Judgment :- 1. These Revisions are directed against the order of the Gudalur Janmam estates Abolition Tribunal and the District Judge of the Nilgris at Udhagamandalam dated 10. 2007 made in I.A. Nos.62 to 68 of 2007 in C.M.A. Nos.10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17 and 18 of 1999. 2. The respondents in the said Interlocutory Applications are the petitioners. The petitioner/appellant thereon is the first respondent herein and the first respondent in that Interlocutory Application is the second respondent. The Interlocutory Applications have been filed in the above C.M.As. under Order 6, Rule 17 read with Order 1, Rule 10(1), Section 151 of C.P.C. and Section 7 of the Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969 praying for permitting the first respondent herein to amend the cause title in the memorandum of Appeal. Those Applications have been ordered by the above referred Court, which is being challenged in these Revisions. 3. The short factual matrix, which is necessary for the disposal of these Revisions are set out hereunder: The subject matter of the lands in question were previously Janmam estates owned by the Jenmis. They were transferred to the State Government and vest with it free from all encumbrances by virtue of Section 3 of the Gudalur Jenam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969. (hereinafter called as "the Act"). The petitioners claimed ryotwari patta under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act before the Assistant Settlement Officer, who is competent to grant patta. Section 12(3) of the said Act contemplates an Appeal against the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer. An Appeal has been preferred by the Tahsildar, Gudalur/Pandalur. Thus, the name of the appellant was described as Tahsildar. Originally, those Appeals were allowed by the Tribunal and the claimants preferred Appeals before this Court. The Appeals were allowed by the Division Bench of this Court setting aside the orders of the Tribunal and the matters were remitted to the Tribunal for fresh disposal. While the matters were taken up for hearing an objection has been taken on the side of the claimants about the maintainability of the Appeals preferred by the Tahsildar. Thereafter, an Application has been filed to amend the cause title by removing the name of the "Tahsildar, Gudalur/Pandalur and substituting the name as State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Collector of Nilgiris. Thereafter, an Application has been filed to amend the cause title by removing the name of the "Tahsildar, Gudalur/Pandalur and substituting the name as State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Collector of Nilgiris. Those Applications have been allowed by the Tribunal constituted under the Act viz., the District Judge, Nilgiris at Udhagamandalam and the present Revisions are directed against the said order. 4. In the affidavit filed in support of the Applications for amending the cause title, which has been sworn to by the Collector of Nilgiris, it is stated that the Appeals have been preferred against the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer and in the Appeal memorandum, the name of the appellant has been wrongly described due to a bona fide mistake. Instead of stating the appellant as "the State of Tamil Nadu" represented by the Collector of Nilgiris it has been wrongly stated as "the Tahsildar, Gudalur/Pandalur. It is a bona fide mistake and and if the bona fide error as regards description of the appellant is not corrected, great hardship and irrepairable injury will be caused to the State. 5. In reply to the said Applications the claimants have filed counter affidavit, wherein it has been set out that the proposed amendment would alter the entire cause of action, besides it is barred by limitation. Though, even at the outset, an objection has been taken with regard to the locus standi of the Tahsildar in preferring the Appeals, the mistake has not been rectified and the State Government did not take any steps to bring on record the necessary parties. The Appeals preferred by the Tahsildar of Gudalur/Pandalur is non-est in law. It is not a mis-description and the same cannot be remedied now. Thus the counter affidavit sought for dismissal of the Applications. 6. On considering the said submissions made by both parties, the Tribunal constituted under the Act viz., the District Judge of Nilgris at Udhagamandalam by an order dated 10. 2007 allowed the Applications and the present Revisions are directed against those orders. 7. Mr. Thus the counter affidavit sought for dismissal of the Applications. 6. On considering the said submissions made by both parties, the Tribunal constituted under the Act viz., the District Judge of Nilgris at Udhagamandalam by an order dated 10. 2007 allowed the Applications and the present Revisions are directed against those orders. 7. Mr. T. Srinivasa Raghavan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in C.R.P. Nos.3340 to 3345 of 2007 contended that — .