Judgment Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. This first one of the above two first miscellaneous appeals is at the instance of a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract and permanent injunction and is directed against the order dated 17th December, 2007 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, 2nd Court, Barasat in Title Suit No.222 of 2007 by which the learned Trial Court although issued notice upon the respondents to show-cause why the prayer of the plaintiff for temporary injunction should not be granted, yet, refused to grant any ad interim order of injunction. Being dissatisfied, the plaintiff has come up with the present first miscellaneous appeal. The plaintiff-appellant filed the aforesaid suit against the Respondents, being Title Suit No.222 of 2007, thereby praying for the following relief: “(a) A decree for specific performance of the agreement dated 24th June, 2005, terms whereof are recorded in the Memorandum of Understanding dated 4th August, 2005; (b) A decree for specific performance of the agreement dated 4th August, 2005 by directing the defendant no.11 to handover the share certificates of 32,33,000 no. of shares, particulars whereof are set out in schedule hereto and the defendant nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 be directed to execute the transfer deeds in respect of the shares standing in their respective names in favour of the plaintiff and/or his nominee; (c) Decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendants to take all such necessary steps as may be required to be taken by the said defendants for the purpose of sale and/or transfer of all the shares in the defendant no.8 in favour of the plaintiff and/or his nominees; (d) Decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants and each one of them from taking any step or further steps to transfer or caused to be transferred any shares held by them of and in the defendant no.8 or to deal with the same in any manner whatsoever contrary thereto and/or inconsistent with the agreement excepting for the purpose of transferring the said shares to and in favour of the plaintiff and/or his nominees; (e) A decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants to issue and/or caused to be issued any new or fresh or further shares of and in the defendant no.8; (f) Decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant nos.1 to 8 from dealing with, disposing of or in any manner encumbering the said land situated at BP2, Sector-V, Salt Lake, P.S. Bidhannagar, Kolkata; (g) Decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant no.2 and defendant no.9 from acting as directors of the defendant no.8; (h) Decree directing the defendant no.8 to rectify its Share Register and have the name of the plaintiff and/or his nominee or nominees entered in the same as registered holders of 32,30,000 shares in place and stead of the existing shareholders; (i) Decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant no.10 from handing over the sanction plan to the defendant no.2, defendant no.8 or defendant no.9 or to any other person except the plaintiff; (j) Decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant no.11 from handing over the shares of the defendant no.8 to anyone except the plaintiff; (k) Mandatory injunction directing the defendant no.11 to make over all share certificates deposited with the said defendant to the plaintiff; (l) Mandatory injunction directing the defendant nos.1 to 7 to execute transfer deeds in respect of all shares deposited with defendant no.11 and make over the same to the plaintiff; (m) Mandatory injunction directing the defendant no.8 to rectify its register of members by inserting the name of the plaintiff as the holder of all shares of an in the defendant no.8; (n) If necessary decree for deliver up and cancellation of 23 lakhs equity shares issued and allotted to defendant no.1 on December 26, 2005; (o) If necessary declaration that the issue and allotment of 23 lakhs equity shares of and in the defendant no.8 in favour of the defendant no.1 is illegal, null and void; (p) If necessary perpetual injunction restraining the defendant no.1 from exercising any rights or receiving any benefits in respect of 23 lakhs equity shares of and in the defendant no.8 referred to above; (q) Perpetual injunction restraining the defendant nos.1 to 9 and 11 from in any manner interfering with the management and affairs of the defendant no.8 and/or with the assets of the defendant no.8 and in particular and land described in paragraph 1 of the plaint; (r) Receiver; (s) Injunction; (t) Costs; (u) Further or other reliefs;” The case made out by the appellant may be summed up thus: (1) On June 24 2005, the respondent no.2 approached the appellant with a proposal for sale of 100 percent shareholdings of the respondent no.8 by making following representations: (i) The respondent no.2 along with his nominees and companies under his control held 100 percent shares in respondent no.8 without any encumbrances on those shares. (ii) There was no bar on the shareholders to transfer their shareholdings in the respondent no.8 to the appellant or his nominees. (iii) The said shareholders had authorized the respondent no.2 to enter into the agreement and that the respondent no.2 was