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2008 DIGILAW 551 (AP)

A. VenkatReddy v. District and Sessions Judge, Chittoor, Chittoor District

2008-07-23

C.V.RAMULU, V.V.S.RAO

body2008
C.V. RAMULU, J :- This writ petition is filed seeking a mandamus declaring the action of respondents 1 and 2 in issuing Proceedings L.Dis.No.32/Estt/2006, dated 11.1.2007 as arbitrary and illegal and consequently to set aside the same. 2. It appears, at the relevant point of time, the petitioner was working as Upper Division Clerk/Deputy Nazir in the Court of III Additional District Judge, Tirupathi. In the midnight of 19/20.7.2005, due to heavy downpour, rain water entered into the residential quarters of the Judicial Officers at Tirupathi. Petitioner was informed to rush to the quarters for help and to remove the Court files etc. However, petitioner reached the quarters at 6.30 a.m. on 20.7.2005. Thus, immediately he did not reach the quarters for rendering assistance to the Judi,cial Officers. Therefore, respondent No.1 issued a charge-sheet dated 8.12.2005 enumerating the following charge: "That the said Sri A. Venkat Reddy, Senior Assistant, while working as Senior Assistant (D.N.) in III Additional District Judge's Court, Tirupati failed to attend to render necessary assistance to the inmates of the Judicial Officers' quarters whose houses were submerged with water, which is minimum expected from the Senior Assistant (Nazarath Section) to report before the Officers along with available Process Servers to render help in excavating the inmates and their belongings including Court files from the Judicial Officers quarters, though informed and only reported in the morning after water was cleared by Fire Service personnel, which amounts to dereliction of duties and which is unbecoming of an employees and which if proved or established amounts to misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of APCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964." Petitioner submitted his explanation to the said charge stating that in the night of 19.7.2005 there was heavy rain fall at Tirupathi and entire Tirupathi town was submerged with water and electricity was cut off in the residential area where he was residing. Though he admitted that he received a phone call from the II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tirupathi on the midnight of 19.7.2005 about rain water entering into the residential quarters of the Judicial Officers, he could not rush to the quarters, as there was heavy downpour and his residence was 4 kilometres away from the Judicial Officers' quarters. Though he admitted that he received a phone call from the II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tirupathi on the midnight of 19.7.2005 about rain water entering into the residential quarters of the Judicial Officers, he could not rush to the quarters, as there was heavy downpour and his residence was 4 kilometres away from the Judicial Officers' quarters. Apart from that, he is a heart patient and undergone Angiography on 11.12.2002, stinting was also done of RCA bifurcula stenocis and he was under continuous medication and daily after food, he would take medicines which will keep him drowsy. According to him, he made best efforts to reach the quarters, but could not, as the rain water was overflowing on the roads. Ultimately, he reached at 6.30 a.m. on 20.7.2005 and rendered all possible help to the Judicial Officers. Thus, he requested for dropping of the charge. However, having not satisfied with the explanation, an Enquiry Officer was appointed and enquiry was conducted. The learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupathi under whom the petitioner was working at the relevant point of time, was examined as PW.1 and the III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tirupathi was examined as PW.2. The complaint made by PW.1 to the learned District Judge, Chittoor was marked as Ex.P 1. On the basis of the evidence on record, the Enquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty of the charge. Thereafter, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner, who submitted his explanation on 30.11.2006. According to the petitioner, without considering the said explanation, the 1 st respondent imposed the punishment of withholding of promotion permanently, by an Order dated 11.1.2007, which is illegal. Hence, this writ petition. 3. A detailed counter-affidavit has been filed by the 1 st respondent denying the allegations made by the petitioner as to development of ill-will or malice and there was no bias at all in dealing with the present case. It was stated that the petitioner was placed under suspension on 8.11.2005 and the said Proceedings were issued consequent on the directions of this Court, on administrative side. Further, the charge levelled against the petitioner was enquired into in detail and the Enquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty of the charge. It was stated that the petitioner was placed under suspension on 8.11.2005 and the said Proceedings were issued consequent on the directions of this Court, on administrative side. Further, the charge levelled against the petitioner was enquired into in detail and the Enquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty of the charge. Therefore, petitioner was imposed with a punishment of denyihg promotion permanently, since the charge was grave in nature and the petitioner failed to react to the situation and to attend to his legitimate duties. There was a dereliction on the part of the petitioner in attending to his duties being a Deputy Nazir having control over Nazarath and left the Judicial Officers and their family members to their fate on a mid night in a heavy rain fall and when they came out from their quarters with wearing apparels in rain water mixed with drain water upto waist level depth, despite receiving a phone call from a responsible Judicial Officer. Therefore, conducting enquiry and imposing punishment was in consonance with A.P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1991. The impugned Order is perfectly justified and valid. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the duties of a Deputy Nazir are not enumerated anywhere and the petitioner was not supposed to attend to any such rescue operations. If any help is expected from the petitioner, it was only on humanitarian basis, but the petitioner explained that in the mid night of 19.7.2005 whole of Tirupathi was in rain water, the place where the petitioner was residing was 4 Kilometres away from the Judicial Officers' quarters and the electricity was cut-off in the entire area where the petitioner was residing; therefore, he could not come out. Apart from this, petitioner was a heart patient and underwent surgery and was under medication and he was not supposed to come out in the mid of the night when there was heavy downpour and drench himself completely. This would be definitely against the medical advice. The respondents instead of taking the practical situation into consideration, have made a pedantic approach and have intentionally involved the petitioner into such misconduct and conducted enquiry and imposed the punishment. Learned Counsel further stated that such a misconduct, as is alleged, is not enumerated in the A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules and there was no authority for the 1st respondent to enquire into such a misconduct at all. Learned Counsel further stated that such a misconduct, as is alleged, is not enumerated in the A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules and there was no authority for the 1st respondent to enquire into such a misconduct at all. Neither such duties were entrusted officially to the petitioner nor he is expected to attend to such duties officially or on protocal basis. In fact, the first charge memo issued on 8.12.2005 itself would show the mind set of the 1st respondent roping in the petitioner into the present misconduct and enquiry. Even otherwise, the petitioner, in the facts and circumstances of the case, had reached the place i.e., the Judicial Officers quarters at 6.30 a.m. on 20.5.2007 and rendered all the assistance possible. Looking from any angle, there was no misconduct, whatsoever, on the part of the petitioner and the respondents have no authority to enquire into such a misconduct and punish the petitioner. 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent submitted that firstly the petitioner had an effective alternative remedy of appeal before the High Court on administrative side. Instead of availing the same, petitioner had filed this writ petition directly. Secondly, the petitioner being a Deputy Nazir and control over the Nazarath Section could have reached the quarters where rain water inundated and the files were being spoiled within a reasonable time as was done by other two staff members. The alleged dereliction of duties is nothing but a misconduct, since he failed to react to the situation. The word 'misconduct' has a generic meaning. The dereliction of duties herein is failure on the part of the petitioner in not reacting to the situation immediately and rendering assistance to his superior Officers along with other staff members. Therefore, it cannot be said that this is not an enumerated misconduct and as such, no enquiry could have been conducted by the 1 st respondent and no punishment could have been imposed against him. The very conduct of the petitioner in reaching the Judicial Officers' quarters on the next day morning at 6.30 a.m. itself would show his recklessness towards the safety and security of the Court files etc. Apart from this, petitioner even on protocol side is supposed to assist his superior officers whenever it is necessary. The very conduct of the petitioner in reaching the Judicial Officers' quarters on the next day morning at 6.30 a.m. itself would show his recklessness towards the safety and security of the Court files etc. Apart from this, petitioner even on protocol side is supposed to assist his superior officers whenever it is necessary. This is a case where the Judicial Officers were in soup, in view of entry of water into their quarters in the mid of the night. Petitioner could have been of a great help had he reached the quarters in time. Looking even from humanitarian angle, it appears that the petitioner failed to react to the situation as a human being. Therefore, the conduct of the petitioner cannot be approved to be a good conduct and no enquiry can be made therefor or no punishment could have been imposed against him. The writ petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. 6. We have given our earnest consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned Counsel on either side and perused the impugned Order and other material made available on record. 7. From the pleadings of both the parties, the following questions of law arise for consideration: (1) Whether the petitioner could not have filed this writ petition without availing the alternative remedy of appeal before the High Court on administrative side? (2) Whether the allegations made against the petitioner can be said to be a misconduct on his part in his official capacity as a Deputy Nazir and the same is an enumerated misconduct under the Rules? 8. For the sake of convenience, we deal with the second question at the first instance. 9. Before going into the details, it is relevant to notice Rule 9 of the A.P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1991 and Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, which read as under: "9. 8. For the sake of convenience, we deal with the second question at the first instance. 9. Before going into the details, it is relevant to notice Rule 9 of the A.P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1991 and Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, which read as under: "9. Penalties:- The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided be imposed on a Government servant, namely- Minor Penalties: (i) Censure; (n) Withholding of promotion; (iii) ......................