(i) against the orders of the second respondent herein viz., the Assistant Settlement Officer, Dharapuram, the Government had never filed any Appeal, but the Appeals have been preferred only by the Tahsildar, Gudalur/Pandalur, which are totally not maintainable; .(ii) the mandatory requirements prescribed under Section 79, C.P.C. and Article 300 of the Constitution of India were not followed. While so, it cannot be cured by filing the Applications for substituting the cause title; (iii) the amendment Petitions have been filed after 8 years and 3 months after filing the Appeals by the Tahsildar/Gudalur Pandalur and hence the amendment sought for is clearly barred by limitation; .(iv) the amendment sought for is not correcting mis-description of the cause title, but it is a defect of non-joinder of necessary parties; .(v) the Government is a necessary party in the Appeals and in the absence of necessary party the Appeals deserve to be dismissed in view of Order 1, Rule 9, C.P.C.; .(vi) the reasoning of the Court below in allowing the Applications for amendment is totally erroneous. 8. Mr. M.K. Kabir, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in C.R.P. No.344 of 2008 submitted that — .(i) when the Appeals have been remanded by the Division Bench of this Court in STA Nos.7 to 20, 22 of 2003 and 1 of 2004 dated 14. 2007 there was no direction by the Division Bench of this Court to amend the cause title. While so, the Applications preferred after the remand for amending the cause title, should not have been entertained by the Tribunal as contemplated under the Act. 2007 there was no direction by the Division Bench of this Court to amend the cause title. While so, the Applications preferred after the remand for amending the cause title, should not have been entertained by the Tribunal as contemplated under the Act. The scope of remand is limited and the Tribunal which has decided the Applications under Order 6, Rule 17 had enlarged the scope of remand and hence the order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside; .(ii) under the said Act Section 7 contemplates filing of Appeal and Section 7 of the Act prescribes that against the order of the Settlement Officer within one year, the State Government has to prefer the Appeals if any. While so, the Appeal has not been preferred by the State Government but the Appeal has been preferred only by the Tahsildar, Gudalur/Pandalur. Since no Appeal has been filed by the State Government as contemplated under the Act now the State cannot file an Application to substitute its name in the place of Tahsildar, Gudalur/Pandlur, which will be clearly barred by limitation as per Section 7 of the Act; (iii) the affidavit in support of the Application for substituting the name of the State Government had been filed by the Collector and he cannot remove the Tahsildar and substitute himself in his place and file an affidavit for the purpose of amending the cause title; (iv) it is not a mis-description as it is sough to be raised but it is an Appeal preferred by an incompetent person and the same cannot be rectified after a lapse of more than 8 years, which is not permissible. Thus the right of the petitioner is sought to be taken away by substituting the State Government in the place of Tahsildar, Gudalur/Pandalur. 9. Per contra, Mr. Thus the right of the petitioner is sought to be taken away by substituting the State Government in the place of Tahsildar, Gudalur/Pandalur. 9. Per contra, Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Additional Advocate General contended that when the matter originally came before this Court against the orders of the Assistant Settlement Officer by way of Special Tribunal Appeal Nos.7 to 20, 22 of 2003 and 1 of 2004, the Division Bench of this Court, while remanding the matter has clearly held that though an objection was raised by the claimants regarding the maintainability of the Appeals by the District Forest Officer and the Tahsildar, there is no serious dispute as to the finding regarding the maintainability of the Appeals preferred by the Tahsildar or by the District Forest Officer. Thus, according to the learned Additional Advocate General, a clear finding has been rendered by this Court stating that there was no serious objection on the side of the petitioners herein regarding the maintainability of the Appeals preferred by the Tahsildar or by the District Forest Officer and hence the petitioners are now precluded from raising an objection with regard to the maintainability of the Appeals preferred by the Tahsildar, Gudalur/Pandalur. By way of abundant caution an Application has been filed by the District Collector, Nilgris for substituting the name of the State Government in the place of the Tahsildar, which cannot be seriously objected by the petitioners. (i) If for any reason, the Division Bench of this Court has held that the Appeals preferred by the Tahsildar was not maintainable and if an Application has been filed for substituting the name of the State Government then it could have been said that the Application preferred for substituting the State Government in the place of Tahsildar is barred by limitation. Since it is not that position prevailing, the petitioners cannot be urged to contend that the present Applications are barred by limitation. .