executing the agreement on behalf of all other shareholders. (iv) The respondent no.8 had outstanding liabilities to the tune of Rs.2, 00, 00,000/-approximately, which would be cleared out of the total sale-price of the shares. (2) The respondent no.2 represented to the appellant that the shareholdings pattern of the respondent no.8 was as follows: Issued share capital of Rs.93, 00,000/- divided into 9, 30,000 shares of Rs.10/- each. The shares were held by – (3) The respondent no.2 further represented that the aforesaid companies, holding shares in respondent no.8, were also under his control and all the shareholders, including the heirs of the two deceased shareholders having nominal number of ten shares each, would transfer the entire shareholding in the respondent no.8 at a total price of Rs.16,51,00,000/- and further that the liabilities of the respondent no.8 would be cleared out of the total consideration monies of the shares to be paid by the purchasers. The respondent no.2 further represented and disclosed that he was the Director of the respondent no.1 and the companies under his control were holding the entire share capital of the respondent no.1; the respondent no.2 further disclosed that he and his wife were the only Directors of the respondent no.1 and that the entire share capital of the respondent no.1 was held by him, the Sunrise Projects Private Limited and the Parimala Mercantile Private Limited, and that the latter two companies were wholly under the control of the respondent no.2. (4) Upon the terms and conditions being finalized through negotiations, a Memorandum of Understanding dated 4th August, 20005 was executed between the appellant and the respondent no.1 represented by its Director, the respondent no.2 and accordingly payments were made. (4) Upon the terms and conditions being finalized through negotiations, a Memorandum of Understanding dated 4th August, 20005 was executed between the appellant and the respondent no.1 represented by its Director, the respondent no.2 and accordingly payments were made. (5) Some of the representation made by the respondent no.2 had been recorded in the said Memorandum of Understanding and some of the salient terms and conditions of the said agreement dated 4th August 2005 are set out below: (i) That the Transferor and the Shareholders have agreed to sell the entire shareholdings in Graphitech India Limited and transfer the same without any liability in Graphitech India Limited to the Transferee and/or his nominees for Rs.16,51,00,000/-. (ii) That the said consideration amount should cover the cost of the shares and also the amount required to clear the loans, advances as reflected in the Books of Accounts of Graphitech India Limited, which would be made available to the Transferee along with the Certificate from the Chartered Accountant of the Transferor. (iii) All the original share certificates and transfer deeds should be deposited with Mr. B.K. Jain, Advocate, in trust and the same should be handed over to the Transferee on making the full and final payment of the consideration amount. (iv) The Transferor should take all necessary steps to transfer the entire shares of Graphitech India Limited in favour of the said Transferee and/or his nominees. (v) The Transferor at his costs and efforts should hand over all the original share scripts duly transferred in favour of the Transferee and/or his nominees and all the statutory registers, documents, original lease deed of the land in BP Block, Sector-V, Salt Lake City, Bank Accounts, Account Books, Building Sanction Plans, clearances, etc. would be handed over to the Transferee. (vi) The existing Directors of Graphitech India Limited should resign and appoint the Transferee herein and his nominees as the Directors of the Company. (vii) No further shares other than any share to be allotted to Transferee should be issued. (viii) The shareholders should not deal with any other third party or share of the company. (vi) The existing Directors of Graphitech India Limited should resign and appoint the Transferee herein and his nominees as the Directors of the Company. (vii) No further shares other than any share to be allotted to Transferee should be issued. (viii) The shareholders should not deal with any other third party or share of the company. (6) By the said agreement, the parties intended that the shares and transfer deeds of the respondent no.8 were to be held by Mr B. K. Jain, Advocate, and immediately upon payment of the full amount of consideration, the shares would be delivered and transferred to the appellants or his nominees. (7) Pursuant to the said agreement, the appellant had taken the following steps: (I) The appellant had paid and caused to be paid towards the consideration amount from time to time a sum of Rs.13,91,90,000/- towards the agreed consideration, the particulars whereof would appear from a Memo of Consideration signed by the respondent no.2 on receipt of the payments. (II) The balance sum of Rs.2, 59, 10,000/- was sent to the respondent no.2 under cover of a letter dated 19th November 2007 along with six cheques issued in the names of some of the respondents as directed by the respondent no.2. (III) The appellant in the year 2005 appointed “Espace” as Architect to prepare a building plan for sanction by the Bidhannagar