(omitted) (iv) Withholding of increments of pay without cumulative effect; (v) (a) suspension, where a person has already been suspended under Rule 8 to the extent considered necessary; (b) reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a period not exceeding three years, without cumulative effect and not adversely affecting his pension. Majar penalties: (vi) withholding of increments of pay with cumulative effect; (vii) (a) and (b)......................... (viii) Compulsory retirement; (IX) Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Government; (x) Dismissal from service which shall ordinary be a disqualification for future employment under the Government;" "Rule 3. General :-(1) Every Government employee shall be devoted to his duty and shall maintain absolute integrity, discipline, impartiality and a sense of propriety. (2) No Government employee shall behave in a manner which is unbecoming of such employee or derogatory to the prestige of Government (3) No Government employee shall act in a manner, which will place his official position under any kind of embarrassment (4) .................... 10. Admittedly, the charge against the petitioner was that he failed to render necessary assistance to the inmates of the Judicial Officers quarters when the quarters submerged in water, which was the minimum expected of a Senior Assistant (Nazarath Section). He should have reported before the Officers along with available Process Servers to render help in excavating the inmates and their belongings including Court files from the Judicial Officers' quarters, though he was informed he reported only in the morning after the water was rescinded, which amounts to dereliction of duties and unbecoming of an employee and amounts to misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. 11. Petitioner has admitted that he had received a phone call in the mid night from a Judicial Officer informing about entering of water into the Judicial Officers' quarters. 11. Petitioner has admitted that he had received a phone call in the mid night from a Judicial Officer informing about entering of water into the Judicial Officers' quarters. It appears, along with the petitioner two other employees were called for help. The other two employees had reached the Judicial Officers' quarters in the mid night by 1.00 a.m. and rendered assistance whatever was possible. It was the explanation of the petitioner that he was a heart patient and undergone surgery in the year 2002 and he was under medication. Further, the whole of Tirupathi town was inundated with water on that night, electricity in the area in which the petitioner was residing was cut-off and it was totally dark and his residence was about 4 kilometres from the Judicial Officers' quarters. Therefore, in view of the situation in that mid night as well as in view of his health condition, he could reach the quarters only at 6.30 a.m. on 20.7.2005. There is no dispute as to his reaching the quarters at 6.30 a.m. on 20.7.2005 and rendering all possible help. Absolutely, there is no discussion anywhere in the impugned Order that had the petitioner reached in time, he would have done something unusual and the situation would have been far better. In fact, two employees of the Court had already rushed by 1.00 a.m. and had rendered help whatever possible. Petitioner had also arranged water, tea etc., in the morning hours and helped the Officers thereafter. The fact that the petitioner had undergone heart surgery and was under medication is not in dispute. When asked as to the duties required to be attended to by a Deputy Nazir, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents failed to show anywhere as to the nature of duties other than official. Though the learned Counsel for the respondents stated that the petitioner failed to react to the situation and failed to render assistance, which amounts to dereliction of duties and unbecoming of an Officer and amounts to misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, could not demonstrate that the allegations of dereliction of duties of the alleged nature also amounts to misconduct either under the Rules or any decided case law. However, learned Counsel has placed before this Court a copy of the letter dated 8.4.2008 addressed by the learned District Judge, Chitto or to the Registrar General of the High Court, wherein some of the duties and responsibilities that are to be discharged by the Nazir/Deputy Nazir are stated as under: 1. Entrustment of duties to Process Servers of the Establishment placed under his control i.e. placing Process Servers to guard duties of the local Courts and entrustment of Process papers, such as, summons/notices etc., to the Process Servers. 2 Entrustment of paper/warrants to the Field Assistants attached to the Process/Nazarath Section. 3. Supervision of preparing the Process and warrants. 4. Receive of executed/returned notices and warrants by the Process-Servers/Amins (F.As)/Bailiffs. 5. Returning of the served and unserved notices/warrants to the concerned Presiding Officers of the Courts in time. 6. Receiving of cash relating to Process Establishment; and 7. To account for the payment of entrusted cash. 8. Acting as Curator for the moveable properties attached and produced before the Court till they are kept in Court custody. 9. Attending to the nature of work/works that may be entrusted to the Presiding Officer; and 10. Maintenance of Register relating to Nazarath Section. 