JUDGMENT H. Baruah, J. 1. Heard Mr. Zochhuana, learned Counsel for the Appellants as well as Mr. N. Sailo, learned Addl. AG appearing on behalf of Respondents No. 1-6 and Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned CGC for Respondents No. 7-11. 2. This second appeal has been filed under Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 20.6.2006 passed by the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl in Civil Suit No. 2/92 and the appellate judgment and order dated 22.5.2006 passed by the learned Additional District Magistrate (J), Aizawl in RFA No. 6/2005. By the impugned judgments the learned trial Court, as well as the appellate Court dismissed the Suit and the appeal respectively for want of territorial jurisdiction. 3. For a decision in the second appeal, after hearing the parties and scrutiny of the relevant facts and other matters on record, the following substantial question are formulated: (a) Whether the Civil Suit No. 2 of 1992 was without territorial jurisdiction or not. (b) Whether the statements of Defendants' witnesses who denied that compensation was disbursed to the Plaintiffs/Appellants in their presence amounts to admission within the meaning of Section 20 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as the pleadings of the Defendants/Respondents stated that the compensation was disbursed in the presence of the said Defendants' witnesses and expressly referred for in formation in reference to the matter in dispute. 4. The brief facts are that the lands belonging to the Appellants were acquired forcibly for construction of National Highway by Border Roads Organization after cutting down the trees and plants grown over there by the Appellants. At this, the Appellants raised objection and asked the Respondent No. 7 herein and his representative, Respondent Nos. 7 and 8 not to damage the crops and remove the earth for the purpose of construction of the road through their land. But to their utter surprise, they were informed that compensation was paid at the rate of Rs. 1,24,652/- and Rs. 66,450/- to one Shri Sangkunga and the Appellant No. 2. But when approached, the said Shri Sangkunga informed that he did not receive any amount whatsoever in the name of compensation for the crops from the Respondent authorities. But to their utter surprise, they were informed that compensation was paid at the rate of Rs. 1,24,652/- and Rs. 66,450/- to one Shri Sangkunga and the Appellant No. 2. But when approached, the said Shri Sangkunga informed that he did not receive any amount whatsoever in the name of compensation for the crops from the Respondent authorities. It is to be noted that the compensation at the rates as stated herein before was assessed by Respondents No. 2-6 and when the Appellants approached the Respondent No. 7 for compensation, he was informed that money had already been handed over to the representatives of Respondents No. 2 and 3 at Lunglei. Thereafter, the Appellants submitted an application before the Respondent No. 6 and in response to that application, Respondent No. 3 called the Appellants to his office on 26.11.1990 but did not make any payment of compensation to them. Being deprived of, the Appellants instituted a suit being No. T.S. 2/1996 before the Court of Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, seeking for a decree. The suit was contested and the learned trial Court, at the conclusion of the trial dismissed the suit on the ground that the trial Court does not have any jurisdiction to try the suit. 5. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the Court of Additional District Magistrate (J), Aizawl was approached by the Appellants against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. The first appellate Court also dismissed the appeal holding that the Courts at Aizawl have no jurisdiction to try the suit. Hence this second appeal. 6. Mr. Zochhuana, learned Counsel for the Appellants while arguing the substantial question of law in respect of jurisdiction, submits that civil Court at Aizawl has got the jurisdiction to try the suit of the Appellants although, the lands situates at Lunglei and cause of action arose therein. Mr. Zochhuana submits that the Appellants in their suit arrayed the Government of Mizoram as one of the Defendant and it being present throughout the State including Lunglei, proviso to Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure affords an opportunity to file a suit for compensation in Aizawl also. Mr. Zochhuana submits that the Appellants in their suit arrayed the Government of Mizoram as one of the Defendant and it being present throughout the State including Lunglei, proviso to Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure affords an opportunity to file a suit for compensation in Aizawl also. The proviso to Section16 of the Code of Civil Procedure speaks as under: Provided that a suit to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immovable property held by or on behalf of the Defendant may, where the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience, be instituted either in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate, or in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the Defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain. 7. Further, in support of his contention Mr. Zochhuana referred to a judgment of this Court dated 17.11.2006 passed in R.S.A. No. 10/2006. This Court, while disposing the said RSA vide judgment and order as above held that the proviso to Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives an authority to file a suit for compensation within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the Defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain. Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the provisions for institution of a suit which speaks for the classes of suit described in (a) to (f) of the section. Suits are ordinarily instituted within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate or cause of action arises. But proviso to section is an exception to general provision of Section 16 and therefore, when one of the Defendants i.e. the State of Mizoram is present through out the State, this proviso would also be applicable in respect of the suit filed by the Appellants before the trial Court. 