection established between the death and employment of the deceased. He also submitted that following are substantial questions of law raised by appellant as mentioned in Para 9A, 9B and 9C which are quoted as under : "9A. There was no casual connection established between the death and employment of the deceased. He also submitted that following are substantial questions of law raised by appellant as mentioned in Para 9A, 9B and 9C which are quoted as under : "9A. Whether looking to the above said facts and circumstances of the case the learned Commissioner rightly came to the conclusion that there was a relationship as master and servant between the deceased and the opponents ? 9B. Whether looking to the above said facts and circumstances of the case the learned Commissioner rightly came to the conclusion that the deceased died during the course of the employment ? 9C. Whether looking to the above said facts and circumstances of the case the learned Commissioner has properly appreciated the provisions of Section 3 of the Act ?" 4. I have considered the submissions made by learned advocate Mr. Shah and also perused the order passed by Commissioner. The accident occurred on 11th August 1995 and deceased was workman under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act. The salary was Rs.1,800/- per month. The respondents were dependents of deceased who was bread winner of the family. The deceased was doing contract work in opponent No.1 company. The deceased was residing in the said company under the instructions of opponents by erecting temporary shed and he was under employment of both the opponents since last two months prior to the date of accident. Section 10 notice was served to both by claimant. Opponent has filed reply Exh.10 before the Commissioner. Vide Exh.12 and Exh.10 – written statements filed by opponent No.2 and Opponent No.1 respectively. After receiving the reply from respondent No.1, 2 and 3 including Insurance Company, issues were framed vide Exh.22 and certain decisions have been relied upon by both the learned advocates. Exh.33 is a deposition of Rayjibhai Patel. Exh.36 is a deposition of Gopalbhai Patel. Exh.40 is a deposition of Maganbhai Chouhan. Exh.26/1 is a complaint registered at Varnama Police Station, Exh.26/2 is a copy of panchnama, Exh.26/3 is a PM report and Exh. 26/7 is a school leaving certificate of deceased which were placed on record. Exh.44/1 being a xerox copy of insurance policy. Exh.49/1 is a xerox copy of bank statement regarding premium. Exh.55/1 is a xerox copy of Form No.64 VB of Insurance Act. Except that, no evidence was led by either party. 26/7 is a school leaving certificate of deceased which were placed on record. Exh.44/1 being a xerox copy of insurance policy. Exh.49/1 is a xerox copy of bank statement regarding premium. Exh.55/1 is a xerox copy of Form No.64 VB of Insurance Act. Except that, no evidence was led by either party. Exh.51/1 is a xerox copy of policy with Form No.64 VB of Insurance Act. The parties have produced written arguments before the Commissioner. After considering the submissions made by all the learned advocates, the Commissioner has come to conclusion that accident occurred during the course of employment applying notional extension theory in facts of this case. The Commissioner has considered Rs.1800/- per month salary after deducting Rs.800/- which comes to Rs.1,000/- and thereafter, on that basis, looking to the age of deceased 21 years, a compensation has been worked out which comes to Rs.2,22,710/- and 40% which comes out Rs.89,044/-. Therefore, applicant is entitled to compensation of Rs.89,044/-. The relevant discussions have been made in Para 17 to 25, therefore, the same are quoted as under : "17. I have carefully gone through the pleading and oral and documentary evidence placed on record. There is no dispute by and between the parties for the following facts. The deceased was died due to electrocution. The deceased died when he gone to take his cloth after bath which were lying on the grass. The deceased was residing in the compound at the site where the construction work was going on. The deceased had been provided accommodation for residence/rooms by the opponent : 1 & 2 at the work place. 18. There is most material dispute by and between the parties is with regard to death of deceased. As per case of the applicants, the death had been occurred while deceased was on his duty, where as per case of opponents, the deceased was not upon his duty and bath was natural event. 19. The Applicant no. 1 has deposed vide Exh. 33 and corroborated the pleading of his petition. He deposed that the deceased has gone to bath near water tap in the company and where he died to get cloth, he met with an intense electric shock and succumbed to death. This witness was cross examined by the Ld. advocate for the Opponent no. 1. He has admitted that, the incident had occurred at 7-30 a.m. The Ld. He deposed that the deceased has gone to bath near water tap in the company and where he died to get cloth, he met with an intense electric shock and succumbed to death. This witness was cross examined by the Ld. advocate for the Opponent no. 1. He has admitted that, the incident had occurred at 7-30 a.m. The Ld. advocate for the Opponent no. 1 had tried to establish that, in which shade number, either in shade No. 445-A or 445-B, the incident had been occurred, but the witness did not know the shade number and name of its owner. The witness was cross examined by the Ld. advocate for the insurance company, wherein, he has admitted that, at the time of accident, he was at Godhra and he came to know that his son was died due to electric shock while he was taking bath and his corpse brought to his nature. 