ORDER (Per V.V.S. Rao, J.) Introduction Petitioners are Judicial Officers in the rank of District Judge Grade-II. They are governed by Andhra Pradesh State Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1958 (Higher Judicial Rules, for brevity). Both of them were initially appointed as District Munsiffs (redesignated as Junior Civil Judges), to State Judicial Service regulated by Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service Rules, 1962 (Judicial Rules, for brevity). They were promoted as Senior Civil Judges, and later they were appointed by transfer as District Judges Grade-II to Higher Judicial Service. Government of Andhra Pradesh acting on the recommendation of High Court of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O.Ms.No.87, dated 28.07.2007, and G.O.Ms.No.32, dated 07.04.2007, compulsorily retiring them with effect from last day of the month in which orders were passed. As these orders were issued in purported exercise of powers under first proviso or second proviso to subsection (1A) of Section 3 of Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984 (Parent Act, for brevity), as amended by A.P.Act No.42 of 2006, petitioners while impugning Government Orders also challenge first and second provisos to Section 3(1A) of the Parent Act as ultra vires the Constitution of India. The impugned first proviso empowered the State Government to compulsorily retire members of judicial service at the age of fifty years or fifty five years or fifty eight years or thirty three years of qualifying service, if such officer is found not fit and eligible to be continued in service. Second proviso empowers the State Government to retire an officer in public interest after giving three months notice in writing or three months of pay in lieu of such notice. Reference to Full Bench 2. W.P.No.16437 of 2007 initially came up before a Division Bench. In Motiram Deka v General Manager, North East Frontier Railwai (hereafter referred to as Motiram), inter alia it was laid down that the rule permitting to compulsorily retire a civil servant without imposing limitation as to minimum period of service would violate Article 311 (2) of Constitution of India. In view of this, Division Bench thought it fit to refer entire case to Full Bench to consider two issues. In view of this, Division Bench thought it fit to refer entire case to Full Bench to consider two issues. As the entire case is referred to Full Bench and not a mere question for an answer, it is appropriate for this Bench to consider gamut of controversy and points for consideration that are thrown up, in the background of pleadings and rival submissions. Points for consideration 3. Four points would arise for consideration. (i) Whether first proviso to Sec. 3(1 A) of Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984, as amended by A.P.Act No.42 of 2006, insofar as the same enables the Government to compulsorily retire a judicial officer on attaining the age of fifty years or fifty five years, if he is found not fit and eligible to be continued in service is ultra vires and violative of Articles 14 and 311 (2) of Constitution of India? (ii) Whether second proviso to Section 3( 1 A) of Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984, as amended by A.P.Act No.42 of 2006, is ultra vires and violative of Articles 14 and 311 (2) of Constitution of India? (iii) Whether impugned order of the Government in G.O.Ms.No.87, dated 28.07.2007, whereunder the petitioner in W.P.No.16437 of 2007 was ordered to compulsorily retire from service with effect from 31.07.2007 in terms of second proviso to Section 3(1A), is unconstitutional and invalid? (iv) Whether impugned order of the Government in G.O.Ms.No.32, dated 07.04.2007, whereunder the petitioner in W.P.No.18123 of 2007 was ordered to compulsorily retire from service with effect from 30.04.2007 in terms of first proviso to Section 3(A) of the Act, is unconstitutional and invalid? Legal Context 4. A brief history of relevant legislation is necessary to understand the background of the case and the controversy that has arisen for adjudication. Fundamental Rules govern age of superannuation of public servant. The appointment, pay, grant of increments, leave and disciplinary control are also regulated by Fundamental Rules, 1922. FR 56(a) of Andhra Pradesh Fundamental Rules and Rule 231 of Hyderabad Civil Service Rules prescribed superannuation age of fifty five years. This was enhanced from fifty five to fifty eight years in 1979 (fifty eight to sixty years for last grade service). Five years thereafter, Parent Act was enacted. FR 56(a) of Andhra Pradesh Fundamental Rules and Rule 231 of Hyderabad Civil Service Rules prescribed superannuation age of fifty five years. This was enhanced from fifty five to fifty eight years in 1979 (fifty eight to sixty years for last grade service). Five years thereafter, Parent Act was enacted. Section 3 thereof provided that every Government employee not being a workman shall retire from service at the age of fifty five years. When the Act was challenged, its constitutional validity WCJS upheld by Supreme Court in K.Nagaraj v State of Andhra Pradesh. 5. Even while Nagaraf was pending before Supreme Court, State of Andhra Pradesh promulgated A.P.Ordinance NO.24 of 1984 amending Section 3(1) of Parent Act providing that every Government employee shall retire at the age of fifty eight years. Subsequently, the same was enacted as Act NO.3 of 1985 (hereafter called, first Amendment Act). This, however, made the benefit of upward revision of retirement age inapplicable to those persons who had retired pursuant to the provisions of Parent Act. This impacted another round of litigation. The legislative policy excluding the retirees from the application of first Amendment Act did not find favour with Supreme Court. In B.Prabhakar Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh4, Supreme Court invalidated offending provisions in first Amendment Act. 6. Higher Judicial Rules are the Rules made by State Government in exercise of powers conferred by Article 233 of Constitution and the proviso to Article 309 of Constitution. District and Sessions Judges Grade-I and District and Sessions Judges Grade-II constitute service governed by these Rules. Junior Civil Judges, Senior Civil Judges and Judicial Magistrates of II Class constitute separate judicial service and are regulated by Judicial Rules promulgated by the State in exercise of powers under Article 234 read with proviso to Article 309 of Constitutions. In the matter of pay, allowances, leave, leave salary and other conditions of service, members of these services are also regulated by other service Rules6 promulgated by the Government under proviso to Article 309 of Constitution. The members of judicial service are to retire at the age of fifty eight years as per Section 3 of Parent Act as modified by first Amendment Act, which is also applicable to all judicial officers. Turning Point 7. There occurred turning point in judicial service benefiting all members of judicial service in the matter of age of superannuation. The members of judicial service are to retire at the age of fifty eight years as per Section 3 of Parent Act as modified by first Amendment Act, which is also applicable to all judicial officers. Turning Point 7. There occurred turning point in judicial service benefiting all members of judicial service in the matter of age of superannuation. This happened in 1993 resulting in "betterment of service conditions of subordinate judiciary". In AI/India Judges' Association v. Union of India? (hereafter referred to as All India Judges' Association-I) inter alia Supreme Court directed to raise the age of superannuation of judicial officers in the country to sixty years. Yet again, when Union of India sought review, in All India Judges' Association v. Union of India.8 (hereafter referred to as All India Judges' Association-II), the apex Court affirmed earlier decision and further directed that the enhancement from fifty eight to sixty years would be subject to High Court finding an officer fit to be of continued utility for judicial service, even after fifty eight years of age or else he should be compulsorily retired at fifty eight years. We do not propose to excerpt passages from these two very important cases. But, to the benefit of all, we may quote binding conclusions of these two cases as noticed by a Division Bench of Supreme Court in Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (hereafter referred to as Bishwanath Prasad Singh). 1. Direction with regard to the enhancement of superannuation age of judicial officers given in AI/India Judges Association v. Union of India [ (1993) 4 SCC 288 ] does not result in automatic enhancement of the age of superannuation. By force of the judgment a judicial officer does not acquire a right to continue in service up to the extended age of 60 years. It is only a benefit conferred on the judicial officers subject to an evaluation as to their continued utility to the judicial system to be carried out by the respective High Courts before attaining the age of 58 years and formation of an opinion as to their potential for their continued useful service. Else the judicial officers retire at the superannuation age appointed in the service rules governing conditions of services of the judicial officers. 2. Else the judicial officers retire at the superannuation age appointed in the service rules governing conditions of services of the judicial officers. 2. The direction given in 1993 case is by way of ad hoc arrangement so as to operate in the interregnum, commencing the date of judgment and until an appropriate amendment is made in the service rules by the State Government. Once the service rules governing superannuation age have been amended, the direction ceases to operate. 3. The High Court may, before or after the normal age of superannuation, compulsorily retire a judicial officer subject to formation of an opinion that compulsory retirement in public interest was needed. The decision to compulsorily retire must be in accordance with relevant service rules independent of the exercise for evaluation of judicial officer made pursuant to 1993 case. Recommendation for compulsory retirement shall have to be sent to State Government which would pass and deliver the necessary orders. 4. If the High Court finds a judicial officer not entitled to the benefit of extension in superannuation age he would retire at the age of superannuation appointed by the service rules. No specific order or communication in that regard is called for either by the High Court or by the Governor of the State. Such retirement is not "compulsory retirement" in the sense of its being by way of penalty in disciplinary proceedings or even by way of "compulsory retirement in public interest". No right of the judicial officer is taken away. Where the High Court may choose to make any communication in this regard, it would be better advised not to use therein the expression "compulsory retirement". It creates confusion. It would suffice to communicate, if at all, that the officer concerned, having been found not fit for being given the benefit or extended age of superannuation, would stand retired at the normal age or date of superannuation. 8. The decision in All India Judges' Association-II (8 supra) led to second amendment of Parent Act. Sub-section (1 A) with two provisos and explanation were added after sub-section (1) of Section 3 of Parent Act. Sub-section (1) provides that every Government employee not being a workman shall retire at the age of fifty eight years. Sub-section (1 A) is a special provision with non-obstante clause. Sub-section (1 A) with two provisos and explanation were added after sub-section (1) of Section 3 of Parent Act. Sub-section (1) provides that every Government employee not being a workman shall retire at the age of fifty eight years. Sub-section (1 A) is a special provision with non-obstante clause. It provides that every member of Higher Judicial Service or Judicial Service shall retire at the age of sixty years. This is, however, subject to - as provided by first proviso; the High Court finding such officer fit to be continued. Such assessment and evaluation has to be undertaken before a judicial officer attains the age of fifty eight years. Second proviso gives an option to the member of service to retire at the age of fifty eight years, exercising such choice in writing before he attains age of fifty seven years. 9. The next important step is the impugned A.P.Act No.42 of 2006 (hereafter called, third Amendment Act). The impugned Act excluding the short title provision, contained only one Section. Sub-section (1A) of Section 3 of Parent Act remained intact but while retaining the second proviso to Section 3(1A) of Parent Act, the legislature substituted the first proviso and inserted another proviso. After such amendment, Section 3 with sub-sections (1), (1 A) and provisos reads as under. 3. Age of Superannuation:- (1) Every Government employee, not being a workman and not belonging to Last Grade Service shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of fifty eight years. After such amendment, Section 3 with sub-sections (1), (1 A) and provisos reads as under. 3. Age of Superannuation:- (1) Every Government employee, not being a workman and not belonging to Last Grade Service shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of fifty eight years. (1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), every member of the Andhra Pradesh State Higher Judicial Service or the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of sixty years; Provided that any such member of the Andhra Pradesh State Higher Judicial Service or the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service may be compulsorily retired from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of fifty years or fifty five years or fifty eight years or thirty three years of qualifying service, if he is found not fit and eligible to be continued in service by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, on an assessment and evaluation of the record of such member for his continued utility, well within time, before he attains the age of fifty years or fifty five years or fifty -eight years or thirty three years of qualifying service. Provided further that any member of service after giving three months notice in writing or three months of pay and allowances in lieu of notice may be required to retire in public interest from service on the date on which such member attains the age of fifty years of fifty five years or fifty eight years or thirty three years of qualifying service or any date thereafter to be specified in the notice. Provided further also that any such member of the Andhra Pradesh State Higher Judicial Service or the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service at his option to be exercised in writing before he attains the age of fifty seven years may retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of fifty years. Explanation:- The assessment and evaluation by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for the purposes of this subsection is in addition to and independent of the assessment for compulsory retirement that may have to be undertaken at any other time under the relevant rules applicable to such members of the Andhra Pradesh State Higher Judicial Service or the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service. (Amendments by AP Act No.46 of 2006 are shown in highlighted italics) Analysis of First Proviso to Section 3(1A) 10. Parent Act as modified by second amendment pursuant to All India Judges' Association-II (8 supra) conferred the benefit of extended age of superannuation from fifty eight years to sixty years subject to the condition that record of the Judicial Officer for his continued utility should be assessed and evaluated by the High Court within time before an officer attains the age of fifty seven (sic. eight) years by following the procedure for compulsory retirement under the applicable Rules. Judicial career review for the purpose of giving the benefit of extended superannuation age was to be undertaken only after the officer attains the age of fifty seven years and if he is found fit he may be continued upto' age of sixty years. The impugned provision also requires an assessment of the record by High Court. But, the provision is silent as to the procedure to be followed for such assessment and evaluation of the record of the officer. Admittedly High Court is following procedure for compulsory retirement, while extending the benefit of superannuation age of fifty eight years to sixty years. Hence, the same is not a contentious issue in these writ petitions. It is agreed by all that the procedure followed for non-punitive compulsory retirement is also adopted by High court while taking up assessment and evaluation of record of member of judicial service for extending the benefit of enhanced age of superannuation. 