JUDGMENT RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J. These appeals are preferred by the dealer against the order of the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, dated February 27, 1999 revising the order of the Appellate Deputy Commissioner (CT), Kurnool. It would suffice, for the purpose of all these appeals, if the facts in Special Appeal No. 7 of 1999 are noted. The appellant, a registered dealer under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, was engaged in the manufacture and sale of liquor and beer. For the assessment years 1981-82 to 1985-86 it claimed different treatment for bottles, cartons and other packing material, not at the rate of tax payable on liquor and beer. The appeals preferred by the assessee were allowed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in T.A. No. 611 of 1990 and batch. In its order dated September 9, 1993, the Tribunal held that cartons were taxable under entry 19 of the First Schedule and that other packing material were taxable as general goods. According to the appellant, the order of the Tribunal for these assessment years had become final and the State had not preferred tax revision cases against those orders. The Commercial Tax Officer passed assessment orders for the subsequent assessment years, aggrieved by which the assessee preferred appeals before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner who, by his orders dated May 2, 1995 and August 17, 1995, allowed the appeals in respect of cartons and other packing material referring to the order of the Tribunal without noticing that the order of the Tribunal related to the very same assessment years. The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes not only sought to revise the orders of the Appellate Deputy Commissioner for the assessment years 1981-82, 1983-84, 1984-85 and 1985-86 but also for the eight assessment years from 1986-87 to 1993-94 except in respect of the assessment year 1992-93. For these eight assessment years, the Appellate Deputy Commissioner had granted relief in respect of cartons and other packing material relying on the decision of the Tribunal in the appellant's own case in T.A. No. 611 of 1990 and batch dated September 9, 1993. For these eight assessment years, the Appellate Deputy Commissioner had granted relief in respect of cartons and other packing material relying on the decision of the Tribunal in the appellant's own case in T.A. No. 611 of 1990 and batch dated September 9, 1993. The Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, issued common show-cause notice dated January 29, 1999 proposing to set aside the relief granted by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner on cartons, etc., and, on receipt of the appellant's objections thereto, passed orders dated February 27, 1999 holding that the appellant had not placed any material before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner to conclude regarding the independent transaction in packing material and that the Appellate Deputy Commissioner should have remanded the matter on cartons and packing material also on par with the bottles. The Commissioner observed that the decision of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, relied upon by the appellant, would only apply for that assessment year and could not be accepted as a principle. He remanded the matters with a direction to the appellant to appear before the assessing authority with all material evidence in his possession. The Commissioner further observed that, if required, the assessing authority should also visit the office of the appellant to enable them to produce all the records, that he should conduct proper verification and pass orders thereafter. Before us, the order of the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, is under challenge. Sri S. Dwarakanath, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that the scope of revision under section 20(1) of the APGST Act is confined only to an examination of the record of any order or proceeding recorded by any authority subordinate to him; that the scope of enquiry was limited only to the material on record and that a new case could not be made out for the first time in revisional proceedings. Learned counsel would submit that there is no material on record to show that cartons and other packing material used by the dealer are mono-cartons and not secondary packing material and, since the assessing authority had not recorded any finding that the packing material used by the appellant was mono-cartons, the revisional authority had exceeded his jurisdiction in remanding the matter back to the assessing authority to ascertain facts afresh since the scope of revision under section 20(1) was confined only to an examination of the material on record. Learned counsel would rely on Manepalli Venkatanarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1959] 10 STC 524 (AP), Menta Narasimhaswamy & Company v. State of A.P. [1983] 54 STC 6 (AP), I.T.C. Ltd. (I.B.D. Division) v. Deputy Commissioner (CT), Gundur Division [2003] 129 STC 104 (AP) and Bayya Pitchaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1969] 24 STC 390 (AP). Learned counsel would further contend that, under section 20(2A) of the APGST Act, the power under sub-section (1) of section 20 could not be exercised by the authority in respect of "any issue or question", which was the subject-matter of appeal before, or which was decided in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal under section 21 of the Act. Learned counsel would submit that, since the Tribunal had already taken a particular view in the appeals filed by the appellants in T.A. No. 611 of 1990 and batch dated September 9, 