20. The applicant has examined witness Gopalbhai, brother of deceased, who was with the deceased at the time of incident. He has also narrated the facts of incident as stated earlier. This witness was cross examined by the Ld. advocate for the Opponent no. 1. He has deposed that, his brother wads residing in the company and construction work was going on. He deposed that, the work of construction and company was to begun at 8-00 a.m. The witness was cross examined by the Ld. advocate for the Opponent no. 2, wherein he has deposed that, his brother was not doing work at the time of accident, but he was to go on his work after taking bath. He deposed that, the accident had not been occurred during construction work. This witness was cross examined by the Ld. advocate for the insurance company. He has deposed that, he has no evidence that, his brother was working in the Shirish Construction Co. He had denied on asking that he and his deceased brother were residing 50-100 feet away of construction work of construction hut. This witness has deposed that, they were residing in the company compound. 21. The applicant has examined another witness Maganbhai at Exh.40, who has deposed that, prior to 7-8 months of accident, they were working in Jay Bharat Steel Co., there was contract of Shirishbhai who was building contractor. This witness has deposed that, they were residing in the company compound. 21. The applicant has examined another witness Maganbhai at Exh.40, who has deposed that, prior to 7-8 months of accident, they were working in Jay Bharat Steel Co., there was contract of Shirishbhai who was building contractor. They were residing in the hut during their working hours which was built up by the contractor. He was on his way to room after taking bath, at that time, other labourers have shouted, so he came to know about the incident. The deceased Arvindbhai met with electric shock, deceased was made got free from the electric wires. The deceased was shifted to civil hospital, Vadodara. He has deposed that, their working hours normally begun at 7-30 a.m. and upto 18-00 and lunch hours are 13-00 to 14-00. Further, he deposed that as and when contractor called them beyond working hours, then they usually attend. The water tap was 3-4 feet and their hut was 15-20 feet from the construction work. The deceased Arvindbhai had t go on his duty, this witness was cross examined by the Ld. advocate for the Opponent no. 1, wherein, he has deposed that, Shirishbha had engaged them in construction work in Jay Bharat Steel Co. He had deposed that, they were informed to use the water tap by Shirishbhai. The Ld. advocate for the Opponent no. 2 was not present, therefore, right to cross examination of Opponent no. 2 was closed. The Ld. advocate for the insurance company had cross examined, wherein, he had deposed that, he was head (mukadam) of all labourers, there is no card for the presence of labourers. If it is available, then he has to verify. He deposited that, he secures the present of workmen after starting work. They are not paying the charges to workman who are getting charges after relieving from the duty till the next day reporting on their duty. He has deposed that, there is no evidence that deceased was reported on his duty prior to bath and his present was secured. 22. Therefore, considering the evidence placed on record, it is an admitted fact that, the deceased and others were residing in the company compound where the construction work was going on. It is admitted that, the labourers of the construction work, were/are from the tribal area like Panchmahal and Godhra. 22. Therefore, considering the evidence placed on record, it is an admitted fact that, the deceased and others were residing in the company compound where the construction work was going on. It is admitted that, the labourers of the construction work, were/are from the tribal area like Panchmahal and Godhra. The residence accommodation was provided to the labourers in the company premises at the site. It is important to note that, as well as one can taken judicial notice that, labourers of the construction work belonging to tribal areas and remote places. The builder/contractor provide them residence accommodation at the site for the multi purpose reason like; (1) to secure their attendance everyday regularly (2) to preserve raw material like cement, sand, bricks, steel, etc., which are lying at the work place. (3) For watering newly constructed structures. The prudent man can think that, the construction work usually starts at 8-00 a.m., and secure presence of all the workmen at site for the above mentioned activities and no prudent man can deny the same. The applicants have not stated the same facts in petition and in evidence, but the real