Municipality and the building plan was prepared by the said Architect and was submitted in the name of the respondent no.8 to Bidhannagar Municipality in the month of August 2005 for sanction. However, due to the change in the Rules with regard to sanction of floor area ratio, the building plan was returned to the respondent no.8. The said Architect engaged by the appellant prepared a new plan and the same was submitted in the name of the respondent no.8 to the Municipality on 10th May 2007. (IV) The appellant had engaged J. Patnaik & Associates of 7A, Bentinck Street, Kolkata700 001 on 10th May 2006 to conduct a due diligence in respect of the affairs of the respondent no.8. At the request of the appellant, in order to satisfy the queries raised by J. Patnaik Associates, the respondent no.2 by a letter dated 16th May 2007 had submitted copies of several documents relating to the respondent no.8. At the request of the appellant, in order to satisfy the queries raised by J. Patnaik Associates, the respondent no.2 by a letter dated 16th May 2007 had submitted copies of several documents relating to the respondent no.8. Due diligence was completed after 16th May 2007 and the report was submitted by the said J. Patnaik & Associates in May 2007. (8) The respondents had also in part performance of the agreement dated August 4, 2005 took the following steps: (i) In the month of September 2005, the respondent no.2 deposited 9,29,760 shares with Mr B. K. Jain, Advocate, whereupon the said respondent no.1 issued a letter dated 30th September, 2005 recording the deposit of the said share. (ii) On 30th September, 2005, the respondent no.2, on behalf of the respondent no.8, handed over to the appellant the provisional permission dated 28th September, 2005 granted by Bidhannagar Municipality to the respondent no.8 for construction of the permission. (iii) In November 2005, the respondent no.2 handed over to the appellant the letter of the Airport Authority of India Limited dated 9th November, 2005 issued to the respondent no.8 recording their ‘No objection’ to the construction of the proposed building at BP Block, Plot No.2, Salt Lake City. (iv) In October 2006, the respondent no.2 handed over to the appellant a letter dated 18th October, 2006, issued by the Government of West Bengal through the Urban Development Department requesting the respondent no.8 and the respondent no.2 to deposit a sum of Rs.10,000/- per cottah towards permission fee for change of land use. (v) The respondent no.2 handed over to the appellant a copy of the order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No.5320 (W) of 2007 dated 23rd April, 2007, inter alia, directing the Principal Secretary, Government of West Bengal, Urban Development Department to consider and dispose of the representation dated October 31, 2006 made by the respondent no.8 after taking into consideration of notification issued by the Department. (vi) The respondent no.8 forwarded to the appellant a letter dated 7th September, 2007 issued by the Government of West Bengal, Urban Development Department addressed to the respondent no.8 enclosing therewith a copy of the order passed by the Principal Secretary allowing the change of use of the land. (vii) The respondent no.2 submitted the project proposal to the department of Environment under cover of a letter dated February 22, 2007. (vii) The respondent no.2 submitted the project proposal to the department of Environment under cover of a letter dated February 22, 2007. (viii) In May 2007, the respondent no.8 deposited a sum of Rs.6,05,471/- with the State Bank of India, Salt Lake as fees for permission of change of land used and handed over a copy of the challan to the appellant. (ix) On 26th December 2005, the respondent no.2 had caused the respondent no.8 to issue new shares numbering 23 lakhs for face value of Rs.10/- each and after the allotment of the new shares to the respondent no.1, the total shareholding of the respondent no.8 became 78.79 per cent. (x) The respondent no.2 acting on behalf of the respondent nos.1 and 2 agreed to deposit the further 23,00,000 shares with the respondent no.11 in order to cause those shares to be transferred as part of the 100 percent shareholding of the respondent no.8 to the appellant without any alteration of the agreed consideration of Rs.16,51,00,000/-. (xi) The respondent no.2 deposited the said 23 lakhs equity shares in the respondent no.8 with the respondent no.11, which was duly confirmed by the respondent no.11. (9) Out of the agreed amount of Rs.16,51,00,000/-, a sum of Rs.13,91,000.00p. had already been paid by the appellant partly by issue of cheques in the names of such of the shareholders of the respondent no.8 as indicated by the respondent no.2 and partly by cash. Details of such particulars were mentioned in the Annexures appended to the plaint. (10) The appellant handed over a letter dated 19th November, 2007 to the respondent no.11 and called upon the respondent no.11 to handover the original share certificates along with the transfer deeds to the appellant for the purpose of completing the transfer of the shares in terms of the agreement. By a letter dated 22nd November, 2007, the respondent no.11 replied to the appellant enclosing a copy of a letter dated 21st November, 2007 written by him to the