1993, which order had become final, the decision of the Tribunal on the same issue/question expressly barred the Commissioner from exercising jurisdiction under section 20(1) of the Act. Learned counsel would submit that the Commissioner had made no efforts to distinguish how the facts involved in the appeals before the Tribunal was different from the cases before him and that he had acted contrary to the law laid down by the Full Bench of this court in Indo National Limited v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, A.P., Hyderabad [2004] 136 STC 586. Learned counsel would submit that the Division Bench of this court in Sri Satya Winery & Distillery Pvt. Ltd. v. State of A.P. [2006] 145 STC 399 had specifically held that cartons, which are secondary packing material, had to be taxed independently under entry 19 of the First Schedule and not at the same rate at which its contents are taxed. According to the learned counsel, the facts of this case would also disclose that the cartons used were only secondary packing material and, since they could only have been taxed independently under entry 19, there was no need for an order of remand. Learned counsel would submit that reliance placed by the Commissioner on Premier Breweries v. State of Kerala [1998] 108 STC 598 (SC) was misplaced since section 5(5) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act was not identical to section 6C of the APGST Act. Learned counsel would submit that reliance placed by the Commissioner on Premier Breweries v. State of Kerala [1998] 108 STC 598 (SC) was misplaced since section 5(5) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act was not identical to section 6C of the APGST Act. On the other hand, learned Special Government Pleader for Commercial Taxes would contend that, since the Appellate Deputy Commissioner, while granting relief to the appellant, had not ascertained whether the packing material used was mono-cartons (primary packing material), or secondary packing material, the Commissioner was justified in revising the order and remanding the matter back to the assessing authority to enable him to ascertain whether the cartons used were primary or secondary packing material. Learned Special Government Pleader would fairly state that, while secondary packing material was liable to be taxed independently under entry 19 of the First Schedule to the APGST Act in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this court in Sri Satya Winery & Distillery Pvt. Ltd. [2006] 145 STC 399 mono-cartons (primary packing material) were liable to be taxed at the same rate as that of liquor or beer as the case may be. Learned Special Government Pleader would submit that the Commissioner had merely remanded the matter back to the assessing authority to ascertain these facts and that he had not acted contrary to the judgment of the Full Bench of this court in Indo National Limited [2004] 136 STC 586. He would contend that the expression "any issue or question", in sub-section (2A) of section 20, related only to issues or questions of law and not of fact and as the order of the Commissioner, in remanding the matter back to the Tribunal, was only to ascertain facts, the order of the Tribunal in T.A. Nos. 611 of 1990 and batch dated September 9, 1993 did not bar him from exercising jurisdiction under section 20(1) of the APGST Act. Learned Special Government Pleader would contend that the order passed by the assessing authority in a particular assessment year would not constitute res judicata for subsequent years. 611 of 1990 and batch dated September 9, 1993 did not bar him from exercising jurisdiction under section 20(1) of the APGST Act. Learned Special Government Pleader would contend that the order passed by the assessing authority in a particular assessment year would not constitute res judicata for subsequent years. He would rely on Instalment Supply (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India [1961] 12 STC 489 (SC), M. M. Ipoh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras [1968] 67 ITR 106 (SC), Dwarkadas Kesardeo Morarka v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Bombay [1962] 44 ITR 529 (SC) and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Mysore Breweries Limited, Vijayawada [1999] 29 APSTJ 142. Section 20 : Scope of revision : Does the Commissioner have the power to remand the matter to the assessing authority to make an enquiry ? It is true that a Division Bench of this court in Manepalli Venkatanarayana [1959] 10 STC 524 observed that section 20 sets certain limitations within which the power of revision should be exercised, that the revisional authority could correct an order of assessment only in the light of the material that was available to the assessing authority, that the power of revision was not of such wide amplitude as to enable the revising authority to correct assessments based on information subsequently gathered, that the revising authority must confine itself to the material already on record and cannot call for fresh evidence and determine the assessment on the strength of it and, while the legality or the propriety of the order under revision could be judged with reference to the material on record, i.e., the entire assessment file upon which the order questioned had been and could be based, it did not authorise the authority concerned to go beyond the record. It is, however, necessary to note that section 20 of the APGST Act, which fell for consideration in Manepalli Venkatanarayana [1959] 10 STC 524 (AP), was amended subsequently. It is useful in this context to refer to section 20 of the Act, the scope of which fell for consideration in Manepalli Venkatanarayana [1959] 10 STC 524 (AP) and the section as it reads subsequent to its amendment. It is useful in this context to refer to section 20 of the Act, the scope of which fell for consideration in Manepalli Venkatanarayana [1959] 10 STC 524 (AP) and the section as it reads subsequent to its amendment. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Pre-amended section 20(1) Amended section 20(1) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Board of Revenue may suo The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes motu call for and examine the record may suo motu call for the examine the of any order passed or proceeding record of any order passed or proceeding recorded by any authority, officer or recorded by any authority, officer or person subordinate to it, under the person subordinate to it, under the provisions of this Act, including provisions of this Act, including sub-section sub-section (2) of this section, for (2) of this section and, if such order the purpose of satisfying itself as to or proceeding recorded is prejudicial to the legality or propriety of such the interests of the Revenue, may make order or as to the regularity of such such enquiry, or cause such enquiry to proceeding and may pass such order be made and subject to the provisions of in reference thereto as it thinks fit. this Act, may initiate proceedings to revise, modify or set aside such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- While the words "Commissioner of Commercial Taxes" were substituted for the words "Board or Revenue" by Act 14 of 1978 with effect from January 17, 1978, the words "and if such order or proceeding recorded is prejudicial to the interest of Revenue, may make such enquiry, or cause such enquiry to be made and subject to the provisions of this Act, may initiate proceedings to revise, modify or set aside such order or proceeding" were substituted for the words "for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such proceeding" by Act 18 of 1985 with effect from July 1, 1985. Even prior to the amendment of section 20(1), by Act 18 of 1985, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in State of Madras v. Louis Dreyfus and Company Ltd. [1955] 6 STC 318, while dealing with section 12 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 and rule 14(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939 (prior to its amendment), which relate to the power of revision akin to section 20(1) of the APGST Act, held that rule 14(2) was directed to the correction of improper or illegal assessment orders which had levied less or more tax than justified and dealt with escaped assessment. The Full Bench held that the expression "record of any order passed" meant the record of assessment including the assessment order as well as other files of the assessing authority which would furnish the basis upon which the assessment order and if, from a perusal of the record or the assessment files, the revising authority could find that the turnover was before the assessing officer, it was competent for it to pronounce upon the legality or propriety of the assessment order. Section 12(1) and (2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Act 9 of 1939), which confers the power of revision, and section 19(1) and (2) thereof which is the rule-making power, though not identical, are similar to sections 20(1) and (2) and 39(1) and (2) of the APGST Act, 1957, respectively. The scope of sections 12 and 19 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 fell for consideration in State of Kerala v. K.M. Cheria Abdulla and Company [1965] 16 STC 875 and the Supreme Court observed : "Turning then to the jurisdiction which the revising authority may exercise under section 12(2), attention must first be directed to the phraseology used by the Legislature. The Deputy Commissioner is thereby invested with power to satisfy himself about the legality or propriety of any order passed or proceeding recorded by any officer subordinate to him, or the regularity of any proceeding of such officer, and to pass such orders with respect thereto as he thinks it. For exercising this power, he may suo motu or on application call for and examine the record of any proceeding or order. For exercising this power, he may suo motu or on application call for and examine the record of any proceeding or order. There is no doubt that the revising authority may only call for the record of the order or the proceeding, and the record alone may be scrutinised for ascertaining the legality or propriety of an order or regularity of the proceeding. But there is nothing in the Act that for passing an order in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction, if the revising authority is satisfied that the subordinate officer has committed an illegality or impropriety in the order or irregularity in the proceeding, he cannot make or direct any further enquiry. The words of sub-section (2) of section 12 that the Deputy Commissioner 'may pass such order with respect thereto as he thinks fit' mean such order as may in the circumstances of the case for rectifying the defect be regarded by him as just. Power to pass such order as the revising authority thinks fit may in some cases include power to make or direct such further enquiry as the Deputy Commissioner may find necessary for rectifying the illegality or impropriety of the order, or irregularity in the proceeding. It is therefore not right baldly to propound that in passing an order in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction, the Deputy Commissioner must in all cases be restricted to the record maintained by the officer subordinate to him, and can never make enquiry outside that record. In our view the amplitude of the power