(ii) The said Act is a social welfare legislation and hence the delay in the proceedings will affect the persons, who are going to be benefited under the Act. (iii) The special statute like Janmam Act is silent about, who should represent the State Government and hence the objections raised by the petitioners is unsustainable. 10. I have heard learned counsel and the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respective petitioners as well as Mr. (iii) The special statute like Janmam Act is silent about, who should represent the State Government and hence the objections raised by the petitioners is unsustainable. 10. I have heard learned counsel and the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respective petitioners as well as Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents. 11. Mr. T. Srinivasa Raghavan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in some of the Revisions has drawn my attention to Section 79 of C.P.C. Section 79, C.P.C reads as follows: 79. Suits by or against Government.— In a Suit by or against the Government, the authority to be named as plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, shall be — .(a) in the case of a Suit by or against the Central Government, the Union of India, and .(b) in the case of a Suit by or against a State Government, the State. He has also drawn my attention to Article 300 of the Constitution of India, which reads as follows: 300. Suits and Proceedings.-- (1) The Government of India may sue or be sued by the name of the Union of India and the Government of a State may sue or be sued by the name of the State and may, subject to any provisions which may be made by Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of such State enacted b y virtue of powers conferred by this Constitution, sue or sued in relation to their respective affairs in the like cases as the Dominion of India and the corresponding Provinces or the corresponding Indian States might have sued or been sued if this Constitution had not been enacted. .(2) If at the commencement of this Constitution — .(a) any legal proceedings are pending to which the Dominion of India is a party, the Union of India shall be deemed to be substituted for the Dominion in those proceedings, and .(b) any legal proceedings are pending to which a Province or an Indian State is a party, the corresponding State shall be deemed to be substituted for the Province or the Indian State in those proceedings. 12. Further the learned counsel drawn my attention to Order 27, Rule 3 of C.P.C. which reads as follows: 3. 12. Further the learned counsel drawn my attention to Order 27, Rule 3 of C.P.C. which reads as follows: 3. Plaints in Suits by or against Government.-- In Suits by or against the Government, instead of inserting in the plaint the name and description and place of residence of the plaintiff or defendant, it shall be sufficient to insert the appropriate name as provided in Section 79. 13. Further the learned counsel drawn may attention to Order 1, Rule 9 of C.P.C.: 9. Misjoinder and non--joinder.— No Suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non joinder of parties and the Court may in every Suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it: Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party. 14. By drawing those provisions under the C.P.C. and Constitution of India, Mr. T. Srinivasa Raghavan learned counsel appearing for the petitioners strenuously contended that in a Suit filed by or against the Government the authority to be named as plaintiff or defendant as the case may be in the case of Central Government, the Union of India and in the case of the State Government, the State. While so, the Appeals against the Assistant Settlement Officer were instituted by the Tahsildar, Gudalur/ Pandalur, which are not maintainable, in view of the provisions referred to above. Thus according to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in some of the revisions, the Appeals preferred by the Tahsildar are non-est in law. While so in an Appeal, which is not maintainable or non-est in law, an Application cannot be filed to substitute the name of the State Government in the place of Tahsildar. 15. Mr. Kabir, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in C.R.P. No.344 of 2008 also submitted that the Appeals preferred in the name of the Tahsildar cannot be considered as an Appeal preferred by the State Government and hence in an incompetent Appeal preferred by the incompetent person an Application cannot be filed to substitute the State Government. Thus the Court below has totally misunderstood the real position and allowed the Applications for amending the cause title. 16. Per contra, Mr. Thus the Court below has totally misunderstood the real position and allowed the Applications for amending the cause title. 