fasts prevailing, is no reason to discard. The applicants are poor and illiterate people, obviously they could not have stated this fact, merely on that ground, it is not to say that, the deceased was not on his duty at the time of accident. For the above mentioned work, the labourers must have to reside at site and builder and contractor are providing accommodation for above mentioned work round the clock. Therefore, opponents have tried to prove that, the incident had not occurred during the course of his employment. But, looking to the facts and circumstance as stated above, it is not tenable. The incident had apparently nexus with the duty of the deceased, there was relationship as master and servant between deceased and Opponent no. 1 & 2 (The Opponent no. 1 is principal employer and Opponent no. 2 is contractor). The applicants have proved that the accident had occurred during the course of employment of deceased. Therefore, argument and case put forwarded by the opponent, is not tenable. 23. The applicants are father and minor brother of the deceased. The name of deceased had been mentioned in the F.I.R., inquest and in p.m. note. The applicants have also provided xerox copy of leaving certificate vide Mark 26/7. Therefore, argument and case put forwarded by the opponent, is not tenable. 23. The applicants are father and minor brother of the deceased. The name of deceased had been mentioned in the F.I.R., inquest and in p.m. note. The applicants have also provided xerox copy of leaving certificate vide Mark 26/7. The name of Applicant no. 1 had been shown behind the name of deceased as father. Further, it was proved by the oral evidence on record that, the son of Applicant no. 1 had died in accident and they are dependent. Therefore, considering overall evidence placed on record, it is proved that, the applicants are dependent of the deceased, hence I decide Issue No. 1 to 3 in affirmative. 24. The applicants have pleaded and deposed that, the deceased was having monthly salary of Rs.1800/-. The incident had occurred on 11/8/95. At the relevant point of time of accident, the salary limit was Rs.1000/- p.m. When the salary exceeding Rs.1000/- p.m. then it would be considered Rs.1000/- p.m. Hence, I decide, the deceased was having monthly salary Rs.1000/-. The applicants had pleaded that, the deceased was having 21 years of age at the time of accident. The applicant had not deposed about age, but produced xerox copy of leaving certificate of deceased vide Mark : 26/7. On perusing the same, the birth date of deceased was shown 3/5/1974. The accident had occurred on 11-8-95, therefore, on the date of accident, the deceased was having 21 years, 3 months and 8 days of age. Therefore, I decide that the deceased was having 21 years of age on the date of accident. In it a fatal case. As per statute, 40% of the salary would be considered of the calculation of compensation as per statue. As per age of deceased, the relevant factor 222.71 would be applicable for the purpose of computing compensation. The detailed calculation is as under : Salary : Rs.1000/-p.m. Factor : 222.71 x 100 = Rs.2,22,710/- 40% Entitlement: Rs.89,044/- Therefore, applicants are entitled to get compensation of Rs.89,044/-. 25. The Opponent no. 2 had produced copy of insurance policy & 64 VB Form vide Mark 44/1 and 5/1 respectively. The insurance company has produced copy of policy and 64 VB Form vide Mark 51/2. On carefully perusing the same, the policy in the name of Shirish Construction, Opponent no. 2. 25. The Opponent no. 2 had produced copy of insurance policy & 64 VB Form vide Mark 44/1 and 5/1 respectively. The insurance company has produced copy of policy and 64 VB Form vide Mark 51/2. On carefully perusing the same, the policy in the name of Shirish Construction, Opponent no. 2. The policy is under the provision of WC Act, 1923. The policy was issued from 27-12-94 to 26-12-95. The incident had occurred on 11-8-95. Therefore, on the day of accident, the policy was in force. Therefore, insurance company is liable for compensation. The Opponent no. 1 is principal employer and deceased was servicing with Opponent no. 1 under the contract of Opponent no. 2. Therefore, as per provision of WC Act, the insurance company is liable for the amount f compensation. The Opponent nos. 1 & 2 have not deposited the amount of compensation nor paid to the applicants in time. Therefore, as per provision of WC Act, they are liable for the interest and penalty. The applicants have served notice to Opponent nos. 1 & 2 through their lawyer, is produced vide Mark 26/4 & 26/5 respectively. Therefore, it is crystal clear that, the Opponent nos. 1 & 2 had information and knowledge of accident, in spite of they have not paid the amount of compensation in time. Therefore, Opponent nos. 1 & 2 are liable to pay penalty and interest. It is the duty of contractor employer-Opponent no. 2 to pay compensation r forward necessary and relevant claim papers to insurance company. There is nothing on record to show and establish that, Opponent no. 2 had forwarded claim papers to insurance company for releasing the claim. It is an admitted fact that the history of the incident is well within the knowledge of Opponent no. 1 & 2, if the Opponent no. 2 had