conferred by sub-section (1) and illustrated by sub-section (2) of section 19 takes in the power to provide for making further enquiry enabling the revising authority to exercise his powers, and unless the power so conferred expressly or by clear implication nullifies or is inconsistent with any provision of the Act, it must be regarded as validly exercised. Conferment of power to make further enquiry in cases where, after being satisfied about the illegality or impropriety of the order or irregularity in the proceeding, the revising authority thinks it just for rectifying the defect to do so does not amount to enlarging the jurisdiction conferred by section 12(2). Conferment of power to make further enquiry in cases where, after being satisfied about the illegality or impropriety of the order or irregularity in the proceeding, the revising authority thinks it just for rectifying the defect to do so does not amount to enlarging the jurisdiction conferred by section 12(2). ..." The decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Louis Dreyfus and Company Ltd. [1955] 6 STC 318 was followed by a Full Bench of this court in Bayya Pitchaiah [1969] 24 STC 390. In Bayya Pitchaiah [1969] 24 STC 390 (AP), the assessee contented that the power under section 20 was not available to increase the taxable turnover and that such an increase amounted to redetermination of the turnover to the best of judgment which could not be done under section 20. The Full Bench held that the power of revision could not be so whittled down. Following the judgment of the Full Bench of this court in Bayya Pitchaiah [1969] 24 STC 390, a Division Bench of this court in Menta Narasimhaswamy & Company [1983] 54 STC 6 while holding that the earlier decision in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sri Rama Laxmi Satyanarayana Rice Mill [1975] 35 STC 601 (AP), which laid down the principle that a question not considered by the assessing authority could not be revised under section 20, was arrived at without noticing the judgment of the Full Bench in Bayya Pitchaiah [1969] 24 STC 390 (AP), further observed : "... Section 20 contemplates revising the order or proceeding of a subordinate authority, on the material available at the time of assessment. Under section 20, the legality, propriety and regularity of an order is examined on the material upon which it was passed. ... In exercise of this power, the revising authority can direct such subordinate authority to make such further enquiry as it may direct. ..." As noted above section 20(1) of the APGST Act, consequent upon its amendment by Act 18 of 1985 with effect from July 1, 1985, enables the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, if he finds that the order under revision is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, to make such enquiry or cause such enquiry to be made as also to modify the order. The only restriction on the power of the Commissioner, in making an enquiry, or in causing an enquiry to be made, is that he should satisfy himself that the order or proceeding is prejudicial to the interests of Revenue. Unless the revising authority satisfies himself that an order or proceeding of the subordinate authority which he proposes to revise is prejudicial to the interests of Revenue, he cannot assume the jurisdiction conferred under sub-section (1). The satisfaction that the order or a proceeding sought to be revised is prejudicial to the interests of Revenue is not only a jurisdictional fact to exercise the revisional power, but it also operates as a limitation on the power of the authority exercising the revisional power under sub-section (1). I.T.C. Ltd. (I.B.D. Division) [2003] 129 STC 104 (AP). In his revisional order, the Commissioner observed that the order of the Appellate Deputy Commissioner was prejudicial to the interests of Revenue. It is not even the case of the appellant that the order of the Appellate Deputy Commissioner is not an order prejudicial to the interests of Revenue or the conclusion of the Commissioner, that it is so, is perverse. Once the Commissioner records his satisfaction that the order is prejudicial to the interests of Revenue, he has the power under the amended section 20(1), to cause necessary enquiry to be made. The contention of Sri S. Dwarakanath, learned counsel for the appellant, that the scope of enquiry is limited only to the material on record and that the revisional authority does not have the power to remand the matter back to the assessing authority to ascertain necessary facts does not, therefore, merit acceptance. The contention of Sri S. Dwarakanath, learned counsel for the appellant, that the scope of enquiry is limited only to the material on record and that the revisional authority does not have the power to remand the matter back to the assessing authority to ascertain necessary facts does not, therefore, merit acceptance. Relying on the judgments in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Narendra Doshi [2002] 254 ITR 606 (SC), Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shivsagar Estate [2002] 257 ITR 59 (SC), Union of India v. Kaumudini Narayan Dalal [2001] 249 ITR 219 (SC) and Berger Paints India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [2004] 266 ITR 99 (SC), Sri S. Dwarakanath, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that, if the Revenue did not accept the correctness of the judgment of the Tribunal, it could have preferred revisions/appeals there against and, having accepted or permitted the order of the Tribunal to attain finality, it was not open to the Revenue to differentiate the case of the assessee with another or in the case of the very same assessee for different assessment years. On the