16. Per contra, Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents contended that the Tahsildar, who has preferred an Appeal has preferred the Appeal on behalf of the State Government. The Tahsildar has not filed the Appeal in his individual capacity, but he has filed the Appeal representing the State Government. The meat of the matter is that when the Tahsildar representing the State Government had filed the Appeal obviously it is on behalf of the State Government. Thus, according to the learned Additional Advocate General, the arguments that have been put forth on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in some of the matter and the learned Senior Counsel appearing in one of the Revision has to rejected in toto. In this connection the learned Additional Advocate General has drawn my attention to the judgement reported in The Secretary, Ministry of Works & Housing, Government of India and others v. Shri Mohinder Singh Jagdev and others, 1996 (6) SCC 229 , and paragraph 5 of the said Judgment is usefully extracted hereunder: Having given due consideration to the contentions of the counsel and having gone through the facts and circumstances of the case, first question that arises is: whether the Appeal has been competently laid ? It is not disputed and cannot be disputed that the Union of India can lay the Suit and be sued under Article 300 of the Constitution in relation to its affairs. Under Section 79 read with Order 27, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure in a Suit, by or against the Central Government, the authority to be named as plaintiff/defendant shall be Union of India. The Secretary, Ministry of Works and Housing is a limb of the Union of India transacting its functions on behalf of the Government under the concerned Department as per the business piles framed under Article 77 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Appeal came to be filed by the Secretary, though wrongly described. The nomenclature given in the cause title as Secretary instead of Union of India, is not conclusive. The meat of the matter is that the Secretary representing the Government of India had filed the Appeal obviously on behalf of Union of India. Accordingly we reject the first contention." 17. The nomenclature given in the cause title as Secretary instead of Union of India, is not conclusive. The meat of the matter is that the Secretary representing the Government of India had filed the Appeal obviously on behalf of Union of India. Accordingly we reject the first contention." 17. The contention of the learned Additional Advocate General appears to be more on sound reasonings. When the Tahsildar had initiated an Appeal against the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, the same is not preferred in his individual capacity or it can be said that he has got personal interest in preferring the Appeal. The Appeals have been preferred only in his official capacity representing the State Government. When that is the position, at no stretch of imagination, it could be said that the Appeals have been preferred by the Tahsildar, in his individual capacity not representing the Government at all. The nomenclature that has been used in the cause title would be the Tahsildar, but in effect it is only an Appeal by the Government and at the instance of the Government. The judgment cited by the learned Additional Advocate General referred to above strengthens the argument of the learned Additional Advocate General. In the above judgment the Honble Apex Court has clearly held that the nomenclature given in the cause title is not conclusive and the meat of the matter is that the Secretary representing the Government of India had filed the Appeal obviously on behalf of the Union of India. Thus, even in the case on hand it could be safely concluded that the Tahsildar representing the State of Tamil Nadu had filed the Appeal and obviously on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu. Thus the argument put forth by the learned counsel and learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners have to be rejected in toto. 18. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in C.R.P. Nos.3340 of 2007 cited a decision reported in Smt. Ganga Bai vs. Vijaykumar and others, AIR 1974 SC 1126 , more particularly para 15 of the said judgment. Paragraph 15 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: 15. 18. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in C.R.P. Nos.3340 of 2007 cited a decision reported in Smt. Ganga Bai vs. Vijaykumar and others, AIR 1974 SC 1126 , more particularly para 15 of the said judgment. Paragraph 15 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: 15. It is thus clear that the Appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 in the High Court was directed originally not against any part of the preliminary decree but against a mere finding recorded by the Trial Court that the partition was not genuine. The main controversy before us centres round the question whether that Appeal was maintainable. On this question the position seems to us well established. There is a basic distinction between the right of Suit and the right of Appeal. There is an inherent right in every person to bring a Suit of a civil nature and unless the Suit is barred by statute one may, at ones peril, bring a suit of ones choice. It is no answer to a Suit, howsoever frivolous the claim, that the law confers not such right to sue. A Suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit. But, the position in regard to Appeals is quite the opposite. The right of Appeal inheres in no one and therefore an Appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explains why the right of Appeal is described as a creature of statute." 