11. The first proviso mandates judicial I officers career review at the age of fifty years, fifty five years or fifty eight years. Such career review is also required after an officer completes thirty three years of qualifying service. The first proviso speaks of compulsory retirement at the 'age of fifty years or fifty five years or fifty eight years or thirty three years of qualifying service'. Such career review is also required after an officer completes thirty three years of qualifying service. The first proviso speaks of compulsory retirement at the 'age of fifty years or fifty five years or fifty eight years or thirty three years of qualifying service'. This, by ordinary meaning, would mean that in the career of a judicial officer there can be career review for the purpose of compulsory retirement at four stages. It might be argued that such career review should be undertaken when an officer completes fifty years of age or thirty three years of qualifying service, fifty five years of age or thirty three years of qualifying service or fifty eight years of age or thirty three years of qualifying service. The words 'qualifying service in the first proviso' would mean the service, which qualifies an officer for pension and other retirement benefits. A person who is compulsorily retired under first proviso - say; at the age of fifty years can never have thirty three years of qualifying service, even when such officer enters service at the age of twenty one years. In such a case, after thirty three years, the officer would have completed fifty four years. Be that as it is, the proviso mandates the assessment and evaluatron of record of an officer likely to attain the age of fifty years or fifty five years or fifty eight years of age well within time before he attains such age. The first proviso to Section 3(1 A) of Parent Act prior to impugned amendment provided that a member of judicial service may be compulsorily retired when he attains the age of fifty eight years if he is found unfit for extending the age of superannuation. It does not contain the words 'fifty eight years of age or thirty three years of qualifying service'. Analysis of Second Proviso to Section 3(1A) 12. A member of judicial service can be ordered to retire in public interest on the day on which such member attains the age of fifty years or fifty five years or fifty eight years or thirty three years of qualifying service. Here again, the phrase 'on the date on which such member attains age of fifty years or fifty five years or fifty eight years or thirty three years of qualifying service' would possibly have same meaning as in the case of first proviso. Here again, the phrase 'on the date on which such member attains age of fifty years or fifty five years or fifty eight years or thirty three years of qualifying service' would possibly have same meaning as in the case of first proviso. Be that as it is, a member can be asked to retire in public interest not only on the day when he attains the specified age but also on "any date thereafter", to be specified in the notice of three months or payment of three months pay in lieu thereof. The provision is silent as to whether the 'retirement' under second proviso is non- punitive compulsory retirement. !t is also not clear whether before giving three months notice of retirement, assessment and evaluation of the record has to be undertaken or not. The respondents submit that even where a judicial officer is retired under second proviso to Section 3(1 A), the High Court is undertaking assessment and evaluation of the record of judicial officer concerned. In Re point No.1 13. The submission of learned counsel in both the writ petitions is that the first proviso insofar as it enables compulsory retirement of a judicial officer at 'the age of fifty years or fifty five years' is unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14 and 311 (2) of Constitution of India. They would also urge that it is arbitrary and irrational. They would further submit that to that extent first proviso is contrary to the Judgment of Supreme Court in All India Judges' Association-I and II and Bishwanath Prasad Singh (7,8 and 9 supra). The learned standing counsel for High Court submits that the power of Government to compulsory retire a judicial officer at the age of fifty eight years if he is not found fit for continued utility for extending superannuation age of sixty years, is in accordance with law laid down by Supreme Court in AI/India Judges' Association-If (8 supra). The compulsory retirement of judicial officer at the age of fifty years or fifty five years is in accordance with the recommendation of First National Judicial Pay Commission (hereafter referred to as Justice Shetty Commission) as well as observations of Supreme Court in Nawal Singh v. State of UP.,10 (hereafter referred to as Nawal Singh), and does not contravene Article 14 or 311 (2). In view of these submissions we propose to examine the issue under three sub-headings, namely, (i) impact of Article 311 (2), (ii) Compatibility with Article 14 and (iii) Ratio in Nawal Singh (10 supra) and recommendation of Justice Shetty Commission. (i) Impact of Article 311 (2) 14. The contract of employment or contract of service decides the conditions of service including disciplinary powers of the master (employer) to terminate services. In public law, however, termination of contract of service is not unregulated prerogative of employer. No employee can be terminated simply because employer does not like employee or his work. Any such termination has to be preceded by an elaborate exercise leading to termination of contract of service which results in dismissal or removal. As bureaucracy and other public servants play important role in democracy, security of tenure becomes an important and inseparable facet of public service. A public servant has status though his conditions of service are impliedly governed by contract of service which ordinarily include rules having force of law or enforceable guidelines. 15. It is axiomatic that a member of service under the Government has a right to continue in service till he attains age of superannuation. This is the general rule. But, a government servant can be punished or terminated (dismissed or removed) for proven misconduct. As a measure of punishment, such Government servant can also be compulsorily retired. Non-punitive compulsory retirement, which is not for any culpable misconduct, is not considered as punishment. So to say, in all cases of termination for misconduct, a government servant is given a constitutional right not to be dismissed, reverted or removed unless a proper quasi-judicial enquiry in accordance with relevant rules is conducted and finding of guilt is recorded. Termination, which amounts to dismissal, removal or reversion without complying Article 311 (2) of the Constitution would be unconstitutional. Even a rule, which enables termination of government servant ignoring Article 311 (2) of Constitution would be unconstitutional'. 16. Part XIV Chapter I of Constitution of India deals with 'Services under the Union and the States'. Articles 309, 310 and 311 form omnipotent trinity encompassing all aspects of recruitment, conditions of service and disciplinary matters of all persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with affairs of Union or the State. 16. Part XIV Chapter I of Constitution of India deals with 'Services under the Union and the States'. Articles 309, 310 and 311 form omnipotent trinity encompassing all aspects of recruitment, conditions of service and disciplinary matters of all persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with affairs of Union or the State. Though Chapter VI of Part VI of Constitution (Articles 233 to 237) deals with appointment of District Judges, Senior and Junior Civil Judges and High Court control over subordinate Courts, all subordinate Judges derive constitutional legitimacy and are governed by the trinity provisions regulating public services. Therefore, all the District Judges and other subordinate Judges are also entitled to the protection of Constitution and they have a right under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution not to be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after a fair enquiry. 17. After All India Judges' Association-II (8 supra); High Court of Andhra Praqesh - it is not denied or disputed; evolved a procedure for assessment and evaluation of service record of a judicial officer for finding fitness for continued utility. This is done by Hon'ble Judges of Administrative Committee. The recommendation to retire Judicial Officer at the age of fifty eight years for the reason that such officer is not fit to be continued beyond fifty eight years was invariably accepted by Government of Andhra Pradesh, who issued orders of compulsory retirement under the first proviso to Section 3(1A) as inserted by second amendment. It may also be noted that in AI/India Judges' Association-I and II (7 and 8 supra), Supreme Court pointed out that the assessment of the record of judicial officer must be well within time before such officer attains the age of fifty eight years and that such assessment will be on the lines of assessment for the purpose of nonpunitive compulsory retirement. Importantly Supreme Court further pointed out that the procedure indicated by their Lordships would be followed till appropriate Service Rules are made in that regard. 18. In view of the dicta laid down by Supreme Court, the validity of impugned provisions has to be considered independently. Importantly Supreme Court further pointed out that the procedure indicated by their Lordships would be followed till appropriate Service Rules are made in that regard. 18. In view of the dicta laid down by Supreme Court, the validity of impugned provisions has to be considered independently. Though the reasons for and against the argument may draw some support and sustenance from some observations made by Supreme Court in AI/ India Judges' Association-I, AI/India Judges' Association-II and Bishwanath Prasad Singh (7, 8 and 9 supra), impugned Act's constitutional compliance, however, cannot be presumed, even if part of the impugned provision is enacted pursuant to Judgment of Supreme Court. We may reiterate that career review of judicial officer for giving the benefit of extended sixty years age of retirement is not in controversy. The respondents contend that notwithstanding the impact of Article 311 (2) on the impugned provision insofar as it enables career review at the age of fifty years or fifty five years is .' prompted by the decision of Supreme Court in Nawal Singh (10 supra). Would that be sufficient justification to uphold its vires? We are afraid the answer must be in the negative. Law made by competent Legislature has to be tested independently for its constitutionality even if such law is made pursuant to Judgment of Supreme Court. We may make a brief reference to Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms12 (PUCLI) and Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India13 (PUCL). 19. In the first case, the respondent pro bono filed a writ petition in Delhi High Court seeking a direction to implement the recommendations made by Law Commission in its one hundred and seventieth report and make necessary changes under rule 4 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. The recommendations of Law Commission were intended to make electoral process more fair, transparent and equitable to refuse distortions. Law Commission recommended for debarring a candidate from contesting election if charges are framed in a Court in respect of certain offences. Delhi High Court gave certain directions inter alia to furnish information to the voters pertaining to contesting candidates and their criminal history. The appeal by Union of India was disposed of by Supreme Court giving directions. Subsequent thereto, Representation of People (Third Amendment) Act, 2002 was enacted inserting Sections 33A and 33B. Delhi High Court gave certain directions inter alia to furnish information to the voters pertaining to contesting candidates and their criminal history. The appeal by Union of India was disposed of by Supreme Court giving directions. Subsequent thereto, Representation of People (Third Amendment) Act, 2002 was enacted inserting Sections 33A and 33B. Section 33B enabled contesting candidate not to disclose or furnish any information which is not required to be furnished under the Act. This Amendment Act was challenged in a writ petition before Division Bench of Supreme Court. It was urged that Legislature ought to have adopted in entirety the directives issued by the Court in PUCLI and that any dilution or deviation from the norms set by the Court would be ultra vires. Rejecting such plea, it was held that when a Legislation is made, the Court of judicial review has to make an independent assessment, though directives issued by the Court cannot be brushed aside by Legislature. The following placitum can be beneficially excerpted. Though certain amount of deviation from the aspects of disclosure spelt out by this court is not impermissible, a substantial departure cannot be countenanced. ... It is not a proper approach to test the validity of legislation only from the standpoint whether the legislation implicitly and word to word gives effect to the directives issued by the Court as an ad hoc measure when the field was unoccupied by legislation. Once legislation is made, this Court has to make an independent assessment in the process of evaluating whether the items of information statutorily ordained are reasonably adequate to secure the right of information to the voter so as to facilitate him to form a fairly clear opinion on the merits and demerits of the candidates. In embarking on this exercise, as already stated, this Court's directives on the points of disclosure even if they be tentative or ad hoc in nature, cannot be brushed aside, but should be given due weight. But, I reiterate that the shape of the legislation need not be solely controlled by the directives issued to the Election Commission to meet an ad hoc situation. (emphasis supplied) 20. Therefore, impugned provision has to be tested on independent constitutional assessment and cannot be validated or invalidated based on the directives issued by Supreme Court. But, I reiterate that the shape of the legislation need not be solely controlled by the directives issued to the Election Commission to meet an ad hoc situation. (emphasis supplied) 20. Therefore, impugned provision has to be tested on independent constitutional assessment and cannot be validated or invalidated based on the directives issued by Supreme Court. Indeed, in All India Judges' Association-I (7 supra) and Bishwanath Prasad Singh (9 supra), apex Court made it categorical that once the Service Rules governing superannuation age are amended, the directions issued by Supreme Court in the former case would cease to operate. This will also apply to the plea of respondents that impugned provision was enacted to give effect to Nawal Singh (10 supra) and recommendations of Justice Shetty Commission. 