Judgment : In all these cases, the common question of law raised for consideration is: "Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding introduction of the proviso to Section 113 with effect from 6. 2002?" 2. In all these cases, the respondents were duly served. The first tax case in T.C.No.2622 of 2006 is taken up as a typical case. In that case, there was a search under Section 132 in the residential premises of the assessee on 26. 1999. A block assessment was framed for the block period 4. 1989 to 20.8.1989, and the block assessment order was passed on 28. 2001. The assessing officer levied a surcharge at 10 percent on the tax payable on the block assessment. The appeal preferred by the assessee before the Commissioner of Tax (Appeals) ended in dismissal. However, on further appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal following the decision of Special Bench of Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad in the case of Merit Enterprises held that prior to the introduction of proviso to Section 113 with effect from 6. 2002 surcharge was not leviable. The correctness of the same is put in issue in this appeal. 3. We heard the argument of the learned counsel on either side. The issue is now settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax Vs. Suresh N. Gupta, wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: "... Section 158BA relates to assessment of "undisclosed income" discovered as a result of a search, and section 158BB deals with the computation thereof. Parliament has taken the block period to mean the period comprising previous years relevant to 10 or 6 assessment years preceding the previous year in which the search is conducted. The unit of time remains constant. Block assessment computation in section 158BB does not exclude either the concept of "previous year" or the concept of "total income": they are retained. Section 158BB(1) incorporates the principle of aggregation of total income of previous years falling within the block period computed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, which deals with "computation of total income". Even computation of "undisclosed income" under section 158BB has to be done in the manner provided under Chapter IV dealing with "computation of total income". Section 158BB(1) incorporates the principle of aggregation of total income of previous years falling within the block period computed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, which deals with "computation of total income". Even computation of "undisclosed income" under section 158BB has to be done in the manner provided under Chapter IV dealing with "computation of total income". In view of the non-obstante clause in Section 158A and the retention of the concepts of "previous year" and "total income", one has to read section 158BB with section 4. There is no conflict between the computation machinery under Chapter XIV-B and the normal computation machinery under Chapter IV. Section 158BH inter alia states that if there is no conflict between the provisions of Chapter XIV-B and any other provision of the Act then the latter will operate. Once section 158BB is to be read with section 4 then the relevant Finance Act of the concerned year would automatically stand attracted to the computation under Chapter XIV-B. Section 158BB looks to section 113. The proviso was inserted in section 113 to indicate that the Finance Act of the year in which the search was initiated would apply. That; proviso was only clarificatory in nature. There is no question of retrospective effect. The proviso has to be read as it stands. Prior to June 1, 2002, in several cases, tax was prescribed sometimes in the Income-tax Act and sometimes in the Finance Act and sometimes in both. This made liability uncertain. Therefore clarification was needed. The proviso is curative in nature. The proviso only clarifies that out of the four dates, Parliament has opted the date, namely, the year in which the search under section 158BC is initiated, which date would be relevant for applicability of a particular Finance Act." 4. Therefore, following the judgment of the Supreme Court which profounded the law that even prior to 6. 2002 the Department is entitled to levy surcharge as the proviso introduced on that is only curative in nature, the Appeals are allowed by answering the question of law in negative in favour of the revenue.