respondent no.2 in respect of transfer of the said shares. In the said letter on 22nd November, 2007, the respondent no.11, however, informed the appellant for the first time that only share scripts were in the possession of the respondent no.11 and that the respondent no.2 deposited no transfer deeds in respect of those shares. In the said letter on 22nd November, 2007, the respondent no.11, however, informed the appellant for the first time that only share scripts were in the possession of the respondent no.11 and that the respondent no.2 deposited no transfer deeds in respect of those shares. (11) On 5th December, 2007, the appellant received back the registered envelope sent to the respondent nos.1, 4, 6, 7 and the heirs of Chitta Roy and Amar Nath Dutta. The registered envelope containing the cheques were sent to the respondent no.2 but the same had not returned back from the said respondent. On 5th December, 2007, the appellant received a letter dated 23rd November, 2007 issued by the respondent no.2 on behalf of the respondent no.1 by which the intention of the respondents not to abide by the agreement dated 4th August, 2005 was for the first time disclosed and a false story of termination of the said agreement by mutual consent was sought to be made out by the said letter. Hence the suit. Hence the suit. On the basis of the selfsame allegations as contained in the plaint, the appellant filed an application for temporary injunction thereby praying for the following relief: “(a) An order of injunction restraining the respondent Nos.1 to 9 from dealing with or dispose of or encumbering the shares, particulars whereof have been given in paragraph-29 herein, in any manner except for the purpose of handing over the same to your petitioner; (b) An order of injunction restraining the respondent No.11 from handing over the building plan to any one else except plaintiff and/or his nominee; (c) An order of injunction restraining the respondent No.11 from handing over the shares, particulars whereof have been given in paragraph-29 herein, to any one except your petitioner; (d) An order of mandatory injunction directing the respondent Nos.1 to 9 to transfer or cause to be transferred the said shares, particulars whereof have been given in paragraph-29 herein, in favour of your petitioner and/or his nominee; (e) An order of injunction restraining respondent Nos.1 to 9 from taking any step or further steps or transferring any of the shares held by them to any one else except your petitioner and/or his nominee; (f) An order of injunction restraining the respondents to issue and/or caused to be issued any new or fresh or further shares of and in the respondent No.8; (g) An order of injunction restraining the respondents from dealing with, disposing of or in any manner encumbering the said land situated at BP-2, Sector-V, Bidhan Nagar, Kolkata; (h) An order of injunction restraining the respondent No.2 and respondent No.9 from acting as directors of respondent No.8; (i) An order of injunction directing the respondent No.11 to make over all share certificates deposited with the said respondent to your petitioner; (j) Ad-interim orders in terms of prayers above; (k) Costs of this application be paid by the respondents; (l) Such further order or orders and/or direction or directions be given as to this Learned Court may seem fit and proper.” As indicated earlier, the learned Trial Judge issued notice to the respondents to show-cause why the prayer for temporary injunction should not be granted but refused to grant any ad interim order of junction on the ground that without hearing the respondents no injunction should be granted. Being dissatisfied, the plaintiff has come up with the present appeal. Being dissatisfied, the plaintiff has come up with the present appeal. Mr Anindya Mitra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant strenuously contended before us that on the basis of the averments made and the documents annexed to the application for temporary injunction, the learned Trial Judge should have granted ad interim order of injunction as prayed for by his client. Mr Mitra submits that while refusing the prayer for ad interim order of injunction the learned Trial Judge has not followed the well accepted principles, which are required to be followed. Mr. Mitra submits that the learned Trial Judge, prima facie, was satisfied with the merit of his client’s case and that is why, issued direction of service of notice upon the respondents but no reason was practically assigned why the order of ad interim injunction should not be granted. Mr Mitra, therefore, prays for setting aside the order impugned and granting an interim order of injunction till the disposal of the application for temporary injunction. Mr. Kapoor, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent nos.1 and 2 has opposed the aforesaid contentions advanced by Mr Mitra and has contended that even in the body of the application for temporary injunction, the appellant has referred to the fact that his clients have already filed a suit against the appellant and in that suit, an order of status quo has been passed. According to Mr Kapoor, the order of status quo is sufficient to protect the interest of the appellant and the learned Trial Judge rightly refused to grant any ad