21. Any dismissal, removal or reversion of a public servant without following 'procedural and substantive due process' under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of Constitution would violate Article 311 (2). What matters is not the act of dismissing, removing or reverting, but the fact of terminating from service. In a given situation, if termination amounts to dismissal, removal or reversion by whatever name such termination is called, the same would be violative of Article 311 (2). What would be the impact of Article 311 (2) on compulsory retirement? All kinds of compulsory retirement are not punitive. Article 311 would not be attracted to a case of non-punitive compulsory retirement when an employee is retired after attaining age of superannuation as per the Rules or when an employee is not continued in service after completing certain minimum period of service in the interest of public and in the interest of service. In Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer14 (hereafter referred to as Baikuntha Nath Das) , three Judge Bench of Supreme Court after referring to earlier case law, inter alia, held that, "an order of compulsory retirement is not punishment (and) it implies no stigma nor any suggestion of mis-behaviour. Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement'. 22. Conceptually what is compulsory retirement? Bishwanath Prasad Singh (9 supra) gives the following elucidation. Compulsory retirement in service jurisprudence has two meanings. Under the various disciplinary rules, compulsory retirement is one of the penalties inflicted on a delinquent government servant consequent upon a finding of guilt being recorded in disciplinary proceedings. 22. Conceptually what is compulsory retirement? Bishwanath Prasad Singh (9 supra) gives the following elucidation. Compulsory retirement in service jurisprudence has two meanings. Under the various disciplinary rules, compulsory retirement is one of the penalties inflicted on a delinquent government servant consequent upon a finding of guilt being recorded in disciplinary proceedings. Such penalty involves stigma and cannot be inflicted except by following procedure prescribed by the relevant rules or consistently with the principles of natural justice if the field for inflicting such penalty be not occupied by any rules. Such compulsory retirement in the case of a government servant must also withstand the scrutiny of Article 311 of the Constitution. Then there are service rules, such as Rule 560) of the Fundamental Rules, which confer on the Government or the appropriate authority, an absolute (but not arbitrary) right to retire a government servant on his attaining a particular age or on his having completed a certain number of years of service on formation of an opinion, that in public interest it is necessary to compulsorily retire a government servant. In that case, it is neither a punishment nor a penalty with loss of retrial benefits. 23. Any compulsory retirement of a judicial officer or a public servant amounting to dismissal or removal cannot stand the scrutiny of Article 311 (2) of Constitution of India. Even a rule, which provides for unreasonable and arbitrary power to compulsorily retire an officer is invalid. A rule which does not provide for a reasonable number of years of service for compulsorily retiring an officer or a rule which confers absolute power to retire government servant prematurely on attaining a particular age or on such employee completing certain number of years of service cannot pass the test of constitutionality. The law is so well settled that this Judgment need not be burdened with passages from reported cases. Supreme Court in Shyamlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh15 (hereafter referred to as Shyamlal), State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand (hereafter referred to as Saubhagchand), Motiram and Gurudev Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab1? (hereafter referred to as Gurudev Singh) laid down, reiterated and reaffirmed principle, which is now axiomatic. 24. In Shyamlal (15 supra), a Constitution Bench of Supreme Court, for the first time laid down that, "there is no element of charge or imputation in the case of compulsory retirement. (hereafter referred to as Gurudev Singh) laid down, reiterated and reaffirmed principle, which is now axiomatic. 24. In Shyamlal (15 supra), a Constitution Bench of Supreme Court, for the first time laid down that, "there is no element of charge or imputation in the case of compulsory retirement. Two requirements of compulsory retirement are that the officer has completed twenty five years of service and that it is in public interest to dispense with the services of an employee. It has no stigma or implication or mis-behaviour or incapacity." Article 465A of Civil Service Regulations, which gave power to Government to retire any officer after completion of twenty five years of qualifying service without giving any reasons, was tested to know whether a compulsory retirement is dismissal or removal depriving the officer of pension or it is compulsory retirement without any stigma or implication of misconduct". It was held as follows. But an officer who is compulsorily retired does not lose any part of the benefit that he has earned. On compulsory retirement he will be entitled to the pension etc. that he has actually earned. This, is no diminution of the accrued benefit. It is said that compulsory retirement, like dismissal or removal, deprives the officer of the change of serving and getting his pay till he attains the age of superannuation and thereafter to get an enhanced pension and that is certainly a punishment. It is true that in that wide sense the officer may consider himself punished but there is a clear distinction between the loss of benefit already earned and the loss of prospect of earning something more. In the first case, it is a present and certain loss and is certainly a punishment but the loss of future prospect is too uncertain, for the officer may die or be otherwise incapacitated from serving a day longer and cannot, therefore, be regarded in the eye of the law as a punishment. The more important thing is to see whether by compulsory retirement the officer loses the benefit he has earned as he does by dismissal or removal. The answer is clearly in the negative. The second element for determining whether a termination of service amounts to dismissal or removal is, therefore, also absent in the case of termination of service brought about by compulsory retirement. (emphasis supplied) 25. The answer is clearly in the negative. The second element for determining whether a termination of service amounts to dismissal or removal is, therefore, also absent in the case of termination of service brought about by compulsory retirement. (emphasis supplied) 25. In Saubhagchand (16 supra), the Court observed that protection of Article 311 (2) is available whenever action is taken against a government servant, which entails forfeiture of benefits already earned by him. In such an event, government servant ought to be heard and given opportunity to show cause against the order. To say, in other words, where retirement involves stigma or imputation of misconduct or incapacity, it must be treated as dismissal. But, this principle can have no application where such order is not punishment and result is in no loss of benefit already accrued. In this case also, the test of 'deprivation of accrued benefits' was reiterated by Court. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab1B, a Constitution Bench of Supreme Court pointed out two tests laid down in Shyamlal (15 supra) and held that, "two tests had to be applied for ascertaining whether termination of service by compulsory retirement amounted to removal or dismissal. ….the first test is whether the action is by way of punishment and to find that out it was necessary that a charge or imputation against the officer is made the condition of exercise of power; the second is whether by compulsory retirement the officer is losing the benefit he has already earned by dismissal or removal". 26. In Motiram (1 supra), a seven Judge Constitution Bench approved Shyamlal (15 supra) and Saubhagchand (16 supra). Law is laid (i) that, "a person who substantially holds a permanent post has right to continue in service subject to the rule of superannuation and the rule as to compulsory retirement. 26. In Motiram (1 supra), a seven Judge Constitution Bench approved Shyamlal (15 supra) and Saubhagchand (16 supra). Law is laid (i) that, "a person who substantially holds a permanent post has right to continue in service subject to the rule of superannuation and the rule as to compulsory retirement. If for any other reason, that right is invaded and he is asked to leave his service the termination of his service must invariably mean the defeat of his right to continue in service and as such it is in the nature of penalty and amounts to removal", and (ii) that, "if any rule permits appropriate authority to retire compulsorily a civil servant without imposing a limitation in that behalf that civil servant should have put in a minimum period of service, that rule would be invalidated and the so called retirement order and the said rule would amount to removal of the civil servant within the meaning of Article 311(2)". Be it noted that the Supreme Court was considering the validity of Rules 148(3) and 149(3) of Indian Railway Establishment Code. Both these Rules provided that the service of railway servants shall be liable to termination by notice on either side for a specified period or pay in lieu thereof. Apex Court ultimately invalidated these Rules as unconstitutional violating Articles 14 and 311 (2) of Constitution. 27. The ratio in Motiram (1 supra) principle was crystalised in Gurudev Singh (17 supra), which comprised five Judges of Motiram (1 supra) Bench. The principle is summed up by unanimous Bench as below. The majority judgment in Motiram case took the view that it would be inappropriate and inexpedient to reopen an issue which was covered by several prior reported decisions of the court. Besides, the point covered by the said decisions did not directly arise in the case of Motiram Deka. Even so, the majority judgment took the precaution of adding a note of caution that if a rule of compulsory retirement purported to give authority to the Government to terminate the services of a permanent public servant at a very early stage of his career, the question about the validity of such a rule may have to be examined. Even so, the majority judgment took the precaution of adding a note of caution that if a rule of compulsory retirement purported to give authority to the Government to terminate the services of a permanent public servant at a very early stage of his career, the question about the validity of such a rule may have to be examined. That is how in accepting the view that a rule of compulsory retirement can be treated as valid and as constituting an exception to the general rule that the termination of the services of a permanent public servant would amount to his removal under Article 311 (2), this Court added a rider and made it perfectly clear that if the minimum period of service which was prescribed by the relevant rules upheld by the earlier decisions was 25 years, it could not be unreasonably reduced in that behalf. In other words, the majority judgment indicates that what influenced the decision was the fact that a fairly large number of years had been prescribed by the rule of compulsory retirement as constituting the minimum period of service after which alone the said rule could be invoked. Therefore, it seems to us that Mr.Bhandari is right when he contends that the present article which reduces the minimum period of service to ten years, is open to challenge in the light of the majority decision pronounced in the case of Motiram Oeka. (emphasis supplied) 28. The challenge in the case was to the constitutional validity of Article 9.1 of Pepsu Service Regulations, which was amended in January, 1960 conferring on Government, "an absolute right to retire any government servant after he has completed ten years of qualifying service without giving any reason in public interest on account of inefficiency, dishonesty, corruption or infamous conduct". Applying Motiram (1 supra) principle, apex Court struck down the impugned Pepsu Article 9.1. The following observations are apposite. …Therefore, it seems that only two exceptions can be treated as valid in dealing with the scope and effect of the protection afforded by Article 311 (2), if a permanent public servant is asked to retire on the ground that he has reached the age of superannuation which has been reasonably fixed, Article 311 (2) does not apply, because such retirement is neither dismissal nor removal of the public servant. If a permanent public servant is compulsorily retired under the rules which prescribe the normal age of superannuation and provide for a reasonably long period of qualified service after which alone compulsory retirement can be ordered, that again may not amount to dismissal or removal under Article 311 (2) mainly because that is the effect of a long series of decisions of this Court. But where while reserving the power to the State to compulsorily retire a permanent public servant, a rule is framed prescribing a proper age of superannuation, and another rule is added giving the power to the State to compulsorily retire a permanent public servant at the end of ten years of his service, that cannot, we think, be treated as falling outside Article 311 (2). The termination of the service of a permanent public servant under such a rule, though called compulsory retirement, is, in substance, removal under Article 311 (2). (emphasis supplied) 29. In Takhatray Shivdatrai Mankad v. State of Gujarat19, a Division Bench of apex Court referring to the principles in Saubhagchand, Motiram and Gurudev Singh (16, 1 and 17 supra), observed that, "the principle is that the rule relating to compulsory retirement of a Government servant must not only contain the outside limit of superannuation but there must also be a provision for a reasonably long period of qualified service which must be indicated with sufficient clarity. To give an example, if 55 years have been specified as the age of superannuation and if it is sought to retire the servant even before that period it should be provided in the rule that he could be retired after he has attained the age of 50 years or he has put in service for a period of 25 years". 