19. By citing the said decision, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that a Suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law but the position is totally different in case of Appeal. To maintain the Appeal there shall be clear authority of law. The said judgment relates to a matter where the defendant prefers the Appeals against mere findings recorded by the Trial Court. In that context, the Honble Apex Court held that the Appeals preferred against the mere finding is not sustainable. 20. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in C.R.P. No. 344 of 2008 cited a decision reported in Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. In that context, the Honble Apex Court held that the Appeals preferred against the mere finding is not sustainable. 20. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in C.R.P. No. 344 of 2008 cited a decision reported in Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. of Andhra Pradesh vs Collector and others, AIR 2003 SC 1805 , and contended that the special statute provides for filing of an Appeal by the State Government and when the Appeal is not filed by the State Government and if it is filed by the Tahsildar, it is totally an Appeal filed by an incompetent person and the same cannot be entertained. Learned Senior Counsel more particularly relied on paragraph 11 and 12 of the said judgment, which is extracted hereunder: .11. It needs to be noted here that a legal entity - a natural person or an artificial person can sue or be sued in his/its own name in a Court of law or a Tribunal. It is not merely a procedural formality but is essentially a matter of substance and considerable significance. That is why there are special provisions in the Constitution and the Code of Civil Procedure as to how the Central Government or the Government of a State may sue or be sued. So also there are special provisions in regard to other juristic persons specifying as to how they can sue or be sued. In giving description of a party it will be useful to remember the distinction between misdescription or misnomer of a party and misjoinder or non-joinder of a party suing or being sued. In the case of misdescription of a party, the Court may at any stage of the suit/proceedings permit correction of the cause title so that party before the Court is correctly described; however a misdescription of a party will not be fatal to the maintainability of the suit/proceedings. Though Rule 9 of Order 1 of C. P. C. mandates that no Suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, it is important to notice that the Proviso thereto clarifies that nothing in that Rule shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party. Therefore, care must be taken to ensure that the necessary party is before the Court, be it a plaintiff or a defendant, otherwise, the Suit or the proceedings will have to fail. Therefore, care must be taken to ensure that the necessary party is before the Court, be it a plaintiff or a defendant, otherwise, the Suit or the proceedings will have to fail. Rule 10 of Order 1, C.P.C. provides remedy when a Suit is filed in the name of wrong plaintiff and empowers the Court to strike out any party improperly joined or to implead a necessary party at any stage of the proceedings. 12. The question that needs to be addressed is, whether the Chief Conservator of Forest as the petitioner/appellant in the Writ Petition/Appeal is a mere misdescription for the State of Andhra Pradesh or whether it is a case of non joinder of the State of Andhra Pradesh - a necessary party. In a lis dealing with the property of a State, there can be no dispute that the State is the necessary party and should be impleaded as provided in Article 300 of the Constitution and Section 79 of C.P.C., viz., in the name of the State/Union of India, as the case may be, lest the Suit will be bad for non-joinder of the necessary party. even post in the hierarchy of the posts in the Government set-up, from the lowest to the highest, is not recognised as a juristic person nor can the State be treated as represented when a Suit/proceeding is in the name of such offices/posts or the officers holding such posts, therefore, in the absence of the State in the array of parties, the cause will be defeated for non joinder of a necessary party to the lis, in any Court or Tribunal. We make it clear that this principle does not apply to a case where an official of the Government acts as a statutory authority and sues or pursues further proceeding in its name because in that event, it will not be as Suit or proceeding for or on behalf of a State/Union of India but by the statutory authority