interim order of injunction in the facts of the present case. Mr Dasgupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.4 has supported the submissions of Mr Kapoor and has contended that no case of urgency was made out for grant of any ad interim order of injunction. Mr Dasgupta submits that since all the shares are held by Mr B.K. Jain, Advocate, there is no scope of transferring the shares and consequently, there is no urgency of passing any order of injunction. Mr Roy Chowdhury, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.8, submits that his client, having a separate legal entity, was not bound by the agreement, even if, entered into by the respondent nos.1 and 2. Mr Roy Chowdhury, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.8, submits that his client, having a separate legal entity, was not bound by the agreement, even if, entered into by the respondent nos.1 and 2. Mr Roy Chowdhury further submits that as a company having separate existence, his client is not bound by the activities of its shareholders and therefore, there should not be any order of injunction restraining his client from performing its duty as a company. Mr Roy Chowdhury submits that there should not be any order of injunction even as regards the transfer of the land mentioned in the application for injunction, which belongs to his client. Mr Roy Chowdhury, therefore, prays for dismissal of the appeal. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record we find that the learned Trial Judge was apparently satisfied with the prima facie case of the appellant and for that reason, decided to issue notice upon the respondents to show-cause why the prayer of the appellant for temporary injunction should not be granted. If the learned Judge was not satisfied with the prima facie case, there was no occasion for even issue of notice to show-cause why the prayer for temporary injunction should not be granted. We have also gone through the averments made in the application for temporary injunction filed by the appellant in the Court below as also the Annexure of the said application and we are of the view that if those allegations are ultimately found to be correct and that there is no suppression of material facts by the plaintiff, he has definitely made out a strong prima facie case to go for trial. Therefore, at this stage of grant of ad interim injunction, we can accept the averments to be true as the plaintiff, by affidavit, has taken responsibility of the averments knowing fully well that if those are subsequently found to be false, he would face the penal consequence and at the same time, those are not apparently so absurd or improbable statements that we should disbelieve those outright. In a suit for specific performance of contract, once prima facie case has been made out, in our view, the plaintiff is entitled to have at least an ad interim order to such extent that the ultimate relief of specific performance claimed in the suit may not become infructuous when the application for injunction will be taken up for hearing in the presence of the other side. In the case before us, the plaintiff in his application for temporary injunction has shown that there was a written agreement between the plaintiff and the respondent nos.1 and 2 and that those respondent nos.1 and 2 hold 100 percent share of the respondent no.8. It further appears that Rs.13 crore and odd were paid out of Rs.16 crore and odd, the total amount of consideration agreed between the parties. The appellant has also shown that the respondents have acted pursuant to the agreement. In such circumstances, in our view, the learned Trial Judge should have granted an ad interim order at least for a limited period so that, in the meantime, the shares are not transferred or additional share are not issued and at the same time, the land belonging to the respondent no.8 as mentioned in the application is not encumbered in any way. If on contested hearing of the application for temporary injunction, the Court comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff has no prima facie case, the inconveniences suffered by the respondents for grant of ad interim injunction, can be compensated by payment of adequate costs; on the other hand, if ad interim injunction, we propose to give, is refused and in the meantime, the shares are transferred or new shares are issued or the land is encumbered and on contested hearing, it is established that the version of the plaintiff is true, in such case, the mischief done by the respondents cannot be undone and the Court may even finally hesitate to grant a decree for specific performance of the contract. Therefore, the balance of convenience and inconvenience is in favour of granting the prayer of ad interim injunction for a limited period. Therefore, the balance of convenience and inconvenience is in favour of granting the prayer of ad interim injunction for a limited period. We are not at all impressed by the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that an ad interim order of status quo granted by the selfsame Court in the earlier suit filed by the respondent nos.1 and 2 was sufficient to protect the interest of the appellant before us. By virtue of the said interim order, all that has been ordered was that the parties were directed to maintain