forwarded relevant and necessary papers to insurance company, then insurance company ought to have been released the same at appropriate time. Therefore, according to my view, the Opponent nos. 1 & 2 are liable to pay penalty. It is important to note that, the discretion had been given to court for imposing penalty, but it shall not be exceeding of 50% of compensation amount. Therefore, as per Section 4(A), the Opponent no. 2 failed to pay and get it released, therefore, liable to pay penalty 50% of compensation amount i.e. Rs.44,522/-. It is important to note that, the discretion had been given to court for imposing penalty, but it shall not be exceeding of 50% of compensation amount. Therefore, as per Section 4(A), the Opponent no. 2 failed to pay and get it released, therefore, liable to pay penalty 50% of compensation amount i.e. Rs.44,522/-. As per the terms and conditions of the policy, the insurance company is liable to pay compensation and Opponent nos. 1 & 2 have to pay the interest on the amount of compensation at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date it fells due." 5. The Commissioner has considered certain decisions of Apex Court in case of; (1) General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay v. Mrs. Agnes reported in AIR 1964 SC 193 , (2) General Manager, Western Railway Bombay and another v. Chandrabai alias Narayanibai and another reported in 1992 SCJ 496 MP High Court, (3) General Superintendent, Talcher Thermal Station v. Bijuli Naik reported in 1994 ACJ 1054 High Court of Orissa, (4) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Philo reported in 1996 LLR 521 Kerala High Court, (5) T.N.C.S. Corporation v. S. Poomali reported in 1995(I) LLJ 378 Madras High Court, (6) Ahmed Harun Gori v. Abbas Ibrahim Kara and Anr. reported in 1994(2) LLJ 1013 Gujarat High Court. 6. Then, finally, following observations have been made by Commissioner as under : "I am carefully gone through the citation as discussed above earlier. The deceased and other labourers had been provided residential accommodation by the principal employer as well as contractor at the work site. This was provided for the purpose of; (1) securing their attendance for work everyday regularly (2) to preserve raw material (3) for watering newly constructed structures. The court can take judicial note that, the labourers of the construction site are from the tribal areas and remote places. Every person who is in building profession are providing shelter for the above mentioned purpose to the labourer. The Court can take judicial note that construction work to start at 8-00 and ending upto 18-00, but other works are to be done round the clock. The deceased was died due to electric shock after taking bath, but they were given shelter for the preserving raw material and watering newly constructed structures are part of the duty round the clock over and above beyond the construction period. The deceased was died due to electric shock after taking bath, but they were given shelter for the preserving raw material and watering newly constructed structures are part of the duty round the clock over and above beyond the construction period. Therefore, the accident had been occurred during the course of his employment, therefore, applicants are entitled to get compensation and accident had nexus and relation with the incident." 7. The main contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Shah is that at the time of accident, workman was not on duty and it was not a period of duty hours. Therefore, such accident cannot covered by occurred during the course of employment. This contention is answered on the basis of accepting the theory of notional extension of employment which has been recognised by Supreme Court and other High Courts including Gujarat High Court. 8. The Apex Court has also considered the same in case of Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bail Valu Raja reported in AIR 1958 SC 881 . The relevant observation made by Apex Court in Para 7 which is quoted as under : "7. As a rule, the employment of a workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment and does not continue when he has left the place of employment, the journey to and from the place of employment being excluded. It is now well-settled, however, that this is subject to the theory of notional extension of the employer's premises so as to include an area which the workman passes and re-passes in going to and in leaving the actual place of work. There may be some reasonable extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in the course of his employment even though he had not reached or had left his employer's premises. The facts and circumstances of each case will have to be examined very carefully in order to determine whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of a workman, keeping in view at all times this theory of notional extension." 