30. Whether the impugned first proviso satisfies the tests laid down by various Constitution Bench cases as above? As pointed out in AI/India Judges' Association-II (8 supra) and Bishwanath Prasad Singh (9 supra) review of officers career record at the time of completion of fifty eight years is for the purpose of conferment of right i.e., extend the age of superannuation. Whether the impugned first proviso satisfies the tests laid down by various Constitution Bench cases as above? As pointed out in AI/India Judges' Association-II (8 supra) and Bishwanath Prasad Singh (9 supra) review of officers career record at the time of completion of fifty eight years is for the purpose of conferment of right i.e., extend the age of superannuation. But when review is taken at the age of fifty or fifty five years, in plain terms, it is for curtailment of right to continue in service till the completion of age of superannuation as provided under Section 3(1A) read with that part of first proviso dealing with review at the age of fifty eight years. Whatever be the conceptual difference between dismissal and removal, termination of a judicial officer by an order of compulsory retirement after he attains age of fifty or fifty five years certainly carries with it some element of punishment. To our mind without anything else compulsory retirement of a judicial officer on attaining age of fifty or fifty five years certainly curtails his right to continue till he attains age of fifty eight years and then sixty years. Compulsory retirement like dismissal or removal certainly deprives the officer of the chance of serving and getting his pay till he is superannuated as per law. 31. Why a public servant is compulsorily retired on attaining certain age or on completion of certain years of qualifying service? 'Maintenance of efficiency of administration' is the ultimate constitutional object of any public service (see Article 335 of Constitution). Inefficient public servants cannot burden the State exchequer. Transparent constitutional governance by rule of law cannot be ensured unless the public servants are honest with high integrity. Therefore, Courts have held that inefficient public servants subject to the protection granted by Articles 14, 16 and 311 (2) of Constitution of India can be compulsorily retired provided they are not deprived of the benefits they earned during the service. When once a government servant is appointed after following the procedure laid down by the Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of Constitution, an employee acquires right to security of tenure. The enjoyment of right to security of tenure is absolutely essential for efficient administration of the State (see Gurudev Singh (17 supra)). When once a government servant is appointed after following the procedure laid down by the Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of Constitution, an employee acquires right to security of tenure. The enjoyment of right to security of tenure is absolutely essential for efficient administration of the State (see Gurudev Singh (17 supra)). This does not, however, mean that employees who lost utility to the service after certain minimum period of service must be continued, as liability to the State. In Bishwanath Prasad Singh (9 supra), it was observed that, "the object of such compulsory retirement is not to punish or penalize the Government servant but to weed out the worthless, who have lost their utility for the administration by their insensitive, unintelligent or dubious conduct impeding the flow of administration or promoting stagnation". Compulsory retirement is also resorted to even in cases of corrupt officials as a compromise between interest of the State (to get rid of corrupt official) and not to deprive such retiree of his benefits (gratuity, pension etc). If it is shown that the charge and imputation of corruption is the motive for an order, compulsory retirement cannot escape rigour of Article 311 (2) (See Dalip Singh (18 supra)). 32. Though Section 3(1 A) prescribes superannuation at sixty years, it is subject to review at fifty eight years. The justification for this is the law laid down by Supreme Court in All India Judges' Association-I and II (7 and 8 supra). Here, the test to be applied is to see whether an officer who is about to complete fifty eight years has potential for his/her continued useful service. The review in this case is after an officer completed adequate qualifying service and he would not be deprived of any benefit like gratuity or pension. Such review for the purpose of extending age of superannuation to sixty years may not be totally objective without some elements of subjectivity. In addition to review of judicial work one has to consider conduct and vigilance reports pertaining to such officer. The same is not the case when the officer is compulsorily retired .at the age of fifty or fifty five years. In addition to review of judicial work one has to consider conduct and vigilance reports pertaining to such officer. The same is not the case when the officer is compulsorily retired .at the age of fifty or fifty five years. The law in AI/India Judges' Association I and II and Bishwanath Prasad Singh (7, 8 and 9 supra) does not contemplate assessment and evaluation of the record of an officer at the age of fifty or fifty five years. Therefore, the impugned first proviso contravenes the dicta laid down by Supreme Court. As observed by Supreme Court in PUCL, a law purportedly consequential to the decision of the Court has to be scrutinized and tested independently. That does not, however, mean that the Legislature can drastically deviate and depart from the law laid down by apex Court and the principle behind it. 33. Here, we may indicate that in All India Judges' Association-I, the Division Bench of Supreme Court making reference to recommendation of Law Commission in its Fourteenth Report gives four reasons for fixing age of retirement at sixty years for judicial officers. These are: (i) for normal civil servants, a graduate is eligible, whereas for recruitment of judicial service, a minimum further period of three years becomes necessary to acquire Bachelor's degree in Law. While for civil servants, the age of recruitment varies from twenty five to twenty eight years, for judicial officers at basic level, entry is permitted upto age of thirty two years and for District Judges, it is more; (ii) there is marked distinction between the nature of work done by executive officers and judicial officers. Physical exertion is more important for executive officer and there is necessity for more mental activity for judicial officers. Experience is an indispensable factor and subject to basic physical ability with growing age experience grows; (iii) a sizable portion of the manning in the High Courts is done by elevating District Judges who are continued upto age of sixty two years like directly elevated members of the Bar of High Court; and (iv) for certain services in the State, like teachers of Universities, scientific research officers and employees of certain corporations, age of retirement is fixed at the age of sixty years as they do special type of work. 34. 34. In All India Judges' Association-II (8 supra), another Bench of Supreme Court gave the following reasons for enhancing the age of superannuation. These are: (i) Pre-requisite for recruitment of the post of the Judge at the lowest level is minimum practice at Bar after obtaining necessary qualification, whereas there is no waiting period for the candidates of other services. A judicial officer enters the service at a relatively higher age than the member of the service; (ii) judicial service stands by itself in the matter of age of retirement by reason of great importance of a long experience and a mature mind in the judicial office. The recognition of this principle led most countries to prescribe much higher age for retirement of judicial personnel; and (iii) competent lawyers are reluctant to accept judicial posts in view of the sizable earnings at the Bar and there is thus a dearth of proper talent available to man the judicial post. It is therefore for the health of administration of justice that attractive service conditions including higher retirement age is prescribed for the members of judiciary. In our opinion, compulsorily retiring a judicial officer at the age of fifty years or fifty five years on the ground that such an officer is not found fit and eligible to be continued in service, virtually he is being removed from service. The whole exercise by apex Court to initiate steps for evolving attractive service conditions for betterment of Judicial service would in one go rendered useless. 35. The impugned first proviso drastically deviates and departs from the dicta laid down by Supreme Court and also the law laid down by Motiram and Gurudev Singh (1 and 17 supra). The first proviso fails to satisfy the test laid down by Supreme Court i.e., "deprivation of accrued benefits". Be it noted that in Gurudev Singh (17 supra) explaining Motiram (1 supra), it was held that a rule• giving power to the State to compulsorily retire a permanent public servant at the end of ten years of service cannot be treated as falling outside Article 311 (2) and that to be constitutional compliant, rule or law providing for compulsory retirement must necessarily prescribe minimum qualifying service as high as twenty five years. Applying this test as we may examine whether compulsory retirement at the age of fifty or fifty five years would satisfy this test. Applying this test as we may examine whether compulsory retirement at the age of fifty or fifty five years would satisfy this test. Learned standing counsel for High Court relying on Shyam Lal, Saubhagchand and Gurudev Singh (15 to 17 supra) made a valiant effort to justify the first proviso. He contends that retiring a judicial officer at the age of fifty or fifty five years does not violate the principle laid down therein. We are afraid we cannot accept the submission. 36. After All India Judges' Association-II (8 supra), by second amendment, Section 3(1 A), two provisos and explanation were added. Explanation is to the effect that the assessment and evaluation by High Court of A.P., for the purpose of sub-section 3(1 A) is in addition to and independent of the assessment for compulsory retirement that may have to be undertaken at any other time as per relevant rules applicable to members of Higher Judicial Service or State Judicial Service. Even after impugned third amendment. the explanation has been retained. This would give indication that though first proviso employs the words 'compulsory retirement', it is not compulsory retirement as such. As already noticed supra, as it stood prior to amendment, the review taken up by the High Court when the officer is about to attain the age of fifty eight years is for the purpose of extending age of superannuation. The purpose of such review even under the first proviso remains the same, but for the review at the age of fifty years or fifty five years. Secondly, in the State of Andhra Pradesh, except Rule 44 of A.P.Revised Pension Rules, 1980 (Pension Rules, for brevity), there is no other rule or fundamental rule which empowers Government to compulsorily retire a government servant after specified qualifying service. Therefore, we are convinced that first proviso is not intended as such for compulsory retirement but it is intended to extend age of superannuation. In case High Court does not find an officer fit to be continued upto the age of sixty years, as observed by Supreme Court in Bishwanath Prasad Singh (9supra) without any specific order, such officer shall retire with all dheres benefits. 37. As per Rule 44 of A.P.Revised Pension Rules, 1980 (Pension Rules, for brevity), at any time after a government laid down therein. We are afraid we cannot accept the submission. 36. 37. As per Rule 44 of A.P.Revised Pension Rules, 1980 (Pension Rules, for brevity), at any time after a government laid down therein. We are afraid we cannot accept the submission. 36. After AI/India Judges' Association-II (8 supra), by second amendment, Section 3(1 A), two provisos and explanation were added. Explanation is to the effect that the assessment and evaluation by High Court of A. P., for the purpose of sub-section 3( 1 A) is in addition to and independent of the assessment for compulsory retirement that may have to be undertaken at any other time as per relevant rules applicable to members of Higher Judicial Service or State Judicial Service. Even after impugned third• amendment, the explanation has been retained. This would give indication that though first proviso employs the words 'compulsory retirement', it is not compulsory retirement as such. As already noticed supra, as it stood prior to amendment, the review taken up by the High Court when the officer is about to attain the age of fifty eight years is for the purpose of extending age of superannuation. The purpose of such review even under the first proviso remains the same, but for the review at the age of fifty years or fifty five years. Secondly, in the State of Andhra Pradesh, except Rule 44 of A. P. Revised Pension Rules, 1980 (Pension Rules, for brevity), there is no other rule or fundamental rule which empowers Government to compulsorily retire a government servant after specified qualifying service. Therefore, we are convinced that first proviso is not intended as such for compulsory retirement but it is intended to extend age of superannuation. In case High Court does not find an officer fit to be continued upto the age of sixty years, as observed by Supreme Court in Bishwanath Prasad Singh (9supra) without any specific order, such officer shall retire with all dheres benefits. 37. As per Rule 44 of A.P.Revised Pension Rules, 1980 (Pension Rules, for brevity), at any time after a government servant has completed thirty three years of qualifying service, but before attaining age of fifty eight years of age may be required by appointing authority to retire in public interest. In such an event, he shall be entitled to dheres pension, i.e., pension as is admissible in a case of superannuation. In such an event, he shall be entitled to dheres pension, i.e., pension as is admissible in a case of superannuation. Rule 43 thereof also gives an option to government servant to voluntarily retire from service after he is to be in not less than twenty years of qualifying service. The avowed object behind these Rules is to see that government servant is not deprived of the retiral benefits which he earns while in service. It is no gainsaying that gratuity, pension, leave salary etc., are not bounty, nor boon granted to a government servant. From the day one joins public service till superannuation, a government servant earns these retiral benefits. If a judicial officer is retired at the age of fifty or fifty five years, he would hardly be entitled to any pension. 38. In State of Andhra Pradesh, for entry level post of Junior Civil Judge or Judicial Magistrate of First Class, minimum age is twenty one years and the maximum prescribed age is thirty four years for open category candidate and forty years for reserved categories like SC/ST. As observed by Supreme Court in All India Judges' Association-I and II (7 and 8 supra), there is always some gap between the practice at the Bar and appointment of a qualified and suitable advocate to the post of judicial officer at the lowest level. Assuming that a candidate enters the service at the age of thirty eight years or forty years, there will be qualifying service of less than ten years and he would be deprived of the benefits earned during those years of service. Same is the case with regard to the compulsory retirement at the age of fifty five years. To the posts of District and Sessions Judge governed by Higher Judicial Rules, the maximum age is forty five years. A person who joined as District Judge at the age of forty four or forty five years if compulsorily retired at the age of fifty years or fifty five years it would certainly be violative of Article 311 (2) of Constitution. We are also not impressed with the submission of respondents that in all cases, the officers would not be deprived of the benefits earned during the service even if they are retired at the age of fifty or fifty five years. We are also not impressed with the submission of respondents that in all cases, the officers would not be deprived of the benefits earned during the service even if they are retired at the age of fifty or fifty five years. If such an argument is accepted, incorrect factual position has to be assumed that all officers entering judicial service could be joining at the minimum age, which would be irrational and does not stand to reason. Viewed from any angle, impugned first proviso violates constitutional rights under Article 311 (2) of Constitution. (ii) Compatibility with Article 14 39. Argument of petitioners is that first proviso is arbitrary and discriminatory. In our considered view the first proviso violates Article 14 on both the counts, namely, discrimination and arbitrariness. (a) Hostile Discrimination 40. Court's scrutiny of impugned enactment is both primary review and secondary review of Constitutionality. Primary review essentially concerns with the competency of legislature. Secondary review is concerned with other aspects which vitiates legislative action. The first principle of secondary review is whether the classification adopted by a law satisfies twin tests of classification, namely, 'rationality test' and 'nexus test'. The former demands the State to demonstrate that the impugned classification complained as discriminatory, is founded on an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others. The latter requires the State to substantiate that differentia has rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. 