status quo in respect of the demand and obtaining possession of the original share certificates. It is rightly pointed out by Mr Mitra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that it is the case of his client that transfer deeds have not been handed over to Mr Jain, Advocate and, therefore, even if, the original shares are held by Mr Jain, there is no impediment in law in transferring or issuing fresh shares. Moreover, the respondents other than the respondent nos.1 and 2 are not parties to the earlier suit filed by the respondents nos.1 and 2 against the appellant and as such, the said order of status quo is not binding upon them. Similarly, the appellant has made out specific case that he has already submitted plan through his appointed Architect and has spent huge amount for the purpose of getting plan for construction of the building on the land held by the respondent no.8 at Salt Lake and various letters addressed to the respondent no.8 had been given to the appellant, which if ultimately found to be true, gives indication that that the respondent no.8 is aware of the agreement and had approval of such agreement, and consequently, handed over those letters addressed to the respondent no.8 to the appellant and, therefore, if in the meantime, the said property is encumbered or the nature and character of the property is changed, it will be prejudicial to the interest of the appellant in the event the application for temporary injunction succeeds in the long run. Even the Court, at the time of final hearing of the suit, in spite of existence of the agreement may refuse to exercise discretion in favour of grant of any decree for specific performance because of subsequent involvement of the third parties. Even the Court, at the time of final hearing of the suit, in spite of existence of the agreement may refuse to exercise discretion in favour of grant of any decree for specific performance because of subsequent involvement of the third parties. We, therefore, find that it is a fit case where there should be an ad interim order of injunction restraining the respondent nos.2 to 9 from dealing with, disposing of or encumbering the shares of the respondent no.8 and from transferring those to any one except the appellant and/or from issuing any new fresh or further share or dealing or disposing of or encumbering the land of the respondent no.8 at BP-2, Sector-V, Salt Lake, P.S.- Bidhan Nagar, Kolkata till the disposal of the application for temporary injunction. We direct the respondents to file affidavit-in-opposition positively within a week from today and reply, if any, should be given within a week thereafter. Since the respondent nos.1 and 2 had already filed an earlier suit for declaration that the said agreement dated August 4, 2007 has been cancelled and in connection with that suit have also filed an application for temporary injunction, which is pending, it is expedient that both the applications for injunction should be heard analogously. It appears that defence in one suit is the plaint cases of the parties in the other suit so far the appellant and the respondent nos.1 and 2 are concerned. We make it clear that at the time of disposal of the application for temporary injunction mentioned above, the learned Trial Judge will not be influenced by the fact that we have granted an ad interim order of injunction till the disposal of the application for injunction as scope of grant of ad interim order of injunction is different from that of disposal of the application for injunction on contested hearing. At this stage, we have not taken into consideration the defence of the respondents that may be taken and we have restricted our consideration only to the allegations contained in the plaint and application for injunction as the scope of this appeal is limited as to whether on the basis of those allegations, the learned Trial Judge was justified in refusing an ad interim order of injunction. The moment defence will be disclosed by the respondents, the prima facie view adopted by us may be proved wrong if on consideration of such defence it is found that the case made out by the plaintiff is a false one and there is suppression of material fact in the application for temporary injunction. Since an application for appointment of Receiver has also been filed by the appellant, such application should also be heard along with the application for injunction and the respondents are directed to file affidavit-in-opposition within a week from today and reply thereto should be given to the appellant within a week thereafter. The learned Trial Judge should positively dispose of the applications for injunction and the one for the appointment of Receiver within three weeks from the date of communication of this order. The other appeal preferred by the appellant against the refusal of grant of Receiver has not been pressed as we have already passed direction for hearing of the application for Receiver along with the application for injunction within three weeks. The appeal preferred against refusal of ad interim injunction is accordingly allowed and the other appeal preferred against the refusal of the prayer for appointment of ad interim Receiver is dismissed as not pressed. In the facts and circumstance, there will be, however, no order as to costs.