as such. .21. That is a case where the dispute arisen between the two departments of the Government with regard to the title to the lands in question and the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued orders directing the Commissioner of Survey, Settlement and Land Record to make an enquiry under Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act and to pass a speaking order after hearing the parties concerned. When the enquiry was pending, the Pattedars filed the Suit before the Subordinate Judge, Wanaparthy for a declaration of title, recovery of compensation for the lands in question and for rendition of accounts. Thereafter, in pursuant to the orders of the State Government of Andhra Pradesh, the Commissioner conducted enquiry, heard both the parties and opined that the Order of the Collector passed under Section 87 of the Land Revenue Act was correct and did not call for any interference therewith. The Government accepted the order of the Commissioner and no further steps have been taken to correct it or set aside the said order. However, a doubt has crept in the mind of the Chief Conservator of Forests and he filed Writ Petition before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the order of the Commissioner of Survey, Settlement and Land Record. In that context the Honble Apex Court was called upon to decide whether the Chief Conservator of Forest is competent to file the Writ Petition questioning the order of Commissioner of Survey, Settlement and Land Record and their lordships have opined that the Chief Conservator of Forests cannot maintain the Writ Petition. But the facts in the present case is totally different. The Tahsildar had filed the Appeal against the orders of the Assistant Settlement Officer and the State Government now wants to substitute itself in the place of the Tahsildar. Thus, the judgment cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in C.R.P. No.344 of 2008 has no relevance for the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. 22. It is also to be borne in mind that originally when the Appeals have been filed questioning the orders of the Assistant Settlement Officer by various parties in S.T.A. Nos.7 to 20,22 of 2003 and 1 of 2004, the Division Bench of this Court in paragraph 9 of the said judgment have clearly held that there was no serious objection on behalf of the claimants regarding the maintainability of the Appeals filed by the Tahsildar or District Forest Officer. Paragraph 9 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: 9. Now, let us consider the order of the Tribunal. Paragraph 9 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: 9. Now, let us consider the order of the Tribunal. Though an objection was raised by the claimants regarding maintainability of the Appeal by the District Forest Officer and the Tahsildar, ultimately, the learned District Judge, after finding that the appellants therein (District Forest Officer and the Tahsildar) are aggrieved persons and in order to protect the forest lands, gave a finding that the Appeals filed by them are maintainable and rejected the objection of the claimants. Even before us, there is no serious dispute as to the finding relating to maintainability of the Appeals filed by the Officers. 23. After the matter has been remanded as per the orders referred to above, the petitioners cannot once again re-agitate the matter by contending that the Appeals by the Tahsildar are not maintainable. They cannot be heard to say so after the orders of the Division Bench of this Court referred to above. Even then it has been thought it fit to file an Application for amendment substituting the name of the Tahsildar and add State Government in their place and the same was done by way of abundant caution. The discussions made above will amply prove that the Applications filed to substitute the name of the State Government cannot be said to be erroneous and the Court below has rightly entertained the said Applications. 24. Yet another contention that has been raised on behalf he learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in C.R.P. Nos.3340 to 3345 of 2007 and the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in C.R.P. No.344 of 2008 is that the present action in filing an Application to amend the cause title in the memorandum of Appeal to substitute the name of the appellant as Tahsildar, Gudalur/Pandalur as State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Collector of Nilgris, at Udhagamandalam is totally barred by limitation and hence the same cannot be entertained. 25. The bone of contention in this regard is that the Government has not filed the Appeal. But the Appeal has been filed by the Tahsildar and now by substituting the name of the State Government the vested right of the other side is sought to be taken away. 25. The bone of contention in this regard is that the Government has not filed the Appeal. But the Appeal has been filed by the Tahsildar and now by substituting the name of the State Government the vested right of the other side is sought to be taken away. At this point of time, the State Government cannot file an Appeal because under Section 12 of the said Act the Appeal has to be filed within one year from the date of the order of the Settlement Officer and what could not be filed directly is sought to be done indirectly by filing an Application for amendment substituting the name of the Tahsildar as State Government. In this connection, several judgments have been relied on by the counsels appearing for the petitioners. 