41. Parent Act inter alia applies to all persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State (Sub-section (2) of Section 1). As noticed supra, members of Higher Judicial Rules and State Judicial Rules are also governed by various statutory Rules promulgated under the proviso to Article 309, applicable to all public servants in the State. By reason of Articles 233 to 237 of Constitution, Special Rules read with Article 235, absolute control over members of judicial service is vested in High Court. To this extent, judicial officers are different from other public servants in the matter of conditions of service. Otherwise all are governed by the same set of Rules and are also governed by Parent Act regulating age of superannuation. Section 3(1) applies to all government employees and Section 3(1A) applies to judicial officers. To this extent, judicial officers are different from other public servants in the matter of conditions of service. Otherwise all are governed by the same set of Rules and are also governed by Parent Act regulating age of superannuation. Section 3(1) applies to all government employees and Section 3(1A) applies to judicial officers. Reading Section 3(1), (1A) and proviso thereto would show that all persons governed by the Parent Act including judicial officers shall retire at the age of fifty eight years but latter category of public servants, shall retire at the age of sixty years if they are found fit. and eligible to be continued in the service. If that be the admitted case, what is the intelligible differentia for classifying judicial officer for subjecting them to a different procedure for continuing beyond fifty or fifty five years? What is the object sought to be achieved and whether such object can be achieved by such a provision? 42. In Motiram (1 supra), relying on dicta in Sri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkaf'1, the majority observed that, "the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or Corporations to hostile or discriminating legislations". The arguments before the high Bench was that there was no rule of compulsory retirement couched in the language used in Rules 148(3) and 149(3) of Railway Establishment Code, in other service rules and that only railway employees are treated as separate class as a target group for applying the impugned Rules. The submission was countenanced by majority. They held that the Rules 148(3) and 149(3) providing for compulsory retirement would violate Article 14 of Constitution of India. Gajendragadkar, J (as He then was) speaking for majority, laid down thus: We appreciate the argument that the nature of services rendered by employees in different sectors of public service may differ and the terms and conditions governing employment in all public sectors may not necessarily be the same or uniform; but in regard to the question of terminating the services of a civil servant after serving him with a notice for specified period we are unable to see how the Railways can be regarded as constituting a separate and distinct class by reference to which the impugned Rule can be justified in the light of Art.14. If there is any rational connection between the making of such a Rule and the object intended to be achieved by it, that connection would clearly be in existence in several other sectors of public service. What has happened is that a provision like R.148(3) or R.149(3) was first made by the Railway Companies when employment with the Railway was a purely commercial matter governed by the ordinary rules of contract. After the Railway were taken over by the State, that position has essentially altered, and so, the validity of the Rule is now exposed to the challenge under Art.14. Therefore, we are satisfied that the challenge to the validity of the impugned Rules on the ground that they contravene Art.14 must also succeed. (emphasis supplied) 43. The above reasoning applies with all force to the present case. When no such review at the age of fifty or fifty five years for the purpose of continuing beyond fifty or fifty five years, is permissible for other public servants, subjecting judicial officers alone for such mid career review certainly violates Article 14 of Constitution of India. 44. So as to answer nexus test, the learned counsel for respondents relies on Bishwanath Prasad Singh (9 supra), Nawal Singh (10 supra) and recommendations of Shetty Commission. In paragraph 7 of first case, referring to All India Judges' Association-I and II (7 arnd 8 supra), Rajat Baran Roy v. State of West Bengal, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad v. Sarnam Singh and Ramesh Chandra Acharya v. Registrar, High Court of Orissa24, it was observed that, "Supreme Court intended to confer a benefit on the judicial officers by force of the Judgment and to provide a mechanism for availing the benefit during the period until a State amended Service Rules governing age of superannuation of judicial officers". It was further held. Once Rules are amended, the age of superannuation would be governed by the service rules. But so long as that was not done, the judgment of this Court in 1993 case was intended to govern the age of superannuation. It was further held. Once Rules are amended, the age of superannuation would be governed by the service rules. But so long as that was not done, the judgment of this Court in 1993 case was intended to govern the age of superannuation. Under the service rules, if amended, the right to hold the judicial office shall be a statutory right subject to satisfying the requirement, superannuation to 60 years shall be a benefit available to judicial officers subject to their satisfying the test of suitability at the evaluation or assessment to be made by the High Courts in accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court. Such evaluation is independent of and other than an assessment undertaken for compulsory retirement in public interest which could be resorted to earlier or later also. (emphasis supplied) 45. After carefully perusing above observations, we are not able to accept submission of respondents. As held by Supreme Court, a judicial officer shall have statutory right to extended age of superannuation of sixty years subject to satisfying the test of suitability. This, however, does not preclude the State from resorting to compulsory retirement as per relevant rules at an earlier date also. This was never intended to enable or permit the review of judicial career at the age of fifty or fifty five years. Bishwanath Prasad Singh Bench (9 supra) itself made it clear that when they observed that if a High Court finds a judicial officer not fit for extending the benefit of extended age of superannuation, he must retire at the age of superannuation appointed by Service Rules and no specific order and communication is called for. Such retirement is not compulsory retirement. When the High Court chooses to make any communication of not extending the age of superannuation to sixty years, the expression "compulsory retirement" may not be used. Therefore, review for the purpose of extending age of superannuation from fifty eight years to sixty years is taken up, it is not for the purpose of compulsory retirement of Judicial Officer. The observations made by Supreme Court cannot be understood as permitting the career review at the age of fifty or fifty five years before an officer completes or about to complete fifty eight years. Respondents also sought to justify impugned first proviso relying on observations made in Nawal Singh (10 supra). The observations made by Supreme Court cannot be understood as permitting the career review at the age of fifty or fifty five years before an officer completes or about to complete fifty eight years. Respondents also sought to justify impugned first proviso relying on observations made in Nawal Singh (10 supra). We propose to take up this aspect when next point is examined. 46. The classification of judicial officers I for subjecting them to precarious career I review before attaining the age of fifty eight years does not satisfy rationality test. Does it achieve the objects which it seeks to. We may notice here that it is only in Andhra Pradesh that legislative enactment is in place providing for career review of judicial officer at the age of fifty or fifty five years for the purpose of advancement from fifty to fifty five years and from fifty five to fifty eight years. The statement of objects and reasons appended to A.P.Act No.42 of 2006 inter alia is as follows. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal NO.2898 of 2001 in its judgment dated 23-9-2003 observed that: For keeping the stream of justice unpolluted, repeated scrutiny of service records of Judicial Officers after specified age/completion of specified years of service provided under the rules is must by each and every High Court as the lower judiciary is the foundation of judicial system. The First National Judicial Pay Commission in its recommendations, stated that the cases of Judicial Officers should be periodically reviewed for compulsory retirement once in every five years i.e., at 50 years, 55 years and 60 years under the respective service rules. In view of the recommendations of the First National Judicial Pay Commission and the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, the Registrar General of Andhra Pradesh High Court after careful examination has proposed to amend Section 3(1 A) of the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984 so as to enable the High Court to regularly make the exercise to review the performance of the officers at the age of 50 years or 55 years or 58 years or 33 years of qualifying service, for weeding out the dead wood. 47. The object of introducing the amendment is "to weed out the dead wood and to keep the stream of justice unpolluted". 47. The object of introducing the amendment is "to weed out the dead wood and to keep the stream of justice unpolluted". Nobody even doubts that judicial officers must maintain blemish less on/off the Bench standards and strictly adhere to highest norms of human conduct in discharge of judicial functions. Any minutest deviation from puritanic judicial code of conduct would attract loud criticism. These judicial ethics are generally not inculcated formally but are informally acquired and imbibed by each officer manning a judicial post. By repeatedly subjecting a judicial officer after some years in job to review for continuation in service after fifty or fifty five years, in our opinion does not achieve object with which the amendment was made. Unless and until it is proved in a properly constituted departmental enquiry that a public servant is guilty of misconduct as defined, such a public servant is deemed to be of acceptable character standards. In case, there are definite allegations of misconduct, it is always open to the employer to terminate contract of service in accordance with law. The review at the age of fifty eight years for conferring benefit of extended age of superannuation of sixty years is taken up with a view to find out-whether a judicial officer has continued utility to judicial service. Such review has been accepted by Supreme Court as necessary because a benefit is being conferred on the Officer, which is not available to persons in other public services. Whereas the review of the career at the age of fifty years or fifty five years is taken up only to weed out the dead wood and to keep the streams of justice unpolluted, which means there is institutional assumption that such officers who are not allowed to continue beyond fifty or fifty five years are polluting the judiciary. When can such officers are said to have polluted the streams of justice. We have an answer in Motiram (1 supra), wherein Justice Gajendragadkar (as His Lordship then was) observed that, We ought to add that in a modern democratic State the efficiency and incorruptibility' of public administration is of such importance that it is essential to afford to civil servants adequate protection against capricious action from their superior authority. We have an answer in Motiram (1 supra), wherein Justice Gajendragadkar (as His Lordship then was) observed that, We ought to add that in a modern democratic State the efficiency and incorruptibility' of public administration is of such importance that it is essential to afford to civil servants adequate protection against capricious action from their superior authority. If a permanent civil servant is guilty of misconduct, he should no doubt be proceeded against promptly under the relevant disciplinary rules, subject, of course to the safeguard prescribed by Art.311 (2), but in regard to honest, straight forward and efficient permanent civil servants, it is of utmost importance even from the point of view of the State that they should enjoy a sense of security which alone can make them independent and truly efficient. In our opinion, the sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of permanent railway servants in the form of Rule 148(3) would inevitably create a sense of insecurity in the minds of such servants and would invest appropriate authorities with very wide powers which may conceivably be abused. (emphasis supplied) In Gurudev Singh (17 supra), similar observations were made as under. In this connection, it is hardly necessary to emphasise that for the efficient administration of the State, it is absolutely eS3entiai that permanent public servants should enjoy a sense of security of tenure. The safeguard which Art.311 (2) affords to permanent public servants is no more than this that in case it is intended to dismiss, remove or reduce them in rank, a reasonable opportunity should be given to them of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to them. A claim for security of tenure does not mean security of tenure for dishonest, corrupt, or inefficient public servants. The claim merely insists that before they are removed, the permanent public servants should be given an opportunity to meet the charge on which they are sought to be removed. (emphasis supplied) 48. Indian constitutional framework envisages an independent judicial system. It is an important characteristic of Judges that they are independent of administrative authorities. The Judges of Supreme Court and High Court occupy absolutely independent position. Their tenure and salaries are protected. Their conduct while, exercising judicial functions cannot be