9. The Apex Court has also considered the same in case of General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay v. Agnes reported in AIR 1964 SC 193 . The relevant observation made by Apex Court in Para 14 which is quoted as under : "14. The Apex Court has also considered the same in case of General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay v. Agnes reported in AIR 1964 SC 193 . The relevant observation made by Apex Court in Para 14 which is quoted as under : "14. Bombay is a City of distances. The transport service practically covers the entire area of Greater Bombay. Without the said right, it would be very difficult for a driver to sign on and sign off at the depots at the schedule timings, for he has to traverse a long distance. But for this right, not only punctuality and timings cannot be maintained, but his efficiency will also suffer. D.W. 1, a Traffic Inspectors of B.E.S.T. Undertaking, says that instructions are given to all the drivers and conductors that they can travel in other buses. This supports the practise of the drivers using the buses for their travel from home to the depot and vice versa. Having regard to the class of employees it would be futile to suggest that they could as well go by local suburban trains or by walking. The former, they could not afford, and the later, having regard to the long distances involved would not be practicable. As the free transport is provided in the interest of service, having regard to the long distance a driver has to traverse to go to the depot from his house and vice versa, the user of the said buses is a proved necessity giving rise to an implied obligation on his part to travel in the said buses as a part of his duty. He is not exercising the right as a member of the public, but only as one belonging to a service. The entire Greater Bombay is the field or area of the service and every bus is an integrated part of the service. The decisions relating to accidents occurring to an employee in a factory or in premises belonging to the employer providing ingress or egress to the factory are not of much relevance to a case where an employee has to operate over a larger area in a bus which is in itself an integrated part of a fleet of buses operating in the entire area. Though the doctrine of reasonable or notional extension of employment developed in the context of specific workshop factories or harbours, equally applies to such a bus service, the doctrine necessarily will have to be adopted to meet its peculiar requirements. While in a case of a factory, the premises of the employer which gives ingress or egress to the factory is a limited one, in the case of a city transport service, by analogy, the entire fleet of buses forming the service would be the "premises". An illustration may make our point clear. Suppose, in view of the long distances to be covered by the employees, the Corporation, as a condition of service, provides a bus for collecting all the drivers from their houses so that they may reach their depots in time and to take them back after the day's work so that after the heavy work till about 7 p.m. they may reach their homes without further strain on their health. Can it be said that the said facility is not one given in the course of employment? It can even be said that it is the duty of the employees in the interest of the service to utilise the said bus both for coming to the depot and going back to their homes. If that be so, what difference would it make if the employer, instead of providing a separate bus, throws open his entire fleet of buses for giving the employees the said facility? They are given that facility not as members of the public but as employees; not as a grace but as of right because efficiency of the service demands it. We would, therefore, hold that when a driver when going home from the depot or coming to the depot uses the bus, any accident that happens to him is an accident in the course of his employment." 10. We would, therefore, hold that when a driver when going home from the depot or coming to the depot uses the bus, any accident that happens to him is an accident in the course of his employment." 10. The Apex Court has also examined the same in case of Rajanna v. Union of India reported in AIR 1995 SC 1966 = 1995-II LLJ 824 in Para 10 and 12 which are relevant, therefore, the same are quoted as under : "10....In the facts of that case the employer was held not liable only because the accident occurred when the workman was travelling in a boat not provided by the employer but a public transport in which any other member of the public could travel and it was not incumbent on the workman to adopt that mode of travel. Applying the test in the present case, it is clear that since the appellant was travelling in the official SPG vehicle he was required to travel from the staff quarters to the South Block, that vehicle not being available to anyone other than the SPG personnel, the appellant was at a place or a point or an area which came within the theory of notional extension of the official premises for performance of 'actual VIP security duty." In other words, that official SPG vehicle was a notional extension of the official premises and, therefore, the appellant was deemed to be on actual V.I.P. security duty, while travelling in it from the staff quarters to the South Block in these circumstances. 12. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 33, Fourth Edition, the summary is stated thus : "490. Accident travelling to and from work :- The course of employment normally begins when the employee reaches his place of work. To extend it to the journey to and from work it must be shown that in travelling by the particular method and route and at the particular time, the employee was fulfilling an express or implied term of his contract of service. To extend it to the journey to and from work it must be shown that in travelling by the particular method and route and at the particular time, the employee was fulfilling an express or implied term of his contract of service. One way of doing this is to establish that the home is the employee's base from which it is his duty to work and that he was travelling by direct route from his home to a place where he was required to work, but that is only one way of showing this; the real question at issue is whether on the particular journey he was travelling in the performance of a duty, or whether the journey was incidental to the performance of that duty and not merely preparatory to the performance of it. If the place where the accident occurs is a private road or on the employer's property, the accident is in the course of the employment because he is then at the scene of the accident by reason only of his employment and he has reached the sphere of his employment. The test is whether the employee was exposed to the particular risk by reason of his employment or whether he took the same risks as those incurred by any member of the public using the highway." "496. Accidents travelling to or from work in employer's transport :- An accident happening while an employed earner is, with the express or implied permission of his employer, travelling as a passenger to or from his place of work in any vehicle which is being operated by or on behalf of his employer, or which is provided by some other person in pursuance of arrangements made with his employer, must be deemed to arise out of and in the course of his employment, even though the employed earner is not obliged to travel by that vehicle, if it would have been deemed so to have arisen if he had been under an obligation to travel by it provided that the vehicle is not operated in the ordinary course of a public transport service. (emphasis supplied)" 11. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has also considered the same in case of Vidyaram Kanauha v. Punabi & Others reported in 1999-III LLJ (Supp.) 410. (emphasis supplied)" 11. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has also considered the same in case of Vidyaram Kanauha v. Punabi & Others reported in 1999-III LLJ (Supp.) 410. The relevant observation made by Madhya Pradesh High Court in Para 16 which is quoted as under : "16. The only surviving question is if the mere fact that at the particular point of time, when the accident occurred, deceased Jagdish, responding to Daru's call to take quilt for him, would be such an act on his part as would be outside the course of his employment. Daru being Vidyaram's servant, and being in-charge of working operations relating to the irrigation of fields, would be evidently enjoying the status of a supervisor and he would be exercising on behalf of the employer Vidyaram control over other persons working at the site. It has been held in Dhrangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra 1957 (1) LLJ 477 (SC), that the test of contract of service is existence of right in the master to supervise and control not only by directing what work may be done, but also directing as to how and the manner in which work has to be done. The incident took place in the month of January and the night being cold, at the end of the day after hard work, Daru wanted to comfort himself by slipping inside the quilt and he called, therefore, Jagdish who was under his control to bring the quilt. The act of deceased Jagdish of carrying the quilt to Daru would be related to his employment because it advanced the interest of his employer. The expression 'course of employment' is to be infused with such meaning as will reflect the nature of the employment, the environment in which the work is done and the surrounding circumstances, characteristic of human nature. The small boy earning bread for his family, opting out of the company of his younger brothers and sister to land at night at a place of hazardous undertaking, had little option except to respond dutifully and obediently to Daru's cal. Daru's status naturally overawed him even if Daru himself was not frightened and apprehensive of the prospects of the demand he had made on the young boy. Daru's status naturally overawed him even if Daru himself was not frightened and apprehensive of the prospects of the demand he had made on the young boy. I would, therefore, hold that in carrying the quilt, deceased Jagdish acted under Daru's control and he was advancing the interest of his employer non-applicant/appellant in doing so: his act fell within the mischief of the expression 'course of employment'." 