26. Citing the decision reported in T.N. Alloy Foundry Co. Ltd. vs. T.N. Electricity Board and others, 2004 (2) CTC 143 : 2004 (3) LW 732. Mr. T. Srinivasa Raghavan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in some of the Revisions has submitted that the amendment has to be declined if a fresh Suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of Application. The relevant passage in para 2 is extracted hereunder: "2. Shri T.L.V. Iyer, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, urged that the view taken by the High Court in rejecting the amendment of the appellant was erroneous. The law as regard permitting amendment to the plaint, is well settled. In L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. and another vs. Messrs. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 : 1957 SCR 438 , it was held that the Court as a rule decline to allow amendment, if a fresh Suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the Application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered and does not affect the power of the Court to order it." That is a case, where the amendment has been sought for enhancing the claim for damages. Originally, the learned Single Judge of this Court has allowed the Application for amendment, which has been set aside in the LPA by the Division Bench and the same has been confirmed by the Honble Apex Court. Originally, the learned Single Judge of this Court has allowed the Application for amendment, which has been set aside in the LPA by the Division Bench and the same has been confirmed by the Honble Apex Court. In the present case on hand, the facts are totally different. The State Government wants to come as an appellant in the place of Tahsildar and hence it cannot be said that the claim made now by the State Government is barred by limitation. Further more, even in the said judgment it has been held that the factor of limitation has to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered and does not affect the power of the Court to order it. 27. Yet another decision that has been cited has been reported in Shiv Gopal Sah v. Sita Ram Saraugi & others, 2008 (1) LW 451. In that matter an amendment has been sought to be introduced by seeking a prayer regarding the declaration of sale deed dated 10. 1985 as being bogus and ineffective document and the said amendment has been sought to be introduced, even after the defendants had pleaded a title in their favour on the basis of the said sale deed. In those circumstances, the Honble Apex Court held that the Court would not permit the plaintiffs to introduce a time barred claim. 28. As discussed above, in the present case on hand, no new claim is being made or sought to be introduced by way of amendment. Hence the judgment cited will not be of any use to the petitioners. The other decision that has been cited is reported in Radhika Devi v. Bajrangi Singh and others, AIR 1996 SC 2358 . That is a case where in a partition suit though the defendants had filed written statement specifically pleading execution of the gift deed in his favour regarding the property in dispute, the amendment of Plaint seeking declaration that the gift deed was obtained illegally and fraudulently made beyond the period of limitation and in those circumstances in the said judgment their lordships of the Supreme Court have disallowed the plaintiff from making such amendment. The said judgment also will not be of any use to the petitioners. The said judgment also will not be of any use to the petitioners. As stated already, the present Applications have been filed only for substituting the name of the appellant Tahsildar Gudalur/Pandalur as the State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Collector of Nilgiris. The said amendment, in view of the fact that the Tahsildar has filed the Appeal representing the Government on behalf of the Government could never be said to be an Appeal preferred in his individual capacity and not representing the State Government. Thus the said amendment will not either alter the structure of the Appeal or could be said to be a time barred one. 29. For all the reasons stated above, I am inclined to hold that the Court below has rightly allowed the Applications preferred for amending the cause title, which has been extracted above. In the result, the order of the Gudalur Janmam Estates Abolition Tribunal and the District Judge of the Nilgris at Udhagamandalam dated 10. 2007 made in I.A. Nos.62 to 68 of 2007 in C.M.A. Nos.10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17 and 18 of 1999 is confirmed and the Civil Revision Petition are dismissed. Consequently, the connected M.Ps. are closed. No costs.