subject matter of debate in the legislative bodies. Any comment about Judges, which tends to diminish their role in democracy is criminal contempt. The Judges of Supreme Court and High Court occupy absolutely independent position. Their tenure and salaries are protected. Their conduct while, exercising judicial functions cannot be subject matter of debate in the legislative bodies. Any comment about Judges, which tends to diminish their role in democracy is criminal contempt. Their impeachment procedure is impossibly cumbersome. Even the subordinate judiciary enjoys independence without which they cannot act impartially. Though their conduct is regulated by statutory rules and they are subject to control of High Court, independence of subordinate judiciary is recognized by the Constitution. Article 234 of Constitution requires rule making authority to consult the High Court while making service rules. This is to ensure independence of subordinate judiciary and to see that service conditions of subordinate Judges are not subject to whims and fancies of other two legislative bodies. All subordinate Judges are subject to the control of High Court only. The Supreme Court and High Court have done everything to ensure independence of subordinate judiciary so that all of them are constitutionally accountable in discharge of their onerous judicial functions. Security of tenure to an officer appointed to judicial post like in the case of other public servants cannot be arbitrarily diluted. Yet again when it comes to security of tenure of the independent subordinate judicial officers, if there is a feeling that at any time after fifty years or fifty five years they are likely to be retired would certainly damage independence of judiciary. An officer who is coming up for review on the eve of completion of fifty years or fifty five years would not be able to function without fear if there is uncertainty in the matter of his continuity in service. In the case of review for continuing beyond the age of fifty eight years, there is no scope for such uncertainty because by law, the age of superannuation is sixty years subject to officers' suitability for continuance beyond the age of fifty eight years. As observed by Supreme Court in All India Judges' Association-II (8 supra), able lawyers who earn good money in legal profession, do not come forward to take up judicial jobs and therefore, it is for the Nation to make attractive service conditions including adequate salaries. If that be so, subjecting a judicial officer to an assessment and evaluation would certainly send wrong signals. If that be so, subjecting a judicial officer to an assessment and evaluation would certainly send wrong signals. This may result in a dangerously precarious situation of not finding suitable candidates to man judicial posts. For the above reasons, we hold that impugned provision does not satisfy nexus test as it not only does not achieve the object sought to be achieved but it hangs like Damocle's sword over the heads of judicial officers threatening security of tenure which is an inseparable component of right to public employment guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India. (b) Question of Arbitrariness 49. Wide sweep of Article 14 of Constitution requires a law to be unarbitrary. A law which is arbitrary or permits arbitrary procedure for decision making based on whims and caprice of men falls foul of equity clause. In Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesfi5, explaining the meaning of arbitrariness, the Court held: The meaning and true import of arbitrariness is more easily visualized than precisely stated or defined. The question, whether an impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case. An obvious test to apply is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned act and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness. Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is no impediment in following that procedure, performance of the act otherwise and in a manner which does not disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable, may itself attract the vice of arbitrariness. Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason, is arbitrary. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being. It is trite that be you ever so high, the laws are above you'. This is what men in power must remember, always 50. To survive the test of equality ,and equal protection of laws, a law must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness. Satisfaction of the test by the legislation is sine qua non for its validity. In India, as elsewhere, arbitrariness is considered as species of irrationality. This is what men in power must remember, always 50. To survive the test of equality ,and equal protection of laws, a law must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness. Satisfaction of the test by the legislation is sine qua non for its validity. In India, as elsewhere, arbitrariness is considered as species of irrationality. The term 'arbitrary' or 'capricious' is used to indicate that the findings are without rationale basis or means and done in a manner without adequate determining principle and 'not done according to reason or JudgmenF6.' In Jaisingani v. Union of India27, it was observed that decisions should be made by application of known principle and rule and in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such decision is antethesis of decision taken in accordance with rule of law. 51. Applying the test of arbitrariness to impugned first proviso insofar as it provides for compulsorily retiring a judicial officer at the age of fifty or fifty five years is concerned, we are convinced it is arbitrary. It would vest the Government with very wide powers which may conceivably be abused. The provision hangs like a sword of Damocle over the heads of judicial officers in the present form and would certainly strike at the idea of security of tenure which is an important condition of public service. Exercise of power is always unpredictable in the absence of objective principles to find officers' suitability from moving one stage to other stage before reaching the milestone of sixty years. Many likely situations though hypothetical - having been pointed out to us across the bar, we may refer to some of them. An officer who is found fit to be continued from the age of fifty years to fifty five years if not given extension would face stigma, because even when allegations of lack of integrity exists, for want of positive evidence, such an officer can be retired under the first proviso, which in a given case would violate Article 311 (2) of Constitution. After implementation of Justice Shetty Commission recommendations, all judicial officers have become eligible for Assured Career Progression (ACP) Scales after completion of five years in the service. After implementation of Justice Shetty Commission recommendations, all judicial officers have become eligible for Assured Career Progression (ACP) Scales after completion of five years in the service. If an officer who got the benefit of ACP after completion of five years or ten years, compulsorily retired under the first proviso on the ground that he is not found fit, the same would be arbitrary. In a given case, there may not be anything adverse against the judicial officer, still if his case disposal rate is low, he may be denied continuance from fifty to fifty five years, and fifty five to fifty eight years only on the ground that he is not fit. When the earlier career enabled the officer to draw ACP scales and in a given case, promotion would be ignored in arbitrary manner. Considerable number of posts of High Court Judges is filled up from category of District Judges in Higher Judicial Service. Assuming that one of the officers has a legitimate expectation by reason of seniority at or about completion of fifty five years, still such officer can be compulsorily retired on review of his career record which is always subjective. Though we cannot totally agree with these possibilities, we cannot simply brush aside such a possibility. A law must be applied equally to all persons in all situations. If absolute power is used differently in different situations, such a law must be deemed to be arbitrary. The argument that the review is taken up by high Judicial Institution like High Court and final orders are passed by the Governor of the State is not always foolproof to assure proper exercise of power. A statutory provision and/or a service rule is always suspect of Article 14 if it confers arbitrary and uncontrolled power on the authority to select any person against whom action can be taken. We hold that being arbitrary the impugned first proviso violates Article 14 of Constitution of India. (iii) Ratio in Nawal Singh and recommendations of Justice Shetty Commission 52. Learned counsel brought to the notice of this Bench, the following observations made by Justice Shetty Commission. Para 21.39:- Elsewhere in our Report, we have stated that the directions of ~ the Supreme Court have affected the morale of the Judicial Officers. (iii) Ratio in Nawal Singh and recommendations of Justice Shetty Commission 52. Learned counsel brought to the notice of this Bench, the following observations made by Justice Shetty Commission. Para 21.39:- Elsewhere in our Report, we have stated that the directions of ~ the Supreme Court have affected the morale of the Judicial Officers. The review of cases for compulsory retirement under the relevant Service Rules should be independently taken up by the High Court, and it should not be linked with the consideration for giving the benefit of service from 58 to 60 years. Therein, we have emphasized and also in our "Preface" to this Report that the cases of Judicial Officers must be periodically reviewed for compulsory retirement once in every five years, that is, at about 50, 55 and 60 years under the respective Service Rules made for the purpose. Such a review must be made by a Committee of Judges of the High Court headed by the Chief Justice. Those who come clean from such review should only be allowed to continue in service till they attain the age of superannuation. 53. The statement of objects and reasons also probably refers to those observations. Whether they are of binding nature? As we presently see all the recommendations were considered by Supreme Court in All India Judges' Association v. Union of India29 (hereafter referred to as All India Judges' Association-II~. In pursuance of observations made in All India Judges' Association-II (8 supra), Justice Shetty Commission was appointed in March 1996. The terms of reference related, to evolve the principles that govern structure of pay of judicial officers, to evolve a sound personnel management policy and to examine the work, methods and environment with a view to promoting efficiency in judicial administration. The Commission presented preliminary report in January, 1998 followed by final report on 11 .11 .1999 making various recommendations. The matter again was placed before Supreme Court in All India Judges' Association-III29, wherein a three Judge Bench of Supreme Court noticed that Justice Shetty Commission made as many as fourteen recommendations. It is not necessary to extract all these. Suffice to mention that these recommendations related to scales of pay, contribution by Union of India towards judicial expenditure, increase in Judge strength, method of recruitment, nomenclature in each cadre and payment of house rent allowance etc. It is not necessary to extract all these. Suffice to mention that these recommendations related to scales of pay, contribution by Union of India towards judicial expenditure, increase in Judge strength, method of recruitment, nomenclature in each cadre and payment of house rent allowance etc. Dealing with increase in retirement age from sixty to sixty two years, Supreme Court concluded as under. The Shetty Commission had recommended that there should be an increase in retirement age from 60 to 62 years. In our opinion, this cannot be done for the simple reason that the age of retirement of a High Court Judge is constitutionally fixed at 62 years. It will not be appropriate, seeing the Constitutional framework with regard to the judiciary, to have an identical age of retirement between the members of the Subordinate Judicial Service and a High Court. As of today, the age of retirement of a Supreme Court Judge is 65 years, of a High Court Judge it is 62 years and locally the age of retirement of a Judicial Officer is 60 years. This difference is appropriate and has to be maintained. However, as there is a backlog of vacancies which has to be filled and as the judge strength has to be increased, as directed by us, it would be appropriate for the States in consultation with the High Court to amend the service rules and to provide for re-employment of the retiring Judicial Officers till the age of 62 years if there are vacancies in the cadre of the District Judge. We direct this to be done as early as possible. 54. Even if a recommendation was made by Justice Shetty Commission for a periodical review for compulsory retirement once in five years, the same appears not to have been accepted by Supreme Court. One must not ignore that the entire exercise to improve judicial service conditions had its beginning in Supreme Court when All India Judges' Association-I (7 supra) to provide 'for better service conditions.' Therefore, having regard to All India Judges' Association-III (29 supra), we cannot accept the submission that there was any such accepted recommendation to provide for periodical review. One must not ignore that the entire exercise to improve judicial service conditions had its beginning in Supreme Court when All India Judges' Association-I (7 supra) to provide 'for better service conditions.' Therefore, having regard to All India Judges' Association-III (29 supra), we cannot accept the submission that there was any such accepted recommendation to provide for periodical review. In any event, as already found, such periodical review other than the review at the age of fifty eight years would tend to damage the reputation of judiciary and also violate Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution by denying security of tenure of service. Indeed in Para 21.40 of their report, Justice Shetty Commission recommended as follows. We have also recommended to delete the Rules made by the High Courts incorporating the directions of the Supreme Court in the Review Judgment in the All India Judges' Association Case for compulsory retirement at the age of 58 years. Instead, we have suggested to all High Courts to make a rule specifying only the superannuation age without any condition. We have indicated that once such a rule is made, the said directions of the Supreme Court need not be followed for review of cases of Judicial Officers as observed by the Supreme Court in Rajat Baran Roy and others v. State of West Bengal and others [ (1999) 4 SCC 235 , at 240]. 55. In Nawal Singh (10 supra), three officers of U.P.Judicial Service were compulsorily retired on attaining age of fifty eight years. Their challenge before Allahabad High Court was unsuccessful. They approached Supreme Court. Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. U.P.Judicial Officers (Retirement on Superannuation) Rules, 1992 were made after All India Judges' Association-I (7 supra). Rule 2 read with Rule 4 thereof provided that notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 56 of U.P. Fundamental Rules, a judicial officer shall retire on attaining age of sixty years. It was contended that in view of the said rule, increasing retirement age from fifty eight years to sixty years, F.R.56 stands repealed. F.R.561 provided that notwithstanding the age of superannuation of fifty eight years, a government servant may be retired after notice of three months after he attains the age of fifty years. It was contended that in view of the said rule, increasing retirement age from fifty eight years to sixty years, F.R.56 stands repealed. F.R.561 provided that notwithstanding the age of superannuation of fifty eight years, a government servant may be retired after notice of three months after he attains the age of fifty years. Supreme Court on consideration of both the rules came to the conclusion that U.P. Judicial Service Rules deal with extension of retirement age from fifty eight years to sixty years, and the same does not amount to amending or substituting F.R.56(b) and (c). In that connection, Supreme Court observed as extracted below. (paras 12 and 13 of SCC) From the facts narrated above, even if we were to sit in appeal against the subjective satisfaction of the high Court, it cannot be said that the orders of compulsory retirement of the appellants are, in any way, erroneous or unjustified. Further, it is impossible to prove by positive evidence the basis for doubting the integrity of the judicial officer. In the present day system, reliance is required to be placed on the opinion of the higher officer who had the opportunity to watch the performance of the officer concerned from close quarters and formation of his opinion with regard to the overall reputation enjoyed by the officer concerned would be the basis. ... It is to be reiterated that for keeping the stream of justice unpolluted, repeated scrutiny of service records of judicial officers after a specified age/completion of specified years of service provided under the Rules is a must by each and every High Court as the lower judiciary is the foundation of the judicial system. We hope that the high Courts would take appropriate steps regularly for weeding out the dead wood or the persons polluting the justice delivery system. 56. A reading of Judgment in Nawal Singh (10 supra) does not even remotely suggest that Supreme Court directed review of the career of judicial officer at the age of fifty or fifty five years even if such provision is contrary to law laid down in Motiram and Gurudev Singh (1 and 17 supra). Those observations were made in the background of U.P.Judicial Rules and U.P.Fundamental Rules and the merits of the case therein. Those observations were made in the background of U.P.Judicial Rules and U.P.Fundamental Rules and the merits of the case therein. We are, therefore, not able to countenance the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that Nawal Singh (10 supra) and Justice Shetty Commission justify impugned provisions. We are also not able to agree with the submission that first proviso addresses the aspect of deadwood as suggested by Nawal Singh (10 supra). In our considered opinion, having regard to fact that except Rule 44 of Pension Rules, there is no rule of compulsory retirement in the State of Andhra Pradesh - F.R.56 having been repealed by Section 7 of Parent Act; first proviso must be understood providing for the procedure adopted while extending age of superannuation from fifty eight years to sixty years. 57. Accordingly, on point No.1, we hold and declare that first proviso of Section 3(1A) of Parent Act as amended A.P.Act No.42 of 2006 insofar as the same enables the Government to compulsorily retire a member of Higher Judicial Service or the State Judicial Service on the afternoon of last day of the month in which he attains the age of fifty years or fifty five years is constitutionally invalid and violates Articles 14 and 311 (2) of Constitution of India. The words 'fifty years or fifty five years' appearing in the impugned first proviso to Section 3(1 A) shall I be ignored while enforcing first proviso to Section 3(1A) of Parent Act. In Re. Point No.2 58. Second proviso to Section 3(1 A) confers unguided and unbridled power on the Government to retire a judicial officer in public interest after giving three months notice in writing or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. First proviso requires as a condition precedent assessment and evaluation of record of judicial officer to find whether he is fit for his continued utility, well within time before he attains age of fifty or fifty five or fifty eight years. The second proviso on the contrary enables retiring an officer even after the date when he attains the age of fifty or fifty five or fifty eight years or any day thereafter. Though the respondents contend that first and second provisos are not exclusive of each other and that they complement each other, we are not impressed with such an argument. Though the respondents contend that first and second provisos are not exclusive of each other and that they complement each other, we are not impressed with such an argument. The plain language used in second proviso would mean that the power to retire a judicial officer after giving three months notice is altogether different from the power conferred under first proviso, to assess and evaluate the record for the purpose of extending age of superannuation from the age of fifty eight to sixty years or after an officer attains fifty years or fifty five years. Basically, second proviso was intended to be applied to those judicial officers who are given benefit of extension under the first proviso, in case such officers are found wanting. That is the reason why the second proviso enables the retirement of a judicial officer even after he attains specified age. Therefore, it is submitted by learned counsel for petitioners that second proviso has no nexus with the length of service for prematurely retiring the judicial officers. They contend that it violates Gurudev Singh principle. They would also contend that second proviso does not even provide for assessment and evaluation of record except stating that an officer can be retired in public interest which necessarily amounts to casting a stigma and therefore, attracts Article 311 (2) of Constitution. The respondents, however, argued that second proviso is intended to remove the pollutants of justice delivery system and is based on a ratio in Nawal Singh (10 supra). They sustain second proviso saying that even while applying it, the High Court is undertaking assessment and evaluation of the record of judicial officer. We are not impressed with such submission of respondents as no material by way of guidelines laid down by the High Court or the Government is placed before us. 59. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chandra Mohan, Rule 16(3) of All India Services (death-cum-retirement benefit) Rules, 1958, which empowered the Central Government to retire IAS/IPS etc officers after completion of thirty three years of qualifying service or on attaining age of fifty years, in public interest, with three months previous notice, fell for consideration. The rule as such did not contain any guidelines except indicating 'public interest' for compulsory retirement. However, the Central Government issued number of instructions to be followed while exercising power under rule 16(3) of the State Rules. The rule as such did not contain any guidelines except indicating 'public interest' for compulsory retirement. However, the Central Government issued number of instructions to be followed while exercising power under rule 16(3) of the State Rules. In that context, it was urged that the orders of compulsory retirement contravened the binding rules and instructions. Adverting to this aspect, Supreme Court made the following observations. It is sufficient for our purpose that these instructions do not violate any provision of the Act or of the rules. Rule 16(3), being a rigorous rule visa-vis a Government servant not himself willing to retire under R.16(2), has to be invoked in a fair and reasonable manner. Since Rule 16(3) itself does not contain any guidelines, directions or criteria, the instructions issued by the Government furnish an essential and salutary procedure for the purpose of securing uniformity in application of the rule. These instructions really fill up the yawning gaps in the provisions, and are embedded in the conditions of service. These are binding on the Government and cannot be violated to the prejudice of the Government servant (see also Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (1968) 1 SCR 111 : ( AIR 1967 SC 1910 ) and Union of India v. K.P.Joseph [ (1973) 2 SCR 752 : ( AIR 1973 SC 303 )]. (emphasis supplied) 60. In the absence of any guidelines, even if assessment is made, the same does not save impugned provision if it is otherwise unconstitutional. We may mention that even if as good governance policy the decision maker adhers to fairness and procedural due process, the same cannot meet requirement of constitutionality. We have already, while dealing with point No.1, adverted to the decision in Nawal Singh (10 supra). The same does not support the submission of learned counsel for respondents that second proviso is intended to remove the pollutants of justice delivery system. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for petitioners the absence of the words "compulsory retirement", the second proviso would render retirement of a judicial officer under the second proviso punitive and certainly results in adverse consequences. It denies the benefits that are earned by judicial officers. The rule therein is so rigorous vis-a-vis a judicial officer that one who is allowed to go to next stage under the first proviso can be retired under the second proviso. It denies the benefits that are earned by judicial officers. The rule therein is so rigorous vis-a-vis a judicial officer that one who is allowed to go to next stage under the first proviso can be retired under the second proviso. This is arbitrary and fails to satisfy the test laid down by Supreme Court in Motiram (1 supra) and other binding decisions. 61. In Motiram (1 supra), Rules 148(3), 148(4),149(3) and 149(4) of Indian Railway Establishment Code were challenged as constitutionally invalid. These rules are extracted as under. 148(3): Other (non-pensionable) railway servants:- The service of other (non-pensionable) railway servants shall be liable to termination on notice on either side for the periods shown below. Such notice is not however required in cases of dismissal or removal as a disciplinary measure after compliance with the provisions of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, retirement on attaining the age of superannuation, and termination of service due to mental or physical incapacity. Note:- The appointing authorities are empowered to reduce or waive at their discretion, the stipulated period of notice to be given by an employee, but the reason justifying their action should be recorded. This power cannot be re-delegated. 148(4): In lieu of the notice prescribed in this rule, it shall be permissible on the part of the Railway Administration to terminate the service of a railway servant by paying him the pay for the period of notice. 149(3): Other railway servants:- The services of other railway servants shall be liable to termination on notice on either side for the periods shown below. Such notice is not, however, required in cases of dismissal or removal as a disciplinary measure after compliance with the provisions of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, retirement on attaining the age of superannuation, and. termination of service due to mental or physical incapacity. 149(4): In lieu of the notice prescribed in this rule, it shall be permissible on the part of the Railway Administration to terminate the service of a railway servant by paying him the pay for the period of notice. Note: The appointing authorities are empowered to reduce or waive, at their discretion, the stipulated period of notice to be given by an employee, but the reason justifying their action should be recorded. This power cannot be re-delegated. 62. Note: The appointing authorities are empowered to reduce or waive, at their discretion, the stipulated period of notice to be given by an employee, but the reason justifying their action should be recorded. This power cannot be re-delegated. 62. Rules 148(3) and 149(3) empower appropriate authority to terminate the services of a railway employee by serving them with a notice for a requisite period or paying them as salary for the said period in lieu of notice. Both the Rules do not require that the power can be exercised in respect of servants who put in prescribed minimum period of service. Invalidating both these Rules, apex Court observed. What the latter portion of the impugned Rules provides is that in case a railway servant is dealt with under that portion, no notice need be served on him. The first part of the Rules can reasonable and legitimately take in all cases and may be used even in respect of cases falling under the latter category, provided of course notice for the specified period or salary in lieu of such notice is given to the railway servant. There is no doubt that on: a fair construction, the impugned Rules authorize the Railway Administration to terminate the service of all the permanent servants to whom the Rules apply merely on giving notice for the specified period, or on payment of salary in lieu thereof and that clearly amounts to the removal of the servant in question. Therefore, we are satisfied that the impugned Rules are invalid inasmuch as they are inconsistent with the provisions contained in Article 311 (2). The termination of the permanent servants' tenure which is authorized by the said Rules is no more and no less than their removal from service, and so, Article 311 (2) must come into play in respect of such cases. That being so the rule which does not require compliance with the procedure prescribed by Article 311 (2) must be struck down as invalid. (emphasis supplied) 63. We do not find any drastic difference between the impugned second proviso in A.P.Act No.42 of 2006 and Rules 148(3) and 149(3) of Indian Railway Establishment Code, which was invalidated in Motiram. Insofar as other aspects of the challenge are concerned, they are also covered by the reasons, which we gave while dealing with point NO.1. It is not necessary again to refer to those reasons. Insofar as other aspects of the challenge are concerned, they are also covered by the reasons, which we gave while dealing with point NO.1. It is not necessary again to refer to those reasons. In view of these reasons, second proviso must be held as unconstitutional. In Re Point Nos.3 and 4 (i) Validity of G.O.Ms.No.87, dated 28.07.2007 64. The petitioner in W.P.No.16437 of 2007 is compulsorily retired under second proviso to Section 3(1 A) of the Parent Act as amended by impugned A.P.Act No.42 of 2006. In view of the findings on point No.2, the order is non-est. The impugned order in G.O.Ms.No.87, dated 28.07.2007 is also challenged on other grounds and therefore, it becomes necessary to consider merits of the case of petitioner. 