8. Mr. N. Sailo, learned Addl. AG referring to the decision of issues No. 1 and 2, decided conjointly by the learned trial Court submits that the learned trial Court rightly held that the Court at Aizawl does not have any jurisdiction to try the suit. 8. Mr. N. Sailo, learned Addl. AG referring to the decision of issues No. 1 and 2, decided conjointly by the learned trial Court submits that the learned trial Court rightly held that the Court at Aizawl does not have any jurisdiction to try the suit. Admittedly, the lands situate at Lunglei and the compensation was assessed by the Deputy Commissioner, Lunglei but for non-payment of the compensation to the Appellants i.e. the land holders, approached the civil Court at Aizawl, the State being one of the Defendants. 9. Mr. N. Sailo, referring to Para 15 of the judgment rendered by this Court in the case between Ramkumar v. J.M. Agarwal Tobacco Co. Ltd. (M/S), reported in 2000 (1) GLT 264 submits that if person or persons (aggrieved) is/are allowed to file suit for a re-life beyond the territorial jurisdiction of a particular Court, when the law does not provide so, every person would come and file a suit or proceeding in every district and in various Courts seeking such relief. This finding was made by tills Court by taking into consideration of the facts involved therein. The facts of our present case is not one and similar with the facts involved in the case (supra). Therefore, this judgment to my humble view would have no application in the present case in view of the proviso of Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. This Court does not see any force in the argument advanced by Mr. N. Sailo, learned Addl. AG in view of the proviso to Section 16 and the judgment referred to dated (17.11.2006) passed in RSA 10 of 2006. 11. Mr. Zochhuana, learned Counsel for the Appellants in respect of substantial question of jurisdiction also submits that such objection to the place of suing can not be raised before an appellate or revisional Court, if such issues were not taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. Mr. Zochhuana learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that the Appellants are entitled to have the compensation from the Respondent authorities for acquisition of the lands and damage caused to the crops. Mr. Zochhuana learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that the Appellants are entitled to have the compensation from the Respondent authorities for acquisition of the lands and damage caused to the crops. But being deprived of such compensation, they approached the Civil Court at Aizawl for a decree but their claim was turned down on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. The issue of jurisdiction was taken for decision by the trial Court and it was decided as against the Appellants which caused injustice to them resulting failure of justice. Mr. Zochhuana in this contact referred the provisions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure together with the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case between Pathumma (Daughter of Koopilan Uneen) and Ors. v. Kuntalan Kutty (Son of Koopilan Uneen) and Ors. reported in (1981) 3 SCC 589 . The Apex Court held as under: Held: In order that an objection to the place of suing may be entertained by an appellate or revisional Court, the fulfillment of the following three conditions is essential: (1) The objection was taken in the Court of fist instance. (2) It was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement. (3) There has been a consequent failure of justice. 12. According to Mr. Zochhuana, all the three conditions are not fulfilled in the present suit. According to him, the learned trial Court and the first appellate Court committed error and illegality in deciding the issues against the Appellants. The substantial question No. 2 framed herein for the purpose of decision has not been strictly challenged by the counsel for the Respondents while arguing the appeal in view of the provisions of Section 20 of the Evidence Act. Section 20 of the Evidence Act provides for-when statement made by a person in a suit can be regarded as admission. Where there is a dispute as regards some facts and the Court is in heed of information regarding truth on that point/fact, any statement made to that fact is nevertheless information within the purview of Section20. In our present case, Defendant claim is that the compensation was paid to the Appellants in presence of J. Lalbiakthanga, the V.C.P. Sethlun, who is a defence witness in the suit. In our present case, Defendant claim is that the compensation was paid to the Appellants in presence of J. Lalbiakthanga, the V.C.P. Sethlun, who is a defence witness in the suit. During his examination on oath in the trial, he divulged that the payment was never paid in his presence nor he did put his signature either in Exhibit D-3 or D-2. The signature Exhibit D-2(A) and D-3(A) do not belong to him and both are forged signature. Apparently, there is a dispute in between the parties regarding payment/non-payment of the compensation and the defence claimed that the payment was made in presence of this witness as aforesaid while the Appellants denied Thus the evidence of J. Lalbiakthanga can be considered as information under Section 20 of the Evidence Act. 13. The primary issue to be decided in this appeal is the issue of territorial jurisdiction. Proviso to Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives an authority to file a suit for compensation under the circumstances referred thereto. 14. In view of the above legal position, the findings of the Courts below are misconceived and accordingly, the same are set aside and quashed. 15. This second appeal is accordingly allowed. The matter is remanded back to the trial Court. The trial Court shall rehear the suit and disposed of the same on merit. No cost. Appeal allowed