11. Supervision over the performance of duties entrusted to the staff members, such as, Process-Servers/Amins attached to the Process/Nazarath Estt." On the other hand, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the alleged dereliction cannot be called a misconduct within the meaning of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, since it is not one of the enumerated misconducts and in this regard, learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment reported in _ A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Limited, AIR 1984 SC 1361 and drawn attention of the Court to paragraphs 5 and 22, which read as under: "(5) A memorandum dated 22.7.1980 was served upon the appellant stating therein that the competent authority proposes to hold an enquiry against him under Rule 27 of the Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. Employees' (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975 ('1975 Rules' for short). There were two heads of charges in the charge-sheet drawn-up against the appellant on which disciplinary enquiry was proposed to be held. There were two heads of charges in the charge-sheet drawn-up against the appellant on which disciplinary enquiry was proposed to be held. These two heads of charges read as under :"article ISHRI A.L. Kalra while functioning as Deputy Finance Manager-Grade II in the Finance Division of the PEC during April, 1979 applied and drew an advance of Rs.16,050.00 for purchase of a plot of land at Faridabad. But he did not furnish the relevant documents in the office nor did he refund the amount of advance to the Corporation within two months of the date of drawal of the advance as required under Rule 10(1)(c)(i) of PEC House Building Advance (Grant and Recovery) Rules. SHRI Kalra by his above act exhibited lack of integrity and conduct unbecoming of a public servant and violated Rule 4( 1) and (iii) and Rule 5(5) of the PEC Employees' (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules and Rule lO(l)(c)(i) of PEC House Building Advance (Grant and Recovery) Rules and thereby committed misconduct punishable under the PEC Employees' (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) RuJes, 1975. (22) Rule 4 bears the heading 'general'. Rule 5 bears the heading 'misconduct'. The draftsmen of the 1975 Rules made a clear distinction about what would constitute misconduct. A general expectation of a certain decent behaviour in respect of, employees keeping in view Corporation I culture may be a moral or ethical expectation. Failure to keep to such high standard of moral, ethical or decorous behaviour befitting an officer of the company by itself cannot constitute misconduct unless the specific conduct falls in any of the enumerated misconduct in Rule 5. Any attempt to telescope Rule 4 into Rule 5 must be looked upon with apprehension because Rule 4 is vague and of a general nature and what is unbecoming of a public servant may vary with individuals and expose employees to vagaries of subjective evaluation. What in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct would expose a gray area not amenable to objective evaluation. Where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. Where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. It is not necessary to dilate on this point in view of a recent decision of this Court in Glaxo Laboratories (l) Ltd. v. Priding Officer, Labow Court, Meerut, (1984) 1 SCC 1 = AIR 1984 SC 505 , where this Court held that 'everything which is required to be prescribed has to be prescribed with precision and, no argument can be entertained that somet4ing not prescribed can yet be taken into account as varying what is prescribed. In short it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly failing within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty'. Rule 4 styled as 'general' specifies a norm of behaviour but does not specify that its violation will constitute misconduct. In Rule 5, it is nowhere stated that anything violative of Rule 4 would be per se a misconduct in any of the sub-clauses of Rule 5 which specifies misconduct. It would therefore appear that even if the facts alleged in the two heads of charges are accepted as wholly proved, yet that would not constitute misconduct as prescribed in Rule 5 and no penalty can be imposed for such conduct. It may as well be mentioned that Rule 25 which prescribes penalties specifically provides that any of the penalties therein mentioned can be imposed on an employee for misconduct committed by him. Rule 4 does not specify a misconduct." Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a decision of the Apex Court reported in State Bank of India v. T.J. Paul, AIR 1999 SC 1994 and drawn attention of the Court to paragraphs 16 and 18, which read as under: "(16) The contention of the learned senior Counsel for the respondent ignores the fact that 'gross negligence or negligence likely to involve the Bank in serious loss' would come under major misconduct within Para 22(iv)(1). As stated above, even assuming that there is no gross negligence, simple negligence will come under major misconduct if accompanied by 'likelihood' of serious loss and this is clear from Para 22(iv)(I). Hence the finding of the Inquiry Officer regarding J gross misconduct is correct and could not have been set aside by the High Court. The findings of the Inquiry Officer clearly bring the case under 'major misconduct'. As held in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunia Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69 , proof of loss is not necessary. (18) But this does not conclude the matter. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Sri P.P. Rao is right in contending that the appellate authority, once it came to the conclusion that the punishment of dismissal was not warranted in the facts of the case, it could not have awarded the punishment of 'removal' which was not one of the enumerated penalties under Para 22(v) of the Rules. In fact, the learned Single Judge also adverted to this aspect. If one reads the order of the appellate authority, it is clear that the said authority went by Rule 49(g) of the State Bank of India (supervising Staff) Service Rules which admittedly, is not applicable to charges pertaining to the period 1977-1981 when the Rules of Cochin Bank applied. The amalgamation of the Bank of Cochin with the State Bank of India took place only on 27.4.1985. It may be that the Rules of the State Bank of India provided for a punishment of removal, but in the Rules relating to penalties for 'major misconduct' in Para 22(v) of the Rules applicable to the employees of the Bank of Cochin, removal is not one of the enumerated punishments which could be imposed. The said punishment is not the same thing as "condoning misconduct and merely discharging trom service" as provided in Para 22(v)(e) of the said Rules." and submitted that, in the case on hand, imposition of the punishment of withholding of promotion permanently also is not one of the punishments enumerated and therefore, such a punishment could not have been imposed on the petitioner. 