65. The petitioner joined judicial service as Junior Civil Judge on 01.04.1987. About fourteen years thereafter, he was promoted as Senior Civil Judge with effect from 14.03.2001. Approximately, five and half (5%) years thereafter, he was appointed by transfer to the post of District and Sessions Judge Grade-II in Higher Judicial Service. As per his date of birth i.e., 11.06.1952 in accordance with Section 3(1A) of Parent Act, he would be attaining the age of superannuation on 30.06.201231. Be that as it is, when he was promoted as District and Sessions Judge Grade-II, he did not complete fifty five years. He attained the age of fifty five years on 11.06.2007. Even before he completed fifty five years, his case was taken up for assessment and evaluation by Administrative Committee in its meeting held on 27.04.2001. The matter relating to petitioner was deferred. He completed fifty five years on 11.06.2007. His case, therefore, could not have been brought under the second proviso to Section 3(1 A) as inserted by third amendment Act. Nevertheless, in the meeting of Administrative Committee on 03.07.2007, the committee resolved to compulsorily retire the petitioner on completion of fifty five years in terms of second proviso. This is adverted to in the counter affidavit filed by High Court as under. The Committee noted that from the period of joining service in 1987, Officer's work has been rated as average or satisfactory in most of the years. In 1990, all the Hon'ble Judges constituting the Committee rated his performance as poor. In 1992, his work was quantitatively treated as unsatisfactory (first period). The Committee noted that from the period of joining service in 1987, Officer's work has been rated as average or satisfactory in most of the years. In 1990, all the Hon'ble Judges constituting the Committee rated his performance as poor. In 1992, his work was quantitatively treated as unsatisfactory (first period). In 1993, similar remark was recorded in regard to his work for the second period and one of the Hon'ble Judges remarked that he needs to be watched. In 1995, his work was treated as quantitatively unsatisfactory and qualitatively just average/below average. The Hon'ble Judge also remarked that the officer is required to be watched. In 1996, Additional District Judge, Adilabad submitted special report and described the work of the officer as unsatisfactory on civil as well as criminal side. In 2002, two of the Hon'ble Judges expressed doubts about his integrity. In 2005, his work was found qualitatively poor in first period and his conduct was described as unsatisfactory. On an overall assessment of the record of the Officer, the Committee is of the opinion that the officer is not fit to be continued in service beyond the age of 55 years. Accordingly, it was resolved that Sri K.Veera Chari be compulsorily retired from service on completion of 55 years of age in terms of second proviso to Section 3(1 A) of the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984, as amended by Act No.42 of 2006 and in lieu of notice he be paid three months salary. 66. The recommendation was sent to Government by a letter dated 13.07.2007 which culminated in the issue of impugned order being G.O.Ms.No.87, dated 28.07.2007, retiring the petitioner with effect from 31.07.2007, with three months pay and allowances in lieu of notice in accordance with Rule 44 of Pension Rules. 67. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that from 1987 till 2001, petitioner did not attract any adverse comments and therefore, he was promoted as Senior Civil Judge on consideration of merit and ability. Again within a period of less than six years of asse~')ment of his merit and ability, the High Court promoted him as District and Sessions Judge. 67. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that from 1987 till 2001, petitioner did not attract any adverse comments and therefore, he was promoted as Senior Civil Judge on consideration of merit and ability. Again within a period of less than six years of asse~')ment of his merit and ability, the High Court promoted him as District and Sessions Judge. When once he has been promoted on 04.08.2006, unless it is shown that between 04.08.2006 to 03.07.2007, the record including the annual confidential reports are adverse to the petitioner, he could not have been retired under the second proviso based on the record for the period from 1987-2001 and from 2001 to August, 2006. Such order of compulsory retirement would violate Articles 14, 16 and 311 (2) of Constitution. Secondly, it is submitted that Government ordered payment of three months pay and allowances in lieu of three months notice as per Pension Rules. Rule 44 of the Pension Rules has no application whatsoever to the case of petitioner because it requires minimum qualifying service of thirty three years before an officer can be compulsorily retired under Rule 44 thereof. In support of these contentions, he placed reliance on Shrivastava v. State of M.p2, Baikuntha Nath Das (14 supra) and State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M.Patep3. We propose to deal with these submissions after noticing the factual background in other writ petition, in which similar contentions are raised. (ii) Validity of G.O.Ms.No.32, dated 07.04.2007 68. The petitioner in W.P.No.18123 of 2007 was selected as Junior Civil Judge on 01.04.1987 and nine years thereafter got promotion as Senior Civil Judge with effect from 03.04.1996. In April, 2003, he was appointed by transfer to Higher Judicial Service as District and Sessions Judge Grade-II. Statedly, he completed fifty five years in April, 2007 and on the eve of such completion, his case was considered by the Administrative Committee on 12.03.2007 for the purpose of assessment and evaluation of the record to find his continued utility for the judicial service. The Administrative Committee found that the petitioner is not fit to be continued in service beyond the age of fifty five years. The Administrative Committee found that the petitioner is not fit to be continued in service beyond the age of fifty five years. A communication, dated 16.03.2007 was sent to Government of Andhra Pradesh, who issued G.O.Ms.No.32, dated 07.04.2007, retiring the petitioner from service on the afternoon of 30.04.2007 in terms of first proviso to Section 3(1 A) of the Parent Act as amended by A.P.Act No.42 of 2006. The Government also ordered payment of three months pay and allowances in lieu of notice in accordance with Rule 44 of Pension Rules. Learned counsel for petitioner while adopting the arguments of the petitioner in other writ petition, submits that the impugned order is arbitrary and irrational, in that the High Court considered the service record of the petitioner from 1991 to 1996 when the petitioner was promoted as Senior Civil Judge, and the service record from 1996 to 2003 and thereafter, which is contrary to the law laid down by Supreme Court in cases of compulsory retirement. 69. There is no dispute or denial that in both the cases, the High Court considered the service record of the two petitioners prior to their promotion as Senior Civil Judges as well as District Judges. As per the law laid down by Supreme Court, such assessment and evaluation of the service record prior to the promotion of the officer would be unreasonable exercise of power. Shrivastava (32 supra) is a case of judicial officer in Madhya Pradesh. He was appointed as Munsif Magistrate and rose to the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge. When he attained the age of fifty five years, service record was scrutinized for the purpose of absorption as District and Sessions Judge. The High Court decided to retire Shrivastava on his attaining age of fifty five years under F.R.56(3). Accordingly, the Government issued orders compulsorily retiring him. His challenge before the High Court was unsuccessful. Before the Supreme Court, it was urged that compulsory retirement is unsustainable as it is arbitrary and based on collateral considerations. As a fact, it was found that the High Court relied on some adverse remarks relating to his service as Munsif Magistrate. The apex Court held that such assessment would be arbitrary. The relevant observations are extracted below. The High Court has relied on some adverse remarks relating to 1959-60 or thereabouts. As a fact, it was found that the High Court relied on some adverse remarks relating to his service as Munsif Magistrate. The apex Court held that such assessment would be arbitrary. The relevant observations are extracted below. The High Court has relied on some adverse remarks relating to 1959-60 or thereabouts. It is true that in the early part of his career, the entries made do not appear to be quite satisfactory. They are of varied kinds. Some are good, some are not good and some are of a mixed kind. But being reports relating to a remote period, they are not quite relevant for the purpose determining whether he should be retired compulsorily or not in the year 1981, as it would be an act bordering on perversity to dig out old files to find out some material to make an order against an officer. We, therefore, confined our scrutiny to the reports made in respect of the appellant for about ten years prior to the date on which action was taken against him to retire him compulsorily. ... From what has been stated we find that the decisions taken by the High Court in respect of the appellant is arbitrary as it was mainly based on the entries that were made about 20 years before the date on which the decision was taken. Dependence on such stale entries cannot be placed for retiring a person compulsorily, particularly when the officer concerned has been promoted subsequent to such entries, as held by this Court in O. Ramaswam's case ( 1982 (3) SCR 75 : AIR 1982 SC 793 ). In that case one of us (Chinnappa Reddy, J) observed thus at pages 79-80 (of SCR): (at p.795 of AIR): In the face of the promotion of the appellant just a few months earlier and nothing even mildly suggestive of inaptitude or inefficiency thereafter, it is impossible to sustain the order of the Government retiring the appellant from service. The learned counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu argued that the Government was entitled to take into consideration the entire history of the appellant including that part of it which was prior to his promotion. We do not say that the previous history of a Government servant should be completely ignored, once he is promoted. Sometimes past events may help to assess present conduct. We do not say that the previous history of a Government servant should be completely ignored, once he is promoted. Sometimes past events may help to assess present conduct. But when there is nothing in the present conduct casting any doubt on the wisdom of the promotion, we see no justification for needless digging into the past". (emphasis supplied) 70. In Baikuntha Nath Das (14 supra), a three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court referred to various decisions including Shrivastava (32supra) and laid down following principles to be followed while passing an order of compulsory retirement on the ground that a public servant lost utility. (para 34 of SCC) (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary - in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter - of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it un-communicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it un-communicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. (emphasis supplied) 71. In Umedbhai M.Patel (33 supra), Supreme Court affirmed the Judgment of Gujarat High Court, which set aside an order of compulsory retirement of an executive engineer. Placing reliance on Baikuntha Nath Oas (14 supra), Supreme Court laid down as under (para 11 of SCC) The law relating to compulsory retirement has now crystallised into definite principles, which could be broadly summarised thus: (i) Whenever the services of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, the officer can be compulsorily retired for the sake of public interest. (ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution. (iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the officer. (iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order. (v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration. (vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable. (vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the officer. (viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure. (emphasis supplied) 72. The well settled principle as laid down in the above three decisions of Supreme Court is that if the public servant is promoted to higher post notwithstanding adverse remarks, such remarks lose their string especially when the promotion is based on merit/selection and not upon seniority. Such a factor is in favour of the officer and any order of compulsory retirement based on comments and remarks dug out of the files too remote would be arbitrary. We have perused the minutes of Hon'ble Judges of Administrative Committee. Such a factor is in favour of the officer and any order of compulsory retirement based on comments and remarks dug out of the files too remote would be arbitrary. We have perused the minutes of Hon'ble Judges of Administrative Committee. In both the cases, the remarks and/or adverse remarks against the petitioners prior to their promotion as Senior Civil Judges as well as prior to their promotion as District Judges were considered. Except comments like 'integrity doubtful', 'reputation is not above board', 'to be watched' and 'work is unsatisfactory', there was nothing concrete to show that the petitioners were corrupt or of known dubious conduct. In the absence of any such thing, any order of compulsory retirement under the first proviso or second proviso would be wholly unsustainable. Applying the ratio in Shrivastava (14 supra), Baikuntha Nath Das (32 supra) and Umedbhai M.Patel (33 supra), we are compelled to hold that the impugned orders in both the writ petitions are arbitrary, invalid and unconstitutional. Conclusions 73. In conclusion, we may sum up our conclusions and directions as below. (1) This Court declares that first proviso to Section 3(1 A) of Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984 as amended by A.P.Act No.42 of 2006 insofar as it enables the Government to compulsorily retire judicial officer on attaining age of 'fifty years or fifty five years' is ultra vires and violative of Articles 14 and 311 (2) of Constitution of India. Accordingly, we hold that the words 'fifty years or fifty five years' 3.ppearing in the impugned first proviso at two places shall have no effect and shall be ignored while enforcing and applying the first proviso to Section 3(1A). (2) This Court declares that second proviso to Section 3(1 A) of Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984 as amended by A.P.Act No.42 of 2006 is ultra vires and violative of Articles 14 and 311 (2) of Constitution of India. (3) The Government Order in G.O.Ms. NO.87, Law (LA&J SC.F) Department, dated 28.07.2007, whereby and whereunder Sri K.Veerachari, petitioner in W.P.No.16437 of 2007, is ordered to retire from service compulsorily on the afternoon on 31.07.2007 in terms of second proviso to Section 3(1A) of Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984 as amended by A.P.Act No.42 of 2006 is arbitrary, illegal, invalid and unconstitutional. A writ of Mandamus shall issue accordingly with a further direction that Sri K.Veerachari, District and Sessions Judge Grade-II in A.P.Higher Judicial Service shall forthwith be reinstated with all consequential benefits including the pay and allowances for the period during which he is out of service till he is reinstated. (4) The Government Order in G.O.Ms. No.32, Law (LA&J SC.F) Department, dated 07.04.2007, whereby and whereunder Sri D.Chiranjeevi Babu, petitioner in W.P.No.18123 of 2007, is ordered to retire from service compulsorily on the afternoon on 30.04.2007 in terms of first proviso to Section 3(1 A) of Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984 as amended by A.P.Act No.42 of 2006 is arbitrary, illegal, invalid and unconstitutional. A writ of Mandamus shall issue accordingly with a further direction that Sri D.Chiranjeevi Babu, District and Sessions Judge Grade-II in A.P.Higher Judicial Service shall forthwith be reinstated with all consequential benefits including the pay and allowances for the period during which he is out of service till he is reinstated. 74. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed without any order as to costs.