12. The Commissioner has examined the matter thoroughly and come to conclusion that premises which was given by employer where deceased was residing and before joining the duty, he was taking the bath to secure attendance timely as well as to preserve raw material, it will increase efficiency of work to the employee, therefore, when the accident occurred by electric shock, it has to be considered to have happened during the course of employment, because, notional extension of employment theory is fully applicable on the ground that premises supplied by employer where he was residing at the sight of construction for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary time. Therefore, on the basis of the evidence, the finding given by Commissioner cannot consider to be vitiated baseless and perverse. The claimant has potentially proved by legal evidence that accident occurred during the course of employment. The substantial question of law raised by appellant cannot consider to be a substantial question of law because it is arise with the same is not dependent by the examination of evidence which may not require any fresh investigation of fact and finding given by Commissioner is based on legal evidence and there was no jurisdictional error brought on record by the appellant. Therefore, all the three questions cannot be considered to be the substantial questions of law. 13. This aspect has been examined by Madras High Court in case of The Management, Boys Town Society, Tirumangalam, represented by its Secretary, Boys Town, Tirumangalam v. V. Palani & Anr. reported in 1997 (2) CLR 681. The relevant observation is quoted as under : "6. It has been held in the decision reported in Ramaswami v. Poongavanam, (1953) 1 M.L.J. 557 : AIR 1954 Mad. 218 : 66 L.W. 440 : 1953 M.W.N. 273, that whether a person is a workman or not is a question of fact on which there can be no appeal as per Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It has been held in the decision reported in Ramaswami v. Poongavanam, (1953) 1 M.L.J. 557 : AIR 1954 Mad. 218 : 66 L.W. 440 : 1953 M.W.N. 273, that whether a person is a workman or not is a question of fact on which there can be no appeal as per Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It has been held in the decision reported in Smt. Asmath Beebi (Died) v. Smt. Marimuthu, (1990) 1 LLN 891, also as follows : "A question of fact, however substantial, cannot masquerade as a question of law and cannot automatically be treated as a substantial one even if the amount involved is substantial or the argument pressed is vehement. If it is of great public importance or if it arises so frequently as to affect a large class of people or is so basic to the operation of the Act so basic to the operation of the Act itself, one may designate the question of law as substantial. But, where it is covered already by precedents or the law on that aspect is well settled, the mere difficult of applying the facts to that law cannot make it a substantial question of law." When we consider these two decisions, I am of opinion that the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that the appeal itself is not maintainable since there is no substantial question of law as required under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is involve, is well founded and on that ground itself, the appeal is liable to be dismissed." 14. In light of the aforesaid observations made by Madras High Court, substantial question of law must be having public importance and decided matter on the same issue if it is to be raised again then also it cannot consider to be a substantial question of law. The appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act shall lie only if substantial question of law is involved. Therefore, according to my opinion, while examining the order of Commissioner and considering the contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Shah, no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. Therefore, also, appeal is required to be dismissed. 15. I have examined the appeal in merits as well as on substantial question of law involved or not. Therefore, according to my opinion, while examining the order of Commissioner and considering the contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Shah, no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. Therefore, also, appeal is required to be dismissed. 15. I have examined the appeal in merits as well as on substantial question of law involved or not. The appeal fails on both the counts as Commissioner has rightly decided the matter and deceased was died during the course of employment when premises was allotted by the employer at work sight and before attending the duty hours, he was taking bath and then, immediately accident occurred, therefore, it was considered to be a notional extension theory applied to the employment which period was covered the period prior to actual duty to be performed by workman. That principal has been recognised by Apex Court as discussed above and accordingly, Commissioner has rightly awarded compensation and penalty and interest, for that, Commissioner has not committed any error which requires interference by this Court. Therefore, contentions raised by learned advocate Mr. Shah cannot be accepted, hence, the same are rejected. 16. Accordingly, appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. 17. When the First Appeal is dismissed by this Court today, no order is required to be passed in Civil Application. Accordingly, Civil Application is also dismissed. Appeals dismissed.