other hand, the learned Special Government Pleader for Commercial Taxes would submit that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply so as to make a decision on a question of fact or law in a proceeding for assessment in one year binding in another year, that the assessment and the facts found are conclusive only in the year of assessment, that the findings on questions of fact may be good and cogent evidence in subsequent years, when the same question falls to be determined in another year, but they are not binding and conclusive, M. M. Ipoh [1968] 67 ITR 106 (SC), Society of Medical Officer of Health v. Hope (Valuation Officer) [1960] AC 551 (H.L.) approving and following the decision of the Privy Council in Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Council of Broken Hill [1926] AC 94, Instalment Supply (Private) Ltd. [1961] 12 STC 489 (SC), Dwarkadas Kesardeo Morarka [1962] 44 ITR 529 (SC), Doma Sao Mohanlal v. State of Bihar [1971] 27 STC 473 (SC), Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India Limited v. Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Visakhapatnam [1978] 42 STC 372 (AP), and that an order of assessment or an order of the Appellate Tribunal on appeal fixing the liability to tax in a particular year does not operate as res judicata or estoppel so as to prevent that decision from being reopened in assessments for subsequent years. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Massey & Company [1929] 56 MLJ 451, State of Andhra v. Arisetty Sriramulu [1957] 8 STC 153 (AP) [FB]. We do not, however, consider it necessary to express any opinion on this question as it is evident from the order of the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes dated February 27, 1999 that revision of the order, of the Appellate Deputy Commissioner, was not without just cause. The Commissioner observed that the appellant had not placed any material before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner which would have enabled him to come to a conclusion on the issue in the light of the criteria brought out by the Supreme Court in Premier Breweries [1998] 108 STC 598 and that, in the absence of any such material, the Appellate Deputy Commissioner should not have accepted the plea of the appellant and should have remanded the matter back to the assessing authority as he had done in the case of bottles. The Commissioner was of the view that it was just and proper to give the appellant an opportunity to produce all material available in support of its contention before the assessing authority and that the assessing authority should conduct proper verification and pass necessary orders. The order of the Appellate Deputy Commissioner was revised since he had given relief even though the appellant had not placed any material before him. It is in such circumstances that the Commissioner considered it appropriate to remand the matter back to the assessing authority to enable him to conduct proper verification on the material evidence to be produced by the appellant. The order of the Commissioner remanding the matters back to the assessing authority to cause verification/enquiry cannot, therefore, be said to be without just cause. The order of the Commissioner remanding the matters back to the assessing authority to cause verification/enquiry cannot, therefore, be said to be without just cause. Section 20(2A) : Its scope : Extent to which it curtails the power of revision under section 20(1) and (2) : It must, however, not be lost sight of that while sub-section (1) of section 20 is no doubt of wide amplitude, the revisional power of the Commissioner in terms of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is curtailed by sub-section (2A). It is well-settled that the Legislature, which has provided for a right of appeal or revision, can also create such a right to a party to the lis subject to fulfilment of certain conditions. It can also grant a limited revisional power to a higher authority. As the power of revision, vested in the Commissioner, is circumscribed under sub-section (2A) of section 20 of the Act, something may not be read therein which would widen the power of the Commissioner to such an extent whereby the purport and object of sub-section (2A) would itself be defeated. Irrespective of whether principles of res judicata are applicable or not, section 20(2A) bars exercise of the revisional jurisdiction by the Commissioner, if the "issue or question" has already been decided by the Appellate Tribunal in relation to the earlier assessment year. The words "issue or question" are of wide amplitude. An issue or question may arise in relation to the self-same assessee in respect of any assessment year or it may arise after some years in relation to some other assessee. If such issue or question was the subject-matter of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, or if it had been decided by the Appellate Tribunal under section 21, sub-section (2A) of section 20 would preclude its being the subject-matter of revision under sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Act. A question or issue may be on fact or in law. Where it involves a question or issue of fact, the same may be held to be confined to that particular order and, in relation to another assessment year, the fact may be different. But if the issue or question relates to a point of law, the intention of the Legislature appears to be that the assessee should not be vexed on such questions again and again. But if the issue or question relates to a point of law, the intention of the Legislature appears to be that the assessee should not be vexed on such questions again and again. If a question or issue decided by the