12. The term ‘misconduct’ implies a wrong intention, and not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct literally means wrong or improper conduct, i.e., conduct in violation of a definite rule of action. 12. The term ‘misconduct’ implies a wrong intention, and not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct literally means wrong or improper conduct, i.e., conduct in violation of a definite rule of action. In the absence of statutory definition, the word 'misconduct' has to be understood, in its ordinary dictionary meaning as improper conduct. While interpreting the word 'misconduct', the Apex in State of Punjab v. Ram Singh, 1992 (4) see 54, observed as under: "(4) Misconduct has been defmed in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition thus "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour, wilful in character, improper or wrong behaviour, its synonyms are misdemeanour, misdeed, misbehaviour, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offence, but not negligence or carelessness. "misconduct in office has been defined as: "any unlawful behaviour by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, wilful in character. The term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act. P. Ramanatha Aiyar's the Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987 misconduct' defines thus: "the term misconduct, implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion if left, except what necessity may demand and carelessness, negligence and unskillful ness are transgressions of some established, but indefinite, rule of action, where some discretion is necessarily left to the actor. Misconduct is a violation of definite law; carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been affected. Misconduct is a violation of definite law; carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been affected. (5) Thus it could be seen that the word 'misconduct' though not capable of precise definition, its reflection receive its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve........" 13. May be, the petitioner did not react to the situation immediately, but his explanation that his house was located at a distance of 4 kilometres away and the whole of Tirupathi was inundated with water and the electricity in the area in which he was residing was cut-off on the relevant date i.e. 19.7.2005 was not found to be incorrect. Absolutely, there is no evidence to the effect that the petitioner's statement was wrong or far from truth. So also, his health condition was not disputed. Further, it is the contention of the petitioner that on the very same day another charge-sheet was issued to him enumerating some other misconduct, which is not in dispute and, therefore, the 1st respondent was prejudiced against him. Thus, there is some truth in what the petitioner says that the whole case was made out with some grouse and prejudice against him. 14. The word 'misconduct' though not capable of precise definition, its reflection receive its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. In the case on hand, none of these things can be construed or conceived from the narration of the charge or the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. In the case on hand, none of these things can be construed or conceived from the narration of the charge or the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. Further, the alleged misconduct is not an enumerated one i.e. expressly or specifically mentioned. 15. In the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the age and health condition of the petitioner and the duties to which he was called to attend are not enumerated as official duties, even if there was any failure on his part, it cannot be said to be a misconduct and the petitioner could have been punished. The misconduct alleged against the petitioner is not an enumerated one under Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules and the punishment of withholding promotion permanently is also not one of the enumerated punishments under the A.P.C.S. (CCA) Rules, 1991. 16. The judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner would indicate that in a given case even if the facts alleged under the charge/charges are accepted as wholly true, yet that would not constitute misconduct as prescribed in the relevant rules and no penalty could be imposed for such misconduct. Further, the punishment is not the same thing as enumerated as a punishment under the Rules. In fact, in the State of Punjab v. Ramesh Singh (supra), while discussing the word 'misconduct' it was held that the ambit of misconduct has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. In the case on hand, neither the duty entrusted to the petitioner could be called to be a public duty nor official duty, the failure of attending to which, could be called as a misconduct against a public duty expected of the petitioner. In view of our findings recorded above, the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents have no relevance to the facts of this case; therefore, they need not be delved upon in detail. 17. Looking from any angle, taking up of the very disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner is arbitrary, illegal and without any authority and, therefore, they are liable to be set aside. 18. 17. Looking from any angle, taking up of the very disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner is arbitrary, illegal and without any authority and, therefore, they are liable to be set aside. 18. In view of the above, we need not go into the first question as to availability of alternative remedy and since the Order passed by the respondents is found to be without any authority vested in them, a writ petition of this nature is maintainable. 19. For all the above reasons, the impugned Order is liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. We direct the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion to the higher post, if any of his juniors have already been promoted to such post/posts, from the date on which his junior has assumed charge. No order as to costs.