Appellate Tribunal is in conflict with the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court, naturally, the latter will prevail. Except in such circumstances the Commissioner, on a plain reading of the aforementioned provisions, must be held to be bound by the decision of the Tribunal on a question of law. (Indo National Limited [2004] 136 STC 586 (AP) [FB]). What is, therefore, necessary to examine is whether the revisional powers exercised by the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes in the present batch of cases is on a question of fact or of law. (Indo National Limited [2004] 136 STC 586 (AP) [FB]). What is, therefore, necessary to examine is whether the revisional powers exercised by the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes in the present batch of cases is on a question of fact or of law. In his order dated February 27, 1999, the Commissioner noted that during the 14 assessment years referred to in his order, the assessee had manufactured liquor and sold bottled liquor in cartons, that the invoice price was split up separately into value for liquor, bottles, cartons and other packing material, that the assessing authority had applied the rate of tax applicable to liquor on the turnover relating to bottles, cartons and other packing material under section 6C of the Act, that in all the appeals the disputed turnovers included turnover relating to cartons and other packing material, that the Appellate Deputy Commissioner had allowed the appeals on these two items of disputed turnovers and held that cartons were liable to tax under entry 19 of the First Schedule and that other packing material should be assessed as unclassified goods, that the order of the Appellate Deputy Commissioner had been examined with reference to law and the records and was found to be incorrect and prejudicial to the interests of State revenue warranting revision under section 20(1) of the APGST Act on the allowed part of the appeal relating to the turnover of cartons and other packing material since the Appellate Deputy Commissioner had held that the corrugated boxes (cartons) purchased by the assessee from within the State and/or outside the State were not sold along with liquor as evidenced by separate sale prices shown in the invoices, that mere splitting up of the price into various components would not lead to the conclusion that there was a separate agreement for sale of cartons, that it was not in dispute that the assessee had sold liquor bottles packed in cartons and when bottled liquor was sold in cartons it amounted to integrated sale of liquor attracting levy under section 6C of the Act. With regards the turnover relating to other packing material, the Commissioner observed that they included items like cost of pp-caps, adhesive labels, labels, gum, etc., that all these items were essential to make the bottled liquor safe and identifiable as per the requirements under the excise law, that they had neither independent usage nor could they be reused and that the Appellate Deputy Commissioner had erred in classifying them as general goods contrary to the provisions of section 6C of the Act. As noted above, the Commissioner set aside the allowed portion of the order of the Appellate Deputy Commissioner, on the disputed turnover relating to the value of cartons and other packing material, and remanded the matter to the assessing authority to ascertain facts since the assessee had not placed any material evidence before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner. Since the order of remand is only on a question of fact, and not of law, section 20(2A) would not prohibit the revisional authority from passing such an order merely because an issue of law relating to the same assessee had been decided by the Tribunal earlier. The bar under section 20(2A) of the APGST Act has, therefore, no application to the facts of the present case. While the contention of Sri S. Dwarakanath, learned counsel for the appellant, that the Commissioner could not have placed reliance on Premier Breweries [1998] 108 STC 598 (SC), since section 5(5) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act was not in pari materia with section 6C of the APGST Act, may have necessitated further enquiry, we are saved the trouble of doing so since the learned Special Government Pleader has fairly stated that, in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this court in Sri Satya Winery & Distillery Pvt. Ltd. [2006] 145 STC 399 (AP), it is only mono-cartons (primary packing material), and not secondary packing material, which are liable to tax at the same rate as that of liquor/beer. We, accordingly, hold that the assessing authority shall, in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this court in Sri Satya Winery & Distillery Pvt. Ltd. [2006] 145 STC 399, examine the records of the appellant and verify whether the cartons used are mono-cartons (primary packing material) or secondary packing material. We, accordingly, hold that the assessing authority shall, in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this court in Sri Satya Winery & Distillery Pvt. Ltd. [2006] 145 STC 399, examine the records of the appellant and verify whether the cartons used are mono-cartons (primary packing material) or secondary packing material. It needs no emphasis that it is only if they are held to be mono-cartons (primary packing material) would they attract tax at the same rate as that of its contents. If, however, they are found to be secondary packing material then they are liable to be taxed independently under entry 19 of the First Schedule to the APGST Act. Subject to the observations aforementioned, the appeals fail and are accordingly, dismissed.